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GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME IV
This Introduction deals in the abstract with the common law courts’ virtual
monopoly of statutory construction. Two questions are considered: (a) Why the common
law’s “monopoly” is open to doubt. (The historical setting for the doubts is the
Reformation’s integration of the ecclesiastical courts into the national judicial system, so
that they became agencies of the monarch, like the common law courts, and addressees of
the statutes. That contrasts with agencies of Rome, the activities of which could be
regulated and inhibited by secular law, but not directly commanded by Parliamentary
legislation or otherwise.) (b) Why, as I conclude, the common law monopoly almost had
to prevail notwithstanding plausible doubts. There was a good deal of political
controversy over these questions in the period of this study. In keeping with the policy
explained in Vol. I, however, I do not deal with the literature of this controversy. Rather,
I analyze the issues abstractly in the light of my treatment of the main lines of
jurisdictional law in Vols. I-III. As in several comparable Introductions in those volumes,
I stand back, not only from the specifics of out-of-court controversy, but from the case
law itself. I am aiming at a focus on the issues that may help to make the cases
understandable in a way that the surface of law reports usually cannot do. In fact, the
deep questions about the common law monopoly rarely surface in the cases treated in
Vol. IV. These are cases that show the common law courts dealing with concrete
problems of statutory construction which concern the jurisdiction and powers of
ecclesiastical courts. Vol. IV takes up groups of such cases, sizable ones, where the
common law’s authority to interpret statutes enabled them to define the law on several
matters involving non-common law courts. Miscellaneous examples occur elsewhere in
the study. The common law’s authority itself—its “monopoly”—amounts to a massive
legal fact; there was little occasion to stir it up in the cases that depend on it.
*

*

*

In the range of types of Prohibitions, a distinct place needs to be reserved for
those based on statutes. Such Prohibitions overlap with other types, but they involve a
problem of their own. For present purposes, it is overlap with “ambit of remediable
wrong” Prohibitions (Vol. III) that matters. Suppose A makes a claim in an ecclesiastical
court against B and B seeks a Prohibition on the ground that A’s claim is simply
“unlawful”, simply ought not to be listened to by any court. In other words, B does not
contend that there is any “paradigmatic” infringement of the common law court’s
territory, nor that A’s suit is misplaced as among “foreign” courts. We have seen that the
bases for Prohibitions of the sort B is seeking could be somewhat variable and indeed
somewhat hard to pin down. In some cases it could be said fairly straightforwardly that
the common law—or standards so firmly embedded in traditional English law that they
bind all courts in England—rendered the claim “unlawful”. In other cases, one is perhaps
best advised to translate “unlawful” into “unreasonable”—the ecclesiastical claim simply
seeks to impose an unfair burden on the subject. In still others, the ecclesiastical law itself
could be invoked with some specificity—as if to say, “This claim is bad by ecclesiastical
law; the stakes are such that a common law court should make sure that the ecclesiastical

5

court does not violate its own rules.” Now let us consider another possibility: B says that
A’s ecclesiastical claim is “unlawful” because of a statute.
From one point of view, invoking a statute may seem to make the a fortiori case:
If common law courts may prohibit ecclesiastical suits where there is no “paradigmatic”
infringement—on the relatively vague ground that peremptory common law standards, or
reasonableness, are likely to be violated—then surely they may prohibit suits which a
black-and-white statute renders unlawful. If there is some doubt about the common law’s
title to control the “ambit of remediable wrong” in general—when the common law’s
own direct interest is not threatened and the standards by which control is exercised are a
little hard to specify—then surely there is at least less doubt about its title to enforce the
“ambit” laid down in the statute book. From another point of view, however, bringing in
a statute may seem to make the common law’s right to intervene more dubious, rather
than more certain.
The reason for that possibility lies in the universal bindingness and notoriety of
statutes. Ecclesiastical courts are just as obliged to obey statutory directives as common
law courts. Should it not be presumed that they will obey them? If B thinks that A’s
ecclesiastical suit is unlawful, should he not say so in the ecclesiastical court, instead of
seeking a Prohibition? By contrast, it is questionable whether ecclesiastical courts are
“obliged to obey” imperatives generated by English custom but without basis in their
own legal sources For example, if there were any validity in the argument that the
common law concept of joint tenancy ought to prevail in all English contexts—so that
both joint tenants should participate in an ecclesiastical suit for tithes—it would behoove
the common law courts to enforce the requirement on the ecclesiastical courts, but would
not necessarily behoove the latter to enforce it on themselves. On the one hand, there is
the simple “obligation to obey”, and surely ecclesiastical courts are bound as
instrumentalities of the King and the respublica to do as the statutes order; on the other
hand, there is what might be called “liability to have a superior standard imposed on
one”—carrying a duty not to complain if one is prevented from going by one’s own
standard, but hardly the duty, or even the right, to look outside those standards for
oneself..
(An analogue for this distinction can be found in federal-constitutional systems
such as the American. Certainly courts of the subordinate states are “obliged to obey” the
national constitution, but should they take its imperatives into account as federal courts
should, or as they themselves should take account of state law? To what extent may they,
or even ought they, settle the case as state law requires, merely accepting the liability of
having the result overturned, or the case removed from their hands, if a party should seek
to raise a national-constitutional question in a federal court? The distinction can perhaps
also be reflected in moral experience. We perhaps perceive some situations as such that
we simply ought to act in one specific way rather than another, as if commanded by a
moral law one has no respectable choice but to obey. Are there other situations in which
we see it as our right, or even our duty, to follow moral lights peculiar to ourselves and
characteristically at odds with what we half suspect may ultimately have been “the right
thing to do—to follow such lights, of course, “under correction”, not here of an external
authority, but of experience itself, including experience of other people’s capacity to
adjust to the moral order we create? We should accept the liabilities incumbent on fallible
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and sociable creatures, but need we, or ought we, always to settle our problems
moralistically?)
A similar point may be made in terms of “notoriety”, as opposed to
“bindingness”. Statutes are open to all; they specify the law in black and white for all to
see. By the familiar fiction, acts of Parliament are Everyman’s act, for Everyman is
complicit in their making, having participated by representative if not in person. The
fiction expresses “bindingness”—for being complicit I cannot disclaim the statute’s
rightness and authority—but even more obviously it expresses “notoriety”: I am surely
estopped to deny knowledge of what the law requires in so far as the law is “positive” in
a statute of my own putative making—the more so when the metaphysical presumption ,
so to speak, is empirically reinforced (for statutes are frozen in writing, can always be
referred to, are promulgated so that people have real warning of what they are in any
case bound to know.) By contrast, lex non scripta is in some senses cut off from
universal access—if ultimately knowable by everyone in the community, still requiring
extraction with the help of appropriate skills. Despite the more inclusive presumption that
Everyman has notice of all the law, there remains a shadow between the fiction and the
reality when we assert the claims of specialized capacities to “find” the law. Such a claim
is asserted if one joins the chorus, in which Coke’s was the strongest voice, hymning
“artificial reason.” As against the “natural” rationalism that would maintain Everyman’s
capacity to discover the law’s requirements by reflective application of his ordinary
reason and common moral sense, the chorus insisted that intense training in a particular
legal tradition was essential for finding the what and why and rational necessity of
English legal rules, things that ‘artless’ reason was bound to misperceive. From another
angle, one asserts a “specialized capacity” if one holds that the customary component of
the law is only available to folk-memory, incapable of being found by the non-mystical
procedure of taking evidence of usage, which is probably the reason why an
ecclesiastical court should not try a modus even if it is perfectly willing to.
The application of these general ideas to our present concern is simply that
“foreign” courts would seem to have access to statutory law as they do not to unwritten
law. An ecclesiastical judge should be able to see his duty, in so far as that duty is
prescribed by act of Parliament, by looking at the statute book. In an ultimate
presumptive sense he may be said to “know” the unwritten law as well, and see his duty
in so far as it is based thereon, but he cannot really be expected to have access to what is
outside his specialized tradition. Only a common lawyer can strictly know the rules about
English joint tenancy or the like, and, still more important, only he can understand the
idea of which the rules are the expression—the rationale, virtue, and “weight’ of a legal
idea generated by English tradition, an idea which is quite possibly strange to other
systems of law. To repeat the example, if one senses that an ecclesiastical claim violates
the nature of joint tenancy and ought not to, the common law court should immediately
decide to prohibit or not prohibit, according as it conceives or “weights” the idea of joint
tenancy (i.e., as it considers that ecclesiastical courts are bound or not bound to imitate
the common law with respect to such questions as one joint tenant’s standing to sue
alone.) There is no point in waiting to see how the ecclesiastical court handles the claim
before it, because the ecclesiastical judge cannot be expected to have access to the
relevant lore. Even if he were to do the right thing, whatever that may be, it would be, as
it were, by accident. Per contra, one may argue, the ecclesiastical judge has perfect
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access to the statute book; therefore one should at least wait and see whether he follows
the statutory directives in point—directives aimed as much at him as at any other court,
and in a realistic sense as manifest to him as to others.
Though this line of argument is most appropriate when straightforward
knowledge of common law rules and their policy is demanded, it is not entirely
inappropriate when the objection to a “foreign” claim is its vaguer unreasonableness.
There are of course good grounds for assimilating “reason” to statutes, rather than to the
common law: Everyone has equal access to “reason”, as—by my argument—to statutes.
Therefore ecclesiastical claims should not be stopped at the first opportunity if there is
nothing more to be said against them than that they are unreasonable. There are scraps of
warrant for that proposition. If, however, one takes the elusive and expandable idea of
“artificial reason” seriously, it may be possible to put “binding or pervasive common law
standards” and “mere reasonableness” on one side of a line and statutes on the other.
Granting that “natural reason” is universally accessible, it can still be argued that “natural
reason” is never a sufficient basis for solving a legal problem—that in legal matters some
specific tradition necessarily does, and ought to, shape the sense of reasonableness. It
might be civil or ecclesiastical law, it might be English law, but one or another must and
should mediate for the naked natural capacity. If this is granted, then perhaps within one
community there is room for only one “artificial reason”. Perhaps the common law
should never be readier to take over than when a “foreign” claim is challenged for
reasonableness, because it is “the artificial reason of the law” that should assess that
challenge. Otherwise it will be assessed by a competing “artificial reason”, and a
fundamental, abstract discordance will be introduced into the legal system—more
fundamental because more general or abstract than disharmony brought about by failure
to dispose of closely analogous particular problems by a single rule. Again per contra,
the definiteness of a written statute may differentiate it; ecclesiastical courts may lack
access to the appropriate kind of “artificial reason” as and because they do not have
access to specific legal lore; the statutes are there to see.
The only sort of objection to an ecclesiastical claim that seems, if anything less fit
to move a common law court to immediate action than a statute-based objection, is the
surmise that the claim is invalid by ecclesiastical law itself. Although we have seen (in
Vol. III) a few signs of willingness to preserve ecclesiastical courts from the temptation
to misapply their own law, there are much stronger signs of unwillingness to do that.
Granting that it is utterly inappropriate for common law courts to hold ecclesiastical
courts to responsible application of their own law, a rule for statute-based surmises might
be projected: Viz., to say a claim in an ecclesiastical court is bad by virtue of a statute
amounts to saying it is bad by ecclesiastical law, for statute law is law in all courts.
Therefore common law courts should no more intervene to block that claim than to block
one that appears to be bad by other criteria of ecclesiastical law. At least they should not
intervene until all remedies are exhausted within the ecclesiastical system.
The last sentence above, points to the next problem, for which I have made
allowance by the way in spelling out the arguments above. One might maintain that
ecclesiastical courts should have first crack, but only first crack, at statute-based
objections to claims brought before them. I.e., B comes to a common law court and
surmises that A’s ecclesiastical suit against him is unlawful by statute. The common law
ought at this point to refuse Prohibition. But at a later point—upon a showing that the
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statute-based objection was raised in the ecclesiastical court and incorrectly overruled—
Prohibition lies. One alternative to that is to refuse Prohibition definitively, whatever
happens: The objection should be made in the ecclesiastical court; what the ecclesiastical
court says about the statute goes, subject to ecclesiastical appeal (which ultimately may
mean appeal to the monarch, depending on whether the statute creating the Delegates
preserved or cut off petitioning the monarch for review of that court’s decisions.) The
other alternative is to debate the meaning of the statute at once, if there is anything to
debate, and prohibit if the ecclesiastical claim is deemed invalid by the statute as
construed. Let us now ask whether there is anything to be said for the first, or moderate,
position as against both of the extreme options.
In the first place, we have in Vol. II encountered one context in which common
law courts were disposed to give ecclesiastical courts “first crack” at statutes, yet willing
to prohibit if a statute was in fact misconstrued or ignored: X sues Y in an ecclesiastical
court, perfectly properly prima facie. Y pleads facts which, if true, should allegedly
defeat X’s claim by virtue of a statute. Y seeks a Prohibition on the ground that the
common law should protect him in his statutory rights and therefore should try the facts
which, if found in his favor, would make those rights accrue. In other words, he seeks a
Prohibition without disallowance surmise. We have seen that the courts were disinclined
to prohibit in such cases. That is to say, they were especially inclined to insist on a
disallowance surmise—to make plaintiff-in-Prohibition show that he had brought the
statute to the ecclesiastical court’s attention and been improperly denied its benefit. There
may seem to be no difficulty about applying such precedents to the situation we are now
focusing on: A sues B in an ecclesiastical court. B does not want to introduce defensive
facts to whose benefit he thinks a statute entitles him, but merely to maintain that A’s
claim as stated is bad by statute. Why not proceed in the same way as when defensive
pleas are involved—refuse Prohibition now, grant Prohibition when and if it appears that
the ecclesiastical court was given a chance to dismiss the claim and improperly failed to
do so?
One answer to the “Why not?” is economy. It will save a step if the common law
court blocks the claim now, assuming it believes such a claim is forbidden by statute and
would have to be blocked if the ecclesiastical court were to misconstrue or ignore the
statute. Comity is worth only so much in diseconomy. In the case of defensive pleas,
considerations of economy tilt the other way. The quickest way to dispose of the suit is to
see whether the ecclesiastical court will take note of the statute and understands it
correctly—as one would expect it usually to do, especially when Prohibition remains a
threat—for it it does the facts can be tried where the suit is. The protection of statutory
rights (which may not be in the least danger) should perhaps not be allowed to serve as
pretext for what is likely to be the party’s real motive in such a case—delaying the game
and getting a jury trial. Nevertheless, something can be said for the “first crack” approach
in both situations. It would make sense to accept the argument above from the
“universal bindingness and notoriety “ of statutes up to a point, but without drawing the
extreme conclusion that “foreign” courts have as absolute a title to interpret statutes as
the common law courts. There is arguably a sense in which a “first crack” is simply
owed to non-common law jurisdictions under the King and Parliament—a chance to
show obedience to law addressed to them, and known to them as other components of
English law could not be. Comity is worth something; if the common law reserves the

9

last word, in the event that the “foreign “ court fails to apply the statute correctly, there
will be reason to expect a minimum of conflict—to expect that care and advice will be
taken to interpret the statute as the common law courts probably would in order to avoid
Prohibition. In that way economy would not necessarily be disserved.
On the other hand, good reasons can be given for reserving the last word to the
common law. It is not a bad argument to say, as I do above, that statutory requirements
are as much part of the ecclesiastical law as any imperative fetched from the peculiar
sources of ecclesiastical law, wherefore ecclesiastical courts should be free to interpret
statutes without threat of Prohibition, just as, by the best opinion, they are free of that
threat however egregiously they misapply the non-statutory part of ecclesiastical law. I
think that extreme position was perfectly accessible to ecclesiastical partisans in the 17th
century. But in reply one can say several things.
(a) The “notoriety” of statutes can be turned in favor of at least ultimate common
law control. There is an obvious sense in which common law judges are not competent by
training and experience, however carefully they inform themselves, to judge questions of
ordinary ecclesiastical law, wherefore ecclesiastical appeal, and ultimately Parliament’s
legislative correction, are the proper checks, rather than Prohibition. But the common law
judges do know the statutes, even if they do not know or understand them better than
anyone else; their competence to say what the statutes require is at least equal to others’,
presumptively even in the case of statutes whose primary reference is to ecclesiastical
matters.
(b) The common law judges were in reality the practiced interpreters of statutes.
The vast majority of statutes affected matters only appropriate to common law
adjudication; the vast number of common law cases requiring statutory interpretation,
over a long time, had led to accepted canons of construction, so that “how to interpret a
statute” could be regarded as a branch of common law expertise comparable to “how to
construe a conveyancing deed”.
(c) The common law courts were the prescriptive interpreters of statutes by virtue
of historical facts which post-Reformation defenders of ecclesiastical parity were all-too
awkwardly stuck with. Before the Reformation, when the ecclesiastical courts were
meaningfully “foreign”, of course the common law courts exclusively interpreted the
English statutes. So long as the ecclesiastical courts served the Roman “usurper”, they
could clearly not be granted the least competence to enforce statutes designed to fight
back against the “usurpation”—as any statute limiting ecclesiastical jurisdiction must be
taken to be when England’s one rightful Supreme Head was engaged in resistance to the
Roman yoke. Now—as everyone swept up on the Anglican version, or myth, of the past
must agree, common lawyer and churchman alike—the right was restored where the right
should be; the adversary relationship between the realm and the Church belonged to the
past; the Church courts were in a respectable position to claim equal beholdenness to the
statute book and hence parity as its interpreters. But meanwhile the common law courts
had rather staked out the statutes for themselves! Prohibiting ecclesiastical suits which
the statutes made unlawful was old common law practice; perhaps latter-day theory
should not prevail against that, even though the practice was grounded in the conditions
of a happily forgotten past.
(d) For all that can be said about the equal beholdenness of ecclesiastical courts to
statute law, those courts cannot be considered unbiased with respect to the kinds of
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statutes they could have been given equal freedom to interpret and enforce. If A sues B
and B says that A’s claim is bad by statute, the tendency of what he says is that
ecclesiastical jurisdiction is narrower rather than broader. I put it that way because not
every statute-based objection to an ecclesiastical claim need go to the boundaries of the
jurisdiction. For example, B might confess that he owed an ecclesiastical duty of the sort
A was suing to enforce but contend that C rather than A was entitled to that due. In that
event, B would not be disputing the “size” of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; no greed for
jurisdiction should motivate the ecclesiastical court to construe the statute for or against
A’s claim. To make the same point with reference to typical ecclesiastical interests: if B
confesses his duty to pay tithes but relies on a statute to argue that C rather than A is
entitled to them, no putative bias in favor of tithe-receivers should vitiate the
ecclesiastical court’s construction of the statute. All that can be said is that some
statutes—actual or conceivable—will restrict the bounds of ecclesiastical jurisdiction or
be deleterious to typical ecclesiastical interests and that with respect to those the
ecclesiastical courts will not be indifferent interpreters. Perhaps the net tendency of
statutes affecting rights asserted in ecclesiastical courts can be expected to be thus
restrictive or deleterious, if only because some such statutes date back to the time of
“usurpation” and hostility between realm and Church. Moreover, the line between
restrictions on ecclesiastical jurisdiction or interests and rules merely identifying the
beneficiary of ecclesiastical duties is harder to draw in practice than in theory.
Ecclesiastical courts may be suspected of a tendency to require unsatisfied ecclesiastical
duties, such as tithe payment, to be satisfied even if the wrong party is suing, for the good
practical reason that if a duty to the Church is escaped now by way of a legalism it may
be escaped forever in fact. A statute allegedly disqualifying A to sue for something
admittedly due to someone else might for that reason tend to receive a biased
construction even in the absence of any obvious bar to indifference. In any event, the
need for common law control to prevent biased interpretation in some cases may be urged
as a reason why all claims invalidated by statute should be prohibited, after the
ecclesiastical court has had “first crack” if not before. It is simply too burdensome to try
to distinguish cases in which a bias is probable from those in which it is not.
It should be observed incidentally that there is no very good reason to dispute the
common law courts’ indifference as interpreters of statutes affecting ecclesiastical claims.
Here as elsewhere it is possible to be deceived by the “paradigmatic “function of
Prohibitions distinguished and analyzed in Vol. III. If in fact every statute limiting
ecclesiastical jurisdiction gave jurisdiction to the common law, then ecclesiastical and
common law courts would be equally biased interpreters. But such is not the case. We are
focusing on statutes which allegedly say that a claim of a certain sort, or a claim brought
by a given claimant, is valid nowhere—merely unlawful. Common law courts have no
interest in interpreting the statute so as to uphold or deny such a contention (unless a
mischievous prejudice against ecclesiastical tribunals and interests, something that can
exist but cannot be imputed to courts of law.) Unless motivated by such unreachable
private prejudices, why should the judges care about anything but the words and intent of
the statute, considering that their own jurisdiction has nothing to gain? Of course a
statute might flatly take jurisdiction away from the ecclesiastical court and give it to the
common law. In that event, a common law court interpreting and enforcing the statute
would be acting as judge in its own cause. But that is unpreventable. The right of the
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common law courts to protect their own jurisdictional monopoly—and serve the socially
desirable goal of restricting one type of remediable claim to one place, where consistent
lines of cases can develop—is indisputable. The common law courts could not avoid
deciding controverted cases as to whether a common law remedy is available and hence,
barring exceptions for concurrency, not pursuable elsewhere. They are judges in their
own cause whether or not a statute bears on the question. The only cure for that would be
to erect a special tribunal for the sole purpose of settling jurisdictional questions.
(e) Some risk of conflicting interpretations of one and the same statute would be
incurred if “foreign” courts were conceded full parity as interpreters. “Some risk” is the
proper expression, rather than “high risk” or “certainty”, because the chance that a
statute regulating ecclesiastical rights and remedies would come before a common law
court except by way of Prohibition cannot be regarded as very great. I.e.: If we imagine a
statute defining, say, the duty to pay tithes, and if we assume that common law courts
should never prohibit solely on the ground that an ecclesiastical claim is invalidated by
that statute, there is no obvious likelihood that common law courts will ever have
occasion to look at the statute, and therefore an opportunity to construe it differently than
ecclesiastical courts have come to do. But there remains a risk simply because the
relationship between the temporal and spiritual systems of law was so complex.
Collateral ways can be imagined in which a statute affecting ecclesiastical rights, and
therefore on our assumption normally left to the ecclesiastical courts, would still be thrust
upon the common law judges. Given high standards of comity—full-blooded recognition
of ecclesiastical parity in the interpretation of statutes—common law courts in that
imaginary situation night adopt the policy of following the ecclesiastical interpretation, or
at least allowing it high persuasive authority. But while that is not asking the impossible
it is asking quite a lot. To demand that judges who are expert in statutory construction sit
back and accept a reading with which they disagree is to demand that they repress a
highly respectable sense of superior competence, if not that they violate a sheer duty to
apply the supreme law of the land as they understand it. Therefore parity in interpreting
statutes would almost surely make for some degree of conflicting interpretation. Would
that not be the most scandalous kind of discord within the national legal system—acts of
“the whole body of the realm” taken to mean different things by “members” of equal
authority?
(f) The above reasons seem to me sufficient for the conclusion that the common
law courts must keep ultimate control over the applied meaning of statutes, whether or
not exercise of that control should be restrained by allowing non-common law courts
“first crack.” We may add vaguer considerations without relying on them—which is not
to say that they were not historically operative: the mere “seniority” of the common law
judiciary, hence its predominant claim to perform so obviously important a function as
interpreting the suprema lex in the statute book and protecting the subject in rights which
“the whole body of the realm” has assured to him; the sense in which the common law
judges can be thought of as “chief counsel” to the government in all branches, including
Parliament, so that to their straightforward experience in statutory construction may be
joined the special competence that comes from intimacy with the legislative process—
with the kinds of problems that tend to lead to legislation or the actual ones that have in
particular cases, with the difficulties and conventions of draftsmanship which an
interpreter should be aware of: the sense in which a statute is a “temporal” act even if it
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affects “spiritual” matters, hence within the range of the judges’ supreme “temporal”
punditry—an ambiguous sense to be sure, if one takes the post-Reformation fusion of
temporal and spiritual altogether seriously, but one engrained in habits of thought which
were necessary for many practical purposes.
The reasons I have specified against allowing “foreign” courts parity in relation to
statutes are compatible with allowing them “first crack”—with holding that the peculiar
bindingness and notoriety of statutes justifies a certain generosity toward those courts, a
degree of concession to the sense in which statutes affecting ecclesiastical rights are part
of the ecclesiastical law. But if the moderate position is excluded, as for the sake of
expeditiousness it perhaps should be—if the contest is between the extreme positions—
the same reasons count in favor of immediate common law preemption of statutory
issues: If an ecclesiastical claim is surmised to be invalid by statute, and the legal
proposition of the surmise is true, prohibit at once. In practice that was to all intents the
rule. It was not unopposed by partisans of the other extreme, but there is little indication
that the opposition got a serious hearing from common lawyers. The moderate position
has the attraction of a compromise, but as a practical matter that was not considered
either, even though it was in effect adopted in cases of defensive pleas combining a
factual allegation with invocation of a statute. In the end, a common law near-monopoly
of statutory construction was a legal fact, as it probably should have been or had to be. It
is taken for granted in the groups of cases to which the rest of Vol. IV is devoted, groups
of cases where the judicial gloss on important statutes was largely written through
Prohibition law (and sometimes, when the powers of the High Commission were in
question, the law of Habeas corpus.)

©
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CHAPTER 1: 21 HEN. VIII, C. 5—
ADMINISTRATION OF INTESTATES’ ESTATES
Introduction
The subject of this chapter is the enforcement of the statute of 21 Hen. VIII, c.5,
by Prohibition. The reported cases on this topic which I have found scarcely begin before
the 17th century; they become numerous and produce enduring judicial resolution of some
issues only in the span between 1618 and the Civil War. The subject is thus a strong
example of a phenomenon encountered elsewhere in this study: Elizabethan and 17th
century judges required to make sense of Reformation legislation on which there was
little or no earlier case law available to them.
21 Hen. VIII is 1529-30, which means that the statute in question here barely
counts as “Reformation legislation.” I.e., it was made not only before England’s break
with Rome was complete, but before the formal steps toward that consummation—such
as the temporary interdiction of appealing ecclesiastical cases to Rome in 1533—had
been taken. The gap between passage of the statute and serious efforts to interpret it is the
better part of a century in time, and there is also a wide gap between the makers’
perspectives and the interpreters’. It is worth remembering too that early modern people,
including lawyers and judges, were not well equipped intellectually to deal with historical
distance. As their world—that of ordinary educated people—was still substantially “prescientific”, so was it “pre-historical” by the lights of the 19th century and after.
For some of the Introductions in this study, it suffices to explain the basic legal
rules and issues that inform the cases. Sometimes, however, and emphatically so in the
present instance, it is desirable to range more widely. Why the Prohibition cases on 21
Hen. VIII are difficult can only be seen in focus if one appreciates the complexity of
making out the surface meaning and intent of the statute as a whole. Toward the end of
the Introduction I shall explain the particular problems that predominate in the
Prohibition cases, but first I shall explore the wide constructive context. That
exploration, as in some other Introductions in the study, is speculative, because hard
evidence directly in point is unavailable, or at any rate it could only be discovered by
separate research projects too distractive from my principal purpose of “mapping” the
Law of Prohibitions as it appears in reported cases.
*

*

*

A statute frequently enforced by the common law courts against the ecclesiastical
was the second major part of 21 Hen.VIII, c.5. This statute, like the Mortuaries Act, was
one of those regulating the Church passed at the first session of the Reformation
Parliament. Its first and better-known section was directed against ecclesiastical courts’
taking excessive fees for probate of wills. There was little or no occasion for common
law courts to enforce that section by Prohibition. The succeeding section presented
significant problems of construction and gave rise to numerous Prohibition cases.
From remedying allegedly extortionate probate fees, 21 Hen. VIII moves on to the
administration of intestates’ estates. Although fee-regulation is an incidental feature
here, the second section primarily lays down rules for the granting of administration. The
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preamble of the act gives no explanation of the mischief behind this part of the
legislation, but concentrates entirely on excessive fees and the failure of earlier attempts
to prevent them. I.e., there are no clues to the policy of the intestacy section beyond what
can be gathered from the enacting language and from the statute’s silence on certain
matters that turned out to be doubtful.
The enacting clauses are simple. Ordinaries and other ecclesiastical judges with
probate jurisdiction are directed to grant administration of intestates’ goods to the widow
or next of kin or both. The statute is express in affirming the ecclesiastical judge’s
discretion to choose the widow or nearest relative or both. It proceeds to insure his
discretion to choose any one or more among equally close kinsmen who seek
administration. Part of the act’s policy thus appears to be to cut off disputes about grants
of administration: So long as the grantee is the widow, or a relative than which there is
none nearer, or the widow plus one or more such relatives, or several equally close
relatives, no statutory right to complain is conferred on any eligible person who happens
to be excluded. Excluded eligible persons must either be quiet or seek review by
ecclesiastical appeal of the judge’s exercise of discretion. It was to be problematic
whether the statute left the second option open. At any rate, the statute seems to cut off
all legal claims against preferred co-eligibles—all possibility of seeking more than
reconsideration of what the statute clearly labels a discretionary act.
The language next following is somewhat obscure, but it appears to have the same
purpose—to protect the ecclesiastical judge’s discretion against contenders for
administration. I read it as providing that so long as the widow is among the
administrators others do not have to be nearest relatives. I.e., the widow plus a cousin is
acceptable, and an excluded brother has no title to complain, but if there is no widow, or
if she is excluded, then all administrators must be in the class of nearest relatives. The
statute evidently contemplates the commonplace situation where relatives apply for
administration and either (a) it is uncertain whether there are, or probable that there are,
closer relatives who have not applied or (b) several relatives of unequal degree apply.
Within limits, the ecclesiastical judge is in effect told to go ahead and make a decision
among active candidates. If there is a widow and she is included, the closest relatives
cannot appear later with a right to overturn the arrangements, nor complain about having
to share administration with less close relatives. Administrators of estates can proceed
with minimum delay and uncertainty. Accordingly, the mischief behind the statute would
appear to be a high incidence of litigation and delay owing to uncertainty about the scope
of the ecclesiastical judge’s discretion. A further, perhaps less certain, one might be a
tendency on judges’ part to show too little respect for the claims of closest relatives and
especially of widows. (The statute lays down no criteria for determining propinquity of
relationship.)
After saying to whom administration shall and may be granted, the statute
proceeds to say a little about what the administrators are to do. It is provided that both
administrators and executors must choose two associates for the purpose of preparing an
inventory of the estate’s personal property. The associates must be creditors or legatees if
such exist and consent to serve. (An estate in the hands of administrators could have
legatees in the event that the deceased made a will but failed to designate executors, or in
the event that designated executors refused to serve or were dead.) Otherwise, they must
come from the closest classes of relatives, but if such cannot be found or induced to serve
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any two “honest persons” nay be chosen. The inventory made by the executors or
administrators must be presented in indenture-duplicate form to the ecclesiastical court.
The executors or administrators must swear that it is “good and true.” One copy (half of
the indenture) is to be left on file with the ecclesiastical court, the other to be kept by the
executors or administrators. Administrators are also required to enter a bond insuring
“true administration.”
The statute next appoints a £10 penalty recoverable from any ecclesiastical judge,
or subordinate official of such judge, who violates the rules laid down. This penalty was
of the basic Qui tam form—half to the King and half to the person who sued successfully
for the penalty at common law. The statute provides, however, that only the “party
grieved” may in this instance be the plaintiff in such a penalty suit. i.e., there is not an
open invitation to any member of the public to sue in the role of a mere “informer.” With
respect to what the statute makers clearly had in mind as their paradigm case—where the
ecclesiastical judge or subordinate official exacts a higher fee than the statute permits
from an executor seeking probate or from an administrator for the grant of letters or
administration—there is no problem about identifying the “party grieved”. With respect
to other rules concerning the administration of intestates’ estates, there clearly is a
problem. For the simplest type of case, suppose that Smith dies intestate leaving a widow
and several people in the class of nearest blood-relatives. Suppose that all these apply for
administration. (It seems clear from the statute that rights accrue only to those who want
administration and take active steps to seek it. “Wanting administration “means wanting
the property and claims comprising the estate or a portion thereof, for administrators,
assuming they have performed their common law duty of satisfying the decedent’s
creditors, are essentially in a position analogous to that of residuary legatees—the
tangible property is theirs, and they are free to prosecute any claims they care to.
Ecclesiastical law presumably had rules for what constituted timely application and how
much time must be allowed for potential applicants to act, but I have no evidence of what
they were. Nothing in the text of the statute or in my case material speaks to whether
ecclesiastical courts acting too fast or employing unreasonable standards for timely
application could be considered to violate the statute. )
Plainly none of our imagined applicants—widow plus several persons counting
as next of kin—has a grievance arising under the statute if any one or more of the group
is appointed to the exclusion of any others. The statute is simply not violated. It is
manifestly violated if no one in the group is appointed, but someone else—another
relative or a non-relative. May all the members of the group bring separate suits for the
penalty and recover £5 each? The fact that each such suit would contribute £5 to the
royal coffers might be a motive for saying “Yes.” On the other hand, there is an oddity in
calling any member of the group aggrieved when none of them could be sure of
appointment if one or more of them had been chosen. It would take research directly
about penalty suits based on 21 Hen. VIII, which might be impossible to carry out to
significant results, to ascertain what actually happened and whether either difficulty was
perceived and debated (i.e., the difficulty of multiple suits for one offense, dependent on
the size of the contingent category “next of kin”, and the difficulty of making out who is
aggrieved in some circumstances when the offense is violation of the statute’s eligibility
requirements, as opposed to charging excessive fees.) One might in the present context
think of the Prohibition as a way around the difficulties, since it would take but one
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Prohibition to prevent an offense and plaintiff-in-Prohibition need have no private
standing as a “party grieved” (for the latter point, see Vol. I passim.) Bear this in mind
when we reflect generally on the role of Prohibitions in enforcing 21 Hen. VIII.
Besides recovering the penalty, victims of being charged excessive fees were
authorized by the statute to recover the amount of money by which they were
overcharged. This provision precedes the penalty, and the penalty is represented as an
additional sanction imposed on disobedient ecclesiastical officials. In the abstract,
overcharged persons were compensated for their “actual damages” and given the penalty
expressly on top of that. “Actual damages” being introduced into the statute, the question
arises whether they were recoverable for other infractions than excessive fees. Obviously
the statute could be otherwise violated. We have just looked at one form—flouting the
eligibility rules by overlooking all those from among whom at least one administrator
must be chosen. Other forms—in fact the ones central for Prohibition law—will be
discussed below. Obviously too, people could be much more damaged by such other
violations than a £5 penalty would compensate. In the simplest case of eligibility-rule
violation, where decedent leaves no widow and only one next-of-kin person, say a child
or sibling, that person, if by-passed, would lose the whole value of the estate, which
could be very large, minus £5. It may seem unjust to let him bear that loss when the
victim of a mere overcharge of fees can recover the amount he is overcharged plus £5. In
any more complex case, the problem of identifying who has been wronged recurs more
acutely than with respect to the penalty.
As far as the penalty is concerned, the worst that could happen is that all members
of the possibly numerous class from which at least one administrator must be chosen
could recover £5 (and the King £5 x the number of people from that class who seek
administration.) That outcome would be the Church’s bad luck, avoidable by obeying the
statute, but allowing a sizable number of people to recover the whole value of a large
estate surely seems unacceptable. It is perhaps conceivable that all disappointed
applicants in the widow plus next-of-kin class could be allowed to recover the value of
the estate jointly, but that would have the probably objectionable effect of conferring a
windfall on persons all but one of which could be lawfully excluded without any
violation of the law.
In the light of these considerations, the best solution is probably that the statute
does not give “actual damages” generally to victims of violation, but solely a sum-certain
recovery of excessive fees charged. Those entitled to this recovery are then given the
penalty in addition. But what of those who have suffered loss otherwise—at least certain
loss—in consequence of violation of the statute? Common sense suggests that these
victims should be entitled to the penalty even if damages are ruled out for them. The
alternative would come to holding that these “parties grieved” have no secular remedy.
I.e.: The statute is addressed to the ecclesiastical courts quoad all violations except
charging fees defined by the statute as excessive. Of course such violations should not be
committed, and should be corrected by ecclesiastical appeal, but no common law right is
created, unless perhaps a place for Prohibition can be found.
If, however, one resists denying the penalty to those wronged otherwise than by
overcharging, the language of the statute furnishes some support. The draftsmanship is
poor, but the words may be readable as intended to benefit such “otherwise wronged” at
least to the extent of allowing them the penalty. This effect depends on a single phrase:
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Before saying that the overcharged may recover the amount of the overcharge, the statute
says that all ecclesiastical officials who “do or attempt or cause to be done and attempted
against the act in any thing [italics mine]” shall forfeit “so much money as any such
person shall take contrary to the present act.” Then the penalty is given in addition.
Arguably, perhaps, the phrase “in any thing” should be taken as an acknowledgment that
the act as a whole (notably the part on intestacy) can be violated in various ways and an
indication of intent that violations other than overcharging be rectified at common law, in
a manner not specified but roughly analogous to the remedies provided against takers of
undue fees. I have argued that the penalty is the most plausible feature to extend, though
we shall see from the cases that some lawyers seem to have thought that “actual
damages” were available. There are no signs of the matter’s having been deeply debated.
(In favor of a liberal construction of puzzling language, one should note that charging
excessive fees is practically the only offense likely to occur in probate cases. That is the
offense the statute leads off with and no doubt the main one the statute was enacted to
prevent. Arguably the sanctions section of the statute was written to cover that case, but
without the intent of foreclosing secular recoveries for the wider range of offenses likely
to arise in the secondary category of administration. Possibly a single comprehensive
phrase was thrown in to catch that wider range.)
Before one can say how enforceable by secular law 21 Hen. VIII should be, it is
necessary to raise broader questions than we have yet asked. So far, we have largely
addressed the words of the statute and problems of tort and penal remedies in particular
situations. The broader questions concern the purposes of the statute as it touches
administration and the relation of those purposes to the interests of the Church.
Obviously the statute intends to protect administrators, as well as executors, against
excessive fees, and to that end it provides clear remedies. Plainly, however, it intends
more.
Negatively, the statute intends that Church courts no longer enjoy nearly full
freedom to handle intestates’ estates as they see fit, subject only to canon law and
ecclesiastical appeal. (The text below explains one earlier statutory incursion into the
field, so mild that it barely qualified full ecclesiastical freedom.) Affirmatively, if it does
nothing else, 21 Hen. VIII mandates who at least one administrator shall be. Part of its
practical intent is to insure that widows and nearest relatives get at least a share of the
estate. It was probably anticipated that for most estates, usually small ones, only those
persons would seek administration. The Church lost full freedom to prefer some other
purpose to the interests of those parties.
On the other hand, the statute leaves ecclesiastical courts with a great deal of
discretion. Its language expressly emphasizes that it does so. Let us combine the large
discretionary residue with the assumption that if all members of the class widow-andnearest-relatives, although they have applied, are excluded, the penalty is recoverable by
those excluded. At this point, the ultimate intent of the statute becomes open to question.
Were the statute makers really hostile to leaving out widows and next-of-kin altogether,
provided applicants in that class received £5 each (and a premium was paid to the King—
a sort of license fee for pursuing ecclesiastical purposes rather than serving the familial
interests which the statute was to a degree designed to protect?) Does the statute in effect
say to ecclesiastical courts, “You are free as you have always been to cause intestates’
estates to be devoted to pious purposes, except that now you must pay for the privilege, in
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part by modestly compensating close familial applicants whom you see no reason to
enrich with a share of the estate—nor to burden with the active business of an
administrator”?
Let us now try to visualize why an ecclesiastical court might choose to disobey
the statute at the risk of having to pay the penalty. For this purpose one must posit a fairly
large personal estate, or at any rate a situation in which widows and next-of-kin would be
well provided for without a penny from the personal estate. (That means provided for in
one way or another out of the decedent’s land—a widow by dower rights or a jointure, at
least one next-of-kin by inheritance, i.e., the single male primogenitary heir or all female
nearest relatives. Remember that in 21 Hen. VIII—1529-30—freehold land was not
devisable at all, though there was opportunity to divert land from legal heirs by means of
uses—in modern terms, trusteeship arrangements.)
The ultimate rationale for ecclesiastical jurisdiction in intestacy was that the dead
man’s property should be optimally applied for the benefit of his soul, the Church being
the qualified judge of how the best application could be achieved. While providing for
one’s widow, children, and poor relations counted as a soul-benefiting work, it
approaches a sufficient one only for the modestly circumstanced. Benefactions to
ecclesiastical institutions or to the unrelated poor and indeed Masses for the decedent’s
soul in Purgatory should be imputed aspirations of a well-off intestate, as well as
objective benefits to him. (That is to say, if what the intestate would probably have
provided if he had made a will is taken as the ideal standard for how the ecclesiastical
courts should dispose of his property, there is hardly any generic conflict between
“imputable aspiration” and “objective benefit” under the cultural conditions of 1530.
Ecclesiastical courts presumably had no choice but to impute aspirations to the decedent,
as opposed to formally investigating his actual intentions. The only exception to that is
the special case of an imperfect will attached to the letters of administration. There, if 21
Hen. VIII is to be obeyed and the penalty avoided, administrators must, by express
provision of the statute, meet the eligibility requirements, but once appointed they
become in effect executors to carry out the technically “intestate’s” known wishes.)
In short, ecclesiastical courts traditionally had a duty to look beyond the interests
of widows and nearest relatives. It is not necessary to advert to ecclesiastical greed to
explain why Church courts after the statute of 21 Hen. VIII might be inclined to slight the
statute’s familial solicitude by outright disobedience of the statute and acceptance of the
penalty, or perhaps less expensively in some situations. This is not to deny the reality of
“ecclesiastical greed”—not to make it out as the mere creature of anti-clerical or antiPapist prejudice in many shades—but only to emphasize that the courts were supposed to
take the intestate’s soul into account and that doing so inevitably involved directing funds
to ecclesiastical agencies and concerns.
I do not think radical change from “the cultural conditions of 1530” is likely to
have affected the balancing of familial considerations and ecclesiastical interests very
much. In 1530, Catholic religious culture was still intact in England: Papal supremacy
itself was not yet legally impugned; the mere regulation by statute of ecclesiastical legal
proceedings was not unprecedented, though its conceivable scope was of course much
more limited than after the soon-forthcoming “nationalization” of the English Church.
Protestantization of the new national Church progressed by a jagged path from the 1530s
down to the Elizabethan Settlement, and in some de facto ways beyond it. Of course this
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process swept away many of the modes in which the property of the dead could be
bestowed for the well-being of their souls. Indeed, for those who were well-informed
about Protestantism and serious, conscientious, or genuinely convinced of their
commitment to it, the very idea of conferring a benefit on the deceased was utterly
erroneous. Nevertheless, from the mundane perspective of ecclesiastical courts, I doubt
that this momentous history made much difference.
If the Church lost the duty to look to the intestate’s soul, it did not lose an interest
that might sometimes lead its courts to pay the penalty and dispose of the estate in ways it
deemed better or “more Christian” than what conforming to the letter of 21 Hen. VIII
would produce. This interest does not reduce to a “greedy” one in simply diverting
wealth to ecclesiastical institutions. For one thing, the probable preferences of the
intestate can be plausibly substituted for benefit to his soul. Would a wealthy decedent
who made no will—probably owing to unanticipated death or mere carelessness—have
wanted his whole estate to go to his immediate family, or at least not outside the family at
large? After all, in 16th-17th century England he was presumptively a Christian, and
unless a resident alien a member of the Church of England. Could it be inappropriate for
the Church to concern itself with his reputation, even if the Church in its reformed state
must dismiss as superstitious any way in which it could act effectively from concern with
his soul? Finally, even putting aside all reference to doing what the decedent would want,
need the Church conceived as the spiritual counterpart of “the whole body of the realm”
deny itself power to use its intestacy jurisdiction in part to further the intrinsic ends of a
Christian commonwealth? 21 Hen. VIII can be considered a benign secular intervention
for insuring that the Church does not overlook its responsibility to the decedent’s family
in pursuit of other ends without abandoning those ends.
So much for a defense of ecclesiastical courts’ risking the penalty and simply not
observing 21 Hen. VIII. (Risking rather than incurring, since in our imagined cases of a
large personal estate or a land-rich family those certainly entitled to administration by 21
Hen. VIII might of course choose not to bother with the penalty. Their motive might be
acceptance of the Church’s role and accord with what they could have reason to
understand as the Ordinary’s plan for a “public interest” use of the estate. As it were, they
might elect to treat the ecclesiastical court as a sort of informal trustee and “charitable
adviser.” Retention by the family of particular chattels with personal or sentimental
value could easily be built into a “friendly settlement.” Before ending this speculative
excursus we should take note of one further range of considerations. Remember that
when there was a widow biological family members not in the nearest category could by
the statute be made co-administrators and hence property-recipients along with her. In
effect, a needy cousin could be benefited without violating the statute. For that matter, a
well-off cousin could without penalty be used as a vehicle for bringing part of the estate
to Church-approved employments, if there were a cousin who could be relied on to give
most of his share away for charitable or religious ends. More safely, an eligible cousin,
or sibling or uncle, in place of a child, rich or poor, might be compelled to give
generously for those ends by conditioning his grant of administration on his doing so.
Using this technique would usually require giving the appointee a motive to accept
administration with the condition by letting him keep a reasonable portion of his
prospective share, and of course the maneuver must be free of legal objection—i.e.,
explicitly conditional grants of administration, or alternatively insisting that the grantee
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enter a bond to devote such-and-such a sum or proportion to Church-endorsed purposes,
must be perfectly legal. If the method of a bond is used, secular law necessarily intrudes,
since the bond must be enforced by action of Debt at common law. A common law court
must say whether the condition on the bond is lawful, and so the question arises whether
21 Hen. VIII makes that doubtful. The statute does not at any rate expressly provide that
that administration may be offered to an applicant if he will enter such a bond and
withheld if he is unwilling to. The compatibility with the statute of a straight conditional
grant is open to doubt in the same way—the statute does not authorize such grants, but
neither does it forbid them in terms. The difference between the bond and the conditional
grant is that the former must give secular courts a shot at the legality of the ecclesiastical
technique, while this can hardly be clear for the latter. A penalty suit would probably not
lie if the plaintiff is a kinsman who may be appointed but not a widow or nearest relative
who must be.)
We are now in a position to approach the subject that properly concerns this
study, the role of Prohibitions in enforcing 21 Hen. VIII. The broadest question under this
rubric is whether Prohibition should ever be used for that purpose. It is generally true
that one function of the writ was to prevent non-common law courts from doing what
statutes provided they ought not to. This, however, does not mean that letting it perform
that function was appropriate for all statutes. It is obvious that a statute could ban using
Prohibitions to enforce it by express provision. There seems to be no necessary reason
why a statute could not do the same by implication. Is it possible that 21 Hen. VIII should
be construed as so implying?
It is a plausible generalization that no activity subjected to a penalty by statute
should be stopped by Prohibition. (A penalty, not a punishment. A penalty statute
empowers private parties to recover a definite sum of money at common law from the
doer of an action specified in the statute, if such private person is willing to undertake the
costs and risks of suing for it. Punishments can be various; prosecutions which, if
successful, eventuate in a misfeasor’s punishment must be by indictment or criminal
information; if punishments are monetary, the fine accrues to the King alone.) At
scattered places in this study, Prohibitions are sought to stop actions subject to penalty.
(For the example closest to hand, besides those involving 21 Hen. VIII itself, see Ch. 2 of
this volume.) In such cases it was commonly argued that the availability of a penal
action debarred Prohibition: If Parliament authorized the penal action, should it not be
supposed that Parliament meant that to be the sanction for whatever wrong it had
recognized or created? Must the statute makers not have considered danger of the penalty
a sufficient deterrent and payment of it sufficient amends?
The generalization “No Prohibition where a penalty is provided” is almost
certainly over-broad. The miscellaneous instances suggest as much (and Ch. 2 below
furnishes a strong example of explicit, argued rejection of the principle for one particular
statute.) There are also good intuitive grounds for doubting that it should always be
applied. I do not think it is necessary to make a systematic abstract analysis here of why
the “No Prohibition” maxim should not be consistently followed, if indeed it should not.
Nor shall I analyze the extreme contrary of “No Prohibitions”—that all penalized judicial
activity incompatible with statutory requirements should be halted by Prohibition if
Prohibition is sought and it is possible or practicable to employ the writ. Between the
extreme contrary and “No Prohibitions” tout court there are numerous imaginable
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distinctions; general rules covering different types of situation can be proposed,
defended, and criticized. Rather than distract attention from our focus on 21 Hen. VIII by
commenting on the full abstract range, I shall confine the discussion to two topics. (a) I
shall summarize the reflections just above as a specific argument that enforcement of the
eligibility requirements for administrators laid down in 21 Hen. VIII represents a type of
situation in which Prohibition should probably always be denied. (That does not, of
course, mean that the proposed practice cannot be rationally rejected, or sometimes
qualified even if generally accepted. Bear in mind that only the eligibility requirements
are in question here—in other contexts, still to be discussed, Prohibitions to enforce the
statute may be justified even if it they are not quoad eligibility.) (b) I shall deal with a
few further considerations, some going to principle and some to practical objections to
Prohibitions.
I have argued that there is a sort of situation in which Parliament may intend to
make a change in the law, but not quite the one it seems to on the surface, and that
statutory intent need not always include the ordinary expectation that the statute be
obeyed or conformed with. 21 Hen. VIII, I have argued, fits the type. Certainly the
statute makes it illegal as a matter of English secular law to do something that probably
cannot be made out as illegal in that sense before. (The “probably” signifies the doubtful
possibility that the one medieval statutory intervention in the matter of intestacy
constrained the ecclesiastical courts, as opposed to merely exhorting them—see text for
this detail.) Certainly too the statute affixes a sanction to ecclesiastical courts’ failing to
do what they are in a sense told to—or, alternatively stated, it puts a price-tag thereon.
And yet—to play a bit with one of the most bafflingly complex terms or concepts in both
legal and everyday discourse—were the makers of 21 Hen. VIII probably “intent” on
bringing about the state of affairs to which it seems to point—viz. a strongly familyfavoring policy in the handling of intestates’ estates? I have argued that a negative answer
to this question is likely to be correct—that the makers would quite probably have
expected and welcomed, in the case of large personal estates, ecclesiastical courts’
ignoring the statute at the price of paying the penalty if it was insisted on.
The immediate political circumstances of the statute would seem to count in
favor of this conclusion, as well as the cultural conditions prevailing at the time of
enactment. 21 Hen. VIII was probably made in part to put pressure on Rome in the matter
of the King’s divorce. Keeping pressure moderate can be the way to make it effective. In
1530, it would have made sense to say to Rome something like this: “If you persist in
making trouble about the divorce, you can expect more regulatory interference with
ecclesiastical practices, and it may grow more drastic. At present, however, we mean
only to show that we are ready to interfere by taking some measures for which there is
popular demand and which you yourselves must acknowledge to be reasonable reforms.
If you are willing to cooperate in a matter vital to our interests and in which we believe
we have a strong legal case, and thus our normally amicable relationship is restored, we
can hardly undertake to repeal the reforming legislation we have passed (notably our
insistence on curtailing excessive and capricious fees for various ecclesiastical services.)
On the other hand, we do not intend or believe that we shall have imposed any serious
restrictions on your accustomed way of exercising your jurisdiction. It is the part of the
statute concerning intestacy that might seem to threaten your defensible freedom, but
close attention to the statute will show that there is nothing of substance to fear. You will
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see that you have been subjected only to a requirement to give minimal respect to the
interests of the intestate’s family if it is demanded, something we think you will concede
to be due. We have, it is true, insured that this be done by putting a charge on flatly
disregarding the statute. You need not always, however, go that far in order to settle the
estate as you prefer, and if you must the charge is modest compared to what you would
hope to gain for ecclesiastical, spiritual, or charitable purposes in any case where the
strong measure of disobeying the statute could seem worthwhile. And what, finally,
would stand in the way of passing the charge on to the estate as a whole, in effect
compensating the Ordinary for any expense he is unable or unwilling to bear out of the
ecclesiastical funds he has chosen to favor over familial claims? In sum, though the
statute is a threat if you like—a harbinger of more legislation you will not like and a
demonstration of our willingness to deal with ecclesiastical problems on our own—it is
not a long-run threat to the international Church’s normal operations.”
So visualizing the immediate political exigencies, as well as noting the climate of
values and religious beliefs around 1530, makes for the conclusion that using
Prohibitions to prevent violation of 21 Hen. VIII’s eligibility rules for administrators
would be contrary to the statute’s implied intention. The penalty alone should be relied
on to deter violations of all sorts and degrees. The further possibility, compensating the
actual damages incurred by persons excluded in violation of the eligibility requirements,
should be rejected for the same reason as Prohibitions should be—as over-enforcement,
in the case of actual damages by making violation forbiddingly expensive to the Church
in the very circumstances that most justify it.
I have argued further that the large changes in the English “ecclesiastical polity”
and in its religion after 1530 need not alter the reading of the statute’s original intention
that makes for “no Prohibitions.” This last point, however, has complexities that have not
yet been explored. It would be natural for the Church hierarchy and officialdom—for
those who manned the ecclesiastical courts—to want to hang onto as much discretion in
intestacy cases as possible. It is not, I have suggested, impossible to come up with a
“purified” or Protestant version of the kind of public interest that could and should be
served if the ecclesiastical courts were not in practice rigidly bound or bindable to an
exclusive solicitude for familial interests. Of course one would not expect English people
many decades beyond the Reformation to have a neutral historical perspective on what
legislators in 1530 are likely to have had in mind (and all the solid information I have
found touching legal debate on the construction of 21 Hen. VIII is from many decades
later—see text.) A general awareness that 21 Hen. VIII limited prior discretion, together
with a conviction that ecclesiastical courts’ retaining as much discretion as was plausible
would be beneficial to the realm and appropriate to the national Church’s role in its
governance, is enough to give churchmen and their sympathizers a legitimate antiProhibition case. It does not follow that all or most lay opinion, including that of common
law judges, would find that position convincing.
One can reasonably argue that the “plain meaning” of 21 Hen. VIII–never mind a
rather fancy construction of intent—is that all the assets and claims of intestates’ estates
should go to the family, always at least including widows and next of kin. Competition
between the two basic approaches to 21 Hen. VIII may be at work in the actual debates
over Prohibitions founded on the statute. A proclivity to see the “plain meaning” as
radically family-favoring, may have been reinforced by Protestant distaste for any
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ecclesiastical power to divert family wealth to public or pious purposes. Laymen brought
up in a thoroughly Protestant environment, and sometimes with personal convictions
strongly adverse to practices in the least reminiscent of the “Popish times”, would be
more likely to feel this distaste than Bishops and their satellite officials. In addition to a
vested interest in their own powers, the latter tended toward one version or another of the
Via media position, whereby the national Church, without impugning its Protestant core,
could and should retain something of its ancient institutional scope. To assess whether
the clash of points of view transcending mere law is visible in Prohibition cases springing
from 21 Hen. VIII, it is necessary to look more precisely at the issues in those cases, first
in the abstract terms of this Introduction and ultimately as the cases appear in the text. (It
is better not to call the stringently pro-family interpretation of the statute “Puritan”,
though it would of course be supported by Puritans properly so-called. Strong
Protestantism could shape a disposition to read ambiguous law as compatible with “true
religion” without participating in Puritan demands for changes in the Church’s structure
and outward practices, much less tolerating non-conformity in the sense of disobeying
clear law.)
There is in the end little reason to embrace the view that no statute made
enforceable by a penalty action may also be enforced by Prohibition. One needs to look at
particular instances to discern whether a good case can be made against Prohibition when
a penalty is available. I have argued that such a case is reasonable and probably
preferable if due emphasis is put on the statute’s original intention. Analysis of other
statutes may well reach the opposite conclusion, and so may that of 21 Hen. VIII itself
with respect to arguably implied provisions beyond the eligibility requirements. We shall
soon reach those; most Prohibition law on the statute, or at least most of the Prohibition
law on which the courts reached firm conclusions, is about those provisions. As for
penalty statutes, there is no a priori reason to suppose that the relatively few which
regulate the conduct of judicial bodies must be intended to tolerate disobedience so long
as the penalty is risked or paid. It is true, as is commonly observed, that penalty actions in
general put a “price-tag” on some activity, rather than subject it to a punishment so severe
or so uncertain that few would risk it. This incident of a technique of law-enforcement
does not mean, however, that when Parliament enacted a penalty statute it always had the
same intention within the range from (a) essentially taxing an activity for royal revenue,
to (b) a desire to deter the activity and reduce its frequency or its availability to the lower
classes by making it more expensive, to (c) a preference for seeing the activity stamped
out, even though it is not deeply culpable morally and the best hope for a reasonable rate
of enforcement is to create the private stake that characterizes penalty statutes. One
would generally expect statutes directed against official acts of non-common law courts
to fall in the third category, in which case using Prohibitions to prevent acts of the sort
meant to be “stamped out” is surely desirable if it is feasible. My argument, however, has
been that there may be exceptions, and that the eligibility requirements of 21 Hen. VIII
may well furnish one.
We must now consider whether preventive enforcement of those rules by
Prohibition would be feasible, granting its legitimacy in principle. The best argument is
probably that it could not be consistently feasible, for which reason it might be wise to
avoid complicating the law with distinctions and uncertainties and simply to hold that
Prohibition does not lie on surmise of violation of the eligibility rules. So concluding
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need not imply that Prohibition is inappropriate for other alleged violations of the statute,
which remain to be discussed.
A simple or ideal model of the Prohibition might see it as a necessarily
prospective remedy. I.e., non-common law courts may be prohibited from doing
something ultra vires that they have not yet done. The real picture is more complicated,
but let us for the moment assume the simple model. It seems clear that opportunities to
enforce the eligibility requirements of 21 Hen. VIII prospectively would be relatively rare
and dependent on special circumstances. Often X would have been appointed
administrator before a rival aspirant, Y—or if Prohibition is assumed to lie, any member
of the public, Z could complain that X, or X alone, was chosen in violation of the statute.
Of course this is not a necessity: Y or Z could learn that X had applied for letters of
administration but not yet received them; Y or Z could have found out that the
ecclesiastical court was considering appointing X or on the point of doing so. Y would
obviously have no right at this point to a penalty action, which is, conversely,
retrospective—an illegality must have been committed before it can be penalized; Z
would never be entitled to one, and Y might never, depending on the complexities of
identifying “parties grieved” discussed above. Prohibition’s availability to people in the
position of Y or Z would be advantageous to them and sensible from a public point of
view. Two forms of the writ would be employable depending on circumstances: either a
mere order not to appoint X or an order not to appoint him unless others, specified as
individuals or by class, are also appointed. (Qualified, partial, or conditional Prohibitions
are well warranted. See Vol. I, pp. 293 ff. and 361 ff.) So there is no rational objection to
Prohibitions enforcing the eligibility rules unless on either or both of two bases (a)
Banning violation of those rules subject to the sanctions of Attachment-on-Prohibition is
more thoroughgoing enforcement than the statute intends, as argued above. (b) It is unfair
and bad judicial practice—on our present assumption that Prohibitions must be
prospective—to let some violations, probably a minority, be effectively prevented while
many victims of violations, only contingently different from others, are left to the
chances of penalty suits and a maximum recovery of £5. Is the inequity not substantial
enough to recommend no Prohibitions for eligibility-rules enforcement?
The next question is whether it is correct to say that Prohibitions must be
prospective, as we have been provisionally assuming. At least one situation requires a
negative answer of sorts: Prohibitions were used to block execution of sentences when
they were imposed in cases a common law court considered beyond ecclesiastical
jurisdiction. It was firmly held that an ecclesiastical sentence was no bar to Prohibition,
subject only to common law courts’ discretion to deny a writ if plaintiff-in-Prohibition’s
delay in seeking one was unconscionably long and apt to cause hardship to an adverse
private party. (See Vol. I, p. 115 ff.) An order not to carry out a sentence is obviously in a
sense prospective: If the ecclesiastical court has gone as far as it can—excommunicated
plaintiff-in-Prohibition and even had him committed via De excommunicato capiendo—it
can still lift the excommunication; failing to do so would presumably be disobeying the
Prohibition and generate Attachment proceedings (and if he was kept in prison by the
secular authorities he should be liberated on Habeas corpus.) In another way, however, it
is strained to call a Prohibition after sentence prospective. Efforts to argue that sentences
should bar Prohibition (loc. cit., Vol. I) rested on the stricter logicality of insisting that
only the not-yet-done can be forbidden. The argument usually failed because of the
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doctrine (Vol. I, passim) that the seeker of a Prohibition is an “informer for the King”,
who need have no private interest in whether one is granted or not. The public interest in
having proper lines of jurisdiction observed in the King’s legal system as a whole was in
effect held to trump the logical objection to prohibiting the already-done. If the law was
reversed and plaintiff-in-Prohibition was required to have the private interest he usually
did have in practice, prospectiveness would probably have been insisted on as a logical
necessity. So insisting would have reinforced the practical desirability for all civil lawenforcement that parties with a legally protectable interest act in a timely way to protect
it. In the specific case of an interest in jurisdiction, it is desirable that a party not try his
luck in one system of courts and only after losing—perhaps after a considerable lapse of
time—complain about the jurisdiction of the court he was willing to bet on. Given the
public stake in jurisdiction, however, the point above provides a way out: A Prohibition
after sentence is not flatly an order not to do what has been done, because it amounts to
forbidding execution of the sentenced, an “act” that cannot be done completely so long as
the party is unabsolved (and unpardoned, since a secular pardon could wipe out both lay
and ecclesiastical sanctions.)
A grant of administration is at least harder to make out as short of a completed
act than a sentence in a contentious ecclesiastical suit. It is true that mere appointment of
an administrator does not necessarily cut off all further ecclesiastical concern with the
estate in question, although there is a strong argument that it does, as we shall see below.
At any rate, the estate still needs to be administered—debts to the intestate collected and
tangible property taken possession of by whoever is entitled to it. Prohibiting an unlawful
appointment already made can be construed as forbidding the ecclesiastical court that
made it from dealing further with the estate—from doing anything concerning the estate
that it could do if the appointment were lawful. Where would this leave things?
By force of the Prohibition, we are assuming, the original ecclesiastical court is
cut off from touching the estate of Intestate Smith in any way. So to speak, it has had its
chance and forfeited it by making an appointment not authorized by 21 Hen. VIII.
(Whether it could deal further with the estate, and in what ways, if it had made an
appointment compatible with the statute is a separate question, irrelevant for the present
argument.) The Prohibition is not, however, addressed in terms to ecclesiastical courts
superior to the original grantor of administration. Arguably, therefore, the lower court’s
grant may be appealed within the ecclesiastical system. There may be problems about
such an appeal in ecclesiastical law. (Who has standing to bring the appeal? Need—or
may—an appeal of a grant of administration be brought by a private party? If not, may a
superior court—presumably the court immediately superior—on its own motion take over
for review a matter decided below? In the latter event, a private party who in fact
prompted the superior court’s action would count as an informer, as in ex officio suits,
rather than a proper appellant.) These questions, however, belong to ecclesiastical law.
Common law courts must assume that an appeal brought is lawfully brought as a matter
of procedural form. The important points here are: (a) There is no violation of the
existing Prohibition in the superior court’s considering the choice of Smith’s
administrator. (b) So long as the superior court has not yet decided the appeal, there is no
objection on straightforward grounds of prospectiveness to a common law court’s
entertaining an application for a new Prohibition addressed to the superior court.
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Although in the abstract a Prohibition appropriately sought must be either granted
or denied, in reality the common law court would have no choice but to deny a writ. It
has already decided that the lower court’s grant was unlawful. Now its only sensible
option is to let the higher ecclesiastical court go ahead, reverse the grant below and make
a new and lawful one, as if it were the original tribunal. Although, again in the abstract,
an appellate case must issue in either affirmation or reversal, again in reality the appellate
court would be foolhardy not to reverse. If it affirmed, it would only bring upon itself the
fate already suffered by the original court: a new Prohibition, dubiously prospective but
by our hypothesis sufficiently so, forbidding the higher court from dealing further with
Smith’s estate. Another appeal must be brought if one is available; otherwise, the end of
the road has been reached; hope of obtaining a lawful administrator by the obligatory
standards of 21 Hen. VIII by means of an appellate court’s seeing the light and obeying
the statute must now be abandoned.
A complication for the above line of reasoning might seem to arise if the
ecclesiastical court of first instance were prohibited by the Common Pleas and then a
Prohibition addressed to an appellate court were sought in the King’s Bench, or vice
versa. What guarantees that the two common law courts will agree on the meaning of 21
Hen. VIII and the fit of the instant case with the statutory rules? The question is nugatory,
however. Although there are aspects of the statute on which common law courts could
differ, the basic eligibility requirements are unmistakably clear. I.e., if a widow or one
member of the next-of-kin class has applied, a grant that does not include one of those is
plainly unlawful and subject to penalty suit. Prohibitability—tout court or after a grant
has been made—is another matter, without bearing on the present argument. It is
perfectly possible that the Common Pleas might issue a Prohibition after administration
had been granted, whereas the King’s Bench believed, say, that the eligibility rules
should not be enforced by Prohibition at all. But if the latter were asked to prohibit an
appeal, its refusal to do so on that ground comes out in the same place as refusal because
the best way to get on with administration in the hands of a lawful administrator may be
to rely on ecclesiastical appeal to rectify a mistake below. Another point worth noting is
that conditional Prohibitions would be an instrument of simplification if prohibiting an
appellate court is called for. I.e., a common law court prohibits an appointment after it
has been made; an appeal is brought; Prohibition is sought, ostensibly to stop the
appellate proceedings; instead of refusing a writ, the common law court issues one unless
the appellate court reverses the grant below.
In sum, the ecclesiastical appellate system may provide an escape-hatch if
Prohibitions to the granting tribunal after grant of administration are simply ruled out as
illogical, or if they are saved as a way of assuring that the original tribunal abstains from
any further measures concerning the estate. The hatch is open, however, only if
Prohibition addressed to the lower court does leave higher courts unaffected, and
therefore free to overturn an unlawful grant and re-start administration with a lawful
administrator. That proposition is seriously dubitable. Suffice it here only to say that the
normal force of a Prohibition was to stop all ecclesiastical meddling in a matter held
beyond ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Mere grant of a Prohibition at the original level did
not by itself kill an ecclesiastical suit, but the only way to keep it alive was to sue in
Attachment and force formal pleading. If the Prohibition was upheld by that process, the
misbrought ecclesiastical claim was dead, subject only to a common law Writ of Error.
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No opportunity for ecclesiastical appeal remained. Why should one anomalously survive
in the case of administration?
If Prohibition has been granted at the original level after letters of administration
have been unlawfully issued, and there is no way to use the ecclesiastical appellate
system, and the effect of the Prohibition is to forbid any further measures by the original
court (so that it cannot rectify its own mistake), we have indeed reached the end of the
road. That outcome is not disastrous, but awkward. It must mean that the situation now
“lies at common law.” Since the wrongfully appointed administrator cannot be removed,
he must either be tolerated or resisted. If, say, Smith’s widow has been excluded and
wants to resist, I suppose she can take possession of as much tangible property as
possible, forcing the wrongful administrator, Jones, to sue her for it, in which suit he
should fail if the jury does its duty. If Jones has got possession of some of the late
Smith’s property, the widow has an apparent right to sue him for it and should succeed.
Complications begin if, say, in addition to his widow Smith left six siblings, being his
nearest blood-relatives, any one of whom could lawfully have been made administrator,
with or without the widow. Is any member of this group of seven entitled to recover
property in Jones’s possession and to hold onto whatever he or she has managed to make
off with? Will the vicinage see it that way even if the law does? Further complications
come when Jones is sued by a creditor of the estate or undertakes to sue a debtor.
There is no need to spell out arguable solutions to those questions. My point is
made. The reader deserves an apology for being led through so many complexities and
hypothetical situations, few of which appear openly in the actual cases treated in this
chapter. I believe the excursus is necessary, however, to bring out a negative conclusion
about 21 Hen. VIII and to clear the ground for what the cases in the text mainly put in
question. The negative conclusion is that it would be for the best to hold that Prohibition
simply does not lie to enforce the statute’s eligibility requirements for administrators. So
to hold is to avoid the quagmire of issues I have suggested. This conclusion agrees with
the probable intent of the statute—to make the penalty the remedy for violation of the
eligibility rules because violation was meant to be indulged at a price. It also accords
with the presumption—a rebuttable presumption rather than a firm rule—that no activity
subjected to penalty by statute should be prohibited, My so concluding of course does not
mean that the 17th century judges concurred. See the text for the degree to which the
legitimacy of eligibility-requirement Prohibitions remained an open question variously
answered.
If, in any event, one does conclude for “No Prohibitions” quoad eligibility, what
most of the cases and the clearest judicial resolutions are about stands out sharply: They
are about what, if anything, ecclesiastical courts may do in intestacy cases after they have
granted administration (or conjointly with granting it), whether such grant is lawful by
the statute or unlawful (and so subject to penalty.)
Before defining in detail the issues in the main line of 21 Hen. VIII cases, we
need to add a few more arguments against eligibility-requirement Prohibitions. Let us
now insist on the prospectiveness of Prohibitions and drop the attempt to make out a sort
of “constructive prospectivevness” to justify “prohibiting” something that to ordinary
appearances has already been done. (This entails saying that a grant of administration is
not like a sentence in a contentious suit, which pretty indisputably does not as a rule bar
Prohibition—rather, the post-sentence Prohibition is disobeyed if the sentence is executed
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or a process of execution continues. Although making a distinction is not inevitable,
there is at least an intuitive difference between, on the one hand, taking up an ultra vires
suit and carrying it through to sentence and, on the other hand, performing an intra vires
function, albeit mistakenly by a statutory standard. In the latter case, precise statutory
intent is unavoidably open to examination. As I have argued, it is at least possible for
legislators to intend that enacted standards not be strictly observed, and providing a
penalty can be legitimately taken as a basis for inferring such an intention.)
With the stipulation that Prohibitions must be straightforwardly prospective,
there is no obvious harm in prohibiting a grant of administration that has not been made
by the first-instance ecclesiastical court. There is, however, harm in de facto
whimsicality. I.e., if only an occasional misgrant by the statute’s standards can be
prevented—when an interested party is in a position to expect that the ecclesiastical court
will ignore those standards—it is hardly fair that other interested or entitled parties
should be stuck with a misgrant, which is to say, denied specific relief and thrown back
on the penalty. If one is persuaded by the view, which I have been at some pains to
inculcate arguendo, that the standards of 21 Hen. VIII are not meant to be rigidly
observed, the harm of letting some fortunate parties enforce the standards specifically is
obvious enough. Again, the best rule would be that Prohibitions sought on the basis of the
eligibility requirements should be automatically denied.
Prohibiting an ecclesiastical appeal if the first-instance grant of administration
conforms to the statute, and considering Prohibition but denying it in the hope that a
misgrant by the letter of the statute may be reversed, are not measures obviously
incompatible with straightforward prospectiveness. They do, however, raise issues about
the nature of ecclesiastical appeals which a flat “No Prohibitions” rule would avoid. The
standard view that appeal suspends an ecclesiastical sentence neatly supports the
predominant view that suits are prohibitable after sentence. But is a grant of
administration suspended, assuming ecclesiastical law permits it to be appealed? It is
hard to believe that common law courts could allow grants unexceptionable by 21 Hen.
VIII to be appealed, with the effect of holding up settlement of the estate until appeals are
exhausted. If appeal should be prohibited in that case, must it not also be when the firstinstance grant is unlawful by the statute? It would surely be strange to hold that the acts
of ecclesiastical courts are sometimes suspended and sometimes not. “No Prohibitions to
enforce the eligibility requirements” is the way to avoid mazes and anomalies. (Simply
prohibiting appeals of grants by the first-instance court, whether such grant is authorized
by 21 Hen. VIII or unauthorized, does not, of course, amount to enforcing the eligibility
rules by Prohibition, for depending on contingency it can just as well “enforce” a
violation of the statute. Such a Prohibition comes to saying that in one way ecclesiastical
courts are excluded from acting in intestacy matters once a grant is made—viz they may
not entertain appeals aimed at reversing a grant; we shall soon be looking at other forms
of post-grant ecclesiastical activity.)
In connection with ecclesiastical appeals, it is worth noting that at the time of 21
Hen. VIII remodeling the Church’s appellate system in England had not even begun. 17th
century judges, with whom we shall mostly have to do in the cases, had the fully
remodeled system to work with and to take for granted. In considering whether
appointments of administrators could be appealed, they would know that appeals from
the normally diocesan first-instance court went to the archdiocesan level and finally to
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the Delegates. (Appeal from the Delegates, if permissible at all, was not automatic, but
achievable only “of grace” by petitioning the monarch to create a special review
commission.) In 1530 Rome was still the last resort. In some significant fraction of cases,
the archdiocese provided the court of first instance, because it had jurisdiction by
“prerogative” if an intestate’s goods (analogously to those of a testator) were located in
several dioceses. In those cases, resort to Rome was the only appellate option before
appeals to Rome were banned by statute and the Delegates created to handle appeals from
the archdiocese. A flat rule against issuing Prohibitions on surmise that an ecclesiastical
court might violate or had violated 21 Hen. VIII’s eligibility requirements would have the
further advantage of avoiding hopeless tangles with Rome. (The papal court could not be
effectively prohibited by an English writ. A private appellant in England could
presumably be prohibited from taking an appeal to Rome on the ground that an
archdiocesan court had misapplied 21 Hen. VIII, but such a Prohibition would be highly
anomalous. It would expose to Attachment and punishment a person not so much as
liable to the statutory penalty, besides being incompatible with the normal rule that both a
prohibited party and the ecclesiastical judge are liable to Attachment for disobeying a
Prohibition, the former if he does not drop his suit and the latter if he persists in pursuing
the suit without the party’s cooperation.)
I do not, as I have said above, claim that common law judges decades later than
the statute would give historical attention to circumstances and beliefs at the time of its
passage, although I hesitate to assert that they would have felt no puzzling gap between
how the makers might have wanted the statute to be read and what they themselves might
consider the simplest and most useful way of taking it on its face. The purpose of this
abstract analysis is in any event to bring out problems and possibilities that may not
always have been noticed by the historical actors we shall be looking at.
The last objection against using Prohibitions to see that ecclesiastical courts
apply the statute’s eligibility requirements is the simplest: after all else has been said,
there remains a strong argument from the nature of statute-enforcing Prohibitions. Let us
concede that anything a statute directly forbids ecclesiastical courts to do may be
prohibited by the writ. 21 Hen. VIII does not, however, by its terms forbid anything. It
specifies standards for appointing administrators, or authorizes ecclesiastical courts to
appoint specified persons. It does not say “Thou shalt not” appoint anyone who fails to
meet those standards or specifications. Of course it implies “Thou shalt not” and imposes
a penalty on judges who do otherwise than the statute authorizes them to. It is
nevertheless good statutory construction to take it that when the legislature ventures into
inter-jurisdictional territory it will say clearly whether it intends its enactment to be
specifically enforced by the well-known writ of Prohibition. Parliament could, after all,
have good reasons not so to wish. By this argument, the best way to indicate that
Prohibitions may be used is to forbid in express language, which implies that express
authorization of Prohibitions is not necessary. One may question whether it makes sense
to let a difference of judicial policy hang on the mere contrast between language that
unmistakably says “Don’t!” or only implies it. When, however, a statute says nothing
about Prohibitions and expressly provides another remedy, there is better reason to
presume that Parliament intended to exclude Prohibitions, though the presumption might
be overcome if the statute forbade in unmistakable language.
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The general maxim “No statute-based Prohibitions unless the statute’s language is
expressly prohibitory” is probably hard to confirm from other contexts than that of 21
Hen. VIII. It can, however, be recommended as a formalistic surrogate for deeper
arguments. Invoking it obviates the need to worry about whether the original intent of 21
Hen. VIII was that the eligibility rules it prescribes be universally observed, and whether
that intent should be upheld under post-Reformation conditions. The maxim is also a way
around problems about the sense in which Prohibitions must be prospective and about
Prohibitions directed to ecclesiastical appellate courts.
We have now arrived at our principal question, in the sense of the one behind
most of the reported cases in the text below. The question in general form is whether 21
Hen. VIII has any operation beyond specifying who must or may be appointed
administrator (plus a few procedural requirements, such as that administrators must put in
an inventory and a bond.) Assuming A has been granted administration of B’s estate, may
the ecclesiastical courts subsequently, or in conjunction with making the appointment,
demand anything of A except taking the procedural steps?
The question thus generally stated can be answered with equal generality.
Answering it “No” gives the statute a sharp and radical meaning: It confines
ecclesiastical courts to appointing administrators. Once an appointment is made, the
ecclesiastical system has done the sole job it is now authorized to do; its authority is
exhausted. The eligibility rules should of course be observed, but if they are not the
ecclesiastical court of first instance has no power to correct its mistake in the form of
revoking its grant and making a new one. It may not be quite so clear that there is no
way in which appellate ecclesiastical courts could intervene to save the day, but the
starkest logic probably says there is none—appointment closes out the ecclesiastical
system, not only the court of first instance. Then an unlawful appointment either opens
the way to penalty suits, and possibly common law suits for damages—subject to the
problems that attend those remedies—or else the appointment counts as a nullity. I.e., so
long as an apparent appointment does not conform with the statute it is not an
appointment; the original court is free to make another one that does count without
violating our stipulation that there be no judicial acts other than appointment; there is no
obvious objection to superior ecclesiastical courts’ intervening, as there would
presumably be none if the proper first-instance court simply sat on its hands, failing for
too long to make an applied-for grant or to take the initiative if there were no applicants.
If one says “Yes” to the general question, what one means can only be examined
by looking at the specific post-grant or cum-grant judicial acts that came in question. No
logical exception can be taken to saying that some such acts violate the statute while
others do not. The text of the statute furnishes no direct assistance. It does not say in
general terms that appointing administrators shall henceforth be all ecclesiastical courts
may do in intestacy cases. Nor does it speak of particular acts, other than appointment,
which henceforth either was or was not to be permitted to ecclesiastical courts. Whatever
the statute means in this connection it means by implication. From Parliament’s silence,
one can on the general plane draw opposite conclusions: Either (a) it implies that there is
no intent to limit any acts formerly permissible for ecclesiastical courts except making
appointments not conforming with the eligibility requirements the statute states; or (b)
imposing the eligibility rules implies that acts tending to subvert the policy behind those
rules must be avoided.
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We may turn now to specific controverted questions to which the statute does not
speak in terms, but as to which it may have implications. There are three: (1) May a grant
of administration be revoked by the ecclesiastical court that made it or a superior court?
(2) May ecclesiastical courts require that intestates’ estates be distributed in a certain way
(as opposed to simply becoming the property of the administrator or administrators after
debts are paid)? (3) May ecclesiastical courts require administrators to account for their
handling of the administration?
Various general ideas can be brought to bear on ecclesiastical powers arguably
affected by the implications of 21 Hen. VIII. I.e., there are contrary plausible
comprehensive answers to the question whether the statute should be taken as abolishing
any or all of those powers. With respect to Prohibition cases, there is a further broad
question to which different broad answers can be plausibly given: To the extent that the
statute is held to limit any ecclesiastical powers by implication, may common law courts
use the Prohibition to prevent those powers from being exercised? There are defensible
reasons for saying “No.” If that is the right answer, then either the statutory penalty is
recoverable or the statute intends that there be no secular remedy for one type of
“violation.” Ecclesiastical courts would be free to take the statute as limiting their
discretion in more ways than the eligibility rules do, but they would not be compellable.
If, on the other hand, there is no objection in general principle to enforcing
implied provisions by Prohibition, it does not follow that the writ should always be
granted when an ecclesiastical court is asked to revoke letters of administration, order a
distribution, or call an administrator to account. At this point, whether to prohibit or not
becomes an essentially practical question: Does preventing exercise of a power in a
particular case or situation fulfill the policy of the statute in one way without
inadvertently keeping it from being efficiently fulfilled in another way? Generic answers
to that question are possible: E.g., distribution orders should always be prohibited, as
simply incompatible with the central purpose of the statute, but revocation suits should
not be, since they can sometimes be useful means of correcting mistakes in the
application of the statute and getting it observed. More specific answers are also
possible: E.g., nearly all distributions and revocations should be prohibited, but there is
narrow room for exceptions; these may be either ad hoc, in special situations that cannot
be described exactly before they occur, or they may be in some recurrent and easily
recognized situation for which a simple and uniform legal rule can be stated
I propose in this discussion to focus on the hard practical problem “When should
revocations, distributions, and accountings be prohibited?” rather than belabor the more
general questions head-on—the questions “Should Prohibitions be used at all?” and “Is
there anything counting as violation of the statute to consider prohibiting?” This
emphasis will best introduce what visibly goes on in the cases. The judges could hardly
help thinking first about the possible consequences of prohibiting when a Prohibition was
sought, though attitudes on the larger questions might affect how they saw the practical
one.
(1) Revocation.
There are several plausible practical arguments for several positions on
prohibiting revocation suits brought in ecclesiastical courts.
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(a) Such suits should always be prohibited. 21 Hen. VIII should be taken to
mean by implication that revocation of letters of administration is flatly forbidden;
ecclesiastical courts’ pre-statutory power to revoke is abolished.
The practical strength of this position is that it encourages active administration
of the estate starting as soon as an administrator is appointed. Debts can be paid and
collected, and the administrator can take such steps as are necessary to gain possession of
the decedent’s chattel property. Co-administrators can take steps to work out a division of
the property. The administrator has no reason to delay for fear that, having taken active
steps, he may be removed, compelled to accept new colleagues, or at least to engage in
litigation in the form of opposing revocation in an ecclesiastical court. The administrator
may have to take the trouble of getting a Prohibition, if a disappointed aspirant brings an
ecclesiastical suit, but once “Absolutely no revocations” is known to be the law there
would be little point in his doing so. Ecclesiastical courts themselves, knowing that they
will be prohibited if they entertain a revocation suit brought by an obdurate would-be
administrator, might—in modern language—stop such a suit from being “filed”, sed
quaere whether their procedural resources provided a means for so doing (ridding
themselves of a suit without hearing before it ripens into a prohibitable object.)
To embrace the strict “No revocations” position, a judge would need to be
convinced that prompt carrying-out of administration—satisfied creditors and property in
the hands of those entitled as soon as possible—is central among the purposes of 21 Hen.
VIII, sufficiently so to take priority over other ends. Such a construction is not
implausible, but it presents problems as construction. In a practical perspective, however,
it may be the most useful objective to put at the core of the statute’s policy.
The troubling entailment of “No revocations” is that unlawful appointees by the
eligibility rules could become unremovable administrators. That need not be a disaster. If
an unlawful appointee accepts administration, he is responsible for paying the creditors
and subject to common law suit for the money owed (and in case of co-administrators
they all are.) The ecclesiastical court is deterred from violating the eligibility rules by the
remedy which the statute actually provides, penalty suit. Liability to such suit is probably
enough to limit open-eyed unlawful appointments to very few. It gives the ecclesiastical
court a motive to avoid inadvertent ones by allowing reasonable time for application and
carefully scrutinizing the facts on which competing applicants depend. As argued above,
however, there may sometimes be social utility in intentionally unlawful appointments at
the price of the penalty. Apart from the social utility of religious or charitable works
overseen by the Church, to which some people may subscribe and others not, it can
sometimes make sense to appoint an ineligible administrator for his competence to do the
work of administration, (Say a friend of the family in lieu of the decedent’s elderly
widow and decrepit brother—a friend who can both do the job and be depended on to see
that the residue of the estate gets to the widow and brother, taking for himself only
enough to cover his expenses.) Here the interest of creditors and the end of prompt
settlement, which the “No revocations” rule makes central, are directly served.
The practical advantages of the strict rule are, however, offset by two
considerations. First, giving priority to promptitude and debt-payment is liberal
construction of 21 Hen, VIII, since the statute’s language focuses entirely on the
eligibility rules, as if its only concern were with proper appointment and its consequence
of assuring that the estate’s residue go—sometimes wholly and at least in part—to
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widows and/or next of kin. Secondly, “No revocations” is an ambiguous way to prompt
settlement. While it encourages appointees to get down to business by removing grounds
for fearing complications, it also encourages conscientious ecclesiastical courts to move
slowly in making the initial appointment. Such a court should want to obey the statute
because it is the law, would usually want to obey it to avoid the penalty, and is not only
within its rights to want an optimal appointment but commendable for so wanting. (An
optimal appointment would be lawful by the statute; would serve the secular purpose of
producing a competent and dependable administrator, who would “do the job” promptly
and thoroughly; and that also may yield an administrator solicitous for other concerns of
the Church.) How does the risk of slow initial proceedings in the ecclesiastical court
compare with that of administrators slow to act lest their authority be revoked?
It seems a necessary corollary of a stringent rule against revocation that if
explicit ecclesiastical suits seeking it should be automatically prohibited so should
appeals of grants of administration. Reversing a grant—whether the appellate court itself
makes a new grant or remands to the lower court with orders to start over—is as good as
revocation.
(b) A second possible rule is that revocation suits should always be prohibited
with one exception: Prohibition should be denied if it is sought on the ground that the
grant is unlawful by the eligibility rules; ecclesiastical courts should be allowed to correct
clearly mistaken grants.
This option is intuitively attractive: If an ecclesiastical court has misapplied
the eligibility rules, sees that it has, and is ready to correct itself by revoking the original
grant and replacing it with a lawful one, the most apparent end of 21 Hen. VIII is
fulfilled. If a party entitled to be administrator is willing to forgo the penalty and sues for
revocation instead, is seems harsh to prohibit his suit, as well as waste motion in an
uncomplicated situation. Complicated ones raise problems, but a high incidence of simple
cases is perhaps predictable—cases in which an unlawful appointee, knowing the law,
would find it pointless to contest an eligible person’s motion for Prohibition. (If as a
result of the revocation suit the widow was appointed, the original appointee might have
a good chance of being made a co-administrator by the ecclesiastical court.)
It is probably not a major objection to permitting revocation of unlawful grants
alone that whether a grant is unlawful may pose problems of law, with the result that
time and effort would need to be consumed unraveling those problems, thus delaying
active administration. By and large, it would be difficult to claim on legal grounds that a
permissible grant was impermissible, since the basic eligibility rules are straightforward.
There are some exceptions, however. There is no indication in the statute how some sorts
of person fit the eligibility rules. (Half-blood relatives, bastard children, in-laws, married
women, the husband of a decedent wife with chattel property of her own, aliens, felons,
outlaws, excommunicates.) Let us suppose that administration has been granted to A,
half-brother of the decedent; B, his full uncle, sues in the ecclesiastical court to have the
grant revoked; A seeks a Prohibition to prevent B’s revocation suit from being
entertained. The common law court can grant Prohibition because it thinks a half-brother
outranks a full uncle in eligibility or deny Prohibition if it thinks the opposite. Some time
must of course be devoted to argument and deliberation about this legal question. There
is, however, an attractive generic ground for denying Prohibition, whereby the common
law court would be relieved of deciding how to deal with anomalous cases one by one.
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One can reasonably hold that by saying nothing about half-blood relatives and other such
cases 21 Hen. VIII indicates an intent to leave them to ecclesiastical law. The statute is
violated (and the penalty incurred) if an obviously or admittedly remoter kinsman is
preferred over a closer one, but in ambiguous cases what counts as propinquity or what
effect a disability such as bastardy or alienage has on a candidate’s eligibility remains the
ecclesiastical question it was before the statute. Of course that theory is disputable. It still
makes practical sense as a legal economy to let the revocation suit go forward. A judge
with or without an inclination of his own on such matters as whether a half-brother
should outrank a full-blood uncle might prefer not to have to debate the question here and
now. Why not wait and see how the revocation suit turns out? Some time would be
consumed deliberating these matters, but (in addition to such cases’ being relatively rare)
whichever of these analyses the judges adopt, or if a majority cannot agree between them,
or Prohibition is denied on grounds specific to the case at hand—the outcome is the same
as would obtain if Prohibition were sought to cut off a suit aimed at revoking a manifestly
lawful grant. Similarly, a judge opposed to all enforcement of 21 Hen. VIII by
Prohibition, or convinced that revocation is simply not ruled out by implication of the
statute, could do no more than deny one—again the same result. If, on the other hand,
judicial deliberation results in a majority opinion that a half-blood relative does not count
as if he were full-blood, the court must grant Prohibition as it would if administration
had been granted to a manifestly ineligible person.
Prohibiting only those suits aimed at revoking unlawful grants carries some
risk that denying Prohibitions when revocation is sought on other grounds will lead to
ecclesiastical courts’ revoking an original lawful grant and making a new unlawful one,
but the threat of penalty should prevent that outside the rare case of a deliberately
unlawful grant made at the risk of penalty in order to serve an ecclesiastical purpose.
The principal pitfall in a policy of allowing ecclesiastical suits to revoke only unlawful
grants is that the claim of their unlawfulness may involve uncertain facts. For this, see
below.
(c) A third approach would be for common law courts to allow themselves
some discretion as to whether to prohibit revocation suits, as opposed both to prohibiting
them without exception and to prohibiting them unless the object of the suit is to revoke
an unlawful grant. The courts might limit their discretion so that they would usually
prohibit efforts to have lawful grants revoked, while acknowledging that in some
situations revocation would be advantageous. Suits to revoke unlawful grants would
sometimes be prohibited and sometimes not, depending mainly on which course seemed
likelier to produce expeditious settlement.
This course seems to me better when it is described in outline than when it is
imagined in operation. Restrained discretion is easy to embrace offhand, but it is hard to
specify the situations in which departure from general practice is actually useful. Rules
such as “Always prohibit revocation suits” or “Always prohibit suits seeking to revoke
lawful grants, never ones aimed at having unlawful grants revoked” would save the
common law court elaborate particularized debate on what is just or expedient or most
consonant with the will of Parliament as expressed in an out-of-date statute. The simple
rules also tend to avoid entangling common law courts in clearing up factual uncertainty.
Assuming a flat “No revocations” rule is rejected, what virtue is there in
leaving room for discretionary exceptions from the complementary rules “Always
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prohibit ecclesiastical suits aimed at revoking lawful grants” and “Never prohibit suits
to revoke unlawful grants”? The essential answer quoad lawful grants is that sometimes
the original appointee may seem to the common law court asked to prohibit to be a
person unlikely to administer the estate competently. If the ecclesiastical court is allowed
to revoke, it will probably on reconsideration make a better choice from the point of view
of all interested parties, including even the original appointee. To make such situations
visualizable, I give an imaginary case below. It will illustrate both the advantages of
letting the proposed revocation go forward and the problems that course raises.
Quoad unlawful original grants, the same considerations largely apply. The
only reason for making an exception from usual practice would be that the unlawful
appointee seems, despite his ineligibility, more likely to administer competently than any
apparently available lawful choices. The problems of trying to make an exception are the
same as those generated by trying to permit exceptional revocation of a lawful grant.
The imaginary case: Suppose that decedent’s widow, A, has been appointed. B
claims to be a large creditor of the estate; he wants to be made administrator and brings a
suit to have A’s grant revoked. A seeks a Prohibition to stop B’s revocation suit. B is
received as defendant-in-Prohibition to oppose issuance of a writ, as he must be if
revocation suits aiming to undo lawful grants are not to be prohibited ipso facto. B’s
contention is that A is an elderly and feeble person who cannot be relied on to collect
debts owed to the decedent. As a result, per B, he is himself unlikely to be paid in full,
and to be paid in part he would have to sue A for her last mite. By B’s theory, justice to
himself, the widow’s own interest, and indeed charity would be served if A were replaced
as administrator by him, and so he has said in the libel by which he has commenced his
ecclesiastical suit. Suppose he has said further that if he is named administrator he will
take no exception to an order that he allow the widow for the rest of her life what the
ecclesiastical court deems enough to maintain her—specifying her house if it is held by
lease (i.e., does not pass to decedent’s common law heir), together with its furnishings
and the widow’s personal effects, plus a cash annuity to meet her living expenses.
B’s plan is reasonable on its face. It does, however, involve the assertion of
many facts that may be questionable. Just what is the size of B’s claim on the estate in
relation to the estate’s value? How large and how probably realizable are the estate’s
claims against its debtors? Is the widow, perhaps with assistance she can be expected to
get, really incompetent to administer the estate? B’s answers to questions of this sort
may be true, but the other side is entitled to dispute them, and some court must verify
them before they can be acted on. A common law court that does not consider itself
bound to prohibit attempts to have lawful grants revoked can of course, if it thinks B’s
scheme convincing prima facie, deny Prohibition and let the ecclesiastical court decide
the truth of factual assertions which A, as defendant in the revocation suit, chooses to
challenge (on top of judging the merits of B’s plan even if factual doubts are presumed to
be or found in his favor.) Once the revocation suit is permitted to go forward, the
ecclesiastical court is obliged to decide it correctly. The Church court need not agree with
the common law court acting on the motion for Prohibition that A’s removal would be
wise, or in accord with accepted ecclesiastical rules and practices, or even consonant with
21 Hen. VIII. Ecclesiastical courts are in many ways the best place for A v. B to be
worked out, not least because their fact-finding procedures were well suited to
unscrambling a possibly complex set of factual differences. Unfortunately, however,
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giving the ecclesiastical system its head is apt to delay for a long time getting an
administrator appointed and active administration started. The generous appeals allowed
by ecclesiastical law are likely to draw out litigation, and even a conscientious effort at
the initial stage to discover all the relevant facts (and avoid reversal on appeal, which by
ecclesiastical law could take place on review of factual as well as legal findings) may be
prolix.
A court wary of opening the way to dilatory ecclesiastical proceedings could
possibly use common law means to ascertain facts it needed to know in order to decide
whether to make a discretionary exception from its general practice. Employing these
means would delay settlement compared to always prohibiting revocation of lawful
grants, but probably less than allowing ecclesiastical courts to decide whether revocation
was justified. Common law courts would also avoid the dubious step of exposing lawful
grants to revocation on the basis of a mere prima facie sense that revocation might make
sense in the circumstances of a particular case. The common law path to a solider basis
would be as follows:
Prohibitions were sometimes granted by courts not completely confident that
they should be (or, on some occasions, courts not really in doubt but faced with
defendants-in-Prohibition vehemently insistent that prohibiting them was unjust, whom
only the fullest possible hearing would appease.) Plaintiff-in-Prohibition was given his
writ on condition that he sue Attachment, pursuant to which plaintiff-in-Prohibition
would plead his case formally and defendant-in-Prohibition formally reply. The
Attachment suit would end in a judgment that Prohibition should or should not have been
granted, conclusive except for liability to a common law Writ of Error. This course was o
usually taken when the court was confronted by a difficult legal problem which the
judges thought should be resolved on formal pleadings. Employing it to get a definitive
finding of facts in order for a court to have a sufficient basis for deciding whether to
exercise an inherently discretionary power would certainly be unusual. I do not know
whether any court would consider it good form in that situation. There does not, however,
seem to be any necessary reason to rule it out. Pleadings in Attachment could make
factual assertions subject to being traversed and so raising an issue triable by jury. A
factual issue and jury trial were commonplace in some routine situations, most familiarly
when defendant in a tithe suit sought a Prohibition because he claimed that the in-kind
tithe was commuted by custom to a money payment. A verdict that the alleged
commutation was or was not customary settled the case. This simple model cannot be
applied directly to our A v. B, but it shows that factual determinations can be made in
Attachment. One is at least entitled to ask why a verdict (I should think almost
necessarily a special verdict ordered by the trial judge) could not be the means to obtain
factual determinations in A v. B. The verdict would not settle the case, but only give the
common law court a better basis than an impression for deciding whether to take the
exceptional discretionary step of not prohibiting an attempt to revoke a lawful grant of
administration. So there is possibly a common law way, but are such elaborate and
anomalous proceedings really worth undertaking for the sake of undoing one unfortunate
appointment?
(d) The final option is to hold that ecclesiastical courts’ power to consider
revoking their grants and perhaps to revoke them is left intact by 21 Hen. VIII: suits to
revoke should never be prohibited. There is little to be said for this from a practical point
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of view. A judge might think that barring revocation altogether would probably not stand
up even if it would perhaps be the best rule. Making exceptions would sometimes be hard
to resist, at least when an unlawful administrator with no apparent practical advantages
over lawful ones desiring administration, or when there were strong reasons of equity and
efficiency for replacing one lawful appointee with others equally lawful. Working out a
consistent law on permissible exceptions would be difficult, however, and making them
ad hoc could lead to complex problems while delaying active administration. Better,
therefore, simply to permit revocation suits and trust the ecclesiastical courts to handle
them sensibly.
A further possibility should be mentioned in connection with revocation. It is
also relevant for distribution and accountings, below. Might it not be better for a party
like the creditor in the imaginary A v. B to go to a court of equity? I.e., the best course
for the common law court might be to prohibit revocation, realizing that inequities to the
creditor could result without compensating benefits to the widow, but recognizing that
equity courts could be a possible last resort. I have no idea whether equity would consider
providing a remedy in such a case, but perhaps one should be asked. Going to the
Chancery or another equity court would arguably be better then inviting delay by long
ecclesiastical proceedings or the common law court’s taking a tortuous path to do its own
equity in effect. It is also conceivable that the equity option could also apply in some
suits to prohibit revocation of an unlawful grant. I.e., if the rule is that revocation of
unlawful grants should usually be permitted, but some discretion to go the other way is
retained, the best practice for common law courts could be to prohibit and point to equity
as a place where the party seeking revocation might find a remedy (presumably an
injunction to the administrator to distribute part of the estate, arrived at by finding
relevant facts and avoiding the risk of repeated ecclesiastical appeals.)
(2) Distribution.
The case for prohibiting all distributions is probably stronger than that for
stopping all attempts to have grants of administration revoked and demands for
accounting. Getting rid of distributions is difficult not to see as belonging to the heart of
21 Hen. VIII’s intent. The statute is probably best read as mainly intending that the
decedent’s closest family connections usually get possession of the property and claims
of the estate remaining after creditors are satisfied, promptly and with minimum further
ado beyond the appointment of administrators. To facilitate this end, the statute makes
specific rules, previously lacking, about who may be appointed. Directly to order a
distribution, after appointing administrators or in the process, is to make a direct assault
on the statute’s core purpose. Any apparent excess of stringency in ruling out all
distributions is mitigated by other factors. The statute straightforwardly allows
ecclesiastical courts a wide discretion to achieve the distribution they think best through
the appointment process itself, by making choices within the class of eligible appointees.
When this cannot be accomplished within the eligibility rules, I have argued, it can still
be done by violating those rules at the risk of the penalty. If revoking grants and
permitting accountings survive, wholly or partly, opportunities to distribute in effect also
survive the initial appointment. Arguably, it would be better to indulge these oblique
means to distribution than to make a “direct assault” on the statute’s central purpose. To a
degree, there are reasons for such indulgence even though it carries some risk of leading
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to “distribution by any other name”—e.g., the argument that revocation of unlawful
grants is an efficient way to get administration into lawful hands that spares the
ecclesiastical court from being penalized for an acknowledged and perhaps excusable
error.
Against this “No distributions” position, one can rationally maintain that it
would be wiser to preserve some flexibility, to allow common law courts asked to
prohibit a distribution suit room to consider whether in the particular circumstances
distribution might be the best way to a fair settlement. As suggested above, however, in
support of prohibiting all revocation suits, or at least those aimed at revoking lawful
grants, it may be arguable that if ordering distribution is the only way to avoid serious
inequity to someone interested in an estate it might be better for an aggrieved party to
resort to a court of equity.
(3) Accountings
Ecclesiastical accountings can be seen as a pointless burden on administrators,
as a practice that would do no serious harm and might sometimes be useful, or as a de
facto threat to fulfillment of 21 Hen. VIII’s ends. For the first position one can argue that
if lawful administrators are in place and cannot be removed by revocation of their grants
there is simply no need for ecclesiastical courts to supervise how they are getting on with
administration. They are accountable to creditors at common law. They are also under a
bond in general terms to do their job properly. By requiring the bond Parliament can be
said to have intended that liability thereon be the sanction for such purposes as insuring
that co-administrators cooperate, to the exclusion of ecclesiastical supervision. The main
purpose of accounting would presumably be to see that administrators are making a
conscientious effort to realize the estate’s claims, in the form of debts due to the estate or
property belonging to the decedent but out of his possession at his death. Whether they
do so, however, is their choice. The assets go to them; if they want to give away part of
the estate by not pressing claims, that is their privilege. Admittedly, disagreement among
co-administrators on what to forgive or to claim, or whether the likelihood and value of
realizing a claim is sufficient to justify the attempt, can occur. Perhaps, however, the
bond is sufficient incentive to cooperation. Requiring accounting by a single lawful
administrator would come to paternalistic interference with how he is serving his own
interest; requiring it of co-administrators may come to a form of the same. I.e., appointing
co-administrators and their accepting appointment imply trust on the part of both the
ecclesiastical court and the appointees that cooperation will come with time; it is in a
sense “paternalistic” to keep an eye on them as if the trust were unjustified.
Against this “No accountings” position, one can argue that because the
requirements of 21 Hen. VIII are complex and because the powers to revoke and
distribute, if either survives at all, are intertwined, a non-coercive means to help estates
get settled is desirable. Demanding accounting is of course coercive in the sense that
administrators would be compelled by ecclesiastical sanctions to appear and render an
honest account, but in the end accounting is a fact-finding procedure. Being informed, the
ecclesiastical court would have a benign opportunity to influence the administrators
informally—to remind them of their duty and their bond, to suggest as quasi-mediators
how differences among co-administrators should be resolved, to make administrators
aware of equitable considerations and charitable or religious purposes they might want to
keep in mind, though whether they do is ultimately within their discretion.
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This permissive position is open to criticism, however; “No accountings”
remains defensible. The key objection to giving ecclesiastical courts an opportunity to
exercise informal influence is that recommending and urging on the part of a judicial
authority can de facto come close to coercion. Good offices gently performed could be
benignly helpful to confused or quarreling administrators. If, however, the ecclesiastical
court is strongly convinced that a distribution should be made and lets this be known,
ignorant administrators might believe they had no choice but to comply. Indeed, the
court could harass recalcitrant administrators just by repeated accountings, and
sometimes by pursuing them for infractions unconnected with their administratorship.
Whether distribution is flatly forbidden by the common law or only regarded as
prohibitable unless the court moved to prohibit sees special reason not to, the
ecclesiastical court would have achieved its preference by “voluntary” means. However
wise or even potentially legal that result may be, it undermines the common law’s
authority to interpret and apply 21 Hen, VIII. If, as might be tempting, the ecclesiastical
court used its discovered information to take formal steps—ordering a distribution or a
revocation of the original grant—procedural complications would be created. (Will a
penalty action lie when “disobeying the statute” takes the form of evading implied
provisions of 21 Hen. VIII as authoritatively construed by common law courts—as
opposed to violation of the express eligibility rules, when entitlement to the penalty
clearly accrues? It seems to me that this is an open question. Prohibition would probably
be useless to control what amounts to a clandestine distribution or revocation, because the
ecclesiastical judgments would normally be faits accomplish—i.e., prospectiveness
would be wanting.) In sum, the benefits of non-coercive intervention by way of
accountings are outweighed by the danger of its being perverted to subversion of the
statute’s policy.
Text—Summary
Before the statute of 21 Hen. VIII, c.5, ecclesiastical courts had very broad
freedom to handle intestates’ estates. There was one earlier statute limiting that freedom,
but not in a strong or clearly enforceable way. 31 Edw. III, Stat. I, c. 11, provided that
administration should be assigned to the “plus proschiens et plus loial amis” of the
deceased; that such administrators should have the same power as executors to recover
debts owed to the decedent; and that administrators “soient accountables as ordinairs si
avant come executors sont.” No sanctions are specified for violation of the statute. No
specific standards for identifying “plus proschiens et plus loial amis.” Power to recover
debts would be given effect simply by the common law’s allowing administrators to sue
for such debts. The provision on accountability, if not superseded by implication of 21
Hen. VIII, could be used to argue that ecclesiastical courts may not be prohibited from
calling administered to account, though I have no evidence that it was. It was once
claimed in a complicated 17th argument century that the “nearest friends” criterion for
appointment was not so vague that it could never be the basis for Prohibition. For the
most part, however, the earlier statute can be ignored.
The Introduction above, based on the words of 21 Hen. VIII and general
reflection, describes the problems one would expect to arise in interpreting and applying
the statute. In this study, I have investigated from the evidence of law reports only the
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cases that involve the use of Prohibitions to enforce the statute these cases relate to four
provisions, one express and the other three arguably, but not certainly, implied by the act.
The statute unmistakably makes rules as to who must be appointed
administrator of intestates’ estates and who may sometimes be appointed as additional
co-administrators. See the Introduction for the details of these rules. If they were
violated, a penalty action against the ecclesiastical judge was given to those deprived of
their right to appointment. It is possible, but not certain, that the victims of disobedience
could also recover damages beyond the penalty. The question then arises whether
Prohibition could ever be issued to prevent ecclesiastical courts from violating the
statutory requirements concerning mandatory and permissible administrators. The pros
and cons of this are discussed in the abstract in the Introduction. The issue comes up in
some of the reported Prohibition cases. It is elaborately argued in a few cases, but not
resolved.
Although the statute says nothing about it, ecclesiastical courts’ power to revoke
grants of administration and make new ones came to be questioned. It was argued, and
controverted, that by implication 21 Hen. VIII banned revocation in all or some
circumstances. This issue is taken up in some Prohibition cases. Should attempts to get
grants revoked by ecclesiastical suit, ordinarily initiated by parties omitted from the
original grant who thought they should be appointed, be prohibited? More precisely,
should they always be prohibited on the ground that the statute simply abolished the
ecclesiastical power, or never because the statute had no intention to deprive
ecclesiastical courts of their pre-statutory power to revoke their grants, or sometimes—
unless in the common law judges’ eyes the ecclesiastical court had sufficient reason to
reconsider its original grant?
Although, again, the statute is silent, does it by implication provide that
ecclesiastical courts may not order administrators to distribute the estate? I.e.: After
appointing administrators, or in the process of appointing them, may ecclesiastical courts
require that the administrators dispose of the assets of the estate in some designated way,
as opposed to keeping them for themselves? May Prohibitions be used to stop attempts
by interested parties to obtain, or ecclesiastical courts on their own initiative to make,
such distribution orders? These issues too are discussed in the Introduction for the sake
of a more comprehensive view of their complexity and the merits of different views than
always comes through from the reported discussion in cases. They are, however, well
debated in the cases and come closer to decisive resolution than the other questions
summarized here.
Finally, may ecclesiastical courts compel appointed administrators to account
for their handling of the estate, or does 21 Hen. VIII forbid that? See the Introduction for
a general view of what this question involves. There are expressions of opinion on the
issue in the cases without firm resolution.
A comprehensive summary of where the cases come down is hard to give, but
they present a striking pattern. For a long time between the enactment of 21 Hen. VIII
(1529-30) and 1618 there is little sign that Prohibitions were used to enforce the statute in
any of the four respects distinguished. Little does not mean absolutely none. In the
upshot, however, we have one well-argued Elizabethan case in which the power to
revoke administration was raised explicitly, but the court of Common Pleas was evenly
divided on that question, and the case was resolved without deciding it. A few Jacobean
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reports before 1618 show at least that the effect of 21 Hen. VIII on the law of intestacy
was in the air, but there are no decisions actually restricting ecclesiastical power to
revoke, distribute, and demand accountings. The one Common Pleas decision reported is
a refusal to prohibit accounting, but it contains a dictum that distributions should be
prohibited. In one of three King’s Bench cases, revocation is not objected to as such; the
case’s issues are whether an appellate court may directly revoke a lower court’s
appointment of administrators (as distinct from reversing a lower court’s decision against
revocation in a suit seeking it) and, if so, whether the higher court may itself name a new
administrator (instead of leaving the next step to the lower court.) The other two King’s
Bench cases both present attempts to prohibit, on the basis of 21 Hen. VIII, efforts both
to require accountings and to compel a distribution. In one, the common law court was
disinclined to prohibit on either score, and in the other the two judges present opposed
Prohibition. A major case of 1618 (Torke) is the turning point from the old law to the
new. In that case, the Common Pleas under Chief Justice Sir Henry Hobart made a strong
decision to prohibit a distribution order. Thereafter, Hobart’s Common Pleas took up or
at least touched on distribution, revocation, and accounting in several cases. As of
Hobart’s death in 1625, there were questions still hanging, but the legitimacy of
enforcing 21 Hen. VIII by Prohibition was established, and so was a general inclination
to doubt that the statute left ecclesiastical courts with much of their ancient freedom in
intestacy matters. Hobart himself and some of his puisne judges probably arrived at a
position understood by themselves to be embracing and radical. I shall state it in the
starkest terms, although its advocates may have hesitated to push it quite so far in all
details: The statute authorizes ecclesiastical courts to appoint administrators in accord
with the eligibility rules it prescribes; what it does not authorize it disauthorizes—
ecclesiastical meddling with intestates’ estates beyond the act of appointing an
administrator is ultra vires, without regard to practice before the statute or its persistence
de facto after the statute; making an appointment exhausts ecclesiastical authority.
After Hobart’s day, this position became a sort of presumptive base for cases on
21 Hen. VIII. It could be challenged around the edges, and the stark version was
sometimes qualified in decisions, but it ceased to be arguable that the ecclesiastical courts
remained possessed of all or most of their old powers. It is only a little melodramatic to
say that a legal revolution occurred.
That Hobart’s Common Pleas was the scene of it, rather than either court under
Sir Edward Coke—Common Pleas 1606-1613, King’s Bench 1613-1616—will perhaps
be surprising. In Ch.2 below, we shall see Coke championing Prohibitions to enforce
another Henrician statute—23 Hen. VIII, c. 9—and settling the law in favor of using
them (even though 23 Hen. VIII provides better protection for victims of disobedience by
tort and penal remedies than 21 Hen VIII does.) One can only speculate as to why
Coke’s courts did not embrace the claim that 21 Hen. VIII had implied provisions
enforceable by Prohibition. Accident or want of opportunity hardly seems the likeliest
explanation, since that claim had been broached by his time. My guess would be that his
courts’ inactivity reflects the side of Coke’s thinking that does not accord with his
popular reputation as an enemy of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and eager wielder of the
Prohibition to contain it. (For perhaps the best illustration of this side of his
jurisprudence, see Vol. II, pp. 207 ff., on the ecclesiastical rule that transactions must be
proved by two witnesses. Contrary to judges who thought the rule a foolish burden and
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objectionable because discordant with the common law, Coke thought it both practically
useful and merely within the ecclesiastical courts’ rights if applied to transactions
belonging to ecclesiastical cognizance.) It is plausible to suppose that Coke considered
the powers to revoke, distribute, and require accountings useful for getting intestates’
estates settled in the various and complicated circumstances they could present. They had
arguably worked satisfactorily for a long time, including a long time after passage of the
statute that allegedly abolished them. Giving legal force to statutory implications which
Parliament could have made explicit if it wanted to enact them, and which historically—
in 1530—it probably did not want to enact, may have incurred Coke’s disapproval. It
may have been part of his strength and part of his weakness as a judge that he had little
inclination to rid the law of complexities and anomalies for the practical utility of simple
rules. For an illustration of this point, see my Copyhold, Equity and the Common Law
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1963), Chapter III: Elizabethan judges
were inclined to hold that manorial custom, which supplied the rules governing the
copyhold tenements newly protected by the common law actions of Trespass and
Ejectment were the same as the generally known common law rules governing analogous
situations unless there was clear evidence to the contrary. Coke was more inclined to
discover historical and conceptual objections to making the manorial systems as much
like the common law system as possible. For persons with interests in copyhold land,
Coke’s point of view made the rules they were subject to less predictable than they might
have been, and abstruse litigative debate more probable, although the “real rights” of the
interested were more deeply understood.
In any event, it was Hobart and his colleagues (some of whom had served with
Coke) who took the law of intestacy in a new direction and put the Prohibition on the
map in that field. General speculation on the motives and intellectual history of the
change wrought by the Hobart Common Pleas has little point when, at last, we can look
directly at what the cases tell us. The change (subject to the ways in which it was not
entirely clear-cut and complete) certainly resulted in legal simplification and reduction of
litigation. I.e., the protraction of ecclesiastical measures beyond appointment of
administrators was at least significantly curtailed. Protection of familial rights, which can
be seen as the statute’s chief end, was in practice fostered. The change was permanent,
notwithstanding qualifications and unsettlement of details.
The qualifications and loose ends can really be appreciated only by examining
what was struggled with, decided, or not decided in the particular cases. For a rough
summary: Of the ecclesiastical powers in question, distribution was the most decisively
ruled out by the Hobart Common Pleas. The ban on distribution held up well in the
period between Hobart’s death and the Civil War and indeed into and beyond the war.
Hobart’s successor as Chief Justice, Sir Thomas Richardson, was adamant in upholding
the principle of “No distributions”, but thought that common law courts should have
discretion to permit it in some circumstances. His proposed qualification was not
embraced by the other judges, however. So long as Hobart sat in the Common Pleas, no
attempts were made in the King’s Bench to prohibit ecclesiastical courts on the basis of
21 Hen. VIII. After Torke, it would have made no sense for parties seeking to prohibit
distributions not to resort to the Common Pleas, and lawyers would have figured from the
implications of that case, as well as from other cases and expressions of opinion in the
Common Pleas, that the chance of prohibiting revocations and accountings would be best
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in that court. After Hobart’s death the King’s Bench became more active; it followed the
Common Pleas law in essentials. In the end, revocation was less clearly ruled out than
distribution, but in so far as there was any inclination to permit it was probably only in
the situation where it was most useful—when a grant of administration failed to observe
the statute’s eligibility rules and revocation of the original grant would probably be
followed by a new lawful grant. Accounting is less clearly ruled out, or nearly ruled out,
than the other two powers, but there is definite authority against it. Some of the deepest
arguments on 21 Hen. VIII from the Bar comes in late Caroline cases, in which there is
even an intimation that the basic law established by Hobart’s court should be overthrown,
but this came to no decisional effect.
Text—The Cases
Cases on 21 Hen. VIII are mostly late-Jacobean and Caroline. One explanation
of this would be that ecclesiastical courts in the 17th century tried to take on a more active
role in the oversight of estates and prompted challenges. Earlier, by this hypothesis, the
ecclesiastical courts were mostly content to perform their clear role under the statute,
leaving administrators alone once they had been appointed and submitted an inventory. A
later attempt to assume responsibilities reminiscent of pre-Reformation days begot
Prohibition suits and forced the common law courts to think about the meaning of 21
Hen. VIII as they had scarcely done for almost a century. The alternative hypothesis
would be that ecclesiastical power to revoke administration and to order accountings and
distributions was for a long time so firmly recognized that challenging it would have been
futile. This is unlikely, however. It is true that the earliest challenges were not successful;
the law took a decided turn against ecclesiastical power only from 1618. Nevertheless,
interested parties would in all probability have tried to get Prohibitions if the activities of
the ecclesiastical courts had offended them. There would be reported cases, even if they
all eventuated in Prohibition denied. (And as we shall see below, the one piece of
Elizabethan evidence there is shows that judicial opinion was at least not unanimous in
favor of the ecclesiastical power.)
The reports of cases on 21 Hen. VIII on the whole do not give very detailed
discussions of the statute’s construction. Sometimes 21 Hen. VIII is not even mentioned
in brief reports of cases that must turn on it. The cases following, however, would seem
to depend on the statute, whether or not it is referred to.
My only Elizabethan case has been discussed in detail under other headings in
Vols. I (p.322 ff.) and II (P. 317 ff.)—see references there. In summary: the case presents
the Common Pleas split 2-2 on whether administration once granted may be revoked.
Justices Periam and Wyndham said “No”, Justice Walmesley and Chief Justice Anderson
said “Yes.” In the circumstances of the case, there were fairly strong equitable
considerations in favor of taking administration away from the widow and giving it to the
deceased’s common law heir. Periam and Wyndham seem to have thought that 21 Hen.
VIII was a categorical bar to that, whatever the equities. Whether or not they would have
ruled out any limits on the power to revoke and re-grant, Walmesley and Anderson did
not think it was ruled out in the instant case, where the reasons were quite convincing.
The case was complicated by other factors and resolved by something of a compromise,
leaving the deadlock on the imperatives of 21 Hen. VIII intact.
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Reynald Hall’s Case1, the only one from the first decade of James I’s reign, is a
briefly reported holding that the Delegates may revoke administration, but may not make
a new grant. So far as the main issues on 21 Hen. VIII are concerned, this decision
confirms by implication that there is no objection to revocation and re-grant as such. The
holding itself is specific to the Delegates (or, no doubt, to any appellate court—many
cases on decedents’ estates started in the Prerogative Court of the Archbishop of
Canterbury, so that the Delegates were the first court of appeal.) Its negative point—the
appellate court may not make a new grant—is unsurprising. The function of appointing
administrators belonged to first-instance courts with probate jurisdiction; 21 Hen. VIII
can perhaps be taken as insisting that this role be played by those courts. The report does
not say, however, that the statute demanded the ruling; it might have been the same if the
statute had not existed. The essential point is that an appellate court may not in this way
preempt the functions of a lower court. In general, ecclesiastical courts of appeal had
powers of preemption. If an appeal was brought on an interlocutory point, the appellate
court could if it saw fit take over the suit and give sentence on issues other than the one
appealed, including issues of fact. The present holding says that appointment of
administrators—which is after all a discretionary function and quite different in nature
from deciding suits between adversaries—cannot be swept within a general authority to
speed up the resolution of litigation.
The affirmative point in the present holding—an appellate court may revoke the
lower court’s grant of administration—is perhaps more problematic. There would seem to
be little basis for doubting that the first-instance court’s decision to revoke might be
appealed and either upheld (with the consequence that the matter would be remanded to
the lower court for the appointment of new administrators) or overruled (with the effect
of reinstating the original administrators.) At any rate, I find it hard to see anything in 21
Hen. VIII to interfere with the normal processes of appeal in the ecclesiastical system. A
decision to revoke is a decision, at least analogous to a sentence in a lawsuit. Why
should it not be scrutinized? By the same token, the first-instance court’s refusal to
revoke, when that court has been moved to do so and heard argument, seems a reasonable
object of appeal and hardly at odds with the statute. What seems more dubious is going to
an appellate court with the first motion for revocation—in effect treating the mere
appointment of administrators as a “decision” and “appealing” it in the form of asking the
higher court to revoke. If Hall sustains this, it is highly permissive toward ecclesiastical
courts, despite its insistence that making a new appointment is improper at the appellate
level. Unfortunately, the report of the case does not reveal the circumstances. Interesting
technical questions are raised, but one can do no more than indicate them sketchily.
In Mountgomerie v. Clarke (1614),2 the Common Pleas refused to prohibit a
privately initiated ecclesiastical suit to compel an administrator to account for the estate.
21 Hen. VIII is not mentioned, but it must be the basis on which Prohibition was
unsuccessfully sought. There is no indication in the reports as to whether any special
circumstances were adduced on either side—i.e., grounds on which it might be argued
that an accounting was or was not reasonable in the particular case. Noy’s report adds a
1

T. 3 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,209, f.67.
H. 11 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5419, f. 92b. The undated Montague v. Clark (Noy, 24) is probably
the same case.
2

45

dictum: A suit for distribution (“to make a division of the goods.”) should be prohibited.
It is noteworthy that one court, at any rate, thought a line could be drawn between “bare
accountability” and substantive supervision of how the estate was handled.
In Sotherley’s Case (1616)3, an infant died intestate and his mother took
administration. She was called into the ecclesiastical court both to account and to
distribute to the decedent’s kin. The King’s Bench is reported as inclined to deny
Prohibition. If there was any hesitation it was probably on the score of the distribution
rather than the accounting. The report says expressly that the administratrix was
accountable in the ecclesiastical court. It also says that the estate was encumbered by
many debts. This fact (presumably stated in the surmise) might be an independent ground
for Prohibition with respect to the distribution. I.e., it would be possible to hold that so far
as 21 Hen. VIII is concerned administrators may be forced to distribute, but that suits to
enforce distribution are premature when there are substantial outstanding debts. (Seeking
Prohibition on the ground of such debts would be analogous to an executor’s attempting
to prohibit a legacy suit by surmising some version of “No assets”.) The court in
Sotherley was more decisive on accountability than on distribution, but that may be
because of the claim of heavy debts; if it had any sympathy with the distinction drawn in
Mountgomerie there is no positive indication of it in the cursory report, and the next case
suggests the contrary.
Sharpe v. Simpson4, from the same term and the same court, is identical except
for the claim of debts. Administration was again granted to the decedent’s mother. Again
kinsmen sued for the dual purpose of securing an accounting and forcing a distribution
among “twelve others of near blood.” Prohibition was sought squarely on the statute and
denied by Justices Dodderidge and Houghton—presumably the only judges present in
court. So far as the report shows, counsel seeking Prohibition came down harder on the
distribution than the accounting. He insisted that the statute intends for the nearest
relative to whom administration is granted to take all, which does not have to mean that
the administrator is free of “bare accountability.” The two judges put the emphasis the
other way, saying that “the books” frequently upheld administrators’ liability to account.
Nevertheless, they refused Prohibition, with the effect of allowing distribution
proceedings to go forward. (Their reference to “the books” is a little mystifying, since
decided cases posterior to the statute were infrequent. Evidence of the legality of
accountings from earlier than the statute—from “the books” in the sense of the
Yearbooks—hardly proves that the statute did not change the law.)
Nothing in the cases above, save for the controverted opinion of two Elizabethan
judges as to revocation, goes to give 21 Hen. VIII any effect of restraining ecclesiastical
courts from interference with intestates’ estates after the original grant of administration
and receipt of an inventory. The first case to go the other way, and it does so explicitly
and decisively, is from the Common Pleas in 1618. A good MS. report calls it Torke’s
Case; it is unmistakably identical with Tooker v. Loane in Hobart’s Reports.5
3

P. 14 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,211, f.155b.
P. 14 Jac. K.B. 1 Rolle, 358.
5
H. 15 Jac, C.P. Harl, 5149, f. 96, sub nom. Torke; Hobart, 191, undated, sub nom.
Tooker v. Loane. That the two reports are of the same case is supported, I think beyond a
reasonable doubt, by the following considerations: “Torke” and “Tooker” are close.
4
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In Torke, A had sons B, C, and D. B and C predeceased A. When A died
intestate, the ecclesiastical court granted administration to D. It also took a bond from
him obliging him to make a “rightful distribution” and to share the estate with the
children of B and C. The Prohibition case arose when the Delegates purported to compel
D to make a particular distribution. The MS. Report does not explain how the matter
reached the Delegates, but on this point the generally inferior printed report is helpful. It
appears that the court of first instance demanded an accounting from D. (There is nothing
in the judicial remarks in Torke to suggest that barely insisting on an account was
regarded as objectionable.) When D had accounted, and presumably shown that the estate
was ripe for final settlement, the ecclesiastical judge assumed a mediatorial, rather than a
judicial, role. He did not impose a particular distribution, but negotiated with D as to how
the estate should be divided, presumably on the understanding that the court would accept
a reasonable scheme agreed to under its supervision. I.e., it would regard the bond as
satisfied and refrain from demanding any other distribution. The solution agreed on was
that the estate should be distributed per capita rather than per stirpes. That means that D,
each of B’s children, and each of C’s would take equal shares. The contrasting per stirpes
method would split the estate three ways, one going to D, one to be divided among B’s
children (nine of them as it happened), and one among C’s (who were only three.) The
guardian of the children—both B’s and C’s, it seems, all of them apparently infants—
appealed to the Delegates.
“Appealed” has an unusual sense here, because there was no judicial decree
below. Clearly the guardian went to the Delegates in order to force a distribution on the
per stirpes principle. His position was that distribution on that basis was required by
ecclesiastical law. His position as to procedure was that resort to the Delegates was
appropriate, despite the fact that there was no mistaken sentence to “appeal” in the strict
sense. The lower court did not seek to enforce a distribution. Nominally, it was willing to
let the administrator dispose of the estate at his discretion. In reality, it put the
administrator under the pressure of a bond to make some distribution, and its judicial
inaction was the result of an acceptable scheme’s being volunteered. Under these
circumstances, I take the guardian’s theory to maintain, there was no place to go except a
higher court. Going there is as good as an appeal—an attempt to correct a matter
mishandled by an inferior court—even though it is not one in strictness. The point is
Hobart identifies “Tooker” as Giles Tooker, Reader of Lincoln’s Inn, and Charles, his
brother, those two men being co-administrators. The MS. does not show that there were
two administrators, but refers to the administrator, as to the other parties, by schematic
letters—A, B, C, and D. Whether there were two administrators rather than a single one
does not matter for the issues in the case. The reports agree on all the legally significant
facts, as on the outcome. Hobart gives crucial facts omitted from the MS. (see text), but
some remarks by the judges in the fuller MS. report of their opinions only make sense
with those facts. The full situation presented by the case, including the Delegates’
involvement, is too unusual to have occurred more than once with any probability. Many
reports in Hobart are undated; they can usually be associated with the time of Hobart’s
own Chief Justiceship; 15 Jac. is thus as likely a date as any for an undated report in that
volume.
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reasonable, though it admits of the riposte that it would have been better for the guardian
to sue in the court of first instance for the sort of distribution he thought the law required.
Going straight to the Delegates might have the advantage of efficiency, but it was
questionable procedure. One should note that the guardian was only doing what he
conceived as his duty to see that his charges got what they legally ought to, if, as appears
to have been the case, he represented all the children—not just the three children of C,
who would have done better under the per stirpes principle.
The administrator, D, sought to prohibit the Delegates centrally on the ground that
by 21 Hen.VIII the ecclesiastical courts’ authority is exhausted once administration is
granted, wherefore compelling distributions is simply ultra vires. Remarks by Chief
Justice Hobart (MS. report) suggest, however, that going to the Delegates without a
properly appealable cause was objected to and claimed as a separate ground for
Prohibition. (Like the guardian, the administrator would seem to have been
disinterestedly motivated. The strongest interest in a per stirpes distribution would have
been his. He was only seeking to protect the per capita distribution that he preferred and
the lower court accepted. If forcing a distribution indirectly by means of the bond can be
objected to, the administrator here did not object.)
The MS. report gives the individual opinions of all the judges. They agree in the
upshot (as the printed report confirms), but with some differences in detail; Prohibition
should be granted because under 21 Hen. VIII ecclesiastical courts lack authority to
compel a distribution.
Chief Justice Hobart starts out by dismissing objections specifically directed at
the Delegates’ role. He says in effect that it made no difference in exactly what sense the
Delegates were acting as an “appellate” court. His strict point is probably that it was not
the common law’s business to judge whether there was a properly appealable question,
that being a procedural matter within the ecclesiastical sphere. (“They have appealed
from the Ordinary to the Delegates. And be that an order, decree, or on account of any
other causa gravaminis [interlocutory point] is not material. And for this no Prohibition
will be granted, for it is proper for the jurisdiction of the court.”)
Moving on to the main question, Hobart lays down a premise that cannot be
disputed once objection to the Delegates’ involvement has been cleared away: viz. the
Delegates’ power to order a distribution is as good, but only as good, as the Ordinary’s.
The groundwork thus laid, Hobart announces his stand on 21 Hen. VIII: The statute took
away the ecclesiastical courts’ previous power to compel a particular distribution of
intestates’ goods. There is no question but that the previous power existed; the statute
simply changed the law. The object of the statute is the “preferment” of widows,
children and nearest kin. That policy would be defeated if ecclesiastical courts retained
power to interfere with the discretion of administrators duly appointed under the act’s
standards. Moreover, as a further clue to construction, 21 Hen. VIII in terms puts
administrators, mutatis mutandis, in the same position as executors. Once an
administrator is duly appointed, it is as if the intestate had made a will naming that person
executor. Ecclesiastical courts may as well have power to make an executor distribute the
residue of an estate to non-legatees as power to force a distribution on an administrator.
No one would claim, I take Hobart as saying, that executors ever have any such duty—
i.e., that they are other than residuary legatees when no one else is expressly named as
such. This is the meaning of the statute, and the statute should be enforced by Prohibition.
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It is futile to object that ecclesiastical courts have understood the statute differently and
have built up a body of usage in accord with their understanding. If that is the case, they
have misconstrued the statute, and they and their usage are not its authoritative
interpreters.
Justice Warburton agrees entirely on the central point. The only explanatory
emphasis he adds is on the penalty clause in 21 Hen. VIII: The statute requires the
Ordinary to grant administration to certain persons and subjects him to a penalty if he
does otherwise. That is to say, the statute cares that administration goes to the proper
close kin. It puts the ecclesiastical judge under the pressure of penal liability to make sure
it does. The whole idea is to get administration into the right hands, so that widows and
close relatives may enjoy the property themselves, or otherwise deal with it by
uncontrolled discretion.
The main interest of Warburton’s opinion lies in his express dicta on two further
points: First, as Warburton puts it, once the ecclesiastical judge has granted
administration, “he cannot revoke or control the acts of the administration.” He may,
however, revoke the letters of administration. I.e., the Ordinary may grant administration
to X, then cancel X’s grant and make a new one to Y, without, so far as appears, any
reason, or provided only that Y meets the eligibility standards as well as X. Warburton
does not explain why the statute should be taken as leaving powers of revocation and regrant intact while destroying the power to interfere with the administrator’s acts as long
as his letters are in force. The following argument will support the distinction: Some
power of revocation is desirable for giving effect to the statute’s eligibility requirements.
If the Ordinary mistakenly grants administration to an ineligible person, he ought to be
able to cancel that grant and make a correct one. It would be foolish to rely on the penalty
clause alone to make the Ordinary be careful, when it is possible to give him the means to
correct his mistake and fulfill the policy of the statute specifically. But is it not too
narrow to hold that administration can be revoked only if the Ordinary has actually
violated the statute? The statute gives him discretion among equally eligible candidates.
It must intend that he make serious use of his discretion, not toss a coin, as it were. He
must abstain from interference with the administrator’s discretion because he has had his
chance to use his own to decide, within limits, whose discretion is to be trusted. If he may
revoke in order to correct his mistakes in directly applying the stature, it seems hard to
deny him power to revoke in order to correct mistakes in the use of his discretionary
judgment. Once this is conceded, one might as well say he can revoke at will, for there is
no practical way to sort out instances in which revocation corrects a mistaken but
considerate use of discretion—as where new information is brought to the Ordinary’s
attention—, instances in which it corrects a hasty, inconsiderate grant, and instances in
which the Ordinary has simply changed his mind. The common law courts should not
burden themselves with assessing the circumstances and reasonableness of acts of
revocation.
It should be noted in connection with this argument that conceding an unlimited
power to revoke reinforces the point that there is no power to compel distribution. The
Ordinary is not debarred from thinking that a certain distribution would be desirable.
When there is a choice of candidates, he cannot be prevented from appointing the one he
considers most likely to make the desirable distribution, nor from appointing as coadministrators all the co-eligibles among whom he would like to see a distribution, nor
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from excluding some co-eligibles because he thinks they should not participate in the
distribution. Moreover, the Ordinary is not debarred from second thoughts. In short, the
Ordinary’s indirect power to influence the distribution of estates is sufficient without
giving him direct means—and therewith the temptation to intervene where the statute
clearly provides he should not, as where the administration is in the hands of a solely
eligible widow and the nearest blood-relatives are minor children, but some other
kinsman persuades the judge he deserves a share of a large estate. To the extent that a
legitimate interest in the distribution of some estates is conceded to the Ordinary, and
revocation is conceded to be the legitimate means, a basis is also provided for defending
accountability. Should the ecclesiastical court not be able to discover whether its
discretionary appointees are realizing the estate’s potential, how large that potential has
turned out to be, and whether any distributive measures have been taken, in order to
consider whether the court’s intentions would stand a better chance of being fulfilled by
new administrators?
Warburton’s second dictum is that the obligation taken from the administrator in
the instant case was void. It would appear that the administrator here was the only
eligible person. (Only surviving son, deemed to be a closer relative than a grandchild.
There is at any rate no sign of a widow.) Assuming that to be true, a question remains as
to whether administration may be granted to a discretionary appointee on condition that
he make a distribution. It is conceivable that in that case the letters of administration
could be conditional in terms, with the effect that if the condition is broken new letters
can be granted. Arguably, getting to the same end by means of a bond would be
insignificantly different and innocuous, though the technique of a bond could be objected
to (and might be by Warburton) on grounds independent of the statute. Use of bonds by
ecclesiastical courts was sometimes objected to in other contexts, simply as going beyond
the limits of spiritual sanctions. (Warburton analogizes a rule to the effect that sheriffs
may not take bonds conditioned on appearances and payments of money, but the parallel
is not explained.)
It seems arguable that making a distribution a condition—straightforwardly if
using a bond is intrinsically objectionable—is not clearly against the policy of the statute
when the administrator is a discretionary choice. To the extent that the ecclesiastical
judge has a legitimate interest, in some cases, in influencing the disposition of the estate,
provided he does so upon his original exercise of discretion or by way of revocation and
re-grant, it seems difficult to exclude conditionality. That he does have a legitimate
interest seems implicit in his power to exclude co-eligibles, though, as I have argued
above, it is possible to say that power is a sufficient means to give effect to the interest.
The opinion of the third member of the court to speak, Justice Winch, presents
some legibility problems, and even apart from that it is not as clear as the other judges’
remarks. Winch unmistakably agrees with the others as to the result in the instant case—
the Delegates should be prohibited. He also agrees as to the central question of
principle—21 Hen. VIII rules out the ecclesiastical court’s power to compel distribution
directly. To what the other judges say to this intent, Winch adds that if an administrator
were to make a distribution by order of the ecclesiastical court he would not be off the
hook in the common law sphere—i.e., would be liable for debts of the estate claimed or
sued for after the distribution. (What is the relevance of this? Common law liability
would surely have survived distribution before the statute, when ecclesiastical power to
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compel distribution was unquestioned. A system with no direct way of insuring the
administrator’s safety against late-appearing creditors may be regarded as unsatisfactory.
Indirect devices are imaginable: Ecclesiastical courts should be careful about ordering
distribution prematurely; Prohibitions should prevent their doing so when it could be
shown that claims were probably outstanding; there are various possible ways in which
Ordinaries and administrators could “take out insurance”—putting off mandatory
distribution but taking a bond from the administrator guaranteeing a distribution by a
date safely in the future, taking bonds from beneficiaries of the distribution to save the
administrator harmless against late creditors’ claims, and the like. But no solution to the
inconvenience would be as clean as simply abolishing compulsory distribution—simply
giving the residue of the estate to the administrator, indefinitely subject to liability for
unsatisfied debts. It is reasonable to argue that the statute intended to improve the law in
this respect as in others. Obviously, however, there is no clinching argument from these
considerations for concluding that the statute destroyed ecclesiastical powers which it
does not clearly abolish in terms.) Finally, Winch repeats Warburton’s point that
administration is revocable, again without apparent qualifications.
It is with respect to the bond in the instant case and the relationship between the
first-instance court and the Delegates that Winch seems to deviate from the other judges.
He makes his point as follows: “But we are in the case of the Delegates, who are remote
from the obligation that is taken for the execution of the administration. For though by
reason of that bond the Ordinary could make distribution, yet the Delegates may not.
[Car coment per reason de cest bond le Ordinary poit faire distribucon uncore les
delegates ne poiyent]” It seems to me this language can be interpreted in two ways:
First, the bond as such is perfectly good, contrary to Warburton. But more is implied than
that a suit on the bond could be sustained. The administrator has in effect promised to
make a distribution, and there was nothing unlawful about insisting that he do so before
giving him administration (even though, as would appear to be the case, he was the only
available candidate.) Further, he has implicitly promised to make a distribution that is
agreeable to the Ordinary, for it would be absurd to suppose his undertaking is confined
to anything that could count as a distribution, such as paying a penny to each of the
nephews and nieces. To all practical intents that means “the Ordinary could make
distribution”, though in this case he had not done so judicially, but merely agreed to the
distribution which the administrator proposed to make. But the administrator promised
only the first instance court. The Delegates have nothing to do with it. Therefore
Prohibition to the Delegates is justified on the general principle that distribution is not
straightforwardly within the power of ecclesiastical courts since 21 Hen. VIII.
Alternatively, instead of espousing such a theory, Winch may be speaking in a
highly hypothetical or subjunctive mode: At the very most, perhaps there is nothing
unlawful about the bond, and perhaps, having entered the bond, the administrator has in
effect estopped himself from doing other than distributing as the Ordinary sees fit. But
this is speculative. What is certain is that any power to compel distribution in the special
circumstances here belongs to the Ordinary; whereas it is the Delegates who propose to
control the distribution in the case before us. The case is therefore easy, for nothing can
be said for the Delegates in the absence of a general power in ecclesiastical courts to
force distribution, a power which the statute takes away. (Law French grammar is too
loose to permit a linguistic resolution of Winch’s meaning.)
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The last Justice to give his opinion, Hutton, starts with a historical survey of the
law of intestacy. New arguments for the unanimous conclusion that power to distribute
did not survive 21 Hen. VIII do not emerge from the survey, but it is interesting to
observe that Hutton’s confidence in the conclusion depended in part on his sense of a
coherent historical pattern. The pattern comes to a progressive cutting-back on the
authority of ecclesiastical courts to determine the disposition of dead men’s goods. The
testator and the executor were the first victors. For by “the ancient common law”
(attested to by Magna Carta) decedents’ children were entitled to a reasonable share of
the estate even when there was a will with executors. By Edward III’s time, that had
changed (non-legislatively, Hutton as good as admits by merely stating that the common
law had ceased to “allow” the ancient rule.) The testator’s right to exclude his children
and the executor’s modern position as residuary legatee in the absence of another
designated one became part of the law. The statute of 31 Edw. III started the process of
assimilating administrators to executors. It required ecclesiastical courts to appoint
administrators, instead of dealing directly with intestates’ estates (just by taking and
distributing the tangible assets to charitable and familial beneficiaries, without the
intervention of an executor-like figure.) In terms, it made administrators “executor-like”
by providing that they should sue and be sued for debts of the estate in the same way as
executors. Although he does not spell out the point, Hutton obviously knew that 31 Edw.
III did not complete the assimilation—i.e., did not make the administrator as free as an
executor to keep the property after satisfying creditors or dispose of it voluntarily as if it
were his own. Perhaps Hutton would have said that 31. Edw. III rather intended than
merely anticipated the final step, that 21 Hen. VIII did not change the law so much as it
pinned down the law which the older statute failed to define. In any event, 21 Hen. VIII
was the end-point of the history. “The person to whom solely the administration shall be
committed is made more certain (than the ‘plus proschiens et plus loialx amis’ of 31
Edw. III)”, and from that certainty sprang the consequence all the judges agreed on—
disappearance of the last vestige of ecclesiastical power to force a disposition.
From his history, Hutton turns to the bond in the instant case: In so far as a bond
taken from administrators obliges them to more than “true administration of the goods” it
is void. Note that demanding a bond of administrators is not simply unlawful. Would a
bond obliging to “true administration” oblige to more than performance of the statutory
duties—to select coadjutors with respect for the prescribed criteria and render a full and
true inventory? If not, Hutton’s formulation implies more clearly than Warburton’s that a
bond obliging to distribute would be bad in all circumstances—not only when it is
exacted from a solely eligible administrator, but equally when entering such a bond is
made a condition of the grant of administration to one of several eligibles. If a bond
would be void in the latter case, so surely would be a grant expressly on condition that a
distribution be made.
Hutton then comes back to the central point about 21 Hen. VIII, speaking to the
practical advantages of the court’s position: “The mischief would be great that would
ensue if the Ordinary should dispose at his pleasure. For there may be many of equal
proximity of blood, on which great confusion will ensue. And admit that there are not
many, yet the distribution is often to such as are in a remote degree [of relationship] to
the intestate.” The point may perhaps be spelled out as follows: When the equitable case
for a given distribution is good, the practical problems of effecting one are likely to be
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formidable. In principle, if one co-eligible is chosen administrator, it seems hard to
exclude others of equal relationship from shares of an estate large enough to do more
than reward the administrator for his trouble. In a really hard case, the unfairness of
allowing an administrator chosen by chance or discretion to take all may seem
overwhelming. But one should not make bad law by imagining hard cases of the sort the
statute is drawn to avoid. The act guarantees administration to the widow and/or at least
one child or grandchild (taking issue to be nearest kin) when a widow and offspring exist.
Of course those included could mistreat those excluded in that situation, but surely the
bonds of nature and the good sense of ecclesiastical judges deserve reliance in simple
cases of small family groups. The statute also guarantees inclusion of an issueless widow
unless all other administrators are in the class of nearest surviving blood-relatives. The
practically problematic case will therefore usually come when a man leaves neither
widow nor issue.
In that case, it is quite likely that the eligible kin will be numerous, and the
ecclesiastical court is likely to be at the mercy of applicants. In some situations of that
sort, the equity of a distribution is in a sense especially compelling—say when no one
closer than a cousin is in evidence and who and where other cousins of equal degree are
is all but unascertainable. There is no reason why the cousin who gets there first should
make off with everything. In a sense, that is worse than a wicked son’s doing so—a son
who manages to get the administration and turns his back on his mother and siblings. At
least the wicked son is the intestate’s close flesh and blood. The intestate might have
made a will appointing that son executor and leaving no legacies to his wife and other
children. In theory an administrator is quasi an executor; the ecclesiastical court,
supplying the place of a testator, is meant to choose someone the intestate might have
chosen. The intestate might scarcely have heard of a cousin who turns up with a valid
claim to administration after his death, and is in any event unlikely to have made a
discriminatory decision in his favor. Not uncommonly people prefer charity over their
cousins; they sometimes show special trust or special favor toward one of their sons.
Moreover, it takes a wicked son to scorn his immediate family and his father’s probable
wishes; a cousin does not have to be especially wicked to be indifferent to the fortunes of
other cousins. The scrupulosity and fairness that might lead him to seek them out and
share with them are rather supererogatory virtues, and therefore not to be depended on,
for which reason compulsory distribution is tempting.
The temptation should be resisted, however. The abstract justice of seeing that an
estate is divided among people who may all have meant equally little to the intestate, and
of keeping an enterprising or informed member of that class from enjoying a windfall, is
simply not worth the trouble. In such cases, let the ecclesiastical court do its best to avoid
injustice when it grants administration in the first place. If they cannot or will not do a
perfect job, let the cousins settle their own contentions. Delay and litigation are too high a
price to pay for marginal perfections of justice. 21 Hen. VIII seems intended to minimize
delay and litigation. The more one thinks about it, the clearer it is that the danger is real,
that the policy of heading it off at relatively minor cost makes sense, and that holding the
statute to bar distribution is entailed by that policy.
Hutton’s final point goes to the facts of the instant case. He alone of the judges
speaks about the specific situation at hand—basically, apart from the complexities of the
litigative context, the case of an estate where the natural claimants to share are a

53

surviving son plus grandchildren of the intestate. This contrasts with the case of remote
kinsmen, where arguments for distribution are in a sense compelling, yet ultimately
unsound. Hutton’s remark is: “And I hold that the administration may not be committed
to the children of the son who is dead, if the intestate has any son alive.” The meaning is
clear: Administration was correctly granted in the instant case; children are next of kin in
contemplation of 21 Hen. VIII to the exclusion of grandchildren. But what is the bearing
of this on the legality of compelling distribution? I suggest the following.
The claim that power to order distribution survived the statute is strongest, though
still to be rejected, when one co-eligible is chosen over others. Here the son was eligible
and the grandchildren ineligible, so that the grandchildren’s claim to distribution is not
even in the strongest class of such claims. If we give the statute a more vigorous or more
“substantive” interpretation, the point admits of another formulation: 21 Hen. VIII
provides that grandchildren have no legal right to shares. A distribution in their favor
would contravene the statute and so be unlawful even if compulsory distributions were
not ruled out generally. Any claim the grandchildren have on their uncle, the
administrator, is strictly moral. (Such, for example, that a court of equity could not
enforce it without violating the maxim “No equity against a statute”.)
What I call the “vigorous” reading of the statute may be questioned, however. To
provide that X may be made administrator and Y may not is after all not identical with
providing in terms that X is entitled to at least part of the estate and Y to nothing.
Construction by intent is necessary to get to such further effect, and there is no certainty
that Hutton was ready to go so far. He does not need to in order to argue simply that if
excluded co-eligibles may not force a distribution, a fortiori ineligibles may not. (The
latter argument alone is not incompatible with saying that a court of equity might
properly compel the uncle in our case to satisfy his strong moral obligation to his
nephews and nieces. Arguably, perhaps, for the same practical reasons that justify
construing the statute against ecclesiastical courts, it should not enforce the weaker moral
duty of a cousin to share with other cousins. There is no mention of courts of equity in
the discussion, but thinking about their possible role is useful for clarifying the principles.
It is not historically inconceivable that this was somewhere in the background of the
judges’ consciousness. Whatever the story of how it happened, the Chancery’s
involvement in the confused field of decedents’ estates was increasing in the 17th
century.)
If one starts from the premise that 21 Hen. VIII goes only to eligibility for
administration—i.e., does not settle substantive rights in law and equity to shares of
estates—I can imagine arguing contrary to the position I attribute to Hutton. Excluded
eligibles may not have at least a better claim to distribution than ineligibles. Arguably,
when the ecclesiastical court decides to grant administration to one of several eligible
persons, it makes a judgment about what should become of the estate, or at any rate about
what risks should be run as to its ultimate disposition. If the court prefers Cousin George
and excludes Cousin Harry, it has used its opportunity to make a distributive decision. It
has decided that there is no objection to George’s winding up with the residue of the
estate and Harry with nothing, or—if there would be some objection to that result—that
the risk is acceptable because George can be trusted to use his administrator’s discretion
fairly. Therefore the ecclesiastical court should not be allowed to make an explicit
distributive decision at the cost of delay and unsettlement. On the other hand, if the court

54

must appoint Uncle and cannot take account of Nephew’s interest in the choosing of
administrators, and assuming that the statute does not make their interests a legal nullity,
it is arguable that a distribution should now be compellable.
The last point in the MS. report is a parting word from Chief Justice Hobart. He
only endorses Hutton’s history by observing that “the common law was as Hutton has
said, but that was disallowed in ancient times and restrained to some particular places.”
(I.e., the only vestige of the old law that a distribution could be forced even on executors
was certain local customs entitling close relatives to automatic shares of estates.) The
printed report adds no substantial information beyond the facts for which I have used it. It
gives the court’s conclusion in summary: The Ordinary may not make a distribution for
21 Hen. VIII (miscited as 32 Hen. VIII) “intends a benefit, to the administrator and not an
unprofitable burden, and therefore gives a preferment to the wife and next of kin.” Also,
a bond insuring distribution cannot be taken (which is explicit only in the opinions of
Warburton and Hutton—Winch may have disagreed.) The printed report furnishes the
details that Serjeant Harris was the winning lawyer in this important and law-changing
case and that the ecclesiastical judge of first instance was the well-known civilian Sir
John Bennet. Bennet’s proceedings—taking a bond and effecting a per capita
distribution without making a clearly appealable order—have the look of a studied effort
to avoid legal issues (about the power to compel distribution, on the one hand, and about
the correctness of the per capita scheme in ecclesiastical law, on the other.) Although the
case resulted in an unfavorable holding on the power of Ordinaries, the upshot of
prohibiting the Delegates was probably to insure that Bennet’s plan for putting equal
shares in the hands of all the intestate’s descendants took effect.
Robert Oldfeilde’s Case6, from the Common Pleas in the next term, extends the
spirit of Torke to mere accountability, which the earlier case did not reach. The report of
Oldfeilde ends with an adjournment, but it gives the first-round opinions of the four
judges individually, and three of them sound pretty firm on the view that an administrator
may not be forced to account. Justice Winch is inclined to disagree, but the tone of his
dissent is rather tentative. (Winch was the shakiest member of the court in Torke—the
most inclined to think that ecclesiastical courts could sometimes have a basis for ordering
distribution and to decide Torke on the exceptional procedural situation.)
In Oldfeilde, a creditor of the estate “procured” the Ordinary to summon the
administrator to make account. It might be possible to hold that a creditor may not use the
ecclesiastical apparatus (but must bring an Action of Account at common law), whereas
the ecclesiastical court, on its own initiative or by “procurement” of kinsmen of the
intestate, may require an accounting. There is no sign however, that anything was made
of this distinction. It would present practical problems. One could prohibit creditors’ suits
cast as private suits (commenced by libel), but it would be hard to prevent a creditor from
“procuring” the ecclesiastical court to act ostensibly on its own motion. It is possible,
however, and suggested by some of their remarks, that the judges’ focus on the case was
affected by the circumstance that the initiative came from a creditor.
Chief Justice Hobart so states his opinion as to make it clear that it does not
depend on the motive for the accounting in the instant case: Ecclesiastical courts are
6

P. 16 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5149, f. 162. The briefly reported case of Sparrow v. Norfolk
discussed at the end of Oldfeilde is incorporated in this note.
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simply confined to two functions. They are to supervise the proving of the will if there is
one, and if there is not to commit administration, and they are “to see that there is a true
inventory.”(Quaere as to exactly what the second function involves. Anything beyond
receiving the inventory and making sure that it is verified by oath? Making sure it has
been prepared with the help of coadjutors chosen as 21 Hen. VIII appoints? Would an
accounting at some point later than submission of the inventory not be a good way of
checking on the truth and completeness of that document?) That is all—no accountings
and by implication no revocation or distribution.
Having so stated his basic position, Hobart adds an observation that goes to the
immediate circumstance of the creditor’s attempt to use the ecclesiastical machinery: An
ecclesiastical accounting is not evidence at common law, and creditors may not take any
benefit from it, “yet as I understand [or suppose—‘intend’] they may examine the
account.” I.e., as I take this: The ecclesiastical account will not conclude any common
law questions, cannot be pleaded, perhaps cannot be shown as evidence to a jury (to the
degree that exclusionary rules for jury-evidence were operative at the time of this case.)
But it can be examined by the creditor and so help him indirectly, as a discovery of leads
to evidence usable in the common law sphere. Perhaps Hobart also had in mind that the
account might be examined by or known to the jurors “off the record” and in that way be
prejudicial to the administrator in potential common law proceedings. Jurors, one should
remember, were not yet obliged to form their opinion of the truth from evidence
presented at a trial. This kind of scrupulosity about incidental spill-over from the
“spiritual” sphere to the “temporal” is recurrent in Prohibition law. It militates against
ecclesiastical accountings even when they are not sought by a creditor, since the
accounting might turn up information useful to creditors though sought on someone
else’s initiative.
Justice Huttton takes the same basic stand as Hobart. He says simply that the
power of ecclesiastical courts in intestate matters depends entirely on 21 Hen. VIII and
that the statute makes no mention of accounting, wherefore to demand one is to “exceed
their authority.” Justice Warburton agrees: There is no power to compel an accounting.
An administrator may “do it if he likes”—i.e., account voluntarily, being requested. An
administrator who renders an account before an ecclesiastical court may not, however,
take advantage of it at common law. His quietus est from the ecclesiastical judge will do
him no good in the temporal sphere (just as, according to Hobart, the opposite sort of
finding will be of no formal avail to a creditor and should not be helpful to him
informally. Hobart does not consider the possibility that a voluntary account might have
incidental practical effects at common law. Warburton does not seem worried about that.
21 Hen. VIII and its companion piece, the Mortuaries Act, were made to restrain
ecclesiastical courts from their prior practice of taking excessive fees. (The last
observation is presumably intended to imply more than the truism it states: The statutes
are restrictive. They are intended to take away pre-existing powers of ecclesiastical
courts, including fee-setting powers. From their general spirit one can infer that such
powers as authority to demand accountings are taken away in not being confirmed, even
though 21 Hen. VIII does not say “henceforth administrators shall not be compelled to
account”.)
Justice Winch is reported as doubting whether a Prohibition should be granted and
then as saying “it seems not”. He expressly agrees with Hobart and Warburton that an
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ecclesiastical accounting “is not regarded in our law.” Winch nevertheless saw a
legitimate ecclesiastical interest in accountings, without at the same time claiming any
ecclesiastical power to compel distribution or perhaps even to revoke administration:
“For it may be proper for the Ordinary to see that the administration [is] or will be wellperformed, which he cannot without account.” It is not easy to see what “well
performed” means unless, as is perfectly possible, Winch would have defended power of
revocation as the ecclesiastical court’s device for exercising some control over the
estate’s destiny after committing administration. Otherwise it seems that accounting
could do little more than show up ill performance, with the possible effect of giving
kinsmen a little moral leverage on the administrator and giving creditors a little help of
the sort Hobart and Warburton thought illegitimate. Winch’s relative indulgence toward
ecclesiastical courts may be explained by the parallel case of the executor, which he
mentions. When there is a will, the ecclesiastical court has a much more convincing
ground to concern itself with how the management of the estate has progressed beyond
probate. The will cannot be “well performed” unless the legacies are paid, and they are
in danger of not being paid unless the executor is conscientious about collecting debts
and settling with creditors so as to be in a position to satisfy legatees if assets remain.
Would the majority judges dispute that an executor is accountable so long as there are
unpaid legatees to protect? If not, it may be noted that 21 Hen. VIII no more positively
endorses accounting by executors than by administrators. We have seen it argued that the
policy of the law was to put the administrator so far as possible in the position of the
executor. If one is accountable, Winch may have thought, so should the other be, though
admittedly this is by virtue of formal parallelism if there is no private ecclesiastical
interest analogous to the legatee’s to be protected against the administrator. One type of
case, however, does transcend “formal parallelism”, furnishing a further reason for
preserving the power to require accountings: where the administrator is charged with
legacies because the decedent has made a will without naming executors or the named
executors have refused. That situation could be distinguished in Prohibition proceedings,
but perhaps it would be better to avoid the proliferation of rules and hold that because
accounting can sometimes serve a valid ecclesiastical purpose it is never objectionable
per se.
The report of Oldfeilde ends with a parting exchange between Hutton and Winch.
Hutton comes back with his insistence on what the statute positively authorizes: It
requires a “good” inventory; it says nothing about accounting. One step beyond the grant
of administration is demanded by the statute (and is presumably in some meaningful
sense demandable by the ecclesiastical court—perhaps revocation would be available at
least against one who failed to render an inventory, and if not that an order backed by
excommunication.) To see another step as demandable is to imagine a figment. Winch
replies in effect that he is still unconvinced that any intention to destroy existing
ecclesiastical powers, save for those it clearly limits or directs, can be read into the
statute: “If the Ordinary had such authority before at common law, it may remain at this
day.” (A note of tentativeness still clings to Winch. “It may remain [ceo poyt remayne]”
perhaps has the force “it is possible but not certain.”)
A briefly reported Common Pleas case from the same term as Oldfeilde, Sparrow
v.Norfolk, accords. The situation was different from that presented in any previous case.
B was appointed A’s administrator. B died, making C his executor. D, who is not
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identified with respect to his interest in A’s estate, sued C for an accounting. A
Prohibition was granted. The reporter appends a quaere. This decision is in line with
Oldfeilde in the sense that if an administrator’s executor is not accountable in connection
with the estate in the late administrator’s hands, neither presumably would the
administrator himself have been. In other words, the straightforward reading of the
unexplained decision is that the executor takes over such of his testator’s legal duties as
do not die with him; if B were accountable as A’s administrator, so would his executor
be; therefore the court’s holding implies that B was not accountable. I can see no
argument that C should not be accountable even though B was. The better argument
would go the other way: An administrator should not be compelled to account either
because he has been appointed by mandate of 21 Hen. VIII or, where the statute leaves
discretion, because trust has been reposed in him. Either way, he is meant to enjoy the
residual estate in so far as he wants to and his conscience permits. The administrator’s
executor, on the other hand, may well be a stranger to the intestate and his kin. He is
neither elected by the statute nor chosen by the ecclesiastical court. The ultimate
adjustment of rights in such a case may be tricky. Should C, in so far as he turns out to be
B’s residuary legatee, enjoy the residue of A’s estate because B might have? Or should C
be compelled to distribute to A’s kin because B might, as a kinsman and trusted person,
have distributed voluntarily? However such questions should be answered, their very
trickiness and dependence on further circumstances (Is C in fact A’s younger son, B’s
brother, A’s and B’s only close surviving relative?) lends a certain color to
accountability. Let the ecclesiastical court, one might say, at least find out how a
potentially complicated, and possibly uncomplicated, situation stands. I should imagine
that these considerations explain the reporter’s quaere. The court’s decision, however,
amounts to rejection of the argument.
Another Common Pleas report, Brian v. Goddard7, probably comes from a year
after Oldfeilde and Sparrow. The case is unfortunately not stated. What the report gives
are statements by Hutton, Warburton, and Hobart on several points touching 21 Hen.
VIII. Hutton says straightforwardly that ecclesiastical courts may not revoke
administration granted “to a wife or son, etc., according to 21 Hen. VIII.” Quaere
whether discretionary grants to more remote kin are revocable. Hutton then adds “nor
may [ecclesiastical courts] do any other thing except [require/cite—?] the administrator
to render account. (A word seems to be missing—“…ne faire ascun auter chose forsque
ladministrator pur render account.”) Contrary to his position above, Hutton here seems
to uphold bare accountability, while expressly detaching it from liability to revocation.
Possibly, were the facts of Brian known, his statement could be explained as tentative
and incidental—as it were, “The ecclesiastical court may certainly not revoke, which is
the point in question now; it may not do anything beyond granting administration and
receiving an inventory, unless perhaps it may demand an accounting.” The confusion of
7
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dating is such that Brian could have been decided before Oldfeilde and Sparrow, where
accounting had to be faced head-on.
Warburton says that a widow may refuse administration upon first being
appointed or offered appointment, and that she may also renounce it after having taken it
on and having begun to manage the estate. Quaere as to the status of this remark. Does it
state the ecclesiastical law? Does it state an implied proviso of 21 Hen. VIII or other
common law standard enforceable on ecclesiastical courts, were they to take the position
that such refusal is impermissible? A question on the statute could conceivably arise
concerning the right to refuse administration, especially refusing to continue serving after
starting to. Does the ecclesiastical court exhaust its authority when it has set up an
administrator and received an inventory so that it has no authority left to appoint a new
administrator even if the old one purports to resign? The sensible answer is of course
“No”. So to admit, however, concedes a scintilla of continuing interest in the estate, and a
scintilla can be fanned into a flame. It is to concede that granting administration is not a
total divestiture of interest, like an unconditional alienation in fee, and if it is not, need
the ecclesiastical court’s remaining interest be confined to power to re-grant in case of
resignation? Warburton also says that when a married woman is sued as executrix “or
etc.” (read “or administratrix”) “she is a single woman by the civil law.” This remark is
labeled as a statement of the ecclesiastical law. “So what?” is immediately unanswerable,
but see below for the possibility that it bears on a husband’s power to renounce
administration held by his wife prior to their marriage.
Hobart begins by agreeing with Warburton’s last point. He then says that
administration granted durante minore aetate is “not in” 21 Hen. VIII, with which the
rest of the judges agreed. This is unlikely to mean that a guardian-administrator cannot be
appointed to serve for a clear or exclusive eligible who is a minor—normally a child or
children of the intestate. It more probably means that the statute imposes no eligibility
requirements on the choice of such a temporary administrator and does not bar revoking
his authority or compelling him to account. This interpretation seems confirmed by
Hobart’s ensuing words: “But when it is to the proper person, then it is in the statute.” I
should take “the proper person” to be the one who may or must be appointed under the
statute, as opposed to the special case of a guardian-administrator, choosing and
supervising whom is up to the ecclesiastical court, to be handled as ecclesiastical law and
the court’s discretion indicate. (Quaere whether the statute could be said to require
appointing a guardian-administrator when the next of kin are all infants. Is the
ecclesiastical court free to appoint no administrator until one of the children comes of age
and then to appoint him? To appoint the children despite their infancy, leaving it to the
common law to rule on whether a guardian or next friend may sue for debts and answer
to creditors? If the next of kin are all infants, the ecclesiastical court must presumably
respect their statutory entitlement one way or the other—i.e., may not pass over closer
infants and commit administration to the nearest adult kinsman.)
Hobart then says that if the ecclesiastical court does not commit administration in
accord with the statutory rules there are two and only two remedies: ecclesiastical appeal
and action of Debt for the penalty given in the statute. This is presumably to exclude
Prohibitions as a means of enforcing the eligibility requirements, although they were not
excluded as means to enforce the statute’s implied ban on accounting, revocation, and
distribution. A statutory penalty’s being attached to an act is arguably a good reason why
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that act should not be prevented by Prohibition, but in other contexts that argument was
not always persuasive. The present context militates in Hobart’s favor, however.
Retrospective Prohibitions—prohibiting something after it has already been done—were
workable enough when their effect was to prevent the ecclesiastical court from executing
its decision. But such Prohibitions would be troublesome if employed after an improper
grant of administration, because the only way to obey the Prohibition would be to cancel
the grant and make a new one. That would raise the question whether any power to
revoke survived 21 Hen. VIII. (It would be difficult in practice to get Prohibitions soon
enough to prevent improper grants.) A further application of Hobart’s opinion would be
in common law litigation: If administration is granted to X improperly, and if X purports
to act as administrator by suing for money owed to the estate, the adverse party may not
object that X was ineligible under the statute—for the penalty and ecclesiastical appeal
are the sole legal responses to the ecclesiastical court’s error.
Hobart’s remarks on remedies by implication support the general “exhaustible
authority” model of the ecclesiastical court’s power after 21 Hen. VIII: Once the court
has made X administrator, rightly or wrongly, it has used up all its authority and has
nothing more to do with the estate, subject only to the feature of ecclesiastical law that
the act of a lower court may be appealed. The ecclesiastical court cannot regain or
reassert a concern for the estate, nor may it be told by the common law guardians of the
statutes to resume such a concern. If it has erred, once ecclesiastical appeals are
exhausted, it has committed an irreversible act. A penalty can be recovered if someone
will sue for it. Otherwise, since there is neither turning back nor possibility of reintervention, an erroneous use of the statutory authority is as good as a correct one.
At the end of his remarks, however, Hobart, in accord with Warburton, backs off
from the extreme position that the ecclesiastical system’s authority is to do but a single
act and die. For the Chief Justice says: “There is a great difference when the Court
Christian would repeal the administration and when the administrator comes to them and
would not [ne voet] continue administrator, in which case they may [ils poyent] accept his
refusal, but that is their affair [mes ceo est lour chose].” The meaning seems clear:
Administration may not be revoked, but if an administrator accepts a grant and later seeks
to resign, the ecclesiastical court is free to accept his resignation and appoint someone
else. Its authority is not so far exhausted as to prevent that. There is no duty to accept
such resignation, however. Whether to do so depends on ecclesiastical law, if not on the
court’s mere discretion. The statute has nothing to say about it. The effect of declining to
accept the resignation would be to leave things as they were—the administrator liable to
be sued by creditors, despite his unwillingness to serve, and able to sue for debts if he
chooses to. By the theory that says administrators are meant to profit from the estate,
failure to take advantage of the opportunity to profit by pursuing debtors is solely the
administrator’s affair. There is accordingly nothing wrong with the result from the point
of view of common law interests if resignation is not accepted. Creditors will not lose by
the administrator’s unwillingness to collect debts if they can demand a common law
accounting and recover out of the administrator’s pocket in so far as he has failed to
realize the estate’s potential. Consequently, there would be no great “temporal” harm in
holding that the ecclesiastical court is absolutely divested of authority after the original
grant, so that even a second grant after resignation is barred. The judges quite rightly saw
no sense in that.
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After these remarks by the three judges, the report adds a further exchange
between Hutton and Warburton. Hutton says: “If a woman takes administration and then
takes a husband, she may not renounce administration.” Warburton replies: “That belongs
to them and not to this court.” Warburton’s point is clear: It is for the ecclesiastical court
to decide whether or not to receive proffered resignations of administration; they may,
but need not, as Hobart said. The case of a single or widowed woman who takes
administration, then marries and seeks to resign, is no different from any other
resignation case. It is harder to tell what Hutton is getting at. Perhaps his meaning is that
the woman’s husband may not renounce administration in her name, or that she is not
automatically entitled to renounce when she loses her former legal identity as a feme sole,
owing to the principle stated earlier by Warburton—that by civil law a feme covert
executrix or administratrix is treated as if she were single. Otherwise, the point would
have to be that the woman’s resignation may not be accepted when she acts on her own
initiative, without her husband’s concurrence. (In typical practical effect: Administrator
Alice, John’s widow, may not decide that her new husband is well-enough off, and that
she would prefer to see John’s estate go to his blood-relatives, possibly her own
children.) The reason for such a rule would in a sense be extraneous to the statute.
Whatever the ecclesiastical law on married women’s legal capacity, the common law is
that they may not act as independent agents; ecclesiastical courts may not contravene this
common law standard and defeat expectations founded on it (the new husband’s). It
would be possible to argue, however, that partly in order to avoid just this—acceptance of
a married woman’s resignation, necessitating common law intervention to frustrate the
ecclesiastical court’s perfectly correct behavior by its own standards—the statute enacted
absolute exhaustion of authority by the original grant. It would follow, contrary to
Hobart and Warburton, that ecclesiastical courts are not free to re-grant upon any
administrator’s purported resignation.
A Common Pleas report from 16208 gives no new case but merely lists some
precedents of Prohibitions granted to prevent ecclesiastical courts from compelling
administrators to distribute. The report is evidence for what contemporary cases attest—
that the powers of ecclesiastical courts in intestacy cases were an agitated and unsettled
question. Someone was motivated to look for proof that the common law courts had
prohibited distribution earlier than the day before yesterday. The citations are as good
proof of that as pure precedents can be: Prohibitions granted, but whether contested and
whether reversed is uncertain. In the absence of concordant reports, they cannot be taken
to establish what the thin stream of reports before Torke leaves open to doubt. The
citations are: (1) Barles v. Launders, P. 34 Eliz. No information except that the
Prohibition was “for distribution.” (2) Goddard v. Goddard, P. 38 Eliz. “Simile.” (3)
Hussey v. Waters, H. 9 Jac. “Prohibition for distribution after administration of goods
and chattels and creditors. Alice, wife of the intestate.” Note that the administrator was
presumably the widow, not a remoter kinsman appointed by freer discretion. (4) M. 10
Jac. Jane Smith, Widow, and T.S., Administrator of H.S. sued ex officio to distribute,
where the Ordinary had taken an obligation to stand by his order.
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Continuing agitation of the question of ecclesiastical powers appears from by-play
in a report of 1621.9 The principal matter is a testamentary question unrelated to 21 Hen.
VIII. By way of making the general point that Prohibition lies when a spiritual sentence
“crosseth” the common law, Chief Justice Hobart cites an otherwise unreported Barrow’s
Case, where he and the rest of the court held that a distribution may not be compelled to
children of the intestate. By the “very intention” of 21 Hen. VIII, it was held, the residual
estate is meant to remain to the administrator. (We are not told who was competing with
the intestate’s children—probably his widow, possibly her new husband.) From the Bar,
Henden said to Hobart that he could show a precedent of “that.” He appears to be
disagreeing with Hobart, so I suppose he means a precedent that would cut against
Hobart’s conclusion in Barrow. Precedents of distribution orders if not contested would
signify little; it is not clear, but possible, that Henden had something stronger in mind.
The judges in any event expressed a desire to see what he could offer.
The first Caroline case on 21 Hen. VIII10 is the last one in which Hobart
participated. As we have seen, practically all the significant decisions on this statute up to
1625 came from his Common Pleas. His final case is something of a tribute to his court’s
expertise, because it arose by reference from the ecclesiastical court. Serjeant Henden
moved the Common Pleas for an advisory opinion, certifying that he did so by the desire
of Sir Henry Martin, Judge of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury. Instead of acting in a
problematic situation and leaving it to the losing party to appeal, bring a penalty suit, or
seek a Prohibition—the last awkwardly, because a Prohibition to the Prerogative Court
would be retrospective—Martin agreed to wait on the Common Pleas’ direction. Henden
proceeded to argue one side of the doubtful point, and Serjeant Ashley argued the other.
Adversary debate was clearly pre-arranged to avoid later litigation.
The issue was whether administration may be granted to aliens when, save for
their alien status, they are qualified or best-qualified by the standards of 21 Hen. VIII.
The reporter in stating the case (probably following Henden’s statement) is careful not to
assert that the aliens were more eligible than any non-alien. At any rate, they came
forward seeking administration as kinsmen and presumably could have been appointed in
the absence of superior claimants if they had been natives. They are described as “the
next of kin or rather [ou potius] [persons] who pretend kindred to him [the intestate].”
The aliens were subjects of a friendly prince (unspecified), not enemies.
Henden argued that aliens could not be made administrators. In one way, this was
an uphill contention, because, as Henden conceded, there was no bar to alien executors.
As we have seen, the policy of the law was arguably to put administrators as nearly as
possible in the position an executor would occupy if the intestate had made a will.
Nevertheless, Henden advanced three arguments. One is the predictable argument from
public policy or the general welfare. Aliens are “but adventives here, and go again as
speedily as birds in the air.” Such transitory creatures should not be allowed to carry
away the substance of the realm. (Although Henden does not state it, there is a reasonable
distinction between executors and administrators in these mercantilist and xenophobic
terms. Executor-residuary legatees have a shot at the estate after debts and legacies.
Administrators in the ordinary case, as 21 Hen. VIII was applied, were free to keep the
9
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estate after debts. Ceteris paribus, an alien administrator would have a better chance to
carry off more of England’s substance than an alien executor. Ecclesiastical power to
order distribution would correct the evil and render alien administrators less harmful than
alien executors, assuming the power to be broad and discretionary. Wealth liable to be
exported could be taxed in favor of English charities if the decedent left no English
relatives.)
Secondly, Henden argued that the ecclesiastical court may not appoint two
administrators or groups of administrators, one for chattels real and the other for chattels
personal. Granting the premise, aliens may not be made administrators at all, because
aliens may not take real estate, including chattels real. (Presumably, though this is not
articulated, it would be too awkward to let the choice of administrators depend on
whether the estate actually contained any chattels real. If a testator names an alien
executor, is administration to be granted to someone else—an English subject—quoad
chattels real only? In that case, would both the executor and the administrator be suable
by creditors, the liability of each being limited to the value of the part of the estate under
his control? For a final quaere: Is it true that an alien may not take chattels real and
protect them by actions of Trespass and Ejectment? That is hard law, for it means that a
resident alien cannot rent a house or shop save as a tenant at will. There is of course no
doubt of aliens’ incapacity to take and defend freeholds.)
Finally, Henden claims authority for the proposition that “nearest of blood” in 31
Edw. III, and hence the equivalent expressions in 21 Hen. VIII, should be construed to
mean “nearest of blood not attainted of treason or felony or subject to other legal
disability.” Alienage, Henden maintains, is a legal disability within this construction,
owing to aliens’ incapacity to hold real property. It is a relevant disability because, as the
second argument says, the incapacity can sometimes prevent an administrator from acting
as one and enjoying the residue of the estate, and if it is true that there cannot be separate
administrators for real and personal chattels, the disability must sometimes absolutely bar
an alien’s appointment for any purpose. (The contrary seems arguable enough: “Nearest
kin” means “next-to-nearest” when the literally closest are persons in high bad odor with
the law—convicted traitors and felons, whose own property, including anything that
would be left to them out of the intestate’s estate, is forfeit. If the construction is
extendable to “other disabilities”, should it not be to comparable ones—outlawry and
excommunication perhaps? Are aliens, who suffer from only one disability and otherwise
enjoy the full protection of the law in their persons and property, in the same case?)
Interestingly, Serjeant Ashley does not attempt to answer Henden on the merits of
aliens’ eligibility, except by asserting that since an alien can be an executor he can be an
administrator as well. Having so asserted, Ashley turns to a higher plane: The question
belongs to the ecclesiastical court. It is up to it to decide whether there is any objection to
an alien administrator. If it decides there is none and appoints one, the common law
courts have no basis for interference, assuming the alien appointee is not ineligible,
relative to someone else, by the express standards of 21 Hen. VIII, and even then title to
interfere by Prohibition can be questioned. The statute mandates the next of kin, subject
to discretionary scope in some situations; it says nothing about eligibility in any other
terms. In taking this line, Ashley is not undercutting the project of taking an advisory
opinion. His position is probably what Sir Henry Martin would like to see upheld. The
purpose of the advisory opinion would be served if the Common Pleas were to renounce
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its competence to decide (even if it expressed a purely advisory view against aliens—a
mere warning against the danger of appointing them, the public disutility, the possibility
of complications arising from chattels real, the likelihood of someone’s trying to appeal
within the ecclesiastical system.) Martin could go ahead and use his judgment without
fear of future trouble from the Common Pleas. Ashley’s position does not lack force. The
statute is silent on eligibility apart from familial propinquity, and unless the statute sets
standards for the common law courts to enforce, it is hard to see what title they would
have to concern themselves. In support of his point, Ashley cites a King’s Bench case
from the same term as the present discussion in which he himself was unsuccessful
counsel: He tried to prevent an ecclesiastical court from granting administration to a
bastard, but was turned down by the King’s Bench on the ground that the appointment of
administrators is an ecclesiastical matter.
Ashley’s argument and citation prompted a testy reply by Hobart. The Chief
Justice “dislikes that doctrine. It is true that the granting of administration belongs to the
ecclesiastical judge. But yet he is guided by statute law as to whom he may grant it to.
And if he does not grant it to such person as the statute appoints, we may prohibit…But
he commends the judge of the prerogative court for taking their direction, so that both
laws may accord in the granting of this administration.” Hobart’s remarks conclude the
report except for the information that the court wanted to advise further. There is no
discussion by the judges on the merits of aliens’ eligibility.
The exchange between Ashley and Hobart is noteworthy in several respects. In
the first place, it puts Hobart squarely behind the proposition that Prohibition lies to
enforce the eligibility requirements of 21 Hen. VIII., contrary to his apparent position in
Brian v. Goddard. Ashley did not, however, dispute the prohibitability of ecclesiastical
courts that misapply the eligibility rules. Hobart may have missed Ashley’s point, for it is
surely not that Prohibition is inappropriate if the ecclesiastical court by-passes a widow
and son in favor of a third cousin. The point is that there is no basis, even so, for
prohibiting if the ecclesiastical court appoints an alien whose eligibility is otherwise
clear. But the point is answerable, and perhaps Hobart should be credited with embracing
a relevant answer.
Henden had shown the way: The statute requires appointing next of kin. “Next of
kin” means “Nearest relative not subject to legal disability.” That it so means is a
statutory construction solely within common law competence. To enforce that meaning
on the ecclesiastical court is no different from enforcing a much more obvious or literal
meaning, as by insisting that administration not be granted to a third cousin in preference
to a son. Of course to prevent a grant to an alien requires deciding that “next of kin”
actually has the meaning that Henden proposed, and that alienage is among the legal
disabilities contemplated by the statute. Hobart made no commitments on those
questions. But he was entitled to dislike the doctrine that there could be no basis for
interfering with a grant to an alien, that the statute must be construed as favoring or
leaving intact the powers of ecclesiastical courts except in so far as literal, unmistakable
directions are given for the use of those powers .It is a doctrine that can go against the
main achievement of Hobart’s court in the field of intestacy: 21 Hen. VIII does not say
that a distribution may not be ordered; it only so means by the Common Pleas’
construction. Ashley’s position generalized was that the statute’s silence must have the
effect of leaving ecclesiastical courts as free as they were “at common law” to deal with
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intestates’ estates. (It is conceivably arguable that, whereas “at common law”—before 31
Edw. III—ecclesiastical courts were so free that no objection could be made to their
choosing a stranger over a son, appointment of an alien would still be controllable. Might
choosing a legal non-person, if an alien is classifiable as such, and putting a foreigner in a
position to make off with the substance of the realm, not be considered so extremely at
odds with the common law and public policy as to be prohibitable? Of course this
suggestion is purely theoretical; there is no sign of it in the report.)
Ashley’s case of the bastard is valuable as a spark of evidence on the King’s
Bench attitude in a field dominated by the Common Pleas. Disproportionate resort to the
Common Pleas suggests that those hoping to prohibit ecclesiastical courts in intestacy
cases realized that their chances were better there. The case of the bastard confirms that
inference to the extent that a single case with peculiar characteristics can. Hobart’s
adverse reaction to the doctrine he had just heard may include King’s Bench doctrine as
he understood it to be and may imply that he would have decided the bastard case
differently. That is uncertain, however; one could concede the ecclesiastical court’s
freedom to appoint a bastard and still contest its authority to choose an alien.
Comparison of the bastard and the alien is tricky. We lack information about
Ashley’s case, but it is likely to have been simple and formally parallel with the alien:
The only really close relative of the intestate in an everyday, “natural” sense is an
illegitimate son. The King’s Bench sees nothing in the statute to bar appointment of an
illegitimate child in preference to remote kinsmen and nothing to require it either—
certainly there are no express words in point. Therefore the court concludes that
Parliament left it up to the ecclesiastical judge to decide, as he presumably could before
the statute law invaded the area of intestacy. A similar way of thinking is possible in the
alien’s case. Are there grounds for distinguishing?
It seems to me that distinctions cutting in both directions can be drawn. Surely
there are stronger policy considerations against alien administrators. A bastard English
subject does not threaten to export the substance of the realm nor to turn into an enemy
fifth columnist when the winds of international politics shift. The only public interest to
be served by disqualifying bastards is the discouragement of incontinence, and that is a
sector of the public interest for which the Church is primarily responsible. Secondly, an
alien’s legal personality is more qualified than a bastard’s. A bastard lacks capacity to
inherit real property of which his ancestors were seised, but in most other respects he is
like anyone else. He is fully competent to take property of all sorts by purchase, unlike an
alien. Moreover, in typical circumstances a bastard is more likely than an alien to fall
within the protective purpose of 21 Hen. VIII. The statute favors flesh and blood—
widows, children, those whom the intestate would probably have favored if he had made
a will. It is likely enough that a man will leave only an illegitimate child and relatively
remote kinsmen, in which event the child will have been the more probable object of the
intestate’s personal concern. It would perhaps be hard to say that the ecclesiastical court
must choose the bastard in that situation, whatever the traditions of ecclesiastical law and
the considerations of public policy in the Church’s special keeping, but it is still harder to
say it may not. By contrast, an Englishman is unlikely to have an alien child or widow.
(Whether that is even a possibility in the case of a legitimate child may make a question.
It depends on whether children born abroad to English parents, an English father, or one
English parent, are natural born subjects of the King. So far as I know, a foreign woman
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was not naturalized by marrying an Englishman. Bastards born abroad of English or partEnglish parentage would surely be aliens; their incapacity to be heirs of property rested
on the maxim that they have no legal—only biological—ancestors; it is necessarily
implied that they cannot derive nationality or “allegiance” from parents.) A case
involving an alien candidate for administrator will probably be a contest between
comparatively remote kinsmen, for whose rights relative to each other the statute is less
solicitous than for the claims of the really close. For these reasons, one might concede the
correctness of the King’s Bench precedent and still maintain that Prohibition should lie to
prevent appointment of an alien.
Per contra, it can be urged that while 21 Hen. VIII has no apparent anti-alien
intention it cannot be understood as permitting the appointment of bastards. Without
moralizing about incontinence, one may wonder whether a statute that talks about
kinsmen does not have the sense “legitimate kinsmen” in mind. It may be plausible to
suppose that the spirit of the statute favors a bastard over a distant cousin, but if
legitimacy is taken not to matter at all, problems arise and improbabilities seem implied.
If, let us say, the choice is between my two biological nephews, is it likely that a mistake
of my brother’s youth is supposed to have as good a claim on my personal estate as the
legitimate son of my brother, who happens to be my common law heir? More abstractly,
there is an argument that in case of ambiguity statutes should be taken to use words in an
“artificial” legal sense rather than their “natural” sense. The application to 21 Hen. VIII is
that words equivalent to “kin” should be taken the former way—to mean in effect
“persons capable of inheriting land at common law.” This is a more restricted class than
biological kin, not only in that a bastard cannot take as heir from his (biologically) linear
kin, but also in that no (biological) collateral, though legitimate himself, can inherit from
a bastard. The point is not entirely unconvincing, however. Given a strange world where
it was correct to say “In contemplation of law a bastard has no collateral relatives”, one is
obliged at least to ask whether the legislature would have spoken of “relatives” in a sense
that is inconsistent with the maxim. Parliament was still thought of as legislating largely
within the interstices of the common law. That is a basis of sorts for presuming that it
talks the peculiar language of the common law. There is perhaps somewhat more reason
to read for “kin” “kin as the common law understands it for property-law purposes” than
to read “kin subject to no legal disability, even of the limited sort aliens are subject to.”
Thinking along these lines, one might conclude that if the King’s Bench was right in
permitting the ecclesiastical court to appoint a bastard if it chose to, a fortiori it should be
free to appoint an alien; if the King’s Bench should have prohibited appointment of the
bastard, it does not follow that appointment of an alien should be blocked.
No judge besides Hobart speaks in the advisory opinion case. The court did not
announce an opinion on the question before it, but adjourned for further advisement.
There is no report of a resolution later.
After Chief Justice Hobart’s death, the King’s Bench had a larger share of
intestacy cases than before, and some major debates took place in that court. Let us,
however, follow out the post-Hobart Common Pleas decisions before turning to the
King’s Bench. In Fotherley v. Fotherley, 11 the first case from the Common Pleas under
Sir Thomas Richardson’s Chief Justiceship, the ecclesiastical courts’ lack of power to
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compel distribution was upheld in the face of “strong” argument contra (as Croke’s
report calls it.) The exact circumstances, which might be considered to affect the equities
though they should probably not be allowed to, are given in the MS. Report: Nicholas
had a copyhold worth £40 per annum. Before his death he surrendered the copyhold to
the use of Anne his wife for her life. Nicholas died intestate leaving £200 worth of goods
(i.e., personal property apart from the copyhold.) By Nicholas’s death the reversion of the
copyhold descended to his sister Mary. (I.e., Nicholas and Anne had no children;
Nicholas’s heir under the law of the manor governing copyhold—properly speaking, but
she was no doubt his common law heir as well, or simply his nearest blood-relative—was
his sister.) Administration of the personal estate was granted to Anne. Mary sued to
compel distribution, and the ecclesiastical court acceded to the extent of ordering Anne to
pay her £20. Anne sought a Prohibition.
Anne’s contention was the straightforward one, supported by earlier cases: 21
Hen. VIII simply deprives the Ordinary of power to compel a distribution. Mary’s
contention, so far as the reports bring out the arguments of counsel, was the contrary of
that, plus a couple of further wrinkles, at which we shall look just below. The precise
circumstances may, however, have been thought to slant the equities in Mary’s favor, and
the reporter’s spelling them out may suggest that counsel tried to make something of
them explicitly: Here the wife was lawfully appointed sole administratrix, but it would
have been equally lawful to appoint the sister or both. The wife was well taken care of by
the conveyance of a life-estate in the copyhold. (A common law owner of land could not
literally make the same provision for his wife, though he could do the same in effect by
creating a jointure or trust. I.e., it was by virtue of the peculiarities of copyhold that
Nicholas was able to make what amounts to a direct conveyance to his own wife, so that
in a nominal or legalistic sense Anne was in an especially favorable position.) Distant
relatives were not trying to make away with part of the estate, but only the one closest
relative, whom the ecclesiastical court had left out in the cold. All she got, if £200
represents the net estate, is 10%; all the wife lost was that small portion of the fairly
generous increment which the personal estate would add to her already generous life
income (annually, £200 divided by her life-expectancy, plus interest on the unexpended
part, I would suppose.) One can imagine Mary’s difficult situation, though whether it was
really difficult of course depends on other variables: she had an uncertain possibility of a
livelihood from the land but nothing in the meantime, and she asked for a modest £20 to
tide her over a few precarious years. In short, if ever ecclesiastical power to compel
distribution would have a useful purpose it is in this sort of case.
Croke’s report tells us that Serjeants Henden and Finch argued against
Prohibition. All that report says about their position is that they argued from the “usual
course”—i.e., that ecclesiastical courts made a practice of ordering distribution. The MS.
report gives only the speech of Finch, specifying several points. His basic claim was of
course that statutory intervention in the field of intestacy did not take away the
Ordinary’s power to compel distribution. Despite a good deal of water over the dam, one
may say, this position died hard; it deserved to, in that 31 Edw. III and 21 Hen.VIII
certainly do not, yet could if they would, destroy such pre-existing power in terms.
However, Finch’s remaining arguments suggest that his hopes for a fundamental victory
were no brighter than they should have been. He cites an unnamed Prohibition case from
Lord Hobart’s time in which, after hearing debate, the court advised an administrator to
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submit to distribution. It sounds as if Finch well knew that there was authority from
Hobart’s time against him; he found an instance in which the judges would probably have
been constrained to prohibit, but for some circumstantial reason preferred not to and put
off action in the hope that the administrator could be dissuaded from inequitable
insistence on his legal rights. From such an instance he hoped to show that the court’s
commitment to “No distribution” was less than absolute—that it might be committed to
preventing ecclesiastical judges from directing the final distribution of estates ad libitum,
but reserved a discretion to permit distribution when the case for a particular form of it
was especially strong.
Finch’s second point is more explicitly in the same spirit. He does not go over all
the circumstances of the instant case, but relies on one—“because the matter here is
small.” I take this as admitting by still clearer implication that as judicial exposition of
the law now stood distribution was not compellable, generally speaking. But again Finch
hoped to salvage a certain discretion to deny Prohibition: a “small matter”, such as the
assignment of one £20 quasi-legacy out of a £200 estate, does not count as the sort of
distribution that the statute bars, if it is conceded to bar distribution generally. Perhaps
the distinction could be best defended as a legal economy: the prohibiting power does not
have to be used whenever an ecclesiastical court exceeds its authority in the slightest
technical sense; a margin of discretion is inseparable from the Prohibition, lest it be used
vexatiously and the common law courts be burdened with trivia, where there is no
substantial deprivation of rights.
Finally, Finch argues that Prohibition should not be granted after ecclesiastical
sentence. Again, his tactics show that his real hopes were centered on cracks and sideissues. Finch’s proposal was that Anne should have sought her Prohibition, if she ought
to have one at all, before Mary’s suit for distribution was acted on. His ground is dubious,
for sentence was far from a categorical bar to Prohibition. It was, however, sometimes
regarded as a basis for discretionary denial of a writ (cf. Vol. I, p. 115 ff.), and in the
context Finch was trying to create for the present case his point is cogent. It is perhaps
arguable that an administrator who wants to avoid a distribution has a special duty to act
promptly. There is after all a sense in which an administrator is invited to consider
making a distribution of his own will. As 21 Hen. VIII was interpreted, the ecclesiastical
court’s authority to work out a final disposition is transferred to the administrator. He
may decide not to distribute, but if he suffers an ecclesiastical court to order a given
distribution (albeit improperly) he has arguably acquiesced in the proposition that that
distribution represents his own judgment of’ an equitable settlement and is estopped to
say later that it does not. Acquiescence in a sentence of distribution can be more plausibly
attributed to an administrator than acquiescence in ecclesiastical sentences to
ecclesiastical defendants generally. This point would hold for a large-scale, equitably
questionable distribution. It holds all the more for the modest and easily defensible one in
the present case. Finch need not even argue that every administrator who wants to block a
distribution must act before sentence, though that is a reasonable exception from the
usual rule on the effect of sentence. It is enough for him to say that Prohibition may be
denied in discretion when a particular administrator has weak equitable grounds for
objecting to a distribution (which, for a small estate at any rate, might justify denial of
Prohibition even before sentence) and compounds his folly by delaying unnecessarily.
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The MS. report of Fotherley v. Fotherley proceeds to give the opinions of Chief
Justice Richardson and Justice Hutton, mentioning Justice Yelverton as concurring with
Hutton on one point. (Croke reports only Hutton’s speech, at greater length.) Richardson
knocks down Finch’s contentions one by one. He starts out by saying that the case is not
new, citing Torke (sub. nom. Tucker’s Case, misdating it 12 Jac.) as a fully debated
decision against distribution. He then says, in direct reply to Finch, that it is irrelevant
whether ecclesiastical courts purport to distribute large or small sums—it is unlawful
either way. Richardson makes a generalized concession to Finch’s point that Prohibition
should be sought without undue delay, but at once takes distribution cases as a group out
from under that principle: “…it is true that Prohibition ought to be prayed in due time,
but that is in cases that concern interests and rights which depend long and then are
settled. There the court will not grant Prohibition. But here you come to the Ordinary and
pray distribution and it is granted presently, and therefore a Prohibition cannot be
[obtained] sooner.” In other words, administrators are not under a special duty to act
promptly to block distribution efforts; on the contrary, suits for distribution are typically
disposed of so quickly that administrators cannot be fairly expected to anticipate
sentence.
Richardson next says a word about what he takes to be the main practical
argument in favor of ecclesiastical power to compel distribution: it is said to be
“inconvenient that the wife should have all the estate and the issues nothing.” This
Richardson denies: “But that is not inconvenient, for it will make the parents more
solicitous to provide for their issues.” What sort of reason that is less than evident. Men
will be less likely to neglect providing for their children by will or inter vivos gift if they
know there is an appreciable risk of their widows taking all should they die intestate?
Maybe so.
Finally, Richarson speaks to the major point of the statutes’ effect on the powers
of ecclesiastical courts. He says that before 31 Edw. III distribution was unquestionably
compellable, thereby implying that the earlier statute, rather than 21 Hen. VIII, altered
the law. (That seems to me a defensible position, in a somewhat left-handed way. 31
Edw. III lays down much less definite rules than 21 Hen. VIII, but it lays down a rule; 21
Hen. VIII no more expressly bars distribution than 31 Edw. III; if the effect of any statute
requiring appointment of administrators and indicating who shall be appointed is to
remove the ecclesiastical court’s power to control the final disposition, the older statute
will do as well as the newer.) Richardson then adds that between 31 Edw. III and 21 Hen.
VIII the ecclesiastical court could repeal administration without cause; since 21 Hen.
VIII, repeal must be for cause (no indication of what counts as cause.) This dictum
confirms that the power to distribute, in Richardson’s view, was destroyed by 31 Edw. III
(whether or not contemporaries would have realized that); 21 Hen. VIII cut back
ecclesiastical powers still further by banning arbitrary revocation.
Justice Hutton, as reported by the MS., says that Prohibition is undoubtedly
grantable, that the statute has “made an interest in the wife”, and that “it is intended that
the wife will make distribution to their issues.”(I.e. the law is not against the distribution
of estates, but presumes that the administrator is trustworthy to make such a distribution
when it is appropriate.) Hutton then adds, with Yelverton’s concurrence, that Mary’s
claim to a share of the personal estate in this case was particularly weak owing to her
reversion in the intestate’s copyhold. His reason is a technical analogy: In localities
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where relatives had a customary, temporal right to part of a dead man’s goods, a relative
on whom a reversion in the deceased’s land descended was barred from claiming such
share. The point can be made less technically, as the countervailing side of the equitable
case in Mary’s favor sketched above: Someone who inherits a valuable interest in land
from an intestate has even less business claiming distribution than a close relative
absolutely left out.
As reported by Croke, Hutton covers the ground more completely in coming to
the same conclusion. He appears to agree with Richardson that 31 Edw. III, rather than 21
Hen. VIII, cut off the power to distribute. Like Richardson, but a little more strongly, he
takes 21 Hen. VIII as eliminating the further power to revoke at discretion. (The slight
differences are: Hutton says that free revocation is unlawful especially after 21 Hen. VIII,
as if to suggest that 31 Edw. III may already have done the job. Whereas Richardson
admitted the present-day legality of revocation with cause, Hutton may imply that
revocation is now illegal in all cases except to correct a violation of the statutory
standards in the original grant of administration. He may also imply that bare
accountability before the ecclesiastical court was eliminated at the same time as
revocability.) On utilitarian aspects of the case, Hutton observes that power to compel
distribution would be mischievous because an administrator might be stuck with debts
unrevealed at the time of distribution. The most careful accounting, he says, cannot
certainly guard against that. Finally, Hutton cites some of the authority that
unquestionably existed on his side. (In addition to Torke, cited as Tooker v. Loan, he
mentions two cases not independently reported: A Watts’s Case, 9 Jac., no details. A
Clerk’s Case, 20 Jac., where an administrator prohibited an attempt to compell
distribution even though, when administration was granted, she had entered an obligation
to make such distribution of the residual estate as the Ordinary should appoint.)
The MS. report informs us that Fotherley v. Fotherley was adjourned after the
reported discussion, but that a Prohibition was subsequently granted, in accord with all
the judicial opinion expressed.
Davies’s Case (1627)12 is sparely reported: Prohibition granted to block an
attempt to make the intestate’s widow-administratrix distribute. An anonymous case from
the following term13 confirms the unlawfulness of compelling distribution, but with a
touch of qualification. Initially, the puisne judges agreed on that point in the absence of
Chief Justice Richardson. The report states their holding in such a way as to put the
connection between power to distribute and power to revoke in a slightly different light
than usual: Administration granted to the intestate’s wife cannot be revoked, therefore the
initial grant exhausts the ecclesiastical court’s power, therefore that court has no power
left to force a distribution. In this formulation, irrevocability is the premise on which the
absence of distributing power depends. (Contrast the suggestion that power to distribute
directly was infringed by statute before power to revoke at will and thereby influence the
disposition of the estate indirectly.) The judges added the generality that once
administration is duly granted the grantee has an interest of which he may not be
12
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deprived by revocation—no indication that there may be a penumbra of lawful revocation
for cause, at least undue original grant. The judges are said to have made this firm
holding in the face of objection that Prohibitions in such cases had not been granted until
recent times—a true enough observation if recent times include Lord Hobart’s day. As in
Fotherley, there are hints of a counter-offensive—of lawyers emboldened, with some
justification, to make out that recent intestacy law was not very well-founded and to
reverse the current.
Two dicta are also reported. I am not sure what one of them means: Per Justice
Yelverton, administration may not be granted until a division is made. (Over-hasty grants
of administration are unlawful? And controllable? The immediate family of an intestate
should be given a chance to split up his visible goods by voluntary agreement before an
interest in everything is conferred on someone by a grant of administration? If such a
chance is given, there is no need for revocation and distribution? I am not sure.) The
other dictum, by Justices Croke and Harvey, contributes a point not previously embraced:
An Action on the Case will lie against the ecclesiastical judge if he does not grant
administration where he ought—i.e., presumably to those eligible by the statute. This
would seem to mean that eligible persons may sue the Ordinary for actual damages—
presumably the whole net value of the estate, at least when only one person is eligible.
(What the damage to any one of six eligible equally persons excluded by a misappointment would be makes a question.) Availability of an Action on the Case means
that the party grieved is not confined to the set penalty provided by 21 Hen. VIII—£10,
obviously less than the actual loss that an excluded eligible person might, or solely
eligible person would, sustain by failure to obtain administration of any considerable
estate. There is no telling whether Croke and Harvey meant this observation to have a
bearing on the matters immediately at hand. (It might go with a very strict rule on
revocability: Even an egregiously improper grant may not be revoked, because anyone
wronged by the same is adequately protected by his action for damages. Administration
“duly granted”, and hence irrevocable, means only “granted in a formally sufficient
manner by the standards of ecclesiastical law”, not “granted to a statutorily eligible
person.”)
This case was reargued later, in Richardson’s presence, Finch contending against
Prohibition, as he had in Fotherley. He cited a Davies’s Case on his side, which,
however, is clearly not the Davies’s Case just above. (It is more likely to be identical with
the nameless case from Hobart’s time which he had relied on in Fotherley.) For
Richardson quickly intervenes to concede and distinguish the Davies’s Case now in
question: There was such a case, where Prohibition to block distribution was denied.
However, that was a case “of extremity.” It was a case of a widow-administratrix who
drove the intestate’s son, and apparently her own, from her house and allowed him no
maintenance, nor had the son been provided for in any way by his father (by inter vivos
gift presumably.) Although he does not say so, Richardson clearly saw no comparable
“extremity” in the present case and had no intention to depart from the general rule that
distribution is not compellable. He did, however, have the courage of his concession, for
he proceeds to articulate the appropriate generalization: ultimately, it lies in the court’s
discretion whether or not to prohibit in distribution cases. (In Fotherley, Richardson
seems rather to resist yielding to this view, but he may not then have been confronted
with a case he remembered that seemed to require it. On the other hand, he may have
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modified his opinion towards the indulgent view of ecclesiastical powers that generally
characterized him and sometimes divided him from his colleagues. He may have
preferred the view that authority to order distribution was not absolutely wrested from
ecclesiastical courts by the statutes, but only directed. I.e., the statutes in effect require
that the traditional ecclesiastical power be used only to prevent extreme inequity. To base
such a position on the statutes, it seems to me, is harder than to attribute either of the
more radical effects to them: that they leave the power to distribute intact because they do
not mention it, or that by intendment and implication they destroy it utterly. One would
perhaps be better advised to argue that every Prohibition, of whatever kind, is ultimately
discretionary, that the courts are never obliged to close their eyes and prohibit, whatever
the practical effects and the equities. Possibly that is what Richardson meant.) Justices
Croke and Harvey did not like what they heard from the Chief Justice. They declined to
make an issue of it publicly, but “said secretly between themselves that it was not in the
discretion of the court.” Croke and Harvey would presumably have held that Finch’s
Davies was simply wrong.
In Lady Button’s Case,14 close in date to those above, Richardson’s view that
Prohibition is discretionary in distribution cases comes out again. Of the facts we are only
told that sisters of the intestate sued the widow-administratrix for distribution and that
Prohibition was sought after sentence ordering the same. The report says that various
causes for Prohibition were alleged, but that Richardson insisted that 21 Hen. VIII was
the only relevant basis. He then went on, however, to say “upon the statute” that “upon
conference with the Judges, he conceived that it was in the discretion of the Court to
grant a Prohibition in such cases or not.” Perhaps Richardson had conferred with the
King’s Bench judges, for two of his Common Pleas colleagues at once expressed their
disagreement. Hutton made the basic points—Prohibition must be granted; an
administrator is in the same position as an executor, though anciently both were liable to
have a distribution forced upon them; in appointing administrators the ecclesiastical court
executes its authority and has no more left—with the additional observation that sisters
do not have even a colorable claim to distribution, no more than cousins. The thought
behind the latter point is that children do have at least a colorable claim—though Hutton
believes not a valid one—as against a widow-administratrix. His stated reason for the
distinction is that c. 18 of Magna Carta requires that children have a share of their
father’s goods but says nothing about brothers and sisters. He would seem to be
suggesting that a respectable argument might be made to the effect that it is rather strong
medicine to hold that more recent statutes repeal a clause of Magna Carta, yet one must
so hold to reach the conclusion that under those statutes distribution is never compellable.
Hutton is clearly ready to swallow the strong medicine. He would presumably say that
Magna Carta was addressed to a situation that had now been superseded—a situation of
uncontrolled ecclesiastical power now superseded by one sufficiently protective of
children’s interest on the whole—and could therefore be regarded as “repealed” with
equanimity. His immediate point is that the “respectable argument” will only avail a
child, not other classes of kin. Behind his sense that a colorable case for limited power to
compell distribution could be made from Magna Carta may lie a certain unease about the
“natural justice” of contemporary law. Ought the law to permit a widow-administratrix–a
14
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wicked stepmother perhaps—to shut the intestate’s offspring out? It did so, in Hutton’s
opinion, and Hutton had no use for Richardson’s discretionary-Prohibitions approach, but
he may have recognized that an inadequacy in the law pushed the Chief Justice into that
approach. The inadequacy, however, extended only to neglected children, not to the
miscellaneous ranks of other kin. In support of his main position, Hutton cites an
otherwise unreported Isabel Tower’s Case, where Prohibition was granted.
Justice Harvey spoke to the same effect as Hutton, mentioning the problem of the
“sleeping debt” as a reason against distribution. Harvey contributes a new wrinkle by
mentioning a Flame’s Case, in which it was said that if ecclesiastical courts cannot order
a distribution after an estate is settled they will get to the same result by compelling
distribution before granting administration. The argument would seem to be that
distribution is ultimately unpreventable de facto and therefore might as well be permitted
as a judicial act of the ecclesiastical court at the most appropriate time. (Just what would
compelling distribution before granting administration consist in? Perhaps the range from
conditional grants and bonds to less formal but probably more effective techniques—
more effective because the enforceability of bonds, at any rate, is questionable. I should
suppose that the best way to insure de facto distribution would be to put off a grant and
indicate to the preferred candidate that he would be appointed when and if the close
relatives had split up the liquidated property by agreement.) To this argument, Harvey
replies (or perhaps refers to the answer given in Flame’s Case) that “they have not any
such power, for he ought to commit administration if it be demanded.” I.e., it is not so
easy to effect a distribution by informal manipulation. Quaere tamen. What is the remedy
if the Ordinary drags his feet when an eligible person demands administration? Is there
one outside the ecclesiastical system? Anyhow, Harvey adds that “so it was” by
unanimous opinion in one Clark’s Case. There is no telling what the form of that case and
the significance of the decision were.
The final bit of information in the report of Lady Button is that Justice Yelverton
declined to express an opinion about the Ordinary’s power to require distribution, but
nevertheless agreed to a Prohibition. It is possible that Yelverton was attracted to
Richardson’s approach or worried about the law’s stance and therefore unready to chime
in with Hutton and Harvey. The Prohibition in the instant case may of course have had
Richardson’s consent as well as Yelverton’s. The last case above indicates that
Richardson would usually be inclined to employ his claimed discretion by granting
Prohibitions, reserving denial for hardship situations, such as Lady Button’s sisters-inlaw may not have been in.
In Gray’s Case,15 Magna Carta was used by Serjeant Henden to argue for limited
powers of distribution. The exigencies of the case were such that Henden had to claim
precisely what Hutton in Lady Button said could not be claimed even plausibly on the
basis of Magna Carta. For in Gray one brother of the intestate was seeking to compel
another brother, the administrator, to distribute. In relying on Magna Carta at all, Henden
may have realized that he was playing the last trump card held by the succession of
litigants who tried and failed to salvage the distributing powers of ecclesiastical courts
(by relying on tradition and the ambiguity of the more recent statutes.) In using it for the
purposes of the present case, he had to maintain that a brother is within the same reason
15
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as the widow and children whom Magna Carta protects in terms. So he maintained
expressly, while conceding that remoter relatives could not at the present day force
distribution.
The reported judicial response to Henden comes from Hutton and Harvey and
goes predictably. The two judges do not really take on the general argument from Magna
Carta—i.e., show why the modern law, though at odds with the policy of Magna Carta, is
a necessary interpretation of modern statutes, which statutes do not crudely repudiate
Magna Carta, but create a new and better system, and so render its concerns inoperative.
Rather, the judges concentrate on the invalidity of claiming anything for a brother if a
claim on behalf of a widow or children were plausible: A younger brother might be given
the personal estate as administrator while a quantity of land might descend on an older
brother. It is reasonable that the older should have a share of the personalty as well? Why
is a brother any more in the same case as a child than a cousin in the same case as a
brother? For the rest, amid some garbled remarks that only go to show that Hutton and
Harvey remained firm in their anti-distribution opinion, the judges allude to the resources
for effecting a distribution in fact when ecclesiastical courts could not effect one de jure.
Harvey recollects an instance in which an Ordinary put off granting administration until
he had somehow managed to get £600 from a large intestate estate committed to charity.
The technique must have been to exact a bond, for Harvey adds, “But…in the time of Sir
John Bennet [once judge of the Prerogative—i.e., probate—Court of Canterbury] , such
an obligation was questioned, and they would not endure the trial of it.” The implication
is that a bond obliging one, if appointed administrator, to make a certain disposition of
the estate is invalid. Hutton suggests a possible technique, apparently the product of his
imagination rather than his experience (for his words are “they might invent a new way”)
–viz. to split up the administration, “As if the estate be £400 they might grant
administration of the goods, of the value of £100 to the other [i.e., to such person as is
deemed entitled to a distributed share].” Hutton hastens to add, and Harvey agrees, that
such a grant would be unlawful. Thus, in still another way, there is no danger that
abolition of ecclesiastical courts’ power to compel distribution will be nominal abolition.
My last Common Pleas case16 is later (1634) than the cluster above. It is
significant because in one dimension it raises a question touched on elsewhere but not put
directly in any previous Common Pleas case: May the Prohibition be used to prevent the
original probate court from granting administration to an ineligible person? Or are the
only remedies the penalty appointed by 21 Hen. VIII (plus perhaps tort liability as
suggested above) and (if there is no objection to these latter) revocation and ecclesiastical
appeal? The report of the 1634 case furnishes evidence that the court considered
Prohibition for that purpose inappropriate. (in keeping with Hobart’s intimation in Brian
v. Goddard.) That position is not, however, essential to the decision in the instant case to
deny Prohibition, since the court did not think there was an erroneous grant to prohibit.
Therefore the case does not count as strict authority against Prohibition to enforce the
eligibility requirements as such. In the end, there is no strict authority to that effect, for
we shall see that the propriety of using the Prohibition was put before the King’s Bench
only in a complicated context, and the case in which the matter was raised was not
decisively resolved.
16

M. 10 Car. C.P. Harl. 4813, f. 101.
74

In the 1634 case a woman died intestate. Her next of kin by blood sought a
Prohibition to prevent the granting of administration to her husband. The report’s
statement of the case suggests that administration had not yet been granted to the
husband, but that the kinsman only feared it might be. (All the report says is, “This term
the case was moved to have a Prohibition to the ecclesiastical court to prohibit the
granting of a letter of administration to the husband […de prohibite le granting de un
lettre de administration destre grant al baron]”. A remark by counsel later on, however,
suggests that the grant to the husband had already been made. If that was the case, it does
not change the issues, but only adds a further one, viz.: Admitting that it is unlawful to
grant administration to the husband and that the ecclesiastical court could have been
prohibited from ever making such a grant, will Prohibition lie after the grant has been
made? What would be the effect of such a “retospective” Prohibition? Would it in effect
serve as an injunction to the probate court to repeal the grant or else be found in
disobedience of the Prohibition?
The kinsman’s basic contention was obviously that a husband is ineligible under
21 Hen. VIII. Whereas the statute strongly favors widows, the argument must go, it says
nothing about the case of widowers and ought therefore to be taken to mean that they
have no claim as against blood relatives. This basic point may not, however, have been
the kinsman’s whole argument. The report notes that he surmised that various debts by
bond were due to the wife, the benefit of which should go to her nearest blood-relative
(…et surmise que divers detts per bonds fueront due al feme quell ore esteant mort
appertaine al prochein del kin…) I conjecture that this second line of defense went as
follows: Perhaps there is no objection to making the husband administrator if, so far as
appears, there are no specialty debts due to the wife (even though 21 Hen. VIII says
nothing about widowers.) In that case, all the husband would take—except for the
privilege of satisfying his wife’s creditors—would be the tangible goods she brought to
the marriage, which he would have been free to dispose of as his own during the
coverture. But the statute cannot intend, inasmuch as it expresses no favor to widowers,
that a husband should make off with the possibly great wealth represented by the wife’s
bonds. If a woman who is the beneficiary of thousands of pounds’ worth of bonds marries
and dies a few weeks later, is her widower to take all and her brother nothing, should an
ecclesiastical court for some reason or none see fit to grant administration to the
widower? (I should suppose that other variables could affect the argument. Suppose, for
example, that the bonds held by a rich lady before marriage all fall due in 1640, and that
she dies in 1636. Is the kinsman’s case against the widower not stronger there than if all
the bonds had fallen due, but remained uncollected, at the time of her death? In saying
simply that the bonds were surmised to be “due” to the wife, the report does not resolve
the ambiguity between “due” in the sense of “collectable now, the money capable of
being recovered in an Action of Debt,” and “due” in the mere sense of “owed”.)
The court, on Serjeant Harvey’s motion, rejected the kinsman’s contentions and
denied Prohibition. The judges held that a widower is just as eligible for administration as
a widow. They thought that a widower would clearly have counted as his wife’s “next
and most special friend” when 31 Edw. III was the only statute governing administration
and apparently considered that a reason for holding him eligible under 21 Hen. VIII.
They thought in effect that 21 Hen. VIII’s emphasis on the rights of widows, works in
favor of widowers since, with the sexes reversed, the cases are indistinguishable. (As they
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put it, “By the statute of 21 Hen. VIII it seems to be reason that [if, since] the wife will
have the administration of her husband’s goods by like proportion [per semblable
proporcon] the husband will have administration of his wife.’) For confirmation they
cited what is referred to as “the appeal to the Delegates”, where it was resolved that the
husband should be his wife’s administrator, rather than her nearest blood-relative. I have
no way of identifying the case referred to. We are told that Justices Croke and Jones sat
on the Delegates when it was decided, a fact cited to show that the ecclesiastical decision
had a common law imprimatur.
Their presence means that the case came after 1625 (Jones was appointed to the
King’s Bench in 1624, Croke to the Common Pleas in 1625 and then to the King’s Bench
in 1628.) The possibility cannot be excluded that “the appeal to the Delegates” was in the
instant case; the definite article so suggests. I.e.: When the probate court appointed the
husband, the kinsman went to the Delegates and won. Then the kinsman sought a
Prohibition. The court was all the more inclined to deny a writ because to grant one
would be to contradict Jones and Croke, though if it had been strongly convinced of the
opposite position it would presumably not have hesitated to override them.
These considerations suffice to decide the case. The judges took the occasion,
however, to generalize about the use of Prohibitions to enforce 21 Hen. VIII and to
suggest that even if the grant to the husband had not been perfectly correct it could not be
blocked or undone by Prohibition: “And it was said by the Court that this Court does not
intermeddle with the direction or within anything that concerns the committing of
administration, but that is totally to be left to them of the ecclesiastical court.” Serjeant
Hitcham, presumably representing the kinsman seeking Prohibition, took exception to
this generalization, citing the King’s Bench case of Wingate v. Glascock (discussed
below) as an instance of a Prohibition granted because administration was awarded
contrary to the statute. I shall show under the King’s Bench cases below that Wingate
does not clearly endorse prohibiting a misgrant, though it is legitimately citable against
the flat proposition—asserted by the court here—that Prohibitions have no place in the
implementation of the statute’s eligibility rules. The reporter, probably speaking for
himself, answers Hitcham’s argument with a quaere. He makes two basic points against
the use of Prohibition: (1) The statute imposes a penalty and therefore intends that a
penalty suit should be the remedy against violation of its straight requirements. (I say “its
straight requirements” because there seems to be no objection to distinguishing those
from less direct effects of the statute. In other words, one can oppose prohibiting when
administration is granted to an ineligible person—a “straight” violation—yet support
prohibiting what the statute makes an ultra vires act for the ecclesiastical court, such as
compelling distribution. It need not follow that a penalty suit would not lie against an
ecclesiastical judge who purports to order distribution, or the like—sed quaere.) (2) It is
inappropriate to use the Prohibition as a Mandamus in effect—i.e., to order the
ecclesiastical judge to repeal its erroneous grant and make a new, correct one. Although
such misuse of the Prohibition would be avoidable if a writ were sought before the
original grant, that would not be a practical possibility in many cases. In practice, it is
better to decide that the eligibility requirements are always or never enforceable by
Prohibition than so to enforce them only in the rare case when the Prohibition would have
a prospective operation. (I formulate this point by extension from the bare words, “As for
us, we may not command them to repeal that administration.”) In addition, the reporter
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cites a Common Pleas case (not otherwise reported) in which an alien ambassador died
without kin in England. In that case, he says, the court refused to intermeddle, leaving the
affairs if the ambassador’s estate entirely to the ecclesiastical authorities. No details are
given, so it is impossible to judge what arguments for common law interference might
have been made and rejected.
We may now turn to the smaller body of King’s Bench cases. My only directly
significant one from the later Jacobean years (when a litigant who wanted to prohibit
distribution or accounting had every reason to go to the Common Pleas) is Wingate v.
Glascock.17 It is important that this case involves the question that was least resolved in
the Common Pleas—whether the Prohibition can be used to prevent ecclesiastical courts
from misapplying 21 Hen. VIII in their original grant of administration. Chief Justice
Hobart had suggested a negative answer in Brian v. Goddard. He may have changed his
mind later, but after the question had been raised in the King’s Bench in the instant
Wingate v. Glascock. In the last Common Pleas case above, Wingate was relied on for
the position that misapplication of the statute’s eligibility requirements may be controlled
by Prohibition (i.e., the statute does not merely subject the probate judge to a penalty.)
There is room for doubt, however, as to whether the case clearly has that meaning.
In Wingate, the probate court granted administration to a half-brother of the
intestate. This decision was appealed to the Delegates, the appeal being made by a full
sister. Her position must have been that 21 Hen. VIII mandated, or that ecclesiastical law
and good discretion required, preferring the full blood. (Which of those alternatives is not
self-evident, and the report does not help. It would be plausible to ground an appeal on
the theory that next of kin in contemplation of the statute means a full brother or sister in
preference to a half-brother or half–sister, whether or not the full blood in a remoter
degree should be preferred over the half blood in a nearer. It would also be plausible to
concede that the statute enacts no standard for distinguishing such close cases and still to
argue that the probate court’s use of its statutory discretion is reviewable within the
ecclesiastical system, either as a mere act of discretion or because there are standards
governing such cases in the tradition of ecclesiastical law .) A Prohibition was sought
with a surmise that the Delegates proposed to repeal the lower court’s grant and make a
new one to the full sister. (“They intend and say” that they will take those measures.) The
Prohibition was granted. The explanation given in the report is that construction of
statutes belongs to the common law courts, that “this is grounded on 21 H. 8”, and “so we
will determine to whom it ought to be granted.”
At a certain level of generality, this decision does uphold the propriety of
enforcing the eligibility requirements by Prohibition. If the only secular remedy for
ignoring or misconstruing those requirements is a penalty suit, then the full sister should
bring such a suit against the probate judge or, if the Delegates actually did reverse him,
the half-brother should bring such a suit against the Delegates. Pursuant to the penalty
suit, the common law would exercise its prerogative to decide whether the statute was
violated by the appointment of the half-brother in preference to the full sister, or vice
versa. In prohibiting the King’s Bench opted for “preventive relief”, instead of relying
solely on the statute’s penalty clause. Taking the preventive option in such contexts
usually makes sense, at any rate when it can be done in a prospective manner (prohibiting
17
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the appointment of Ineligible—or, as here, the replacement of Eligible by Ineligible or
No-More-Eligible—before the erroneous step has been taken.)
Before the significance of Wingate can be assessed, however, we must ask just
how the court’s preventive action should be conceived. The Prohibition could be based
on three alternative theories:
(1) As between a half-brother and a full sister, 21 Hen. VIII requires
appointment of the former. If the court prohibited on this premise, it would
straightforwardly endorse the enforcement of the eligibility standards by Prohibition. It
ought to prohibit an original probate court on the half-brother’s motion if that court
“intended and said” that it was going to grant administration to the full sister, as well as
prohibiting an appellate court that proposed to undo a correct grant below. The premise
here is utterly implausible, however. There is surely no basis in the statute for holding
that a half-brother must be preferred over a full sister. Natural expectations go the other
way. If one is the closer relative than the other, it would presumably be the one who
shares two parents with the deceased. The statute speaks only of propinquity of
relationship. It is in no way biased against women; its favor toward widows so testifies.
(2) The statute enacts no preferential standard as between full blood and half
blood in equal degree. The probate court therefore exercised perfectly legitimate
discretion in choosing the half-brother over the full sister. The effect of the Prohibition is
to protect that exercise of discretion—virtually the same thing as preventing groundless
revocation of administration (i.e., revocation on no better ground than that the
ecclesiastical court has reconsidered its perfectly lawful original decision.) It arguably
makes no difference whether such reconsideration takes place in the original probate
court or through the forms of ecclesiastical appeal. If the statute makes a decision
discretionary, one can say, there is no sense in which it is appealable. This position is
entirely plausible. It does not really make for the proposition that the eligibility
requirements are enforceable by Prohibition. I.e., one might hold that a probate court
which “intends and says” that it is going to appoint a third cousin and exclude a son is not
prohibitable. The remedy there is to sue the erring judge for the penalty; the erroneous
appointee cannot be prevented from serving as administator. Without illogic, one can also
hold that review of lawful grants, whether by the original or an appellate court, is
prohibitable. Both propositions serve the interest of expedition, which may be very
important among the purposes of the statute, though the first one is a pretty rough means
in that an utterly improper administrator could make off with considerable property if the
probate judge were not deterred by a £10 penalty. Liability for actual damages would
neutralize the risk of that, however, and ecclesiastical appeal would reduce it. To hold
that appellate courts should be prohibited from reviewing lawful grants (whether
discretionary-lawful or mandatory-lawful) does not imply that they should be stopped
from reversing unlawful ones (though the interest in expedition would be served by
prohibiting even that and relying wholly on the dissuasive effect of penalty and
damages.)
(3) The decision in Wingate may amount to a weak or provisional Prohibition and
so say nothing of importance about the role of Prohibitions in enforcing the eligibility
requirements. I.e., the Prohibition may have been no more than an invitation to move for
Consultation, granted because the court, as the report says, was insistent on its exclusive
right to construe the statute, but was uncertain offhand as to how the case should be
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handled. The judges may have thought that the full sister’s claim against the half-brother
was quite convincing, or unconvincing, but wanted either way to advise more thoroughly.
To prohibit was to stop the ecclesiastical courts from complicating matters by a decision
while the common law judges made up their minds about the statute’s meaning and also,
perhaps, about the propriety of “preventive relief” against misapplication of the statute. A
judge could favor a Prohibition in this spirit even though inclined to doubt the propriety
of such relief—i.e., to hold that even when an appellate court is about to reverse a lawful
grant, the appellate court should be allowed to make its mistake and face the penalty. A
judge in that position would need only to be convinced, in order to prohibit provisionally,
that all issues arising from the statute—both what eligibility standards it enacts and how
it ought to be enforced—belong to the common law. The report suggests that the
contrary may have been urged—i.e., the recognizable though generally unsuccessful view
that statutes are addressed to all courts and are to be construed by whatever court a
statutory contention is raised in. It would not be surprising to find that view tried out in
the intestacy field as a last-ditch effort to reverse the considerable constriction of
ecclesiastical courts in the years before this case. That such an effort should be made in
the King’s Bench is also unsurprising, because it would almost surely fail in the Common
Pleas, whence the constriction had come.
There is no sure basis for choosing between the second explanation of the
decision and the third, but a scrap of further evidence supports the second which is
probably the more convincing in any event. In a similar case considerably later (Brown v.
Wood, below) Wingate was cited straightforwardly for the proposition that half-blood
and full-blood relatives of equal degree are equally eligible under 21 Hen. VIII. This only
proves that the decision was so understood, but the chances are that it was understood
correctly. A more questionable bit of evidence supporting the third explanation is
discussed under Mayow below.
My next King’s Bench case,18 and the one most impressively argued in that court,
also involves the eligibility requirements. Whether Prohibition is appropriate—as
opposed to relying on the penalty—was expressly discussed, as it may not have been in
Wingate. In this case, administration was originally granted to the intestate’s uncle
(Mayow, his mother’s brother.) Thomain Trumplin sought to reverse the grant in the
Arches. Thomain’s relationship to the intestate is not stated in the reports. The intestate’s
name was also Trumplin. Thomain may have had a plausible, but not obvious, claim to be
the better candidate. I say “not obvious” because the Arches confirmed the grant below—
the lower court is not likely to have committed an egregious error—, but “plausible”
because after losing in the Arches Thomain went on to the Delegates, as if he believed in
his chances. The appeal was pending before the Delegates for two years (a comment on
the cost to expeditiousness in letting ecclesiastical process take its course) before Mayow
got around to seeking a Prohibition. Such is the case as stated at the beginning of the
report. Counsel against Prohibition (Noy) smuggled further facts in, but let us take those
as they come.
Serjeant Ashley spoke first, in favor of a Prohibition. His remarks are entirely on
the propriety of Prohibition as a remedy, not on the relative titles of Mayow and Thomain
18
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Trumplin to be administrator. He makes the practical point that the £10 penalty in 21
Hen. VIII is a “small restraint.” Some of Ashley’s language may be intended to cut off
the argument that an erring judge would be liable for actual damages as well as the
penalty. The contention would come to saying that a statute in strictly penal form in
effect “permits” the penalized act, subject to a price—i.e. , does not make the act a tort,
wherefore the only means of enforcing the statute besides the penalty is Prohibition.
What Ashley actually does is to emphasize that the statute speaks of granting
administration “under” the penalty—which I take to say that the statute is in “strictly
penal form”.)
Secondly, Ashley makes a clever argument from the history of statutory
regulation of intestacy proceedings in ecclesiastical courts: 31 Edw. III erects an
eligibility standard for administrators—a vague, but not a meaningless, standard. It
requires that administration be granted to the “loyal amies” of the intestate. The
requirement is meaningful enough to be violated—as by appointing such “unlawful”
persons as an outlaw or one attainted. (By focusing on “loyal”=legalis, rather than 31
Edw. III’s other adjective, “plus proscheins”, Ashley presumably admits that the latter
may be too uncertain to give rise to violation. Can the ecclesiastical court’s judgment that
A is the “nearest friend” of the deceased be controverted? The statute does not in terms
lay down the more manageable standard of “nearest relative”, though it might
conceivably be argued that that is the intent of “nearest friend.”) Now, 31 Edw. III does
not appoint a penalty. Therefore, since Prohibition is strictly the only way to enforce the
statute, Prohibition must have lain to prevent, say, the grant of administration to an
outlaw. Then comes 21 Hen. VIII. The new statute did not appear out of the blue, in the
manner, let us say, of a penal statute imposing a “price” on the previously lawful act of
wearing a green hat on Sunday. Rather, 21 Hen. VIII comes to a continuation,
specification, or fulfillment of 31 Edw. III. 21 Hen. VIII adds a penalty for misgranting
administration, but it should not be construed as taking away the pre-existing means of
preventing misgrants by the going statutory standard—viz. Prohibition. The context of
prior related legislation enforceable by Prohibition takes 21 Hen. VIII out of the class of
mere penal statutes—granting that statutes strictly in that class ought not to be enforced
by Prohibition.
Finally, Ashley claims precedents. The reports at this point are unclear, but he
may claim authority for, as well as asserting, the proposition that Prohibition will lie to
prevent a grant to the half blood in preference to the full. One citation is clear—a case
from M. 21 Jac. That looks suspiciously like Wingate v. Glascock, though it is not
certainly identifiable as such either by name or description. All Ashley says is that a
Prohibition was granted in M. 21 Jac. on the basis of the “proximity of blood” standard of
21 Hen. VIII—the bare precedent Ashley needs (he admits the Prohibition led to a
demurrer and that the parties settled before the case came to judgment.) If the reference is
to Wingate, the extra information supplied by Ashley tends to confirm my third
interpretation above: the Delegates were prohibited from ousting the half-brother in
favor of the full sister only to let the parties raise the legal issues formally. For whatever
reason, they decided that fighting out those issues was not worthwhile.
On the other side of the present case, Noy both controverted Ashley’s immediate
arguments and projected a general theory that transcends them. He took the predictable
position that a penal statute with no “negative” language expressly forbidding the act
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penalized only subjects the act to the penalty. The act is not made subject to Prohibition
(and presumably it is not made a tort either.) Then Noy points out that no Prohibitions
were ever grounded on 31 Edw. III. (Ashley had not cited any, only maintained that
Prohibition must lie in the event that administration were granted to an “unlawful”
person.) From his observation about 31 Edw. III, Noy proceeds to an interpretation: It is
not just unprovable that Prohibition will lie to enforce the statute. From the absence of
Prohibitions we should conclude that the writ will not lie. Why? Because the statute is a
directive to ecclesiastical judges. Whether or not all statutes relevant for ecclesiastical
proceedings are construable by ecclesiastical courts, this one is. I.e., the legislature did
not intend to take away the ecclesiastical courts’ time-honored exclusive authority over
intestates’ estates, but only to tell ecclesiastical courts how to exercise it, trusting them
not to disregard the statute.
Why should one say this (short of saying that all statute-enforcing Prohibitions
are illegitimate, a position I see no need to force on Noy)? Noy states reasons specific to
the case, I believe. In part the argument is from the form of statutes: A statute (like 31
Edw. III) that says “do x” to a judicial authority is not like one that says “do not do y”;
the latter probably makes doing y prohibitable; the former does not make doing acts
incompatible with x, or doing z instead of x, prohibitable. In addition, Noy claims that 31
Edw. III declares the common law. I am not sure how he knows that, but the point is
plausible: 31 Edw. III imposes pretty loose and pretty obvious standards. It is imaginable
enough—in the blissful absence of evidence—that the standards it states were already
accepted (if neglected or doubted, in the manner of rules that need to be “declared” by
statute.) I take the upshot of the point to be that common law interference’ with intestacy
cases was no more justified after 31 Edw. III than before, and surely it was not before.
(Because, presumably, any non-legislated standards ecclesiastical courts were subject to
in this area were very much part of “their law”—“common law” in the sense of
immemorial and binding without a legislative basis, but of no concern to the common law
courts, whose law was simply silent on the disposition of dead men’s personal property.)
Finally, I believe that Noy is conscious of policy considerations reinforcing his
formalism. More of these in a moment, because he expounds them in connection with
alleged further circumstances of the instant case. The effect of his argument from 31
Edw. III is to say, pace Ashley, that this is the context of 21 Hen. VIII: There were
standards for the choice of administrators on the statute book, of course standards capable
of being violated. But Prohibition did not lie to enforce those standards. Violation was
irremediable except by ecclesiastical appeal. Then comes 21 Hen. VIII, a descendent of
31 Edw. III indeed, not “out of the blue”, but within an historical context. What does 21
Hen. VIII alter on the remedial side? One thing only: it appoints a penalty. How can it
authorize Prohibitions when they were not authorized before? Even if the general effect
of penal statutes were not to confine the remedy to the penalty, one would have to
conclude that the statute here in question has that effect. If anything, an “out of the blue”
penal statute addressed to a judicial body would be a better occasion for prohibiting the
penalized act. For here acts very close to those penalized by 21 Hen. VIII were
previously illegal, but still not prohibitable; their earlier non-prohibitability was not the
truistic result of the fact that they were perfectly lawful, as in the “out of the blue” case.
I believe that Noy’s argument involves the further point that prohibiting misgrants
of administration would have practical drawbacks. The general idea he seems to suggest,
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partly through reference to the case at hand, is that discretion is valuable in dealing with
intestates’ estates—even discretion to disobey rules conceived as “guidelines” for the
ecclesiastical courts. If you like, the eligibility standards of 31 Edw. III and 21 Hen. VIII
are usefully regarded as “charged with an equity.” The ecclesiastical courts are by all
tradition the experts in intestacy. Their primary responsibility is to see that the estate is
efficiently and fairly administered, with a view to the probable preferences of the
intestate and the interests of creditors, dependents, and miscellaneous kinsmen.
Parliament has told the ecclesiastical courts not to do certain things, such as overlooking
a man’s wife or son in favor of his third cousin. Of course the ecclesiastical judges ought
to obey these directives, and it can surely be expected that they usually will. They have
now been subjected to the pressure of a modest penal liability to see that they do. But if
an ecclesiastical court were to disobey the rules—risking the penalty—the presumption
should be that the experts have a reason, that they have drawn on a reserve of equitable
authority to secure the objective—efficient and fair administration—in the circumstances
of the particular case. That objective will not be better attained by translating claims to
be administrator into absolute legal rights, enforceable by common law courts by
Prohibition. That approach will only promote litigation by self-interested parties and
involve the common law counterproductively in matters beyond their expertise and
concerning which they cannot know the circumstances as well as the primarily
responsible ecclesiastical courts. Is it healthy, for example, to create a situation in which
a flagrantly incompetent and dishonest person must be made administrator—in an
ambiguous case, because a common law court, without any way of knowing the party’s
character, decides by abstract argument that a full sister, say, is a “closer” relative than a
half-brother, or an illegitimate son disqualified in relation to a third cousin?
The instant case, according to Noy, was just the sort my question suggests. There
is no sign that this information was part of the record (and it does not appear from the
report how ambiguous in terms of familial propinquity the claims of Mayow and
Trumplin were.) Noy informs us, however, that Mayow was accused before the Delegates
of “surreptitiously” obtaining administration and “laboring” to suppress a will. Of the
truth and effect of these circumstances, Noy says, the ecclesiastical court is a “competent
judge”—with the implication that the “competent judge” would be entitled to deprive
him of administration upon an adverse finding, whatever the merits of his familial claim.
Like his arguments in various other cases, Noy’s here is intelligent and ingenious.
It is also radical, for though it need not lead to the conclusion that ecclesiastical courts
may not be prohibited from ordering accountings and distributions, it points that way.
The argument is a pretty fundamental objection to Prohibitions in intestacy cases and to
cramping the discretionary scope of ecclesiastical courts in that area. If the eligibility
rules are “guidelines”, which it is not necessarily wrong to override in hard cases, why is
the same not true of 21 Hen. VIII’s provision (if one sees such a provision in the statute)
that the administrator is to take the residual estate and not to be required to distribute it?
It is difficult to judge from the report how successful Noy was. He won his case,
at least this round, for we are told that no Prohibition was granted. The judicial response
is not reported fully enough to indicate whether the court was at all persuaded of the large
proposition that the eligibility requirements are not enforceable by Prohibition. The one
judge whose individual remarks are given, Dodderidge, seems to avoid any such major
thesis. Dodderidge says to Mayow’s counsel that their application for a Prohibition was
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premature, not that they could have no claim to one. His argument may be that the
grounds alleged against Mayow in the Delegates—his “undue” appointment and
suppression of a will—were at least prima facie, or formally sufficient, grounds for the
proceedings there. The Delegates had not passed on these matters, and until they did so
unfavorably to Mayow he occupied the position of administrator which he claimed to be
entitled to. What did he have to complain about at this point? The answer, surely, is that
if Mayow was mandatory administrator he had a reasonable claim not to be troubled.
(I.e.: The probate court appoints X. A disappointed candidate, Y, appeals the
appointment. X seeks a Prohibition, claiming a closer relationship to the deceased than
Y’s. It is a strongly defensible, though not obligatory, position that the appellate court
should be prohibited at once, assuming the common law court accepts X’s claim. Why
wait to see whether the appellate court will actually reverse the grant below? Waiting
might have a certain “elegance”—“It is bad form to prohibit a court with jurisdiction
when there is no reason to suppose it will use its jurisdiction erroneously”—but the effect
would be to expose both X and Y to needless altercation in the appellate court and to
delay administration.)
If, on the other hand, Mayow was discretionary administrator, just no less
qualified than Trumplin, the case is more complicated. Appellate challenge to his
appointment on grounds of unsuitability and corruption might well be justified. (It is not,
I think, manifest that every discretionary appointment should be reviewable as such. If
the probate court chooses A, it is not at all clear that the equally eligible B is entitled to a
mere second try in an appellate court. There is a sense in which a discretionary act is
unreviewable because it is discretionary, and the desirability of getting on with
administration argues against “second tries”. If, however, B goes to an appellate court
with substantial reasons against A—allegations of controvertible fact bearing on A’s
suitability or the manner in which his appointment below was obtained—he surely has a
good claim to a hearing. That might be so even if the probate court has had an
opportunity to pass on all the matters alleged to the appellate court. A more conservative
position would be that appeal is justified—but only justified then—when B has “new
evidence”, or his complaint is against the procedural propriety of the lower court’s
conduct, rather than the mere way in which it has exercised its judgment. In the case of
“new evidence”, it is arguable that B ought to seek revocation in the probate court before
appealing, though it is also strongly arguable that the common law courts have no interest
in how the ecclesiastical system arranges such procedural matters.) If, however, Trumplin
was perfectly entitled to be alleging Mayow’s corruption before the Delegates and
seeking to oust him on that ground, it seems that Prohibition ought to be denied
definitively. Mayow’s application for a Prohibition was not premature, as Dodderidge
says, but simply one that should be turned down. For surely the ecclesiastical court is the
competent judge of whether in fact Mayow misbehaved and whether his misconduct was
sufficient to justify reversal of a discretionary grant. What does it matter whether the
Delegates decide for or against Mayow, given that the decision is theirs. (One can say it
matters, but the position implied in saying so is hard to defend. That position would be
that common law courts may review the actual decisions of ecclesiastical courts to revoke
or reverse administration, even when it is clear on the record that such revocation or
reversal is sought for cause, or for a legitimate kind of cause, such as “new evidence” or
objection to the procedures of the tribunal that originally granted administration. In the
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instant case, the common law court would be entitled to consider—if not the Delegates’
mere findings of fact—at least the Delegates’ conclusion from the facts as found that
Mayow’s conduct disqualified him for discretionary appointment. That would surely be
to intrude indefensibly on the detailed handling of ecclesiastical business.)
The point of the analysis just above is to say that Dodderidge’s apparent
response—“Maybe Prohibition should lie but it is too early to decide”—is open to
objection on alternative assumptions about the factual unknowns in the present case. His
response can be justified, however, on another hypothesis. This comes to supposing that
he was persuaded by part of Noy’s argument, and it involves assuming that Mayow was
mandatory administrator (i.e., had a better familial claim than Trumplin.) I suggest the
following: Though mandatory administrator by familial relationship, Mayow is
removable for such conduct as suppressing a will. Noy correctly maintained that the
statutory requirements are not absolute. Ecclesiastical courts do have some “equitable”
scope to insure decent administration by appointing a less qualified person by the
eligibility standards. But—contrary to Noy—it goes too far to conclude that Prohibition
will never lie to enforce those standards. “Equitable” overriding of those standards must
be justified, which is to say, the common law court must be convinced that there really
are grounds for denying administration to a closer relative. Ecclesiastical courts should
not simply be trusted to draw on their “equitable reserve” with proper restraint; they
should be prohibited from overriding the standards without sufficient reason. Such
overriding of mandatory standards is different from review of discretionary decisions.
The latter should not be prohibited (I argue above) in so far as they are bona fide—i.e.,
matters with a legitimate bearing on the proper exercise of discretion are before the
reviewing tribunal; someone disappointed by Tom’s discretion is not merely trying his
luck with Dick’s, or having a second go at Tom’s. How the ecclesiastical court deals with
a bona fide suit for review of a discretionary decision is irrelevant from the common law
point of view. Per contra, “equitable” exceptions to mandatory standards—to rules in
whose favor there should be a heavy presumption—have no claim to the common law’s
tolerance unless they really are on good consideration. Whether they are can hardly be
judged until they are made—hence the justification for Dodderidge’s “Wait and see”.
Prohibition now could perhaps be warranted if it were made to appear that an “equitable”
exception was being sought on frivolous grounds, though to prohibit in that situation has
the aspect of insulting the ecclesiastical court—i.e., not giving it credit for ability to
recognize a frivolous appeal, and for the intention of respecting the statute save in very
pressing circumstances. In the instant case, at any rate, it seems clear that the claim
against Mayow was far from frivolous: if administration should ever be denied to the
normally mandatory candidate, it is presumably when he has managed by fraud or
conspiracy to suppress a will and make out that the deceased died intestate. On the
premise that “equitable” exceptions are permissible, Prohibition would seem justified
only if it appeared that the Delegates had denied due process to Mayow, as by finding
him guilty of serious misconduct on insufficient evidence. (It should be added that this
position of principle is considerably complicated when seen through procedural lenses. If
A, being mandatory administrator, comes and says simply “An attempt is being made to
displace me”, it is possible that Prohibition should go—i.e., that the prima facie
presumption should be that such attempts are unwarranted. The burden would then be on
the adverse party to plead that he had alleged “equitable” reasons why the normally
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mandatory administrator should be excluded in this case—or, in so far as it is allowable
to introduce new facts in connection with a motion for Consultation, to make such a
motion. If the “equitable” reasons are not frivolous on their face—and were really
alleged—Consultation should go. A must seek a new Prohibition after the ecclesiastical
court has actually displaced him, if he still wants to complain. The alternative is always
to deny Prohibition when Mandatory Administrator complains simply that an attempt is
being made to displace him: It might be that the attempt is based on valid “equitable”
considerations, wherefore it is up to Mandatory Administrator to say in his surmise that
that is not the case and give the other party an opportunity to contradict him. A choice as
to how to “work it” procedurally is forced by the position that exceptions to the
mandatory standards can be made, but should not be left to the uncontrolled judgment of
ecclesiastical courts, and the options both have disadvantages. If Dodderidge took that
position in principle, he was probably spared worrying about the procedural choice by the
clear-enough state of things in the case at hand. Probably off the record, it was evident
here that there were solid reasons why Mayow should be removed, if the factual
allegations against him were true and the Delegates should so establish by rational
means.)
I have of course attributed a fairly fancy position to Dodderidge on slim evidence,
or by an intolerable deal of ratiocination in proportion to the evidence. It is possible that
“Maybe a Prohibition, but not yet” is little more than a delaying tactic in a difficult case,
only an indication that Dodderidge did not know how to respond to the arguments of
counsel and figured that there was no need to hurry when the Delegates had not (in two
years) removed Mayow from administration and might never do so. I am encouraged,
however, in my construction of Dodderidge’s position by a further remark he makes at
the end of the report. He puts a common law case whose relevance for matters at hand is
not immediately evident, but I believe the relevance can be discerned. The common law
case is: Ancestor dies when Elder Son is abroad. Younger Son enters on Ancestor’s land.
Younger Son is not a disseisor “for the law presumes he preserves the possession for is
brother.” But if Elder Son comes home and Younger keeps him out of the land, then
Younger Son is a disseisor, or, as Dodderidge adds “the law will not have so good an
opinion of him.” The application I propose for this case is as follows: Mandatory
Administrator is like Younger Son. He is “in” without wrong; he ought to be
administrator. But things can change. Things can happen or come out that change the
complexion, cause the law to “lower its opinion.” As a non-disseisor can turn into a
disseisor, so a person duly appointed administrator and solely entitled to be may still lose
his position. 21 Hen. VIII does not absolutely mandate that anyone is to be administrator
of a given estate, merely because of his relationship to the intestate and regardless of all
considerations bearing on his fitness. So far Noy was right, but—taking Dodderidge to
mean his earlier statement that a Prohibition might ultimately turn out to be appropriate—
Noy was wrong in maintaining that ecclesiastical courts should be sole judges of when
the statutory standards admit of exceptions.
The other members of the court may have shared this middle position I attribute to
Dodderidge. They may have accepted Noy’s arguments more completely. There is after
all nothing very startling about his immediate point—that the eligibility requirements are
not enforceable by Prohibition, but by penalty suit only. Chief Justice Hobart may once
have held that opinion, though he may have wavered from it later. As I suggest above, the
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way Noy casts his argument may give it implications beyond that immediate point—one
which Hobart, the principal architect of constraints on ecclesiastical courts in intestacy
cases, would obviously reject. Whether the King’s Bench judges before whom Noy
argued rejected them can only be ascertained from their subsequent behavior. Finally, it
is not certain that either Dodderidge or his brethren reached very firm conclusions in
Mayow v. Trumplin. They may have joined in a delaying move, denying Prohibition only
because that was a respectable thing to do in an undecided frame of mind. All these
possibilities are compatible with the denial, the one sure fact.
In Askurt’s [?] Case (1629)19, two King’s Bench judges addressed themselves to
the more standard issue of distribution. Their remarks reflect uncertainty. The case
appears uncomplicated: A Prohibition was sought on the ground that a probate court
proposed to enforce distribution. Counsel moving for Prohibition, Trotman, claimed a
recent King’s Bench precedent (Wood v. Wood, “within the last two years”.) Justice
Croke and Chief Justice Hyde were the only members of the court present. Croke spoke
first and said that several Prohibitions exactly in point had been granted by the Common
Pleas when he sat there. Croke was a Common Pleas judge for a little over three years
before his removal to the King’s Bench in 1628. His remark confirms the continuity of
the Common Pleas position on distribution in the late 1620s. Indeed, he states the theory
behind it: In granting administration, the Ordinary exhausts his authority. It is just worth
noting that Croke relies on recent Common Pleas precedents known to him personally,
rather than stating—as one would be entitled to do in the light of what we have seen of
Hobart’s court—that the matter was about as firmly settled as any point of Prohibition
law. More noteworthy is the fact that Croke must look to his Common Pleas experience,
suggesting that evidence of any resolution of the question by the King’s Bench was thin.
Plainly enough, his inclination was to follow the Common Pleas and give uniformity to
the law.
Chief Justice Hyde saw things differently. He claimed that there was recent
King’s Bench practice and that it pointed the other way—several Prohibitions had lately
been denied in such cases. (Hyde had the advantage of about a year and a half’s King’s
Bench experience over Croke, having been appointed early in 1627.) Hyde’s explanation
of the denied Prohibitions is singular, however: The Prohibitions were refused, he says,
because the court was informed that the very point was depending in the Common Pleas.
This view of what was going on in the sister court is not totally off base. We have seen
that the legality of distributions was at least; newly stirred up in the Common Pleas after
Hobart’s death, his successor, Richardson, being inclined to doubt that they were
absolutely beyond the power of ecclesiastical courts. My evidence suggests that
Richardson’s qualified dissent from the established position failed to move his
colleagues. But Hyde may reflect contemporary perception fairly enough: To outsiders,
the issue about distribution may have seemed open in the Common Pleas now, whether or
not they realized how closed it was under Hobart. Croke, reflecting inside experience in
the Common Pleas, may register the awareness that the issue, while newly debated, was
not seriously revived. The King’s Bench practice to which Hyde testifies represents a
reasonable judicial policy under the circumstances as perceived: Do not grant
Prohibitions to block distributions until the Common Pleas has made up its mind; when
19
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it has, the presumption no doubt should be in favor of following the Common Pleas and
achieving uniformity; even if the ultimate duty of the King’s Bench is to decide the
merits for itself, it ought not to debate them until the Common Pleas has taken a stand
and raised the question whether any view of the merits could be so decisive and
important as to justify the considerable inconvenience of discordant practice in the two
courts.
In the instant case, Croke and Hyde reached a compromise. They took the
inconclusive step of granting a Prohibition nisi only: If the prohibitee wanted to protest
before a full court he was free to. Moreover, the reason given for even this small step was
“because a long time has passed since the administration was granted.” The rule projected
from this reason would be that Prohibition does not lie to prevent distribution—or at least
that the King’s Bench ought not to grant such Prohibitions pending a Common Pleas
resolution—save in special circumstances, viz. (unless further ones can be imagined)
when there has been undue delay in ordering, or bringing suit for, a distribution. An
administrator is not entitled (at least so far as the King’s Bench is willing to say at
present) to keep the residual estate in every case, but he is entitled to keep it if he has
been led to expect that he will be allowed to—if he is appointed, permitted to deal with
the estate for years and enjoy anything left over as his own, and only then challenged by a
kinsman claiming a share. This position is reasonable on the premise that 21 Hen. VIII
does not cut off the probate court’s authority to compel a distribution, though it is subject
to the objection that common law courts ought not to scrutinize the mere fairness or good
sense of ecclesiastical courts in exercising time-honored powers unaffected by statute. If
an administrator thinks that a particular effort to make him distribute is inequitable, he
should try to persuade the ecclesiastical court to use its discretion in his favor (or else,
perhaps, go to a court of equity.) The general position intimated by the decision would
seem to reflect Hyde’s inclinations rather than Croke’s.
In Levanne’s (or Vandamp’s) Case of 1630,20 the King’s Bench got around to
head-on discussion of the power to distribute and decided unanimously that ecclesiastical
courts have no such power. (Hyde was still Chief Justice and so can be said to have been
converted from any former reluctance.) To this case belongs the honor of pre-Civil War
finality: the two principal courts were at last firmly in accord on the effect of 21 Hen.
VIII. The facts of the case were such that a narrow-grounds decision in favor of
Prohibition would have been conceivable, but the court avoided any such course and held
decisively that the grant of administration exhausts ecclesiastical authority in all
circumstances. The factual peculiarity of the instant case was that the proposed
beneficiaries of the distribution were not, so far as the record showed, kinsmen of the
intestate. (The MS. Report says that they were “on the matter [the matter shown, the
record] strangers to the intestate.” Croke’s report says that the party seeking distribution
claimed that the residual estate was large and that in such circumstances the Ordinary was
entitled to order a distribution among “friends” of the intestate. I take it that Croke’s
“friends” is used advisedly; to communicate what the MS. Says—that here more was
claimed than power to distribute among relatives, or relatives nearly or just as close as the
administrator, and that that was claimed because the aspiring distributees were not kin, or
20

M. 6 Car. K.B. Croke Car. 201, sub nom. Levanne; Harg. 39, f. 133, sub nom.
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at any rate close kin.) It might be conceivable to hold that ecclesiastical courts retain
power to make a fair intra-familial adjustment by appointing one kinsman administrator
to start with, and then, if the residual estate is large enough, requiring him to share with
other equal or nearly equal kinsmen. One could hold at the same time that 21 Hen. VIII,
with its clear familial bias, deprived ecclesiastical courts of their former discretion to
require a distribution to mere “friends” or to charities. But the court did not take this way,
nor is there any sign that it considered doing so.
Sir John Banks, who at this time held the preferment of Prince’s Attorney, argued
in favor of a Prohibition. There is nothing in his argument that had not been said before,
though it gives the appearance, especially from the MS., of being a careful speech,
covering all predictable reasons against distribution. (The policy of the law since 31 Edw.
III has been to put administrators in the same position as executors; its policy is certainly
against the old powers of ecclesiastical courts to require any distribution they like,
including to extra-familial “pious uses”—with perhaps the implication that either all
distributing power is taken away or the full old power remains, which surely cannot be;
protection of administrators against creditors who turn up late in the day is an important
effect and intention of the statutory ban on distribution; the correct theory, in sum, is that
the grant of administration exhausts ecclesiastical authority.) Germyn on the other side
(reported only by Croke) tried to get around the argument from late-appearing creditors
by contending that probate courts “will” (should and habitually have, I suppose) take
security from distributees to restore sufficient goods to the administrator to satisfy such
late claims. Otherwise, Germyn just asserts that it is unfair for the administrator to take
all. He concedes that claims to distribution ought to depend on an averment that all
debts—and legacies where a court-appointed administrator is executing a will—have
been satisfied. (That means procedurally, I suppose, that common law courts should
prohibit distribution if the administrator surmises that debts or legacies remain
unsatisfied—not merely that ecclesiastical courts ought to require claimants to
distribution to make a controvertible allegation that debts and legacies are fully satisfied,
conscience and ecclesiastical appeal being the only controls to assure that they actually
do.)
To all intents, the court unanimously embraced Banks’ position. According to
Croke’s report, the judges expressly answered Germyn’s contention that the lateappearing creditor poses no real problem in the light of ecclesiastical practice. They said
in effect that that might be true as a practical matter, but they would not leave it to
ecclesiastical discretion to provide protection for the administrator. Conceivably, one
could hold that distribution suits are prohibitable upon surmise that the probate court has
not required the distributees to give security, or does not propose to. There is no sign that
this possibility was considered, but no reason why it should be when the court was clearly
sold on the general “exhaustion of authority” theory. In keeping with that theory, the
judges, according to Croke, added a dictum: revocation of administration at pleasure, as
well as distribution, is now ruled out, though both were within ecclesiastical power “at
common law.” (The possibility of revocation for cause remains open. There is no
indication of what this court would count as cause.)
The MS. report tells us that the court, so to speak, “dared” defendant-inProhibition to demur. (“And the Court said that the defendant could demur thereon if he
is so hardy.”) The significance of so saying is hard to be sure about. So far as I know, the
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court could not prevent an unsuccessful defendant-in-Prohibition from forcing formal
pleading and gaining a second chance to argue the merits on demurrer. Pointing out the
still-open possibility of a demurrer may have opposite intents (as a few instances in Vols.
I-III also show.) It could be a way of quieting a vehement and protesting lawyer—as it
were (to Germyn here), “We know you don’t like it, but we are going to prohibit your
client anyhow. If you’re all that convinced we’re wrong you can always demur—but
think it over, because as we now see the issues it would take a hardy man to suppose he
could persuade us with another try.” On the other hand, a note of uncertainty may be
implied—“It looks awfully clear to us that distribution suits must be prohibited across the
board. But admittedly the issue is a hard one, and we won’t say flatly that reargument
would be a waste of time. So if you’re convinced enough of your case to try again against
the odds, go ahead. We won’t be irritated with you if demur, as if you were indulging in
frivolous litigative warfare.”
The MS. also reports individual remarks by two judges, Jones and Croke. Jones
states the position taken by the whole court in a slightly original way. The granting of
administration, he says, puts the “possession and property” of the intestate’s goods in the
administrator, wherefore the ecclesiastical court may not make any disposition of them.
The touch of originality is in translating the agreed-on conclusion into the language of
property. As, for example, tithes set out become the parson’s property—and therefore
arguably cease to be of any concern to ecclesiastical courts—so the act of granting
administration vests the property in the administrator, albeit encumbered with the
intestate’s debts. How could the probate judge have authority to tell the administrator
what to do with his own? Thinking of the matter this way is neat, though it adds no
strength to the conclusion. There might even be inconveniences. E.g., an administrator
appointed to execute a will for default of executors is subject to ecclesiastical compulsion
to pay legacies. The property may be his if you want to say so, but where there is a will it
is “spiritually” encumbered. It has not, like the severed tithes, passed out of the
ecclesiastical sphere, so that it is simply the administrator’s common law property. If still
liable to ecclesiastical interference quoad legacies, why not quoad distribution too, unless
there are reasons besides the state of the property why distribution is ruled out?
Secondly, Jones points to the Common Pleas practice as justification for this
court’s following suit. He testifies to general awareness that authority unfavorable to
ecclesiastical courts in intestacy cases was concentrated in the Common Pleas. Croke
does likewise in his individual speech, which consists entirely in calling attention to his
own experience as a Common Pleas judge. This time, instead of numerous precedents
vaguely, he cites one case specifically: a Briscoe’s Case (not independently reported
under that name) where, Croke says, a Prohibition was granted after long debate for the
reasons urged in the instant case by Banks.
Jones’s final individual contribution is to add a qualification: Although
ecclesiastical courts may not compel distribution, they may require an administrator to
account for how he has disposed of the estate. This is a bit more liberal toward
ecclesiastical power than some Common Pleas opinion from Hobart’s day. The same is
true of another qualification contributed by Jones and Croke together: A “contract or
agreement” between the Ordinary and the administrator that a certain distribution shall be
made “alters the law.” (Quaere as to the meaning. The probate judge says, “I will grant
you administration if you will distribute any net estate in the following way”; the would-
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be administrator replies, “I agree to do so and will accept administration on those terms.”
Now the ecclesiastical court may order the administrator to make the agreed
distribution—i.e., may enforce the contract specifically? The Ordinary—or the intended
beneficiaries of the distribution—are not confined to seeking a remedy in law or equity
for breach of the contract, if the distribution is not effected? If the answer is “Yes”, then
would a condition written into the letters of administration have the same effect as the
“contract” I describe? Is a bond conditioned on the administrator’s making a certain
distribution a good bond? One can go on spinning out such questions in the shadow of
Jones’s and Croke’s generality. The generality at least dissociates the two judges from the
opposite sweeping opinion—that indirect ways of securing a distribution are as illegal as
the outright way.) Jones and Croke, in sum, advocated practically significant
qualifications on the austere doctrine that 21 Hen. VIII deprives ecclesiastical courts of
all authority in intestacy cases except the power to make an unconditional grant of
administration in keeping with the statute’s eligibility rules and to receive an inventory.
For a bare duty to account on the administrator’s part gives the ecclesiastical court a
handle to exercise informal pressure on him, and the probate court’s right to effect a
distribution by “contract” is a significant hole in the “No distribution” position. There is
no basis, however, for associating the full court with these qualifying dicta, and the
unanimous endorsement of “No distribution” as such is the main importance of Levanne.
A few further King’s Bench cases come from the Civil War period. The court’s
opinion in Brown v. Wood 21 confirms the general theory that the grant of administration
exhausts the ecclesiastical court’s authority, with the consequence, in this case, that a
valid discretionary grant may not be revoked. The grant in Brown v. Wood itself was
held invalid, however, and therefore the suit to repeal was not prohibited. The rule of
decision would be that ecclesiastical courts (original or appellate, presumably) are free to
correct their own misapplications of 21 Hen. VIII by revocation; they are not stuck with
the erroneous grant and liable to a penalty suit. This is a reasonable and predictable
position. In reaching the conclusion that the grant in the instant case was invalid, he court
added to the detailed gloss on 21 Hen. VIII.
In Brown v. Wood, the probate court granted administration to a half-sister of the
intestate and her husband. A full brother of the deceased sued to revoke, whereupon the
half-sister and her husband sought a Prohibition. The court agreed that the full brother
had no better claim to be administrator than the half-sister, citing Wingate v. Glascock
(above.) It also agreed that ecclesiastical courts may not revoke valid discretionary
grants, relying on the “exhaustion of authority” theory. In the present circumstances, that
is to say, it would be improper and prohibitable to take administration away from a halfsister and give it to a full brother. Doing so could not be justified by any intraecclesiastical definition of familial propinquity nor by the mere reasonableness of
preferring the full blood. (It is perhaps reasonable to say that preferring the half blood to
the full blood is a poor exercise of discretion—unlike, say, appointing one cousin rather
than another of equal degree, when there is no difference unless in discretionarily
assessed trustworthiness or competence. But in the court’s view this is irrelevant: the
statute insists that when A is just as eligible as B, A’s appointment must stand in spite of
what is in a sense good cause for reconsidering it. So holding is not necessarily
21
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incompatible with permitting A to be replaced for still better reason—as when it comes to
light that he has behaved fraudulently.) The court went on, however, to hold that the
grant to the half-sister and her husband was unlawful under 21 Hen. VIII. The same
would clearly be true if she had been a full sister. The point of construction, which seems
correct, is that the statute favors relatives, not in-laws. It does not intend that an
intestate’s brother-in-law should enjoy his property apart from the normal operation of
the law concerning married women. The judges added that if the grant in the instant case
had been limited to the duration of the coverture it would perhaps be valid. (I.e., “Mary
and her husband John shall be co-administrators for as long as Mary is alive, but
thereafter John shall not be administrator” might be acceptable.) The “perhaps” is the
interesting point: The judges were not sure that the statute permitted appointment of an
in-law even when the practical effect would be no different from “the normal operation of
the law concerning married women.” Indeed it is hard to see how the statute literally
construed could so permit. There is probably also a practical advantage in going by the
letter: Allowing a sort of administratorship pur auter vie would require proceedings for
a new appointment should the wife die first and raise the question whether a sort of
ecclesiastical future interest could be created in the original grant by way of anticipating
that contingency—all unnecessary bother. Because the grant as it stood was unlawful, the
King’s Bench refused to prohibit the suit for revocation.
Hill v. Bird (1648) 22 arose from a nephew’s attempt to prevent a niece from
making off with all the intestate’s property. The niece obtained administration, and the
nephew then sued in the alternative, asking the ecclesiastical court either to revoke the
grant to the niece or to order distribution of a share to him. His position would seem to be
that he and his equally related cousin were entitled to equal parts of the estate, but he left
it to the probate court whether the result should be obtained by a new grant of coadministration or by a distribution. Either way, his suit ought to be prohibited on pretty
well established principles: qua suit for distribution and probably qua suit for revocation
(if a grant to Eligible A is irrevocable despite the existence of Equally Eligible B.) In the
event, the court prohibited (nisi, it should be noted) quoad the distribution only. This
decision, however, is probably reflective of a special circumstance pointed out by counsel
(i.e., does not mean that revocation is generally within the powers of ecclesiastical
courts.) In this case, the grant to the niece was not absolute, but conditioned upon her
producing an inventory. (Expressly so conditioned, I take it. All administrators had a
statutory duty to put in an inventory, but their appointment was presumably not as a rule
made conditional on their doing so.) Counsel accordingly argued that the grant to the
niece was “not yet settled”, wherefore the probate court was still free to withdraw it and
substitute another. I can only make sense of the court’s disposition by assuming that this
point was accepted. The only judicial remarks reported are those of Justice Rolle, and
they go rather strongly to insist that revocation is outside the normal scope of
ecclesiastical courts. There is at least no sign that Rolle and the rest of the court were at
variance, and Alleyn’s report has Justice Bacon “not denying” Rolle’s general point. In
Style’s report, Rolle says first that a brother’s daughter and a sister’s son (the parties in
22
P. 24 Car. K.B. Style, 102; Aleyn, 56. The two reports complement each other without
contradiction. Style is the more complete and gives the conclusion, but some of the points
stand out more clearly in Aleyn.
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this case) are in equal degree and that the Ordinary may grant administration to either.
That says that the discretionary choice of the niece was no error and thus that there is no
color for ousting her. Subsequently in Style, and in Aleyn as well, Rolle says that failure
to put in an inventory or to render an account is no basis for revocation: the administrator
may be compelled to do those things by ecclesiastical process (quod nota as to the
account), but may not be discharged because he fails to. In view of this opinion, and
assuming Rolle’s concurrence in the decision not to prohibit quoad revocation, I can only
suppose that the grant to the niece in this case was held immature—in effect, no more
than an indication that she would be appointed if she submitted an inventory, and
therefore not such an act as to exhaust the ecclesiastical court’s authority.
Two further points were discussed in Hill v. Bird. The nephew seems to have
based his claim to a share, partly if not wholly, on an agreement with the niece or among
the deceased’s kinsmen more generally. If this was the essence of his claim, his case is
the more plausible. That is to say, his position may have been as follows: We concede, if
necessary, that if Eligible A is definitely appointed his grant may not be revoked in favor
of a fairer grant of co-administration to Eligible A and Equally Eligible B, nor may A be
compelled to make a distribution to B. The case is altered, however, if A and B have
made an agreement to share the estate. The ecclesiastical court is entitled to take notice
of the agreement, ordering a distribution that will implement it or, as a possible
alternative, rearranging the administration to produce that result. In effect, appointment of
an eligible administrator may exhaust the court’s “legal” authority, but does not dry up
the reserve of “equitable” power to do minimal justice. While “law” may tolerate a
niece’s taking all and a nephew nothing (and there is no complaining about the justice of
statutory law), “equity” surely cannot tolerate the niece’s enjoyment of her legal rights in
the face of her own agreement. This argument, however, was firmly rejected by Justice
Rolle and presumably by the rest of the court. An agreement among the parties cannot
confer jurisdiction on a court, Rolle says (citing Torke’s Case sub nom. Tucker v. Bone.)
The final feature of Hill v. Bird is that there were more kinsmen of the deceased
than the niece and nephew, perhaps others of equal degree. The agreement on which the
nephew tried to rely is likely to have involved this larger group of relatives. Hale, seeking
a Prohibition, sought to have it so drawn as to run against all the interested kinsmen,
rather than the nephew alone. It is hard to say exactly what that would have meant as to
form, but it is clear enough what Hale was driving at in substance—some sort of “to
whom it may concern” Prohibition, which would render liable to Attachment any other
kinsman who came forward to make trouble for the niece after the nephew had failed.
The utility of such a Prohibition cannot be denied: it would head off foreseeable litigative
vexation and permit the niece to get on with administering the estate. Hale failed in this
attempt, however; the “logical individualism” of Prohibitions (see the discussion of this
concept in Vol. I) won out. As Justice Rolle said, a Prohibition must go against some
certain person; joint Prohibitions covering a number of co-litigants are unobjectionable,
but it is impossible to prohibit merely potential litigants.
A further late case 23 raises the question whether Prohibitions should be used to
enforce the eligibility requirements in the first instance and touches on the revocability of
grants to one of several co-eligibles. Here a man made a will naming two executors, but
23
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both executors predeceased him. The testator died leaving two sisters, one of whom was
appointed administratrix. The other sister sought a Prohibition to block that appointment
on the ground that she was entitled to be co-administratrix. I.e., the excluded sister did
not sue for revocation or distribution, but tried to force the probate judge to repeal his
first grant and make a new one. Prohibition was denied. The report does not show
whether the court relied on one or the other, or both, of the available reasons. (1)
Prohibition does not lie to enforce the eligibility requirements, at least not with
retrospective effect, even if the ecclesiastical court has flagrantly violated those
requirements. (2) Appointing one eligible person and excluding another is a perfectly
legitimate exercise of the probate court’s discretion. The report does, however, have the
court saying that she may appeal if she wants to protest the grant of administration. The
remark points to the first reason for denying Prohibition and comes to a firm statement on
a question that earlier cases do not firmly resolve. The court here does not say that
appointing one sister and leaving out the other was unobjectionable. It at least intimates
that that might not be the case by positively mentioning the possibility of an ecclesiastical
appeal. “Appeal, not Prohibition, is your remedy” seems to be what the court asserts.
The relation between revocation suits and appeal comes to mind. Would this court have
refused to prohibit the excluded sister’s suit for revocation? If so, it would go in the face
of most authority, unless there is something special about the circumstances of this case.
If not, the court’s position takes the following shape: An excluded co-eligible may not
sue to revoke, but he will not be prohibited from appealing the original grant. Though the
effect of a successful appeal would be to undo the grant, the formal difference between a
revocation suit and an appeal is crucial. Though an appellate court may be prohibited
from reversing a correct mandatory grant below, it will not be prohibited from reviewing
a discretionary decision among co-eligibles. This position contradicts the probable
meaning of Wingate v. Glascock above. Wingate, however, is subject to problems of
interpretation, and by and large the cases are not clear as to whether attempts to revoke
administration directly are distinguishable from using the appellate process to the same
end.
The question remains whether there is anything special about the instant case—
any better-than-usual reason why the excluded sister should have been included, hence
why her appeal would be plausible and even why a revocation suit brought by her might
be acceptable. I believe an affirmative answer can be defended. There is no telling
whether any such argument was made in the case, but it may be significant that the
reporter so much as states the particular facts—the existence of a will, the death of the
two executors. Something may have been made of them. The theory of administration
may arguably be that the ecclesiastical court supplies the place of a testator. For that
reason, there are normally no more checks on the ecclesiastical court’s discretion than 21
Hen. VIII expressly puts on it. An intestate might, if he had got around to making a will,
have appointed one of his two sisters executrix and sole legatee, leaving the other out in
the cold. The statute does not expressly prevent the probate judge from making the same
choice, and if he does he must be presumed to have acted responsibly to effect the dead
man’s probable desires—in loco testatoris, as it were. There is no sufficient basis for
presuming otherwise, and the statute seems to trust the ecclesiastical court’s discretion
when it confers it—when it refuses the opportunity to make such rules as “Closest
relatives of equal degree shall always be co-administrators.” Under this theory, however,
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evidence going to show the deceased’s actual intentions should be allowed to rebut the
normal presumption. If the ecclesiastical court is in effect to choose the dead man’s
executor, it should do so in the light of what is known—or “legally known”—of his
intentions; only when there is no on-the-record knowledge of his desires may all the
discretion the statute allows be used. So here. We know that the deceased did not favor
one sister, or either (unless by leaving them legacies, about which there is no
information.) He wanted two other people—two, not one—to be his executors and,
presumably, residuary legatees. Administrators must now be put in the place of
executors. I.e., by the usual practice, the now-executorless will would be annexed to the
letters of administration; the administrators would be liable to satisfy any legacies and
entitled to the residue. Under the circumstances, the best inference about the dead man’s
intentions is that he would prefer to see both sisters in co-administration. He was
indifferent between them and toward them, so far as appears. Since by accident they are
to have what was intended for others, would he not prefer that they have equal shares of
it? And would he not sooner trust the two of them to execute his legacies—checking on
each other—than one whom he showed no sign of trusting?
A final case, from the Commonwealth period, 24 accords with earlier decisions
against indirect means of effecting distributions. In this case, Davis v. Matthews, an
intestate’s widow and nearest kinsman agreed that the widow would take administration,
but would enter a bond guaranteeing a distribution. The agreement came out of a family
dispute over who should be administrator. The “contract” would seem to amount to the
kinsman’s undertaking not to seek administration for himself or to challenge the
widow’s’ proceedings to gain it in exchange for her undertaking to enter the bond. She
carried out the contract in the first instance—i.e., obliged herself (presumably to the
probate court rather than the kinsman) to make the distribution. But then she failed to
distribute and was sued in the Prerogative Court (as of 1655 the secularized successor to
the old ecclesiastical tribunal.) The plaintiff was probably the kinsman with whom the
administratrix had made the original agreement, but other relatives—beneficiaries of the
distribution on which he bond was conditioned—may have been involved. The widow
sought a Prohibition.
Counsel arguing against Prohibition conceded both that distribution is not directly
compellable and that probate courts may not force it indirectly by requiring a
distribution-bond whenever they like. A distinction was urged, however: Mandatory
administrator may not be compelled to enter a distribution-bond or denied administration
unless he does; on the other hand, such a bond may be taken from one co-eligible when
he is appointed over other co-eligibles. The distinction at once makes sense and
controverts earlier opinion. It is of course implicit in counsel’s position that under
appropriate circumstances a distribution-bond is not only valid, but specifically
enforceable by the probate courts. There is no sign from the report that counsel tried to
make anything of the widow’s prior agreement to enter the bond. In other words, they
talk as if the case would be the same if the probate court had demanded the bond on its
own initiative, or without any preceding history. That the agreement could affect the
equities is arguable, however. (Granting that even a discretionary administrator may not
as a rule be forced to distribute by means of a bond, an exception may still be made
24
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where there are strong equitable considerations—as where the person who becomes
administrator expressly promises other members of the family that he will share with
them and undertakes to secure that promise by a bond, and by his conduct deceives the
other relatives into letting him assume administration unopposed.)
Counsel in favor of Prohibition did little more than contradict the other side:
Distribution-bonds may never be required; allowing them is incompatible with the theory
that probate courts exhaust all their authority by the bare act of appointing an
administrator—and surely authority is not exhausted if it extends, not only to demanding
a bond, but forcing the administrator to carry out the promise implied in the bond; as
distribution-bonds are illegal, so are conditional grants of administration. The court
disposed of the case by awarding a Prohibition nisi. It is not clear, however, that the
judges agreed with the contentions of the widow’s counsel. The only member of the court
to speak individually, Chief Justice Glyn, by implication accepts the other side’s starting
point, though not its conclusion. Glyn holds that the bond should not have been taken,
and that the consequent proceedings of the Prerogative Court should be prohibited, but he
so holds because the widow was quasi-mandatory administrator. He is explicit about his
thinking in this behalf: Admittedly 21 Hen. VIII permits the appointment of the widow or
the nearest kinsman. In strictness, by the language of the statute, a widow chosen in
preference to the nearest relative is a discretionarily chosen co-eligible. By common
practice, however, widows are preferred over next of kin, and they ought to be unless
there is a special reason to depart from the practice, as where the husband-intestate has
made inter vivos arrangements for his wife’s support in widowhood. Therefore widowadministratrices should enjoy the whole estate and should not be required to share with
other relatives, by the device of a bond or otherwise. Room is left for counsel’s
contention that a true discretionary administrator—such as the niece preferred over the
nephew or the sister over the sister in the cases above—may in one way or another be
made to distribute the estate. Glyn does not embrace that proposition, but confines
himself to what is necessary for the case at hand; he nevertheless lends it countenance.
The widow’s counsel stated what one can probably call the orthodox position, and that
was rather more conspicuously not embraced by the Chief Justice. Glyn’s view that
widows should be preferred over next of kin and the common practice of probate courts
that he relies on make good policy sense. He does not dress his opinion up to give it
analytic respectability—as by arguing that practice “expounds” the statute, so that the
statute “really means” that widows who are not otherwise provided for must be granted
administration even though it does not say so. Glyn may be censured for his
jurisprudence but praised for his honesty.
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CHAPTER 2—ECCLESIASTICAL SUIT OUTSIDE DEFENDANT’S HOME
DIOCESE
Introduction and Summary
23 Hen. VIII, c.9, essentially provides that people may not be cited into an
ecclesiastical court outside the diocese (or peculiar jurisdiction) in which they live. There
is some difference of opinion in the cases as to which of two purposes the statute was
primarily made for, but it in any event serves both: (1) Protection of the subject against
the inconvenience of travel to remote places and the like. (2) Preservation of order in the
ecclesiastical system as a per se good. The practically important mischief behind the
statute was plaintiffs’ resorting to archdiocesan courts in preference to local ones and
archepiscopal willingness to take first-instance cases. Among other effects, the practice
deprived the defendant of one of the two appeals to which parties were entitled in
ecclesiastical litigation.
23 Hen. VIII was virtually never enforced by Prohibition in the 16th century. (Note
the parallel with 21 Hen. VIII, the statute discussed in Ch. 1 above. ) The first major
issue resolved in the 17th was that Prohibition would lie to stop a suit brought in violation
of the statute. That was problematic because the statute appointed a penalty recoverable
from the ecclesiastical judge who cited a defendant out of his home diocese. (Again, cf.
21 Hen. VIII.) It is uncertain whether earlier judicial opinion was firm that the
availability of a penalty barred Prohibition. There may simply have been very few
attempts to get Prohibitions, because the statute was rarely violated and because the
penalty was perceived as adequate compensation by any parties who were
inconvenienced by being sued away from home. Preference for archdiocesan courts on
the part of plaintiffs may have increased in the 17th century, and those courts may have
become more receptive, giving rise for the first time to serious demand for Prohibitions.
A mixture of circumstances and motives may have entered into such a change; it is hard
to see clues to them in reported cases. It would not be surprising if the upper echelons of
the Church and the civil law profession came to favor more aggressive archdiocesan
tribunals, not necessarily from aggrandizing motives alone, but equally from ambition for
a more efficient and higher-quality legal system—avoidance of tedious appeals, more
competent handling of complex cases at the first-instance level. On the side of the
litigant, preference for specific enforcement of statutory rights via Prohibition could have
a strategic motive. If the stakes in the litigation are high enough, there is an obvious
advantage in challenging one’s opponent to fight over a Prohibition; then, if he declines
to fight or loses, to have two appeals still ahead. As the chance of the statute’s being
violated increased, so naturally did the chance of high-stakes cases occurring and of their
involving determined, sophisticatedly advised, or “strategically” litigious defendants. The
wider context of the statute’s judicial history remains quite speculative. It is perfectly
possible that pre-Jacobean professional opinion, though not much tested, was clearly
unfavorable to Prohibitions; the penalty was a satisfactory-enough remedy for, and
deterrent to, violation of the statute. Greater enthusiasm for Prohibitions as a remedy, or
the conviction that there was a public interest in the specific enforcement of jurisdictional
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lines despite alternatives and regardless of practicalities, may explain to a significant
degree the high incidence of 17th century Prohibition cases on 23 Hen. VIII.
Breakthrough in any event came from a court in which those attitudes were
especially strong—the Common Pleas during Coke’s Chief Justiceship. Throughout the
first half of the 17th century, the great majority of cases on the statute were in the
Common Pleas The King’s Bench eventually had little choice but to follow the lines laid
down by the Common Pleas, but the former court was visibly cool toward Prohibitions on
23 Hen. VIII. Left to itself, it would quite possibly have held that the penalty was the
only remedy. Coke as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench was unable to turn it around
completely.
Once Prohibitions to enforce the statute could clearly be sought, numerous issues
concerning its exact meaning arose. (There is no sign that any of these had been explored
earlier in penalty suits.) Some cases involve details of construction and hardly admit of
summary. The major issues indicated here were not all decisively resolved. The judicial
gloss on the statute had several loose ends at the time of the Civil War.
The following propositions were established beyond serious challengeability:
(1) Prohibition will lie to stop an ecclesiastical suit that violates 23 Hen, VIII. If,
however, a party cited outside his home diocese waits until the improper ecclesiastical
tribunal has given sentence against him Prohibition will be denied. This qualification is
an exception to the general rule that delaying until after sentence is not a bar to
Prohibition, save in case of very long or abusive delay. (See Vol. I, pp. 115 ff., for the
general rule.)
(2) Archepiscopal courts do not have sweeping powers to take cases away from
inferior courts. In a few cases, civilian counsel argued on behalf of the Archbishop of
Canterbury that usage or the Archbishop’s inherent prerogative gave him as much firstinstance jurisdiction, concurrent with that of lower courts, as he chose to assume. These
claims were firmly repudiated. They tend to make a mockery of the statute. If in effect it
did not apply to archdiocesan courts, its preamble, which calls attention exclusively to the
problem of archepiscopal usurpation, would be in vain. The statute would be addressed
to Bishops encroaching on other Bishops, which for practical purposes was not much of a
problem, and to the protection of archdeaconries and peculiars against Bishops, which
was not an agreed-on object of the statute at all (see below.) As a corollary: There are a
couple of decisions that the basic proposition still holds even though the defendant is not
forced to travel beyond the physical bounds of his diocese—as if the Archbishop moves
his court to a diocese where it does not normally sit, or a party living in the diocese of
London is cited into the Arches (an archdiocesan court permanently located in London.)
(3) Among its several exceptions—which caused most of the problems of
construction—statute saves the Archbishop of Canterbury’s prerogative to prove wills
when the testator has goods located in several dioceses (the Prerogative Court of
Canterbury.) This proviso was extended in one way and restricted in another. (a) Though
the statute says nothing about it, the Archbishop has an analogous prerogative to handle
intestates’ estates when the deceased had goods in more than one diocese. (b) Prerogative
to prove the will does not carry with it jurisdiction over legacy suits arising from the will.
The executor must be sued for legacies where he lives, except when there are several
executors resident in different dioceses—then archdiocesan jurisdiction is appropriate.
In contrast to the issues above, the following ones were much less clearly resolved:
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By far the most problematic feature of the statute was an exception for suits removed
to a higher court by request of the lower court to which it would normally belong. The
statute does not say that any suit may be removed by such request, but that any suit which
ecclesiastical law permitted to be so removed may be. There were some small issues on
the meaning of this proviso, such as whether the request can be made by a Bishop’s
deputy and whether it needs to be sealed. There are holdings on these matters of form, but
they do not add up to certain resolution. The big questions were (a) what the
ecclesiastical law does permit and how this is to be discovered; (b) whether the request
must recite reasons for requesting removal and, if so, what reasons are sufficient. The
second question in a sense falls under the first—Does ecclesiastical law require reasons
to be stated, and does it have a restricted list of good reasons? It is arguable, however,
that the statute barred indiscriminate removal even if ecclesiastical law did not, or could
not be proved to.
These issues did not really arise in the Common Pleas when Coke was Chief Justice.
In some ways the most important decision about 23 Hen. VIII was made by the Common
Pleas under his successor, Hobart (Jones v. Jones.) It was held that reasons must be given
and that not just any reason is valid, by force of the statute if not ecclesiastical law. (The
reason actually given in the case at hand was ruled insufficient.) The logic of this
decision is vulnerable, however. It was vigorously attacked from the Bar by William Noy
in subsequent cases, but in the upshot neither confirmed nor reversed.
In the end, the most important issue remained in nubibus. It is a critical issue because
if suits could be removed by the mere request of the lower court the statute would be in
danger of subversion. Lower courts would probably have had motive enough to “unload”
embarrassing or difficult cases on their own initiative; in addition, they would have been
subject to pressure from archepiscopal courts when the latter chose to “request
permission” to take a case. The underlying problem was establishing that ecclesiastical
law put any restrictions on removal in the face of civilian testimony to the contrary and,
failing that, finding any ascertainable restrictions in the statute itself. As with other
statutes from the Reformation period with which later courts had to struggle, this one was
a masterpiece of confusing draftsmanship at vital points.
(1) In less than perfectly clear language, the statute makes an exception for the
situation where a resident of Diocese A offends, or does the act which gives rise to an
ecclesiastical complaint, in Diocese B. In that general type of case, the court of B could
proceed without violating the statute. One would expect legal problems from this
provision, and they occur in a few cases. There are too few, however, and there is too
little articulation of principle in those, to permit abstracting many rules. Clearly if an
inhabitant of A came into B and committed an ecclesiastical crime he could be
prosecuted in B so long as he remained there. Prediction would be less reliable for
variants (returns to A, goes to C, leaves B but comes back after an interval, etc.) Clearly
an inhabitant of A cultivating land in B could be sued for tithes there from in B.
Defamatory words spoken in B by an inhabitant of A probably fall under the rule for
crimes committed in B (owing to the mixture of criminal and civil elements in
ecclesiastical defamation.) For the rest, prospective plaintiffs would be well-advised to
sue where the defendant lived. Except for the duty to pay tithes, rates, and the like, and
the duty to refrain from overt criminal acts, breach of ecclesiastical duties can usually not
be very plausibly ”located” elsewhere than where the party happens to be; the statute
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plainly says he may not be sued where he “happens to be”, but where he lives. (The
concept of residence is not really explored in the cases. It arises in only one, where an
attorney who spent much of the year in London but had a “permanent address” elsewhere
was sued in London. It was held that the suit was improper; his regular and durable
“business address” did not count.)
(2) The statute expressly protects peculiar jurisdictions and their inhabitants. There
was some question, however, as to whether they were protected against diocesan
encroachment, or only archdiocesan. For good reason, some judges were disposed not to
intervene when an inhabitant of a peculiar was cited into the Bishop’s court. (The party
was not forced to travel beyond his home diocese and was not deprived of an appeal. The
title of peculiars to exclude the Bishop from concurrent jurisdiction would sometimes not
withstand scrutiny. Even if citation out of peculiars to the diocesan courts was a violation
of the statute, it is arguably so petty a violation that the penalty would always be an
adequate remedy.) Archdeacons commonly had first-instance jurisdiction, in practice or
by custom, in sub-districts of the diocese. An Archdeacon might arguably have the
privileges of a peculiar, but some judges would have said he could not, and in any event
making out a title to exclude the Bishop from concurrency could be tricky. Best advice to
a parson cited into the diocesan court from a peculiar or archdeaconry would be, “You
have a chance for a Prohibition, but with the difficulties you are likely to encounter it is
scarcely worth seeking one.”
Trends in the construction of the statute over the period 1600-1650 do not stand out
strongly. There is a slight tilt away from willingness to grant Prohibitions on the part of
the Caroline courts, but no real departure from earlier law to the degree it was settled.
Text—the Cases
A statute frequently enforced by Prohibition was 23 Hen. VIII, c.9. This act was made
to preserve localism in ecclesiastical justice. Subject to a number of exceptions, it
provided that people should not be sued for ecclesiastical causes outside the diocese in
which they lived. Prohibition cases on the statute bring together several general and
recurrent themes: The authority of the principal common law courts to interpret statutes
and enforce their interpretation by Prohibition; the legitimacy of common law
enforcement by Prohibition of intra-ecclesiastical lines of jurisdiction; whether provision
for punitive damages or for a penalty in a statute should be taken to exclude its
enforcement by Prohibition. Numerous cases on 23 Hen. VIII raise these questions
explicitly or implicitly, along with detailed questions about the meaning of the act.
For whatever reason, the judicial gloss on 23 Hen. VIII was mainly written by the
Common Pleas when Coke was Chief Justice there. I have found no reported Prohibition
cases on the statute from Elizabeth’s reign. The manuscript version of Justice Hutton’s
reports contains a list of practice precedents—i.e., Prohibitions granted on the basis of the
statute, but without any indication as to whether the writ was contested or of judicial
reasoning..25 It is likely that all the precedents are from the Common Pleas, where Hutton
25
Harl. 4831, among reports from H. 1 Car. The cases listed are as follows: (1) Fowle,.
H. 6 Jac—wrongful citation from diocese of Coventry and Lichfield to Court of
Audience. (2) Hurst. H. 7 Jac.—Winchester to Arches, suit for tithes. (3)Wells. M. 7
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practiced as a Serjeant from 1603 and served as a judge after Coke left that court. One
precedent on the list comes from 43 Eliz., as compared to one from P. 2 Jac. (pre-Coke)
and ten from 6-12 Jac. (the Cokean period.)
From M. 44/45 Eliz., I have a penalty or damage suit on 23 Hen. VIII—as
opposed to a Prohibition suit.26 One of the reports of this case (see note for the
substance) gives the information that the statute was discontinued at one time but revived
by the Supremacy Act of 1 Eliz. It was discontinued in the sense that it was repealed,
along with several pieces of Henrician legislation concerning the Church, by 1 and 2
Philip and Mary, c.8. 1 Eliz. “revived” it (by that term, without revision) together with
the other repealed statutes. The reporting of this fact suggests that 23 Hen. VII and suits
based on it were not as familiar as they later became.
My earliest Jacobean report bearing on the statute comes from the King’s Bench in
1605.27 It gives a remark by Justice Yelverton apparently connected with a case before
Jac.—Norwich to Arches, for scandalous words (4) Powell. T. 8 Jac.—“consimile”..(5)
Fitton. H. 7 Jac,—to Archbishop of York. (6) Foster. P. 12 Jac.—“consimile”. (7) Rudd
et al. 43 Eliz.—sole Elizabethan case, see text; from a peculiar in Rutland called
Ledington; only case on the list about episcopal encroachment on peculiars. (8) Brydges.
M. 9 Jac.—to Arches, defamation; close enough in date to the reported case of that name
(Note 16 below) but subsrance does not look the same. (9) White. M. 9 Jac.—Oxford to
Arches, legacy. (10) Derby. M/ 9 Jac.—matrimonial. (11)Plombe. P.2 Jac.—Norwich to
Canterbury, the See of Norwich being vacant, a circumstance that occurs in none of the
reported cases. (12) Vincent. M. 8 Jac.
For what bare precedents are worth, the 12 cases listed are significant evidence in
addition to the cases following in the text for a brisk Jacobean trade in enforcing 23 Hen.
VIII by Prohibition, since there is little or no overlap with reported cases. The list ends
with one precedent of a penalty suit on the statute—same case as nest note below;
evidence of such suits is very sparse.
26
M. 44/45 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1074, f. 405b; Lansd. 1058, f. 55 sub. nom Maghen v.
Bakington. Bakington or Babongyon was Chanellor of the Bishop of Coventry and
Lichfield, who cited Maghen or Mighen out of a peculiar—quod nota–ex officio for the
offense of keeping a school without the Bishop’s license. The Chancellor denied that he
had cited M. for that, but rather for publishing schismatical opinions; he also denied that
plaintiff lived in a peculiar. M. demurred to this plea, which was held insufficient on two
grounds of form: (a) the alleged schismatical opinions should have been specified; (b) B.
should not have admitted citing M. and alleged affirmatively that he cited him for a
different cause—rather, he should have simply confessed or denied what M. said, that he
was cited for keeping an unlicensed school. The reporter thought, however, that judgment
was stayed because M.’s declaration was also insufficient, for not showing whom the
peculiar belonged to and “other defects.” (Lansd. 1074 gives these full facts; the other
report says only that a penalty action was brought on the statute.)
27
T. 3 Jac. K.B. Add. 25,209, f. 65 (Of the persons appearing in the report besides
Yelverton, Harris is identified as “the old—or senior—serjeant”; Winckorne is identified
as counsel in the case. The way in which the two lawyers are presented is what makes me
think that Harris was probably not counsel in the case, but advising the court on his
own—the point in question was certainly not a familiar one for the King’s Bench.)
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the court (for the report says that one Winckorne, who was of counsel “in the case”,
agreed with Yelverton, and that “the suit” concerned matrimony.) Yelverton’s opinion
was that although 23 Hen. VIII appoints a penalty, “yet a man may not sue another out of
the diocese although he agree to pay the penalty in the statute.” I take this as saying that
a suit brought out of the proper diocese should be prohibited despite the alternative of the
penalty; as it were, the statute says “Thou shalt not”, as opposed to merely putting a
price-tag on suits in the wrong diocese, and “Thou shalt not” should be given effect by
Prohibition. Yelverton’s formulation may, however, have a narrower meaning. In
speaking of the ecclesiastical plaintiff’s “agreeing” to pay the statutory penalty, he could
have had a literal agreement in mind. One might argue that whether or not suits contrary
to the statute are generally prohibitable despite the availability of the penalty, they should
in any event not be prohibited if the plaintiff expressly agrees to pay the defendant £5 and
the King £5—the sum at which the statute may be said to value the offense, and which
could conceivably be said to “liquidate” the double tort damages which the offended
party is also entitled to recover. If that is arguable, Yelverton rejected the argument.
Winckorne agreed with him, but Serjeant Harris, who may be speaking for himself rather
than as counsel (see note) is reported as holding the contrary. He may have been
addressing the special case of an explicit agreement, but may also have differed from
Yelverton on the general effect of appending a penalty to a “Thou shalt not”. The latter
point was soon to be resolved by the Common Pleas in favor of Prohibition.
In contrast with these faint beginnings, I have 15 reported cases plus 1 nota,
which may or may not relate to a separate case, from the Common Pleas in the years
1608-1613, during Coke’s Chief Justiceship. For what bare precedents are worth,
Hutton’s list above adds a few more. These figures compare with 5 from the King’s
Bench in all of James I’s reign, 7 Common Pleas cases plus a nota from that reign after
Coke left the court, 6 plus a nota from the Caroline Common Pleas, and only 1 from the
Caroline King’s Bench. Because of the Common Pleas’ preponderance, I shall deal with
all cases from that court before turning to the King’s Bench.
The first significant case, Lewis and Rochester v. Proctor, 28 is much the greatest.
General questions—the common law judges’ authority to construe statutes concerned
with the Church, the prohibitability of suits punishable by penalty action—were
discussed explicitly, and there was thorough debate on the whole meaning of 23 Hen.
VIII along the way to deciding the immediate issue. The decision to grant Prohibition in
this deeply argued case probably opened the gates to the numerous subsequent
Prohibitions based on the statute. The immediate issue of construction was whether the
statute applied to inhabitants of the diocese of London sued in the archdiocesan court of
Arches, which was located in the city of London. The act manifestly applies, for example,
if an inhabitant of Bath and Wells is sued before the Bishop of Coventry and Lichfield in
respect of a crime or tort in no way committed within the diocese of Coventry and
Lichfield. Lewis and Rochester, however, lived in Essex within the diocese of London
and were sued in the Arches for tithes grown in Essex. To answer in the Arches they
would not have had to go physically out of their home diocese. Among other arguments
28
13 Coke, 4, sub. nom. Porter and Rochester’s Case, M. 6 Jac. C.P.; 2 Brownlow and
Goldesborough, 1—undated, sub nom. Lynche v. Porter; Lansd. 601, f.207; Harl. 4817,
f. 192, sub nom. Lewis and Rochester v. Proctor.
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against a Prohibition, it was urged that 23 Hen. VIII did not apply in these circumstances.
(The Arches was held in the church of St. Mary le Bowe, that parish, along with a dozen
others, being part of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s London peculiar. A peculiar is the
ecclesiastical equivalent of a franchise: an area carved out from a diocese and not subject
to the Bishop’s courts. If Lewis and Rochester had lived in St. Mary le Bowe, or perhaps
elsewhere in the Archbishop’s peculiar, they would without question have been suable in
the Arches; indeed, it would almost certainly violate 23 Hen. VIII to sue them before the
Bishop of London. As it was, they claimed that they could only be sued in the diocesan
courts, irrespective of the physical location of the Arches.)
The reports of this case are of two sorts. Harl. 4817 and Brownlow give narrative
accounts, differing only in that each contributes details which the other lacks. Coke and
Lansd. 601 give the court’s resolutions with almost no narrative. The latter reports are the
same except for small ways in which one supplies what the other omits. Both have the
marks of authentic Cokean products. Lansd. 601 is a MS. version of 12 Coke, containing
some material not included in the printed volume. Lewis and Rochester found its way to
13 Coke rather than 12 Coke. Neither of these posthumous volumes is of the quality of
the 11 volumes published in Coke’s lifetime. The report of Lewis and Rochester,
however, in both versions, is typical of Coke’s style. He preferred not to recount the
unfolding of a case, with the separate arguments of counsel and the judges, but to gather
what he thought was decided in the form of “resolutions.” Aside from the omission of
sometimes significant details, this method tends to make the “resolutions” look more
deliberate and coherent than what the judges actually said in discussing and deciding the
case. Coke was not inhibited about reordering what had been said and adding arguments
or authorities. Sometimes material misrepresentation of the events in the courtroom
resulted. In the present instance, however, there is no real conflict between Coke’s
“resolutions” and the “motion picture” of the case. He may have added some points that
he did not express orally in court, but most of what he says was resolved did indeed come
out in the discussion. I shall nevertheless, in view of the contrasting character of the
reports, proceed by following and combining the narrative accounts, then add the further
points that Coke’s summary contributes.
When Lewis and Rochester sought their Prohibition, they of course set out their
basic claim: they lived in Essex; the tithes were grown there; suing them in the Arches
instead of the diocese of London violated 23 Hen. VIII. But one further allegation is
significant: they said expressly that the Bishop of London had not given his license for
the suit to be in the Arches. Including this allegation was probably prudent pleading,
rather than necessary. 23 Hen. VIII provides that when a Bishop or other inferior
ecclesiastical judge requests a superior judge to take a case, the higher court may take it
without violating the statute. As we shall see, the exact meaning of this provision was
problematic. I doubt, in the light of other cases, that plaintiff-in-Prohibition had a
“pleading burden” to say negatively that the inferior judge had made no request or given
no license, but one might as well say so.
The court’s first move was to assign a day to show cause against Prohibition. I.e.,
the judges did not grant a Prohibition at once, leaving defendant-in-Prohibition to move
for Consultation or to plead formally if he had anything to say for himself. Neither did
they withhold all commitment until arguments for Prohibition were developed. In this
case, giving a day to hear argument against Prohibition had a special character. It seems
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evident that what the judges expected and wanted to hear was civilian argument.
According to Harl. 4817, the first thing the judges said was that they wanted to be
informed by civilians of usage since the statute. The legal implication of that desire
should not be taken too literally, but it is still significant. The judges apparently wanted to
know whether the Arches had made a practice of entertaining cases throughout the
diocese of London, outside the Archbishop’s peculiar. I doubt that they would have held
the usage conclusive—i.e., that if the Archbishop had regularly assumed jurisdiction he
was entitled to—but they could still have been justified in thinking it relevant. Perhaps
consistent usage in the Archbishop’s favor would argue implied consent by the Bishop,
thereby at least raising the question whether tacit assent to a general assumption of
concurrent jurisdiction fell within the statutory exception for requests by inferior judges
to superior. In any event, the judges wanted to know what had been going on in the
ecclesiastical sphere. This confirms what negative evidence from the many years between
23 Hen. VIII and 1608 suggests: attempts to get Prohibitions based on the statute were
very unfamiliar. So basic a point as standard ecclesiastical practice in London had
apparently not been looked into judicially before.
Accordingly, three civilians appeared and argued—Dr. Farrand, Dr. Martin, and
an anonymous third. As it turned out, they did a great deal more than inform the court of
the ecclesiastical practice, indeed more than argue the narrow issue in the immediate case
(whether a citation to appear within the physical borders of London diocese falls under
the statute.) Rather, they made sweeping arguments against the enforcement of 23 Hen.
VIII by Prohibition and in favor of virtually exempting the Archbishop of Canterbury
from it. I wonder whether such argument is not what the court expected and invited.
There is no indication that common law counsel spoke against the Prohibition, whereas
Serjeant Dodderidge made a full-scale argument on the other side. Civilian counsel did
not appear as adversaries on both sides. Rather, they seem to be speaking for the
Archbishop and the ecclesiastical establishment, more than for the defendant-inProhibition. In sum, it looks to me as if the judges knew they had a novel issue on their
hands, knew that routine handling of the case possibly eventuating in a Prohibition would
offend the Church authorities and their political friends, and therefore opted for the grand
manner—a full opportunity for the Archbishop to represent his interest and a fundamental
treatment of the issues.
The civilians’ basic theory was that the Archbishop had full concurrent
jurisdiction throughout his province—i.e., that he could entertain any suit in any diocese
if he chose to and if, in the case of civil litigation, the plaintiff chose to go to an
archdiocesan rather than a diocesan court. As was shown on the other side to the point of
over-kill, this theory comes close to reducing 23 Hen. VIII to unintelligibility. Among
other objections, it involves the premise that the statute does not mean what it seems to
say—that suits must be brought in the court of the diocese where the defendant lives,
with certain specified exceptions—but rather that it confines suits to the defendant’s
home diocese in so far as the ecclesiastical law already so confines them. Because the
Archbishop by ecclesiastical law has concurrent jurisdiction in every diocese, says the
theory, he has it notwithstanding the statute. Construed by intent (though the civilians did
not articulate this point), the statute does not mean to take away any jurisdiction that was
previously valid by ecclesiastical standards. The civilians realized, however, that their
theory tended to make the statute pointless and attempted to show that it would have
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served some purpose even admitting their concurrency doctrine. For they conceded that
the Archbishop could not take over suits already commenced in diocesan courts except
by way of appeal (and they could of course have made the obvious point that there are
other situations presumably covered by the statute, such as my imaginary case of a Bath
and Wells suit pursued in Coventry and Lichfield.) In the abstract, without too much
attention to the precise language, the act could be intended to reinforce such pre-existing
ecclesiastical rules as that against archiepiscopal “disseisin” of a Bishop already
possessed of a suit.
Secondly, the civilians claimed that all usage supported their concurrency
doctrine. As we shall see, Dodderidge and the court came close to conceding this factual
assertion, though they did not give legal weight to the usage. Dr. Martin made the
curiously precise statement that in the period before the statute the Archbishop exercised
concurrent jurisdiction for 427 years before any complaint was made, after which
someone objected to the Pope and the Pope held that people from any diocese could be
cited to the Arches. I know nothing of what Martin was referring to, but his figure is not
senseless. It could say that the usage continued from William I’s establishment of
separate ecclesiastical courts down to shortly before the Reformation, when the Pope
settled the first controversy in the Archbishop’s favor. If that happened, the Archbishop
would have been confidently and routinely exercising concurrent jurisdiction in 1531-32,
when the statute was made and when the Pope, after all, was not yet excluded from the
English ecclesiastical system. One can rationally ask whether the statute-makers are
likely to have meant such established and recently confirmed practice to be henceforth
illegal (without, incidentally, implying that the Papal judgment should have any force as
such.)
The civilians next tried to argue that the Act in Restraint of Appeals—24 Hen.
VIII, c.12—proved that concurrent jurisdiction in the Archbishop was recognized as
lawful. If that was acknowledged a year after 23 Hen. VIII, it would of course be
extremely difficult to say that the earlier statute had made such concurrency unlawful for
the future. The language in question was wrenched out of context (as was pointed out in
rebuttal), but the act does speak as follows (in Sect. iv): “every…cause now depending or
that hereafter shall be commenced…before any of the said Archbishops…shall be before
the same Archbishop where the said…cause…shall be so commenced definitively
determined…without any other appeal…than is by this act limited.” The civilians took
this to show that causes could be lawfully commenced before Archbishops, not just
appealed or removed before them (which of course it does show) and then to imply that
any ecclesiastical cause could be commenced there. The inference involves a saltus:
Why should the act not be taken as acknowledging only that some suits can be
commenced before the Archbishops—notably suits against persons living in the dioceses
of Canterbury or York or in peculiars belonging to the Archbishops (reading 24 Hen.VIII
in the light of 23 Hen. VIII) and probate suits falling within the Archbishops’ prerogative
(which are expressly exempted in 23 Hen. VIII)? Even so, the civilians’ point is not
unreasonable. 24 Hen. VIII speaks generally of suits commenced before the Archbishops
and does not go out of its way to explain that it is referring only to certain limited
categories. To say that 24 Hen.VIII was written on the assumption that suits may be
commenced before the Archbishops at will—so long as they have not already been
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commenced in a lower court—is only “favorable construction” of words which could
have been, but were not, so drawn as to exclude such construction.
Besides their exposition of ecclesiastical law, usage, and understandings at the
time of the statute, the civilians also spoke in their initial argument to the policy of the
statute as applied to the immediate situation. Coke’s statement of resolutions helps fill out
what was said to this intent. (He states the arguments that were made and proceeds to
answer them. Brownlow puts the same point, less precisely, in the civilians’ lead-off
speech.) The general point is that the statute only meant to protect people against being
summoned to remote ecclesiastical courts and therefore did not apply when they were
summoned to one place in London diocese rather than another. This comes to an
argument by way of concession, because one could throw away the claim of general
concurrent jurisdiction in the Archbishop and still maintain that the act was meant to take
effect—or at least should be “specifically enforced” by Prohibition—only when the
subject would be put to material inconvenience. More precisely, the civilians relied on
two places: (a) The title of the act, “That no person shall be cited out of the diocese where
he or she dwelleth.” I.e., the title expounds the strict meaning—no one shall be cited to
appear outside the physical limits of the diocese where he lives, and the act has no force
until someone is so cited, as had not happened in this case. (b) The opening words of the
preamble—“Where great number of the King’s subjects…have been…called to
appear…far from and out of the diocese where such men be inhabitant and dwelling…”
(My italics indicate the language emphasized.)
After the civilians had made the above points, Chief Justice Coke interrupted with
a counter-argument: Canon 94 among the canons made by Convocation and given the
royal assent in 1604 expressly confirmed 23 Hen. VIII by providing that no one except
inhabitants of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s diocese should be cited to the Arches. The
civilians answered in two ways. Dr. Farrand argued that the Archbishopric of Canterbury
was vacant when the canons were made (between the death of Whitgift and the
appointment of Bancroft.) Under those circumstances, a canon deprivatory of the
Archbishop’s jurisdiction was not binding, according to Farrand (“but it is a feeble
response”, says the reporter of Harl. 4817.) Dr. Martin argued that the canon was void by
virtue of 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19—the Act for the Submission of the Clergy, which provides
that canons contrary to the laws and customs of the realm shall not be valid. Martin’s
contention was that the long usage which he had just asserted was the sort of custom or
prescription that the statute had in mind.
Before giving up the floor, the civilians added two further bricks to their edifice.
First they argued that the exposition of the act, because it was an ecclesiastical statute,
belonged to them. Translated into procedural context, the argument comes to the basic
case against enforcing statutes governing ecclesiastical jurisdiction by Prohibition. The
common law courts could not be excluded from dealing with 23 Hen. VIII altogether,
because the statute gives damage and penalty actions, which must be brought at common
law. Were its meaning to come in question in such an action, the common law courts
must interpret the statute; the most they could do by way of self-denial would be to defer
to known ecclesiastical opinion and consult civilians. But the self-denial of refusing
Prohibition regardless of the merits—trusting the ecclesiastical court to deny itself if a
statute so requires—can be practiced strictly. Secondly, the civilians argued that the
Bishop of London had consented to the suit in the Arches by the tacit or passive means of
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not protesting it. Dr. Martin said that the Bishop had notice; I suppose he meant
constructive notice or notice of the Archbishop’s general practice of taking cases in
London and other dioceses, though it is remotely possible that he intended a factual
statement—an unpleaded denial of plaintiff-in-Prohibitions’s stated claim that the Bishop
had not given notice. This argument depends for its force on the premise that an inferior
judge’s failure to protest falls within the statute’s exception for cases in which such
inferior judge requests a superior to take a suit. The statute expressly incorporates the
ecclesiastical law on this point by exempting removals-by-request on condition that they
are lawful by ecclesiastical standards. If by ecclesiastical law a superior judge may defeat
the jurisdiction of an inferior simply by taking a case, provided the inferior judge has
notice and registers no protest, it is plausible that there is no violation of the statute.
At this juncture, by the most likely construction of the sequence, the civilians left
off and Serjeant Dodderidge made his detailed argument in favor of Prohibition. He
started by simply denying the concurrency theory as a matter or law: the Archbishop has
original jurisdiction in his own diocese and peculiars and nowhere else. Yet Dodderidge
conceded that there was at least a good deal of usage to give color to concurrency. He
rather explained this fact than denied it: In the Papist times the Archbishop exercised
legatine authority derived from the Pope—as legatus natus, or possessor of legatine
power without special appointment. Pursuant to that authority he could (by then-current
ecclesiastical standards) and in fact did entertain suits in all the dioceses under him.
Now, however, such legatine authority was abolished together with all other powers in or
derived from the Pope. By the standard Anglican theory, it was usurped in its day, like all
Papal power; in any event, the ecclesiastical law of that time and usage erected on it were
now irrelevant. But obviously there was “at least a great deal of usage”, de facto.
Dodderidge avoids saying that the usage changed with the law; perhaps he realized that it
had not; but any usage of concurrent jurisdiction since the Reformation lacked such color
of legitimacy as the same usage before the Reformation had and was therefore entitled to
no legal force. Such was Dodderidge’s general position. On the Arches specifically,
however, he maintained that its authority did not extend beyond the parish of St. Mary le
Bowe. Legally it never could reach, and factually it never had, beyond that parish. The
Archbishop’s Court of Audience was and remained the proper forum for such other
original jurisdiction as he could lawfully exercise—at this day, the court to which
inhabitants of the other London parishes in his peculiar should be cited.
Dodderidge next insisted that the 1604 canon was “great proof” of his position.
On a general plane, he argued that an act of Convocation, involving the whole episcopal
bench and various deans and Church-law experts, could hardly be based on ignorance of
ecclesiastical law or indifference to the Archbishop’s interests. More specifically, he
went to the “legislative history”: The Bishops of London, Lincoln, and Winchester had
“grudged” at citations of their diocesan subjects into the Arches, but had been reluctant to
complain when the Archbishopric was occupied. (In practice, though Dodderidge does
not put it so baldly, this probably means the Bishops were afraid to complain, or
pessimistic about their chances of success, when Whitgift, with his strong personal
backing from Queen Elizabeth, was in office. Note how this point amounts to a still more
explicit concession on Dodderidge’s part that the usage was as the civilians said it was. )
The complaints were brought out in the open during the vacancy, when Dr. Bancroft, now
Archbishop of Canterbury, was the presiding office of Convocation. (In Brownlow’s
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account, Coke, speaking later, reinforces this point by adding that the jurisdiction of
Canterbury was temporarily committed to Bancroft at the time the canon was made,
while Bancroft was still Bishop of London.) So much, Dodderidge thought, for Dr.
Farrand’s argument from the vacancy of the See in the actual circumstances, even
assuming that something could be said for it in the abstract.
Dodderidge turned next to construction of 23 Hen. VIII itself—to showing that
the act makes no sense if it is taken as contemplating that the Archbishops were perfectly
entitled to exercise concurrent jurisdiction. He asserts the general intent of the statute to
curb the Archbishops, without insisting as strongly as he might have on the way the
preamble makes that intent very hard to doubt, and then focuses on the strongly
persuasive effect of two provisos: The act expressly provides that the Archbishops may
take heresy cases if the inferior judge consents (and here the language about assent is
looser than in the exemption for cases removed by request) or if “he do not his duty in
punishment of the same.” The act also expressly saves the Archbishop of Canterbury’s
prerogative jurisdiction in probate (i.e., his prerogative to supervise probate of wills when
the decedent had goods in more than one diocese—the usual definition of the prerogative,
later affirmed in cases on 23 Hen. VIII, though the statute refers to it without definition.)
These savings, Dodderidge argues, would be purposeless if, in the eyes of the statutemakers, the Archbishop could take any diocesan case.
Finally, Dodderidge answered the civilians’ argument from the Appeals Act. His
point here is only what common sense and a sense of context must assert against the
civilians’ nicety: The Appeals Act has nothing to do with distributing ecclesiastical
jurisdiction within England, but only with preventing appeals from being taken to Rome.
It mentions suits commenced before the Archbishops because there is after all such a
category—cases arising in their own dioceses—and to close all holes the Appeals Act
had to provide that such suits be settled by the Archbishops and not appealed to Rome.
(The act does of course provide for such cases to be appealed into the Chancery—or to
the Delegates as the practice was worked out—in contradistinction to diocesan cases,
which went to the archdiocese first and then to the Chancery/Delegates.)
Upon these arguments, the court gave its opinion, except that after Coke had
spoken for the court the civilians were allowed to try one more approach, which proved
as unsuccessful as their original ones. Prohibition was granted by a majority of Coke,
Warburton, Foster, and Daniel, no one except the Chief Justice speaking individually.
Justice Walmesley dissented (according to Brownlow—other reports leave his dissent to
be inferred from the fact that he is not heard from) on a ground to which he was much
devoted—viz. the position that the Common Pleas, unlike the King’s Bench, could not
prohibit unless a “foreign” court proposed to interfere in a case actually pending before
the Common Pleas. (Brownlow says that the civilians urged this point too.) In other
words, so far as the evidence shows, Walmesley did not dissent on the substance, though
his position may have masked substantive disagreement, or at least distaste for the result.)
Apart from his belief that the Common Pleas had no standing to prohibit without an
action pending, Walmesley was especially reluctant to prohibit one ecclesiastical court
from encroaching on another—a position he would probably, or at least could logically,
have held if he had sat on the King’s Bench rather than the Common Pleas. Covertly or
overtly, Walmesley’s generally conservative approach to Prohibitions may be reflected in
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his dissent, whether or not he was persuaded by the civilians’ dubious interpretation of 23
Hen. VIII.
Coke and the majority in effect adopted everything Dodderidge had argued as the
court’s opinion. It is clear, however, that Coke added further points, whether or not he
said in open court all that he later formulated into resolutions. In giving Coke’s opinion, I
shall omit what only repeats Dodderidge and combine the resolutions with other sources
in a composite picture of his contribution. To start with, Coke was explicit in asserting
the common law judges’ authority to expound statutes dealing with ecclesiastical matters.
He cited cases in support of this proposition and explained one of them. (2 Hen. IV, c. 15,
permitted ecclesiastical judges to imprison persons holding erroneous opinions. In Henry
VII’s reign, a man was committed for saying that he ought not to pay tithes to his curate.
The man brought False Imprisonment, and in disposing of that case the common law
judges debated what “erroneous opinions” the statute applied to.) Whether title to pass
on ecclesiastical matters in the course of expounding a statute in order to dispose of a
common law action entails that statutes should be enforced on Church courts by
Prohibition may be doubted, but Coke clearly had no doubts. Lewis and Rochester was
meant to settle that question for 23 Hen. VIII, and it can probably be regarded as having
done so.
On the general meaning of the statute, Coke emphasized the preamble, as
Dodderidge had not; from the preamble it appears that archiepiscopal infringement of
diocesan jurisdiction was the center of the makers’ concern. On the other hand, Coke
went to some length to show that the preamble’s reference to citation to far-distant courts
should not be taken as restrictive. (Various other statutes called attention to the “greater
mischief” in their preambles, but had been held to apply to lesser instances of the same
mischief.) The benefit of the act for the subject, Coke said, was only in part to save
people travel to remote places; the other benefit of localism—trial in the place where one
is best known—was also intended, and another purpose was to insure people maximum
appellate recourse. A few reinforcing points from minute linguistic features of the act
may be omitted. They add up to a meaning that can scarcely be doubted and illustrate
Coke’s gift for taking a document apart.
On the immediate question, whether citation to an archdiocesan court within
London is citation out of the home diocese as the statute means it, Coke argued that
“diocese” refers to jurisdiction, not to a physical circumference. He thought that the
etymology of “diocese” supported this interpretation and that precise language in the
statute removed all doubt. (The penalty clause imposed the £10 forfeiture for citing men
out of their home diocese “or other jurisdiction”, thus showing that by “diocese” the
makers meant a jurisdiction and not a place.) Coke also noted that the statute protects
peculiars and people living in them against diocesan and archdiocesan courts; he thought
it particularly absurd to suppose that the statute did not by the same token protect
diocesan courts against peculiars, such as the Arches was. Finally, he pointed out how
extendable the civilian position was even without the full concurrency doctrine, for the
Archbishop had peculiars in several other dioceses besides London. If citation to any
such peculiar geographically within the diocese did not violate the statute one might as
well admit full concurrency for most practical purposes, despite the overwhelming
objections to admitting it developed by Dodderidge with some additions by Coke
himself.
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After Coke had spoken, Dr. Martin shot his reserve arrow: The statute imposes a
penalty, therefore it should not be enforced by Prohibition. This argument remains cogent
even if one throws away the rest of the civilians’ case; plainly they did not want to use it
until the rest of their case had to be thrown away. Besides his bare theory, Martin had a
prospectively embarrassing further fact to lean on: In this very case, earlier in the same
term, Rochester had sought a Prohibition in the King’s Bench and been turned down.
Martin does not say that the King’s Bench made the decision because it thought that the
penalty was an adequate remedy and the only one intended by the statute-makers, but the
context in which he introduces the decision suggests that that was the reason.
The Common Pleas shows no sign of being moved by what the King’s Bench had
done, unless to be painstaking in refuting Martin’s theory. The judges held “that when
any judges of any court are prohibited to do anything, if they proceed against the statute
Prohibition lies.” (Harl. 4817. The words of the two reports in resolution form are
virtually identical on this point.) Considerable support, direct and analogical, was
adduced for the rule, some of it in open court, though Coke may have added more in
formulating the resolutions. Various statutes limiting various courts in the common law
sphere (the Steward and Marshall, the Constable of Dover, the Justices of Assize) were
cited as acts which could be or had been enforced by Prohibition. I suspect the value of
emphasizing these examples is that they point to the generality or neutrality of the rule:
The Common Pleas was not insisting on its power to prohibit the oft-prohibited
ecclesiastical courts even when Parliament had provided a penalty; it was insisting on its
power to enforce by Prohibition any statute limiting the jurisdiction of any court,
whatever features beyond the essential mandate, such as a penalty clause, the statute
might have. But after the point is made in completely general form two specifically
ecclesiastical instances are added. In the MS. version of Coke’s resolutions, it is said that
Prohibition would lie to the Chancellor if anyone lodged an appeal in the Chancery
contrary to the Act in Restraint of Appeals (24 Hen. VIII, c. 12), even though the statute
imposes penalties and even though the matter is purely spiritual. (I assume the
contemplated offense would be trying to by-pass the archdiocesan level and go directly to
the Chancery, where the statute provided ecclesiastical appeals should go after the
archiepiscopal court had ruled on them, instead of to Rome as theretofore.) Harl. 4817
and the printed Coke both cite the Mortuaries Act (21 Hen. VIII, c. 6) as one that
appoints a penalty, but on which prohibition nevertheless lies. In 13 Coke, 23 Hen. VIII
is said to be stronger than 21 Hen. VIII because the former was made to maintain the
jurisdiction of Ordinaries, as well as for the people’s ease. In other words, it is plausible,
though not valid, to argue that an act made solely for the protection of the subject will
serve its purpose if the injured party can recover the appointed penalty; the Mortuaries
Act, protecting people against excessive mortuary fees, is such a statute. 23 Hen. VIII, on
the other hand, is meant to do more than make up for the injury a man might suffer in
being forced to travel, say, from Cornwall to Canterbury; it is intended, in addition, to
prevent one ecclesiastical court from doing what another ought to be doing, and that
specific effect—the control of jurisdiction—is what Prohibitions exist to secure. (It is of
course true that the double damages and penalty remedies in 23 Hen. VIII would
dissuade from violation of the statute and thus of the lines of jurisdiction which the
statute was meant to reinforce, but surely the interest of courts in their jurisdiction is both
incompensable and important enough to protect by a specific remedy.) It is of some
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significance for later cases, in which the question arose again, if Lewis and Rochester can
be taken as deciding inter alia that 23 Hen. VIII had a double purpose—to protect both
the subject and the ecclesiastical courts.
Exempla more analogical than directly in point enrich the meaning of the court’s
holding that Prohibition lies despite the penalty. The MS. Coke cites a provision of the
Statute of Gloucester inflicting punishment on the sheriff if he fails to put his name on
returns of writs and says that omission of his name is legal error notwithstanding the
penal provision. In other words, statutes that penalize some form of feasance or nonfeasance may generate other legal consequences than the penalty itself—whether award
of a Prohibition or reversal of a judgment in Error. 13 Coke cites a Year Book holding
that anyone who does something prohibited by a statute may be fined for “contempt of
the law.” That is (I take it), a statute which in plain language forbids is to be taken
seriously as forbidding. Such a statute makes it a criminal offense (sub-felonious of
course) to do the thing forbidden, even though it does not do so expressly or appoint a
definite penalty, and even though some other sanction or consequence (such as nullity in
a transaction or error in legal proceedings) would be generated by the statute. By the
same token, an act which forbids a court from doing something should be “taken
seriously as forbidding”, and enforced by the available means of Prohibition, even though
another consequence—such as liability to a penalty—is generated by the act.
Finally, the conclusion that the penalty did not close off Prohibition was
reinforced in three ways, though the principle that any prohibitory statute addressed to
courts may be given effect by Prohibition can support that conclusion unassisted. First, a
nota at the end of Harl. 4817 (which may come from the reporter rather than the court)
calls attention to the structure of 23 Hen. VIII: the statute first forbids suing people out of
their diocese, then in a later clause gives the penalty, wherefore Prohibition clearly lies.
This argument makes it possible to jettison the general principle or demote it to a rule of
construction and still save the conclusion. I.e.: Maybe a statute which contains no distinct
prohibitory language, or merely implies that something on the part of courts is forbidden
in the very language that subjects it to a penalty, is meant not to be enforced by
Prohibition—as if 23 Hen. VIII were to say nothing more than “Let suits outside the
proper diocese be subject to a £10 penalty.” But if a statute, like the actual 23 Hen. VIII,
says “Thou shalt not” and then, as it were after pausing and taking a new breath, adds
“And if thou dost, thou shalt be subject to a £10 penalty”, the priority and independence
of the direct imperative signifies an intent that it be directly enforced by Prohibition—or
that it generate other consequences than the penalty, as in the analogical cases above. I
say “maybe” to the concession, however: I do not think the decision in Lewis and
Rochester has to be reduced to a constructive decision based on the way the prohibitory
and penalty clauses are strung together in 23 Hen. VIII. The court might have held that
Prohibition was appropriate in view of the act’s purpose even if the negative imperative
addressed to ecclesiastical tribunals had not been so clearly separate from the penal
clause.
Secondly, in both versions of Coke, what amounts to a utilitarian argument is
added to the formal principle that a penalty does not foreclose Prohibition. If everyone
offended under the statute, it is said, is put to his action (for the penalty or punitive
damages) “suits and vexation” will increase; Prohibition is the “shortest and more easy
way.” A judicial attitude toward penalty statutes is indicated—a fairly drastic, though
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perhaps not a surprising, attitude toward a commonplace mode of law-enforcement.
Perhaps the feeling could be expressed by saying that the private or semi-private suit is a
necessary evil, necessary to secure enforcement in the absence of an extensive state
prosecutorial system but evil, among numerous other reasons because the device comes
to a legislative invitation to litigate. Even when such litigation is not abusive—not the
work of professional informers or a matter of exploiting obsolete or unimportant statutes
for profit or vexation—it is likely to be expensive for the litigants and costly in the time
of lawyers, judges, and jurors relative to the use of Prohibitions (especially in contexts
like that of 23 Hen. VIII, where issues of fact are unlikely to arise on the Prohibition.)
Enforcement by dissuasion exacts a cost; it is fortunate that sometimes—when
Prohibitions are appropriate—more efficient enforcement of significant policies can be
achieved at less cost, and simply without increasing the incidence of quasi-civil litigation
(which at least in theory Prohibitions were not, but rather public proceedings, “for the
King”. See the extensive documentation of this general point in Vol. I, passim.) If there
were no other reason for enforcing 23 Hen. VIII by Prohibition notwithstanding the
penalty, it would still be practical and socially healthy to do so.
Lastly, it is noted at the end of the printed Coke that the King could dispense with
the penalty, but that the subject would still have the Prohibition. As a legal fact this is
probably accurate enough. The King could undoubtedly dispense with the half of the £10
penalty going to himself, and I think there is little doubt that a non obstante would bar an
informer from recovering his half except when a suit brought by an informer was already
pending when the dispensation was granted. (It is much more doubtful whether the suit
for double damages which 23 Hen. VIII also provides—a suit by the party who is cited
out of his diocese and has suffered actual damage—could be cut off by a non obstante.
None of the discussion in the reports is specific to that provision, however.) On the other
hand, there is probably little doubt that 23 Hen. VIII as a whole, or qua an imperative
distinct from the “price-tag” penalty clause, should be held beyond the dispensing
power—as a general act for the public benefit and not concerned with the minutiae of
economic and social regulation, but rather with the fair and orderly operation of the
whole ecclesiastical legal system and with the preservation of jurisdictional lines
regarded as correct by standards extraneous to the statute itself. As an argument for
enforcement by Prohibition despite the penalty, the observation on the dispensing power
goes to demonstrate the further inconvenience of the counter-position. To put the point in
the form of a rhetorical question addressed to an objector: Do you really want to say that
23 Hen. VIII (leaving aside the double-damages clause) is a dispensable statute—that the
King if he is so inclined may remove the statutory obstacle to making a man travel from
one end of the realm to the other to answer ecclesiastical suits, or may permit a favored
Archbishop to gobble up his diocesans’ jurisdiction? A not entirely trusting attitude
toward imaginable royal preferences may be implied in Coke’s asking something like that
question.
Lewis and Rochester v. Proctor opened a chapter in Prohibition law, for further
cases on 23 Hen. VIII came quickly in the Common Pleas. Before taking up those cases
we must note an immediate sequel, in the King’s Bench as it happened. A few years later
(1611), Proctor sued Rochester there in Debt for the same tithes as he had earlier been
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prohibited from recovering in the Arches.29 I.e., instead of going to the diocesan courts
of London, the parson sought to take advantage of the statute of 2 Edw. VI, c.XXX,
which permitted an action of Debt to be brought for the value of unpaid tithes in some
circumstances. Rochester pleaded that he had been sued for the same tithes in the Arches
and that the suit there had been prohibited upon 23 Hen. VIII, but that sentence had been
given against him in the Arches before the Prohibition. Upon this plea he demanded
judgment—i.e., claimed that a new temporal action for the tithes could not be maintained
when the tithes had already been awarded by an ecclesiastical court, even though real
recovery, or execution of the Arches’ sentence, had been cut off by Prohibition. The
King’s Bench was inclined to hold against Rochester—i.e., that the action of Debt was
maintainable—, but the case was adjourned and not further reported, so that it is
inconclusive on its rather interesting point. It does, however, introduce a further fact
about the earlier Lewis and Rochester—the sentence in the Arches. If the sentence had
been handed down at the time the Prohibition case was argued, there would have been
good grounds against prohibiting. (There are good reasons for exempting Prohibitions on
23 Hen. VIII from the general rule that ecclesiastical sentence is no bar to Prohibition
save in especially aggravated circumstances. This is noted in the discussion of the
foreclosing effect of sentence in Vol. I, pp. 115 ff., and we shall see further evidence.)
Leaving the sentence unmentioned in Lewis and Rochester may have been part of the
price for having one side argued by civilians aiming at a comprehensive vindication of
the Archbishop’s jurisdiction. On the other hand, it is possible that the Arches’ sentence
came before Prohibition was finally granted, but not soon enough to put before the court.
(It would have had to be introduced informally, but there is no necessary reason why it
could not have been. The procedure adopted in Lewis and Rochester, probably in
deference to archiepiscopal sensibilities, of allowing lengthy argument before granting
Prohibition—as opposed to granting a writ for sufficient prima facie cause and letting the
defense move for Consultation—of course permits the ecclesiastical suit to go on, and
perhaps to produce a sentence, before a decision on the Prohibition is reached. An
advantage of granting Prohibition quickly is that a genuinely prior sentence can be used
by the defense and one hastily obtained at the last minute can be discounted.)
Turning now to the cases that came to Coke’s Common Pleas in the wake of
Lewis and Rochester: Salmon v. Wilson (1609) 30 first raises the problem of construction
of 23 Hen. VIII that was to prove most persistent—the exact meaning of the provision
that an inferior ecclesiastical judge may request a superior to take a case, when and if “the
law civil or canon doth affirm execution of such request or instance of jurisdiction to be
lawful or tolerable.” In Salmon v. Wilson the doubt was whether a request to an
Archbishop to take a diocesan case is valid if it comes from the Bishop’s Commissary
instead of the Bishop himself. The language of the statute rather suggests that it is not
valid, for it speaks of request being made by “any Bishop or any inferior judge having
under him jurisdiction in his own right and title or by commission.” I think the natural
reading is that the Bishop and only the Bishop may request removal of a diocesan case to
the Archbishop, while an Archdeacon may request removal from his court to the diocesan
level and the judge of a peculiar may make request to the Archbishop (more dubiously to
29
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the Bishop, as will appear.) In other words, a mere officer under the Bishop, such as his
Commissary, is not authorized by the statute to act for the Bishop. By this interpretation,
the words “or by commission” at the end refer to a distinct jurisdiction constituted by
commission, not to a mere deputizing commission enabling one to serve vice the Bishop
in the diocesan court. Such was the conclusion of Coke and Justice Foster in Salmon v.
Wilson. The report does not give their reasoning, but I think it must have been as I
suggest. Justices Daniel and Warburton, however, said “secretment” that they held the
contrary, because the Bishop has committed all his authority to the Commissary.
(Whether they meant that he had so committed his authority in this particular case or that
Bishops ordinarily worked through such general agents, as they did, is not clear.) The
reporter’s “secretment” probably points to no dark mystery—just that when the case
came up Coke and Foster expressed a decisive opinion, while Daniel and Warburton kept
quiet and later said “off the record” in the reporter’s hearing that they were inclined the
other way. The report gives no further information; the case was probably put off, and no
outcome is known. Justice Walmesley is not heard from. If he, as the judge least
disposed to interfere with the ecclesiastical system, participated later, or counsel figured
on his participation, there would probably have been a majority against Prohibition. The
Daniel-Warburton interpretation might have been based on the somewhat ambiguous
words “or by Commission”; it might be based on nothing more than common-sense
construction—that the statute can hardly intend to prevent removal requests from being
made by the de facto presiding officer of a diocesan court, who is trusted with general
authority by the Bishop and is in a better position than the Bishop himself to know
whether removal would be reasonable and lawful in a given case. One might wonder, in
view of the statute’s express incorporation of ecclesiastical law in the clause in question,
whether civilian opinion should be taken on the legality of a Commissary’s removal
request. I think that could be argued both ways—in the negative by urging that the statute
strictly construed provides that the Bishop alone is competent to request removal, and
then adds as a further requirement that his request must meet ecclesiastical standards of
legality.
Smith’s Case31, from the same term as Salmon v. Wilson, involved another
proviso in 23 Hen. VIII. The report gives only a holding, no context. Although the
principal decision is not stated clearly, I believe it comes to saying that the saving of the
Archbishop of Canterbury’s prerogative in probate extends to administration of
intestates’ estates and entails that administrators appointed by the Prerogative Court
should account there. The saving in question speaks only of the Archbishop’s
prerogative “for calling any person out of the Diocese where he…inhabit[s]…for probate
of any testament…” That is to say, the statute does not mention intestacy cases. That the
court meant to hold that they are included when the circumstances are parallel to those in
which the Archbishop had probate prerogative (when the testator—and now the
intestate—had goods in several dioceses) appears from the one point that is entirely clear
in the report. This is a remark by Coke that if the statute contained no saving for the
Archbishop’s prerogative the common law would still make an exception for that.
Reason: where the Bishop cannot determine a matter, the Archbishop must. Application:
Bishops cannot deal with probate cases when the estate is not all in one diocese. The
31
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same reason holds when an intestate leaves property in several dioceses, and it follows
that if the Archbishop may commit administration in such cases the administrators should
account to him—which is the principal holding.
The statute’s exception for suits removed to a higher court by request came in
question in Hawes’s Case.32 This case involved the Court of High Commission and is
therefore discussed in the End Note following this chapter. High Commission cases are
treated separately in the End Note because they touch the special question whether 23
Hen. VIII applied to the High Commission at all. The holding in Hawes, however, is
probably not confined to the High Commission, but valid for any pair of ecclesiastical
courts. Abstracting from procedural peculiarities of the High Commission case, that
holding can be expressed as follows: Whatever the other exact rules about removal of
suits from one ecclesiastical court to another at the request of the original judge—which
23 Hen. VIII certainly permits—one form of removal is not allowed by the statute, viz.
removal of a suit in medias res, as opposed to when it is first brought, or before the
original court has made any determinations of fact or law.
Hawes was prosecuted for adultery in an Ordinary’s court and censured for the
offense. Then, because he did not perform the censure (meaning presumably that he did
not do a prescribed penitential act or, instead or in addition, disobeyed an instruction to
“sin no more”) the Ordinary “consented” that “the High Commission should have the
punishment of him.” The High Commission took the case. The report says that Hawes
was “convicted” before that court and then punished (by imprisonment, which, unlike
regular ecclesiastical courts, the Commission arguably had power to impose—see End
Note.) The report’s language suggests that the High Commission re-tried Hawes, instead
of taking his previous conviction as sufficient and punishing him forthwith. If that is
what happened, it suggests that the Commission doubted whether 23 Hen. VIII permitted
regular ecclesiastical courts to turn over convicted offenders merely to have them
punished by another ecclesiastical court more likely to be effective. (The High
Commission would be the obvious candidate for greater effectuality, but other superior
courts might find it might find it easier than a local one so much as to excommunicate an
obstreperous and perhaps powerful local figure.) Re-trying the party, as if the case had
been forwarded by the original court before any action taken, may have seemed to furnish
an argument that the removal was within 23 Hen. VIII.
The Common Pleas, however, held per curiam that Hawes was not lawfully
punished. If indeed re-trial in the High Commission took place and was intended to
buttress the removal, the judges were unimpressed. Chief Justice Coke summed up the
holding by saying the original court’s consent must be “before the suit commenced”, and
the reporter notes that this was not denied. There may be some question as to whether
Coke’s rule overstates the result. If “before the suit commenced” means no more than
“before the original court has taken any decisional steps” there is no problem. Quaere
whether “commenced” could have a starker meaning than that. There is a hint in the
language of the report that Justice Walmesley was a bit anxious lest the decision be taken
to say more about the construction of 23 Hen. VIII than the immediate point it makes—
no removal to the High Commission, or perhaps elsewhere, for punitive purposes only.
(See the End Note for the probable purport of Walmesley’s remark.)
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A case of 1610 33 reopened the general questions settled in Lewis and Rochester.
All the report tells is that a Prohibition was sought and granted on 23 Hen. VIII to stop a
suit in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, and that usage in the reigns of Henry VIII
and Queen Mary was urged against a Prohibition. In those reigns, it was argued, the
Archbishop cited men from all dioceses in his province to the Prerogative Court without
the Ordinary’s consent. (It is notable that Elizabethan or other distinguishably postReformation usage—later Henrician or Edwardian—was not urged. Counsel’s theory
must have been that the Papist usage that could be discovered was relevant because it
pointed to what would have been regarded as lawful at the time 23 Hen. VIII was made.)
The court replied as it had in Lewis and Rochester: the usage cited was explicable by the
Archbishop’s legatine authority, now abolished.
In Langdale’s Case, later the same year,34 two points may have been decided. (The
report states what was resolved in the sparest general terms.) (a) A Prohibition on 23
Hen. VIII need not be sought at the earliest possible moment, or before the improper
court has taken any steps to deal with the suit. (b) The party who causes another to be
cited out of the latter’s home diocese may prohibit his own suit. The first point is not
surprising; the second seems hard to justify and is contradicted by later holdings. Selfprohibition was generally permissible (see Vol I, pp. 161, ff,) but it seems doubtful
whether Prohibitions on 23 Hen. VIII should fall within the general rule. If A has had B
cited out of B’s diocese, and B has no objection, why should A be allowed to have
second thoughts and stop the suit? The rhetorical question loses its force, however, if the
purpose of 23 Hen. VIII is as much to uphold proper jurisdictional lines and protect the
lower courts as to save the subject trouble. That the first purpose is as clear and important
as the second may have been held in Lewis and Rochester; Langdale says so indirectly.
In 1611 35, the court was first faced with the precise meaning of residency
(“inhabiting and dwelling”) in 23 Hen. VIII. A King’s Bench attorney who ordinarily
lived in the diocese of Peterborough was sued in the Arches (as executor, for a legacy)
during term—i.e., when he was in London more than fleetingly, to practice his profession
throughout the term (and presumably he came every term, therefore spending a
substantial fraction of each year in London.) The suit was prohibited. Coke distinguished
“remaining” (“demurrant” in Law French no doubt) from living/dwelling/inhabiting and
said that a lawyer who stays at an Inn of Court, as well as an attorney who stays at an Inn
of Chancery, may not be sued in the Arches. Presumably he cannot be sued in a London
diocesan court either, if he has a regular “residence” elsewhere and only keeps premises
in an Inn as a temporary “residence” cum “office” or “business address.” (There is no 17th
century vocabulary quite adequate to the distinctions.) A case could conceivably be made
for archdiocesan courts such as the Arches, in contradistinction to London diocese,
precisely for such situations of genuinely “divided residence”; the report does not tell
whether that was argued. In so far as the purpose of the statute is to save people travel
and the like, the suit in the instant case can hardly be considered against the policy of the
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statute. The decision does, of course, cut off a form of archdiocesan encroachment on
diocesan jurisdiction which could be of more than trivial importance, in view of the
number of people of substance who maintained “second residences” in London. A touch
of 17th century sentiment may be seen in the decision—a tendency to think of a
professional man’s real home as his “country”, however much time he spent in London
earning the means of country life. It is worth noting that the plaintiff-in-Prohibition here
came to the Common Pleas even though he was a King’s Bench attorney, an indication
that enforcement and favorable construction of 23 Hen. VIII was more likely to be
obtainable in the Common Pleas.
Another report from 161136 confirms the holding in Lewis and Rochester that the
penalty given in 23 Hen. VIII is no bar to Prohibition. The report is not related to any
specific case. Whatever the context, the judges gave several examples of situations in
which the existence of a penalty is no obstacle to Prohibition and went on to assert the
general prohibiting power of the Common Pleas over Walmesley’s usual dissent on that
question.
Jones v. Boyer, later in 1611,37 presents the first extensive technical debate on the
removal-by-request proviso. It also led to extra-judicial discussion of other issues arising
from 23 Hen. VIII. Boyer, an inhabitant of the diocese of Llandaff, was sued as executor
in the Arches, for his testator’s dilapidations. I.e., Jones succeeded testator in an
ecclesiastical living; he sued executor to be compensated out of the estate for
deterioration of the permanent value of the living caused or suffered by testator. Boyer
sought a Prohibition. Jones alleged (whether by a proper plea or informally does not
appear) that the Bishop of Llandaff’s Commissary or Vicar General had transmitted the
suit to the Archbishop by letters under seal.
The court asked civilians to appear and inform it as to the legality of the request
by ecclesiastical standards. Drs. Talbot and Martin came and argued that it was lawful.
From nothing that they or the judges said does it appear that the legality of a request by a
Commissary, rather than the Bishop himself, was doubted. This is further evidence, in
conjunction with the case on this point above, that the court, whether or not still split, was
at least by a majority inclined to hold the Commissary competent to act for the Bishop.
Instead, the issue was whether the letter of request needed to recite the reasons why the
request was being made. Apparently there was no such recitation in the instant case; at
least it was not alleged. Talbot and Martin maintained that the reasons did not need to be
rehearsed. The rationale of this negative rule, as they represented it, was that there might
be a number of reasons. (Not a terribly convincing rationale, but perhaps the point is that
there were so many different sufficient reasons, several of which might apply in a given
case, that it would be tedious to require them all to be rehearsed and a source of trouble to
make the requester select one, which might not be the best.)
After making this general argument, Talbot and Martin went on to represent the
case at hand as more complex than my statement and the report have it. It seems that the
suit had originally been brought in an Archdeacon’s court and decided there, so that what
the Bishop’s Commissary really requested was that the Archbishop take an appeal that
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would ordinarily lie to the Bishop, rather than a first-instance case. According to the
civilians, an appeal could legally go from Archdeacon to Archbishop; ergo (as I
reconstruct the reasoning), the Bishop or his deputy may turn over an appellate case to
the Archbishop. Even if the cause for transmitting a first-instance case must be recited,
an appellate case can be transmitted without reason shown.
The court took no action immediately after the civilians had spoken. When the
case was moved again, Coke said he had conferred with another civilian in the meantime
and discovered that Talbot and Martin were wrong on one point: an Archdeacon may not
transmit a case directly to the Archbishop for appellate hearing (he may make such a
transmission to a Patriarch, but the Archbishop of Canterbury is not a Patriarch.) On this
occasion, the judges agreed that a Bishop must transmit a case before it is “commenced”
in his court, but there is nothing to suggest that that point had any relevance for Boyer v.
Jones. No decision of that case is reported, nor is any further discussion of whether the
reasons for a removal need to be rehearsed in the letter of request.
The MS. report (which may have been written by Justice Warburton) goes on,
however: Afterwards a conference took place at Serjeants’ Inn between the Common
Pleas judges (“us”) and three civilians, Sir John Bennet, Dr. Martin, and Dr. James.
Several important questions about 23 Hen. VIII were discussed, but not, so far as appears,
the issues in Jones v. Boyer. My guess would be that the case was still undecided when
the conference was held, but that consensus on the case itself was a less important or
more easily attained goal than working out wider disagreements and misunderstandings.
As in Lewis and Rochester, so in Jones v. Boyer, civilians had represented the Church
position. In the latter case, a combination of genuine doubt—far more likely on the
technical ecclesiastical issue of what constitutes a sufficient letter of request than on the
broad claims advanced for the Archbishop in Lewis and Rochester—and a desire for
peace with the Church lawyers prompted the conference. Perhaps consensus was not hard
to come by in Jones v. Boyer itself. Grounds for denying Prohibition were strong; it was
in the event denied unless counsel, duly discouraged, dropped the attempt to get a writ.
(At least a majority of the court probably had no quarrel with the Commissary’s request.
One need not accept that the ecclesiastical law always sanctioned removal without reason
shown to hold that forwarding an appeal to the normally-appellate archdiocesan level is
perfectly reasonable and therefore probably lawful,) But more important matters were
taken up at the conference, and these the report tells about.
First, the civilians proposed an interpretation of the saving for probate prerogative
in 23 Hen. VIII: “By equity and construction” legacy suits based on wills proved in the
Prerogative Court must be brought in that court. In other words, when the statute saves
“the prerogative of the …Archbishop…for calling any person…out of the diocese …for
probate of any testament”, it means to save testamentary jurisdiction generally in so far as
the Archbishop is lawfully “possessed” of a will by virtue of its having been proved
before him. The Archbishop may indisputably (assuming the testator had goods in several
dioceses) summon Executor out of Bath and Wells to prove the will in the Prerogative
Court. By the same token, per the civilians, Legatee may subsequently cause Executor to
be cited into the Prerogative Court to demand payment of a legacy in the same will. (Cf.
the analogous, though more convincing, point in the poorly reported case above—Note 7:
Prerogative jurisdiction to appoint administrators of an intestate’s estate entails
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jurisdiction to summon an administrator living in Bath and Wells for the purpose of
accounting.)
No consensus was reached by the conference on this matter. All the judges held
“fortement” contra: The statute saves only what it literally saves, the prerogative for
probate. A legacy suit is as independent of the prior probate proceedings as an action of
Debt brought by the executor to recover money due to the estate (for which probate was
also a prerequisite.) In defense of the judges’ position, one should observe that there is a
significant sense in which the Bishop of Winchester “cannot” conduct probate
proceedings when part of the testator’s goods are in Bath and Wells. I.e.,—for the real
sense of the “cannot”—there is no basis for choosing between the two Bishops, so that it
is reasonable to assign the probate function to the Archbishop. (Again, cf. the case at
Note 7.) Once probate has “activated” the executor’s capacity and made him liable to
legacy suits, there is no difficulty about saying the executor should be sued where he
lives, in accord with the statute. Working with this line of reasoning, the judges went on
to make a concession: If there are several executors who live in different dioceses, a
legacy suit must be brought against them jointly; since they cannot be sued in any
diocese, they must be sued before the Archbishop. The civilians did not at once give up
their claim to a wider legacy jurisdiction for the Archbishop, but resorted to their familiar
litany: Usage supported the citation of inhabitants of London in any cause, and citation
from anywhere in the archdiocese when a will had been proved in an archdiocesan court.
The judges only replied. “that is the greater and longer tort”—I suppose the sense is “a
worse mistake, and ‘older hat’, than the construction of the statute you just proposed.”
The rest of the report is a summary of three cases, presumably noted by the
reporter just because they relate to the subject of the conference. One of them, Bridges’s
Case, came a few months after Jones v. Boyer and is independently reported—see below.
The other two are undated and are not reported separately. In the first, a man lived in a
peculiar but occupied land in the diocese of London outside the peculiar. He was sued in
the diocesan court for tithes produced by that land and sought a Prohibition on the ground
that he should have been sued in the peculiar. Prohibition was refused because he
“cannot” be sued in the peculiar in this case. Here as in other contexts, “cannot” is not
literal—it all depends on the competence one ascribes to courts to reach beyond their
ordinary ambit when in some sense they “have jurisdiction” (here because the peculiar
was the proper court, following 23 Hen. VIII, in respect of the tithe-payer’s person.) I
think, however, that the decision in fact accords with the verbal meaning of the statute,
though the drafting is none too clear on this score. The act makes an exception “for any
spiritual offence committed or done…or neglected to be done contrary to right or duty by
the Bishop, Archdeacon, Commissary, Official, or other having spiritual jurisdiction…or
by any other person…within the diocese or other jurisdiction whereunto he…shall be
cited…” I take it that not paying tithes due from land in London diocese is committing a
spiritual offense (or neglecting a spiritual duty) “within” London diocese, so that the
offender may be cited into the diocesan courts of London even though his dwelling place
is elsewhere. The statute is puzzling in that it recites the titles of various judicial officials
and seems to contemplate primarily offenses committed by such persons. The meaning is
presumably the reasonable one that a complaint against the Commissary of Bath and
Wells can be taken to an archdiocesan court even though the Commissary lives in Bath
and Wells. But the statute eventually gets to “any other person” and therefore seems to do
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in effect what could have been done more straightforwardly—viz. make an exception for
the situation where a man lives in X but does a criminal or tortious act whence an
ecclesiastical cause arises in Y, in which case he may be sued in Y. This is plainly a large
and important exception.
The other case, Edmonds’s, on essentially the same issue, complicates the
interpretation. It was reportedly held in this case that if a man who ordinarily lives in
London goes to the diocese of Salisbury, commits adultery there, and then returns to
London, he may not now be sued in Salisbury. 23 Hen. VIII requires that he be proceeded
against again in London—no apparent problem about London’s taking notice of acts
committed in Salisbury. On the other hand, if the adulterer had been sued in Salisbury
before returning to London, there would be no objection. He may not invoke his normal
residence to stop the Salisbury suit. This result is contradicted by Bridges’s Case, as the
reporter notes. It seems to me unreachable by the verbal construction of the statute I give
above. Therefore it must proceed from common-sense construction of intent. The latter
sort of construction could reconcile the apparently inconsistent tithe case above by saying
that Parliament might plausibly have meant that people ought to be sued for agricultural
tithes where the land lies, but that for crimes and personal torts the ecclesiastical
authorities were meant in all circumstances to refrain from what the act is directed
against—e.g., making a man travel from London to Salisbury (even a bad man who has
sinned in Salisbury.) Common law habits of mind could lead one to see a resemblance
between suits for agricultural tithes and actions touching land—“local” actions at
common law, meaning the jury must come from where the land lies, as opposed to
“transitory” personal actions triable in any venue. The resemblance is quite misleading,
because the common law distinction depends on the theory that issues touching land
should not be decided by jurors without putative personal knowledge of the facts—i.e.,
should not be decided merely on evidence presented to the jury. Since all ecclesiastical
causes involving factual disputes were decided on evidence (without jury) there is no true
analogy. It is nevertheless conceivable that Parliament—reflecting “common law habits
of mind”—could have intended a distinction, an exception all but exclusively for tithe
cases.
Whether the tithe case is correct or not, there is a good common-sense argument
for deciding the adultery case as it was decided in Edmonds. For if the statute does not
insist that crimes and personal torts be tried where the defendant lives, and not where he
allegedly did wrong, the statute seems in significant measure to be directed against
something unlikely to occur often. The Bishop of X is unlikely to proceed against an
inhabitant of Y for no reason at all, or merely because he is asked to by someone whose
convenience it suits or who wants to vex the defendant. The foreseeable situation is that
the Bishop of X will see fit to entertain a suit against an inhabitant of Y when the latter
has done something giving rise to a cause of action within X. This does not, of course,
speak to archiepiscopal encroachment, the main mischief behind the statute, but the act
also applies to Bishop encroaching on Bishop, and it is reasonable to suppose that the
intent was not to except away most realistic cases in that category. Nevertheless, this
interpretation may go against the words of the statute.
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Another case from 1611, Hutton v. Grimball, 38 has been dealt with in Vol., I, p.
170, as a special instance of refusal to prohibit after ecclesiastical sentence. A party was
sued in the wrong diocese for defamation and found innocent of the offense. Costs were
accordingly awarded to him. The losing plaintiff sought to prohibit recovery of the costs
against him on the basis of 23 Hen. VIII. The court denied Prohibition with obvious
justice, “because the statute of 23 Hen. VIII does not give any advantage to the party
plaintiff who draws the other out of his jurisdiction, but solely to the defendant.”
Dasset v. Johnson, the same year,39 touches on a matter discussed at the conference
following Jones v. Boyer. What the litigation was about in this case is not specified, but it
was probably a legacy suit. The question was which diocese a suit belongs in when one
executor lives in X and the other in Y. The judges seem to have agreed on two points: (a)
The place where the will was made does not decide the question, “for the statute is for the
person solely.” I.e., the statute forbids bringing suit in Y against a single executor living
in X, although the will was made in Y. As it were, not performing a will made in Y is not
an ecclesiastical offense or neglect of duty committed in Y, like the Londoner’s act of
adultery in Salisbury. One should not deviate from this principle in order to solve the
problem of two executors with different residences. (b) If one of the two executors lives
in the Archbishop’s diocese, the Archbishop should have jurisdiction by reason of his
superior dignity. As to whether the Archbishop may take jurisdiction when neither
executor lives in his diocese, the judges were inclined to say “Yes” in virtue of the
impossibility of assigning jurisdiction on any other principle, but they were not so sure as
on the occasion of the Serjeants’ Inn conference. The case was adjourned and does not
reappear. (The only alternative to opting for the Archbishop or else attaching
significance to where the will was made would presumably be to hold that suit may be
brought in the diocese where either executor lives, and that citing the other executor into
that diocese does not violate 23 Hen. VIII. This is on the assumption that suit must be
brought against all executors jointly. Would there be any risk of common law
interference in suing one executor singly, assuming that the ecclesiastical court was
willing to permit that? I should think not.)
Bridges’ Case, at the beginning of 1612,40 raises the question of ecclesiastical
wrongs committed in a diocese other than that in which the wrongdoer lives. It resolves
this contrary to Edmonds above. (The chronological order of these cases is
unascertainable.) The case, like Edmonds, was adultery committed in Salisbury by one
who normally lived in London and had returned there by the time he was cited into the
Salisbury court. The holding that he could be proceeded against in Salisbury was posited
on the words of 23 Hen. VIII in the way I indicate above, though the court also recited
the maxims “actor sequitur forum rei” and “ubi delinquit ibi punietur.” The judges also
pointed out that in ecclesiastical law the judge of the place where the offense is
committed may punish it, as if to suggest that if the verbal meaning of the statute were in
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doubt ecclesiastical law would be relevant to expound it. (Incorporation of ecclesiastical
law in the clause on removal might suggest the view that it has expository relevance
otherwise.) The reports of Bridges are not particularly helpful on the limits of the
principle it espouses. Adultery is a crime of some gravity; acts constituting it are
necessarily done in definite places. Would, say, defamatory words spoken in Salisbury by
a visiting Londoner be prosecutable in Salisbury? Could a divorce suit grounded in
adultery be pursued there against someone resident elsewhere? A few hints in the Harg.
15 report rather stir up such questions than answer them. The report says “these offenses”
are “local”—pointing, as it were, to such criminal offenses as adultery. But what would
other examples be, and what acts in the ecclesiastical sphere are not “local”? (To the
degree that common law analogies are at work—as they clearly seem to be, though
perhaps with dubious relevance—: criminal cases were “local” at common law, perhaps
with a doubtful penumbra for such semi-criminal ones as prosecutions on penal statutes.
“Semi-criminality” characterizes such ecclesiastical causes as defamation. We have
already seen tithe suits “localized”, perhaps by analogy with claims to and torts involving
land. Obvious ecclesiastical equivalents to the “transitory” class at common law—suits
for money owed and for damages arising from personal torts—are hard to find. Legacy
suits perhaps have the clearest resemblance; we have already seen that those must be
brought where the executor lived.) One other example given in Bridges is false doctrine
preached at Paul’s Cross, which ought to be prosecuted in London rather than the
preacher’s diocese of residence—another criminal example. In stating the instant case,
the MS. report speaks of someone who is incontinent away from home “and detected in
that flagrant crime in the diocese where it is committed.” Is there a hint of limitations in
“detected” and “flagrant”—e.g., that ex officio prosecution of the Salisbury adulterer in
Salisbury is lawful, but no prosecution on private complaint even though the matter is
“criminal” in the sense that the party would be liable to spiritual punishment if convicted?
In any event, Bridges is firm in its immediate holding; it was confirmed with exactly the
same examples in the slightly later James’s Case.
The facts of Stone (?) v. Grigg (1612)41 are not given, but several resolutions on
23 Hen. VIII are reported. The judges agreed that the statute is violated if the Archbishop
of Canterbury or any other Bishop cites a man living in his diocese into a peculiar
belonging to such Archbishop or Bishop outside the diocese. This seems fairly obvious—
inhabitants of the diocese of Canterbury, for example, are protected from having to travel
to London to answer in the Arches. But perhaps there is a bit of a puzzle about the
statute’s meaning when the effect of citing someone out of his home diocese is to cite
him before the same judge as he would in any event have to answer before. (Nominally
the same, because in practice the peculiar and the diocesan court would be presided over
by different deputies of the Bishop.) More likely to be a real problem is the situation of
which, so far as I know, the Arches was the only example: The peculiar belongs to the
Archbishop and in practice operates as an archdiocesan court (i.e., does the legitimate
appellate and prerogative work of the archdiocese, as opposed merely to serving as a
first-instance court for inhabitants of the peculiar.) The removal-by-request provision of
the statute must mean that the Archbishop could “request himself” to take in his
archdiocesan court suits brought in his diocesan court and perhaps in his peculiar
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(depending on whether he is entitled to skip over the Bishop of the diocese where the
peculiar is located.) It is possibly arguable that no form of request is necessary in that
situation—inhabitants of an Archbishop’s diocese (and perhaps his peculiars) are simply
liable to citation into the archdiocesan courts, the citation implying that the Archbishop
has “requested himself.” Applied to this special context, the holding would mean that
whatever it does in practice the Arches is properly speaking only a peculiar. That was
suggested in Lewis and Rochester, which the present holding modestly extends (an
inhabitant of Canterbury diocese is as much within the statute as an inhabitant of London
diocese.)
The second point in the report is not a resolution but a doubt, whether the
reporter’s or the court’s is not clear. The premise for the doubt is that “it seems by the
words of the statute that by license of the diocesan the Archbishop may cite in any
diocese.” “Seems” is weak if the meaning is only that any Bishop may—in due form and
provided that ecclesiastical law permits—request the Archbishop to take over a case, for
the statute certainly provides that. Perhaps the word reflects uncertainty about what “due
form” is—e.g., whether a Bishop may give his Archbishop a general license, as opposed
to making request in each case. The unanswered question is whether this principle applies
to a peculiar belonging to an Archbishop located in someone else’s diocese—e.g., the
Arches, which the present case is in all probability about. The answer should probably be
“no”, given the point above—the Arches is only a peculiar even though it functions as an
archdiocesan court. For the statute permits removal-by-request only from inferior to
superior judge, and peculiars are presumably not superior to dioceses even when they
belong to a personal superior of the Bishop. This is a puzzling and practically
inconvenient result, however, since the Bishop of London would be doing an inhabitant
of his diocese a favor—saving him travel—if he licensed the Archbishop sitting in the
Arches to take a case which he wanted to forward to the higher level. (Nominally,
anyhow. The point would be realistic for an equivalent of the Arches located in
Lincolnshire, since the regular archdiocesan courts commonly sat in greater London.)
The other intelligible resolution in the report restates a point we have already
encountered: If 23 Hen. VIII did not contain an express proviso for probate prerogative, it
would still be treated as an exception. It was “stated as a rule” that when the party
“cannot” have a remedy in an inferior court a superior court may provide one. The report
is garbled or incomplete at the end. There appears to be discussion of the jurisdictional
consequences of a will’s being proved in the Prerogative Court—whether later
proceedings connected with the will, such as legacy suits, may or must be in diocesan
courts—but it is unclear.
Fraunces v. Powell, also 1612, 42 indicates answers to a couple of questions raised
in cases above: (a) A Bishop may give his Archbishop a general license to take diocesan
cases, so far as the statute is concerned, provided that is warranted by ecclesiastical law.
The instant case was adjourned until civilians could be heard on the point of ecclesiastical
law. It was a case of alleged encroachment on London diocese by the Arches. The court’s
action therefore implies that a general license could benefit an archiepiscopal peculiar as
well as regular archdiocesan courts, ecclesiastical law permitting. In announcing the
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disposition, Coke said that Prohibition would lie in the instant case unless the general
license existed and was valid in ecclesiastical law.
(b) It is reported as held that defamation, which the instant case was about, may
be punished by the ecclesiastical court in whose precinct the words were spoken,
although the speaker does not live there. (Note that this need not imply that the place
where this semi-criminal wrong was committed has exclusive jurisdiction, as against the
place where the defendant is resident. Whether it does would presumably be an intraecclesiastical matter.)
Save for dicta below, one cannot say more about Fraunces v. Powell. Full facts
are not reported. We are not told exactly where plaintiff-in-Prohibition lived, nor whether
and how an episcopal license to the Archbishop to take any diocesan case he liked in the
Arches was asserted as a fact. We are informed that the alleged defamatory words were
spoken in St. Sepulcher’s parish, London. There may be a lurking question as to whether
that parish was part of the Archbishop’s peculiar. In Lewis and Rochester, we
encountered the judicial opinion that the Arches as a peculiar court was confined to St.
Mary le Bowe, where the words in question here were not spoken. It is reported as “said”
in Fraunces (but by whom does not appear) that the peculiar covered thirteen parishes,
which is the traditional view. It is possible that once the outstanding question of
ecclesiastical law was settled the court would have to come back to the extent of the
peculiar and whether St. Sepulcher’s belonged to it. There is no report of the case beyond
the adjournment.
In addition to these points directly bearing on the case, Coke made two further
observations in Fraunces. (1) He affirmed that 23 Hen. VIII was made to protect inferior
ecclesiastical jurisdictions—as opposed merely to saving the subject inconvenience.
Indeed, he said that that was the “principal cause” of the statute. (2) He said that the act
was made “in affirmance of the common law.” In support of this, he cited two Year Book
cases in which it was said that excommunication in a “foreign” diocese is void. Assuming
the position is tenable, I am not sure that it would have any implications after the statute,
sed quaere. The point that the statute may be enforced by Prohibition, not only by penalty
suit, is at least assisted by the theory that the act is declaratory, if in the absence of the
statute Prohibition would lie to stop a suit in a jurisdiction counting as “foreign”
(whatever the criteria of foreignness.) For then the penalty would clearly be a superadded
remedy, since the statute does not expressly take away any pre-existing power to prohibit.
The prohibitability of “foreign” suits at common law does not automatically follow from
decisions on the validity of excommunications in the contexts where the common law
had occasion to pass on that—to decide whether a person had incurred the civil
disabilities entailed by excommunication or whether De excommunicato capiendo would
lie. We have seen in Vol. III, pp. 155 ff., that the courts were reluctant to use Prohibition
to keep one ecclesiastical court from infringing on another in the unusual cases where
that was complained of but where 23 Hen. VIII was not involved.
James’s Case, from the next term, 43 is not reported factually, but in the form of
propositions on which the judges agreed, none of them new. (a) Bridges was affirmed. (b)
The probate proviso, being designed to uphold archdiocesan jurisdiction where diocesan
will not work, does not carry the power to entertain legacy suits with it. (c) Exceptions
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not express in the statute may be construed in for cases in the “equal mischief” and where
justice cannot be done otherwise. The example given is the Archbishop’s power to grant
administration in intestacy cases parallel to those covered by the probate prerogative—
when the intestate has goods in several dioceses. The last point, probably the specific
example of intestacy, was said to have been adjudged in Edward VI’s time and by divers
precedents since.
Goruen v. Pym, the same term, 44 in a sense adds little beyond the obvious to the
gloss on 23 Hen. VIII. The statute makes a plain and unqualified exception for appeals. In
this case, citation out of the home diocese was apparently alleged as one reason for
Prohibition, but the citation was in consequence of an appeal to the Archbishop. 23 Hen.
VIII is not actually mentioned in the report, but I think it must certainly have been
invoked. Assuming it was, the court said that there was no violation of the statute. The
only point of interest is how it could have occurred to plaintiff-in-Prohibition to rely on
23 Hen. VIII.
His doing so can be made intelligible, though the attempt was not successful.
Pym sued for a pew in the diocesan court. The Bishop made the equivalent of an order to
quiet possession in Pym’s favor—i.e., awarded him possession of the pew pending trial
of the right at common law. This step is explained by the fact that in some circumstances
a man could have a temporal right to a pew. The Bishop’s court in this case apparently
held that Pym might or might not have such a right, a question that only common law
litigation could determine, and that meanwhile, from an ecclesiastical point of view and
by tentative appearances, Pym was entitled to possession. (I say “from an ecclesiastical
point of view” because it was probably law that if Pym lacked a common law title to the
pew the Bishop was free to settle the right to use it by ecclesiastical standards, or perhaps
by standardless discretion. In other words, the diocesan court was probably not doing
exactly what a court of equity does when it awards temporary possession—acting merely
on “tentative appearances”—though the distinction is a thin one.
Goruen then appealed to the archdiocese. Pym sought to prohibit the appellate suit
partly as a violation of 23 Hen. VIII and partly because the matter was temporal. I
construe his claim, comprising these two elements, as arguing that the suit to the
Archbishop was not a bona fide appeal, such as 23 Hen. VIII excepts. I.e: A definitive
sentence in an inferior ecclesiastical court is appealable, and citation of appellee out of
his home diocese is perfectly legal. The same is no doubt true of a normal interlocutory
appeal—when a non-dispositive point of ecclesiastical law has allegedly been
misdecided. Here, however, the diocesan court had only made an order based on the
proposition that the real issue was determinable at common law. Goruen’s proper move
was to sue at common law if he wanted to assert a right to the pew against Pym. If he was
not willing to take that step, it is at least arguable that he should be stuck with the
Bishop’s disposition—on the theory that where temporal right to a pew does not exist in
either disputant the Bishop has a mere discretion to assign the seat and end the quarrel,
and therefore cannot commit an appealable error. When Goruen appealed to the
Archbishop, he violated the policy of 23 Hen. VIII, though it may be hard to maintain
that he violated the letter. He caused Pym to be cited into an archdiocesan court when
there was no excuse for so vexing him.
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The Common Pleas was probably well-advised in going by the surface of 23 Hen.
VIII—i.e., in holding that an appeal in form is an appeal so far as the statute is concerned.
In denying a Prohibition, I doubt that the judges committed themselves to more than that.
They laid down some rules about title to pews (in brief, that a donor who has always paid
for the upkeep of a seat and used it exclusively has a right protectable at common law,
and otherwise that the settlement of disputes about pews belongs to the Bishop, subject to
power in the parson and churchwardens to assign them if they can agree.) I see no
commitment one way or the other as to whether the Archbishop may interfere with the
Bishop’s disposition once it is established that there is no temporal interest. The decision
seems only to say that there was no objection at the present stage to asking the
Archbishop to review the Bishop’s order for any flaws in the application of the
ecclesiastical law or in the finding of facts. An archiepiscopal order reversing a
definitive episcopal decision about the use of a pew—temporal interest having been ruled
out—could conceivably be an ecclesiastical error, but it would be a very feeble candidate
for Prohibition. The holding in Goruen says that an attempt to get the Archbishop to
reverse a tentative order intended to invite common law litigation is at least an equally
feeble candidate, whether or not the Archbishop ought to entertain such an application.
We now leave Coke’s Common Pleas for later cases in the same court, which
continued to handle many more Prohibitions on 23 Hen. VIII than the King’s Bench.
Jones v. Jones (1618) 45 is an elaborately argued case on the exact meaning of the
statute’s exception for suits removed to a higher court at the request of a lower. The suit
in this case, concerning tithes, was transmitted from the diocese of Llandaff to Sir Daniel
Dunn, Chancellor of the Arches. There is an unclarity in the reports as to who requested
the transmission, an Archdeacon, with jurisdiction subordinate to the Bishop’s, or the
Bishop’s Commissary. In the MS. report, Chief Justice Hobart speaks to both issues—
whether an Archdeacon may transmit a first-instance case to the Archbishop, by-passing
the Bishop, and whether a Bishop’s Commissary, as opposed to the Bishop in person,
may transmit. It is likely that both things happened, in a sense: I.e., the suit was brought
in an Archdeacon’s court, but the request, instead of simply by-passing the diocesan
level, was forwarded over the Commissary’s name. The initiative may have come from
the Archdeacon, but the Commissary was willing to comply. There was no merely formal
objection to the request. It was by letter, and reasons were recited—viz. that no civilians
were available in the locality to argue the case, and the requester, whoever should be
counted as such, did not understand its issues.
Prohibition was granted, but the court permitted the case to be argued at length
subsequently. First, in keeping with the statute’s incorporation of ecclesiastical law in
the section on removal, civilians were heard. On two occasions, Dr. Talbot, Dr. Duck,
and another appeared. Typically, they stated an extreme case, claiming that there were no
limits in ecclesiastical law on an inferior judge’s power to request removal, instead of
maintaining only that the request in this case was by a competent person and for good
cause. The sincerity of their position—and so far as I know its correctness in
ecclesiastical law—appears from the fact that Duck, who seems to have been retained to
argue for plaintiff-in-Prohibition against Talbot, in some sense conceded this point.
(What he said for his client is not reported. He may have argued that the request must
45
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come from the Bishop himself, conceding only that no reasons need be given.) It is
possible that in the end the civilians did not insist on an absolute carte blanche to request
removal, since Hobart says later in the report that they had recited twenty-one good
causes for removal. It seems surprising that the reasons alleged in this case were not,
according to Hobart, among the twenty-one, since the absence of learned counsel and a
learned judge in a remote Welsh diocese seems on its face a reasonable ground. If the
civilians listed twenty-one separate grounds, their contention may have been the one we
encountered above—that grounds were so numerous that none need be rehearsed, and so
none that are rehearsed can be called insufficient.
After the civilians, Serjeant Bawtrie spoke in favor of Prohibition, making three
arguments: (a) The letter in this case was addressed to Dunn specifically. Dunn was now
dead. Therefore there was not a sufficient request to the Arches, or a request which other
officers of that court, or Dunn’s successor, could act on. (b) The Bishop is required by the
words of the statute to make removal requests himself. Besides the immediate words,
which taken literally seem to say this, Bawtrie argued from the language directly
following: The act says that the inferior judge (not the inferior judge or his deputy) may
make request to have the suit examined by the Archbishop “or his substitute.” The
omission of “or his substitute/deputy” in the first clause cannot be taken as an accident or
elision of an understood term when the next clause is careful to include “or his
substitute.” (c) Complete freedom on the Bishop’s part to transmit suits, as maintained
by the civilians, would undermine the statute. (Nothing said about the ecclesiastical
sufficiency or intrinsic reasonableness of the causes shown in the instant case.)
Hobart spoke first from the Bench, holding that the request was made by a
competent person, because the Bishop’s Chancellor or Commissary holds his office by
commission, and the act allows transmittal by an inferior judge “in his own right…or by
commission.” Justice Winch disagreed, holding that a special commission would be valid
to this intent, but not a general one. I.e., I take it, one deputized to handle a particular case
may request its removal, and presumably a commission to do the specific act of
requesting removal of a suit would be good, but a deputy with general authority to
perform judicial acts in the Bishop’s stead may not request removal. It would be
unreasonable, Winch thought, if Commissaries—the agents who did most of the Bishop’s
judicial work in every diocese—could give away their principals’ jurisdiction at will.
(Surely a good point. One hardly makes a general agent to exercise one’s jurisdiction
with the intent that he may remit its exercise and enjoy an easy life.) Hobart replied with
reinforcement of his position: The Bishop and his Chancellor/Commissary are a single
office. The Chancellor may act generally in the Bishop’s name and may only so act—i.e.,
has no competence to act in his own name. The statute speaks of the Bishop or other
officer and must by the “or other” mean the Chancellor. (On the last point, it should be
observed that the removal clause itself does not speak of “other officer.” Hobart probably
meant that the expression is used elsewhere in the statute, implying that the makers
assumed, and in some places showed they assumed, the commonplace fact that most
episcopal jurisdiction was exercised through deputies.)
Hobart also held that an Archdeacon may not transmit a suit directly to the
Archbishop, but he speaks in such a way as to confirm my supposition that the immediate
issue was a Chancellor’s request. (The power of an Archdeacon to by-pass the Bishop is
not irrelevant, because if the Chancellor’s competence to make request is denied, as by
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Winch, it might still be argued that the transmission in the instant case was lawful since it
really came from the Archdeacon and was only forwarded by the Chancellor—or
forwarded with a notation of “No objection”, which, though an understandable
precaution, would be superfluous if the Archdeacon was a competent requester. Hobart
cut off this possibility, however.)
Finally, Hobart made a couple of remarks on the sufficiency of the reasons for
removal. Those I shall subsume under his lengthier opinion on that point. For after the
exchange between Hobart and Winch the case was adjourned. When it was moved again,
later in the same term, the court (except for Winch, who was absent but would
presumably have gone along) upheld the Prohibition, Hobart delivering a careful
construction of the statute. The decision should be taken as holding that the reasons for
removal alleged in this case were insufficient and as repudiating the civilian theory that
any reasons or none would do. The Chancellor’s competence to make request therefore
becomes a moot point. In any event, no judge spoke to that except Hobart and Winch,
who differed.
In his own report of the case, Hobart may have elaborated what he said in open
court, but the MS. suggests too that his speech at the final hearing was based on a close
study of the statute. It is a curious feature of both reports that Hobart never says why the
reasons for removal in the instant case were invalid, except that they were not on the list
of twenty-one reasons recited by the civilians. The only more positive theory I can
construct is that an ecclesiastical court’s disclaimer of intellectual adequacy, in itself and
its counsel, is too easy for a court that wants to be “off the hook” to make, too hard to
challenge as a statement of fact, and in itself a scandal to the King’s ecclesiastical justice.
What Hobart does is to argue carefully that the statute must in general have a
restrictive intent—that it aims at cutting down ecclesiastical litigation outside the
defendant’s home diocese, by removal on request or otherwise, and does not intend to
open a loophole in the request clause. It may have seemed evident enough to him that an
essentially restrictive act could not mean to tolerate removal by “disclaimer of intellectual
adequacy.”
Towards making out a generally restrictive intent, Hobart put the subject’s ease
back in the place of honor as the statute’s main end, relative to the preservation of
diocesan jurisdiction. He supported this ranking of purposes by pointing out that the
subject—not the Ordinary bereft of jurisdiction—is given a penalty action. (He is given
double damages and would no doubt be the usual beneficiary of suits for the set penalty,
but the latter was open to the public and could be brought by the offended ecclesiastical
judge as a stranger-informer. It would be a nice point on estoppel whether a judge who
requested removal could sue as an informer and argue that his request was invalid!)
Emphasizing the subject’s predominant interest is especially useful in connection with
the removal clause. If primacy were given to the Ordinary’s interest, it would be pointless
to restrict the grounds of removal or the form of request, except for the bare purpose of
making sure that a deliberate or “considerate” request was transmitted. There is no
compelling reason why inferior ecclesiastical judges should not be free to throw away
their statutory rights; throwing away the subject’s rights is something else.
In further reinforcement of the same emphasis, Hobart said that the statute greatly
contracted Archbishops’ power to take cases from inferior jurisdictions without their
consent compared to what canon law permitted. In other words, Parliament, thinking
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primarily of the subject, set out to make things more convenient for him than they would
have been if canon law had been allowed to take its course. If this was admittedly done in
one respect—for non-consensual intervention by Archbishops—why should one not
suppose it was done in another—to restrict removal by consent to a greater degree than it
had been restricted before? (In the MS. report, Hobart says that there were twenty-one
sufficient reasons in canon law and ten at most under the statute. How he got to the
figure, and how he thought the statute might be a guide to which ten, does not appear.)
Next, Hobart argued from the form of the removal exemption itself: That clause
begins by making a general exception for suits removed by request and then adds a
qualification—only in so far as such removal is lawful or tolerable by ecclesiastical law.
The qualification would be a “vain correction” if it took nothing away from what the
general language gives. This argument goes to say that the extreme civilian position is
incompatible with the statute. The more moderate position—that there are twenty-one
good reasons in canon law—is compatible enough. (The weakness in Hobart’s position
is that he has no basis for saying that any finite list of valid grounds for removal certified
as ecclesiastical law is ruled out by a “restrictive” intent, at least if the grounds are all
coherent and rational enough to be believable.) Perhaps it is arguable that the statutemakers would not have added the qualifying language if what they deemed to be the
canon law really authorized removal of a large number of cases, even so large as twentyone. Hobart said further that the statute must have been made with the knowledge and
advice of canonists and therefore “cannot be supposed to be ignorantly penned.” I.e., the
statute-makers did not say “suits may be removed by request in so far as it is lawful by
ecclesiastical standards” on the mistaken belief—necessarily mistaken if their putting in
the qualification made any sense—that those standards placed no, or very few, or only the
most narrowly formal, restrictions on removal. Meaningful restrictions must exist. The
present business, as it were—and one might say the assignment for civilians invited to
argue in cases such as this—is to specify a plausible, and plausibly narrow, list.
One further argument (MS. report only) is that the extreme civilian position
violated a maxim of civil law itself, viz. “forum debet sequi personam”. I.e : If it were
true that any suit may be removed on request, the rational relationship between “forum”
and “person” which the maxim endorses would not obtain. One such relationship—by
implication the most obvious and important one—has reference to where the “person”
lives, where he can appear with minimum inconvenience and can answer to those with
direct spiritual supervision over him. (The same maxim was used to argue that the statute
excepts cases in which a man commits a spiritual offense outside his home diocese. In
that event, there is another “rational relationship”, and it is to be preferred—the
“forum’s” responsibility for enforcement of ecclesiastical law when the “person” comes
into its ambit and violates the law.
A final note in Hobart’s own report confirms that the existence of a penalty is no
bar to Prohibition. There is no sign that this was controverted in Jones. The addition is
probably Hobart’s afterthought. (His report, in contrast to the narrative MS., consists
largely of the writer’s observations on the case and omits the decision.) Hobart posits his
view of the penalty’s effect on the form of the statute: Prohibition may be used because
there is prohibitory language independent of the penalty clause; if the statute merely said
“if anyone cites another out of his diocese, he shall forfeit £10”, Prohibition would not
lie.
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Gastlande’s Case, from the same term as Jones v. Jones,46 holds that Prohibitions
on 23 Hen. VIII should not be granted after sentence. The substance is not reported. An
opinion by Hobart, dated the same term,47 makes the same point in general language; it
may well relate to the same case.
Westborowe v. Packman, later in 1618,48 only exemplifies another Prohibition
based on the statute, probably implementing the principle that Prerogative probate does
not carry with it jurisdiction over ensuing legacy suits. (An executor resident in
Colchester was sued in the Arches for a small legacy of 40/. The court gave a day to
show cause against prohibition, rather than granting a writ at once. Whether or not this
was standard practice in the Common Pleas at the time of the case, it probably makes
especially good sense when violation of 23 Hen. VIII was complained of, owing to the
likelihood of factually incontrovertible defenses, such as removal-request or sentence.
Properly, of course, defenses requiring assertions of fact should be pleaded. It was
sometimes convenient to let them be raised by motion for Consultation, and an even
shorter route is simply to delay grant of a writ until the court sees what defendant-inProhibition has to say for himself. If what he has to say is matter of fact, but fact that
probably cannot be disputed save for its legal effect, evading procedural steps beyond the
initial application for Prohibition is eminently sane. A propos of sentence, it is of course
true that putting off Prohibition gives the ecclesiastical court time to rush to judgment, at
any rate if plaintiff-in-Prohibition has appeared there and attempted a defense, and then,
foreseeing failure, invoked the statute. Excommunication for non-appearance, rather than
default judgment, would, I think, be the normal ecclesiastical sanction if the wrongfully
cited party did not show up. It would probably be invalid excommunication for common
law purposes, and would perhaps be reversible by Prohibition. Even so, presumably not
every inhabitant of Colchester would be tough enough to be indifferent to
excommunication in a foreign diocese, and archiepiscopal excommunication could be a
greater nuisance. The most prudent thing to do, if one were cited contrary to 23 Hen.
VIII, would be to seek a Prohibition at once, but it is not the cheapest thing or in all
circumstances the most convenient—as it were, one might as well take now the short trip
to London one was planning anyway, appear in the Arches, and hope that the matter can
be cleared up to one’s satisfaction there. That is not wholly unbenign. It would be just as
well for the executor to pay the small legacy or else convince the Arches it should not be
paid now—defenses such as “No assets” or release would normally be listened to by
ecclesiastical courts, and if they were not Prohibition could be obtained on the
substance.)
Kinge v. Merrial and Anstre (?) (1619) 49 adds a new point to the statutory gloss:
Held per curiam that if a man expressly consents to be sued in the Arches when he lives
in another diocese, he will be bound by his consent and may not have a Prohibition.
”Volenti non fit iniuria”, said Justice Warburton. Chief Justice Hobart stated an important
caveat: Merely appearing and pleading in an improper ecclesiastical court will not estop
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one from having a Prohibition; the consent implied in such conduct does not count;
consent must be express.
Dr. James’s Case (1621) 50 represents another attempt to assert the wide claims
for the Archbishop that had been repudiated in Lewis and Rochester. The attempt failed.
Some details of the case are singular, but nothing basically new was claimed or held. Dr.
James was judge of the Archbishop’s Court of Audience. He was accustomed to hold
court sometimes in Southwark, within the diocese of Winchester. He cited people there
from remote places in Winchester, and if they did not appear he allegedly
excommunicated them and would not absolve them until they consented to transmit their
cases to the Archbishop’s court. Thereby 23 Hen. VIII was “utterly illuded.” Surmising
these facts, Serjeant More sought a Prohibition on behalf of the parties so cited and also,
expressly, on behalf of the Bishop of Winchester.
It was answered on behalf of the Archbishop that no such “art” of transmitting
suits had been used. The “art” or trick being denied, the Archbishop went on to claim that
he was entitled to sit in any diocese for the purpose of hearing cases arising there. That is
to say—as was said—that he had concurrent jurisdiction with the Bishop by prerogative,
subject to the expressly conceded limit that he could not cite people to appear outside the
physical bounds of their home diocese. For the court held in Southwark, established
usage, though not prescription by common law standards, was alleged to back up the
Archbishop’s de jure claim—the court had so operated for more than forty years. (This
argument is consistent with admitting that a mere ruse to coerce ostensible consent is
unlawful, though the ruse was denied as to fact in the instant case.)
The court’s answer to the Archbishop’s contention is reported by Hobart. We are
not told that a Prohibition was granted, but the answer leaves no doubt but that the court
was prepared to issue one. The judges said first that transmission of cases in the manner
alleged directly violated 23 Hen. VIII: If suits were being captured for the Archbishop by
sharp practice, unfairly exacted consent would bar no one from Prohibition. (Cf. the
insistence on express consent in Kinge above.) But the court held that the Archbishop
lacked the right claimed even if no sharp practice was being used. The judges addressed
the Archbishop’s contention that no harm occurred to the subject from the claimed
archepiscopal prerogative, because no one was compelled to appear outside his physical
diocese. They made the point, which we have encountered before, that in so far as the
Archbishop takes diocesan cases the subject loses an appeal. A somewhat confused
sentence seems to make the point that the Bishop of Winchester himself could not
summon people from every place in the diocese (presumably owing to its division into
archdeaconries with customary, if not de jure, exclusive right to first-instance jurisdiction
in their localities.) The Archbishop would deprive inhabitants of this advantage if he had
the authority he claimed. The court went on to enunciate the general doctrine that “the
King is the indifferent arbitrator in all jurisdictions, as well spiritual as temporal, and that
it is a right of the Crown to distribute them, that is, to declare their bounds.” This is a
grandiose way of saying that the common law courts have authority to enforce intraecclesiastical lines of jurisdiction. Possibly the counter-generalization was urged in this
case. It is apposite enough when the statute is not involved, but of dubious relevance
when it is—at most a ground for resolving real doubts about the statute’s detailed
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meaning in favor of non-interference with Church courts. Finally, the judges repeated the
explanation given in Lewis and Rochester and elsewhere of the appearances that gave
some color to the archepiscopal claim to concurrent jurisdiction: such jurisdiction was
once exercised by virtue of legatine authority, now “abrogated with the Pope.”
Puckford v. Jessopp, not dated but clearly from Hobart’s Common Pleas, 51
produced one new holding and confirmation of another point. It was held that if a
bishopric becomes void, so that the diocesan jurisdiction devolves on the Archbishop, the
Archbishop must hold court for diocesan cases within the vacant diocese; citation outside
the diocese violates 23 Hen. VIII as much as if the bishopric were occupied. In the
instant case, however, Prohibition was sought after sentence and therefore denied, in
accord with other decisions.
We now turn to Common Pleas cases from Charles I’s reign. The earliest report 52
is only a statement by Chief Justice Richardson that one who “submits” to a suit in the
wrong diocese may not have a Prohibition on 23 Hen. VIII. If “submit” means
“expressly and voluntarily consents”, this confirms Kinge and Dr. James.
A second case53 has novel features. An executor, being sued for a legacy in the
Prerogative Court, surmised that he lived in the precinct of the Tower, which he claimed
was a peculiar. Counsel opposing Prohibition (Henden) maintained that legacy suits
pursuant to wills proved in the archdiocesan courts were within the statute’s saving of the
probate prerogative. The contention goes against firm earlier opinion. Henden argued,
however, that legacies could not be recovered in courts other than the one where the will
was proved, because diocesan tribunals would not meddle with legacies arising from
wills proved in the Prerogative Court. Secondly, Henden claimed that the Tower was not
a proper ecclesiastical peculiar such as 23 Hen. VIII protected. It was rather a
“particular” jurisdiction—meaning the equivalent of a secular franchise where the lord of
the manor happens to have the privilege of proving wills in lieu of the Church authorities.
By Henden’s theory, a peculiar within the statute must be in effect a diocese cut out from
a diocese, where an ecclesiastical judge exercises the full equivalent of the Ordinary’s
jurisdiction. And even apart from the law, Henden said, spiritual jurisdiction was not at
present being exercised in the place; the Archbishop was not displacing an active lower
court. (Might the jurisdiction of the inoperative Tower court not, however, devolve on the
Bishop, whom the Archbishop would be displacing? There is no sign that this was argued
against Henden.)
Davenport, counsel on the other side, took exception to Henden’s last point. He
admitted that ecclesiastical jurisdiction was not being exercised in the Tower at the
moment, but represented this as a temporary and legally insignificant phenomenon: The
person entitled to exercise it (one report calls him the “lord”, the other the
“Commissary”) had recently died and was unreplaced. Also, per Davenport, true
ecclesiastical jurisdiction was normally exercised there, so that the precinct was a
peculiar within the statute. Finally, it may have been argued (the report is unclear at one
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point) that the statute made no distinction between proper peculiar jurisdiction and such
ecclesiastical functions as a lay franchise holder might be entitled to perform.
No decision is reported, but three judges are heard from. Justice Hutton recited
the familiar rules for when the Archbishop has probate prerogative, then said it “stands to
reason” that legacy suits founded on wills proved in the Prerogative Court should be
brought in that court. Offhand, at least, Hutton was inclined to agree with Henden,
rejecting earlier authority if he was aware of it. Justice Harvey said that if a will was
lawfully proved in the Prerogative Court an inferior court would compel the party to
prove it over again. I suppose that cuts in favor of the Prerogative Court’s jurisdiction in
the legacy case and comes to qualified agreement with Henden’s statement that without it
legacies would go unrecovered: Per Harvey, that is too drastic, but it is true that diocesan
courts make it awkward to recover legacies bequeathed in Prerogative-proved wills by
insisting that the will be proved again. (Such refusal of faith and credit to the perfectly
lawful acts of archdiocesan courts seems quite incredible. It is more so than Henden’s
claim that diocesan courts were reluctant to “meddle” with Prerogative-proved wills, a
practice which would presumably express the mistaken belief that doing so would
infringe the Archbishop’s jurisdiction, or at least be taken by him to do so. Remember he
was not only a superior entitled to respect, but the appellate court as well. Indeed, the
belief may not be mistaken as ecclesiastical law. Should the diocesan judge “meddle”
where the law he is beholden to says he should not, just because he knows—if he
knows—that the common law judges think he should, and might frustrate recovery of the
legacy altogether by prohibiting the Archbishop? Such are the conundrums of a mixed
legal system!) To Harvey, Hutton and Justice Croke replied only “Minus juste”. I.e., they
deplored the practice, but did not deny it. There is no judicial comment on other points in
the case.
Smith v. Executors of Poyndreill 54 comes in the upshot only to another decision
to deny Prohibition on 23 Hen. VIII because sentence had already been given (and in this
case affirmed on appeal.) Prohibition was not literally denied, however, but reversed by
Consultation on motion. A writ was originally granted to stop a legacy suit in the
Prerogative Court where the will had been proved there and the executor lived in another
diocese. This grant represents the position established in Coke’s time, notwithstanding
Hutton’s and probably Harvey’s flirtation with the contrary in the case above. (The two
cases come from the same term. There is no telling which was discussed earlier.) There
is, however, a slight sign of wavering in Smith: Among the reasons given for allowing
Consultation on motion—besides the sentence and long delay in seeking Prohibition—is
the fact that the will had been proved in the Prerogative Court. The judges seem to have
thought that letting the Prerogative Court’s affirmed sentence stand, though reasonable in
itself, was the more reasonable because that court’s improper exercise of jurisdiction at
least had a certain color or excusability. It is almost as if they rather wished the
precedents did not require enforcing 23 Hen. VIII quoad legacy suits on Prerogativeproved wills (though nothing is said about being bound by precedents.)
In the Case of Luckin’s Wife (1629) 55, a suit for marital abuse and alimony
brought in the Bishop of London’s court was prohibited because defendant lived in a
54
55

M 3 Car.. C.P. Croke Car., 97.
T. 5 Car. C.P. Littleton, 277.
132

peculiar in Essex, within the territorial bounds of London diocese. There is not room for
serious doubt that the statute protects proper peculiars and their inhabitants against the
most obvious threat—the courts of the diocese where the peculiar is located. The
Common Pleas seems to show some hesitation in this case before granting Prohibition,
but that is probably owing to the special character of the peculiar. It originally belonged
to a monastery, came to the King by the dissolution, was granted over, and now belonged
to the Earl of Warwick. Serjeant Brampston, arguing for Prohibition, was careful to point
out that the Earl maintained a bona fide ecclesiastical court, not a “shelter” for people
seeking to evade ecclesiastical justice: He had an Ordinary (judge exercising all the
judicial functions of a Bishop) and other officers. Brampston also argued that the
circumstances of the peculiar cut in favor of respecting its jurisdiction, because it rested
on a Parliamentary title (the Statute of Monasteries.) The thought there is probably just
that the place’s title to be counted as a peculiar was clear, not that peculiars held by the
successors of the monasteries enjoyed any special protection under the statute. There are
not many reported cases in which inhabitants of peculiars sought Prohibitions based on
23 Hen. VIII. If there were a lot, there would almost certainly be disputes about whether
the alleged peculiar really was one. Prescriptions and medieval grants of privilege would
come in question. I am not sure that a peculiar that passed through the King’s hands at
the dissolution would be absolutely immune to such disputes (going to whether the
monastery really had the jurisdiction which the King thought he took over.) But at the
least a peculiar granted in terms by the King on the assumption at the monastery held it
would be hard to break.
Otherwise, Brampston cited two precedents only going to show that Prohibitions
on 23 Hen. VIII had been used to protect peculiars. Justice Hutton tried to distinguish one
of them, assigned to 42 Eliz., from the present case. The reason for the Elizabethan
Prohibition, Hutton said, was to preserve the party’s appeal from peculiar to Bishop.
Here, on the other hand, because the peculiar was lay fee—i.e., an ecclesiastical
jurisdiction laicized by the dissolution, analogous to an impropriation—no appeal would
lie to the Bishop, but only to the King “as Ordinary” (in his ecclesiastical capacity.)
Therefore refusing Prohibition would not deprive the party of one appeal. There is no
sign, however, that this nicety led Hutton to dissent from the decision to prohibit, which
the words of the statute surely support. It seems obvious enough that preservation of
appeals is only one purpose of the statute. Brampston’s other citation is Jones v. Jones,
which from date and description must be the major case so-called discussed above. From
the direct reports of Jones it does not appear to have involved a peculiar, but transmittal
from Archdeacon to Archbishop on the recommendation of the Bishop’s Chancellor. The
direct reports are not very clear on the facts, however, and it is possible that the case was
appropriate for Brampston’s bare purpose—a precedent of Prohibition on the statute with
the effect of protecting a peculiar. The notable point is that he hardly had a flood of
precedents;, though that did not, as it should not, stand in the way of Prohibition. Chief
Justice Richardson made a remark which signifies nothing except that ecclesiastical
peculiars were a subject he had given little thought to before. (He suggests that they
originated by some sort of arrangement among the Ordinaries and mentions one he
happened to know about—probably mere rumination.)
We turn now to King’s Bench cases on 23 Hen. VIII. Save for one mentioned
above because it antedates Lewis and Rochester, the earliest is Foster v. Blackburne
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(1611). 56 Plaintiff-in-Prohibition was cited out of the peculiar of the Arches—to what
court we are not told—and sought a Prohibition on 23 Hen. VIII. The brief report
contains opposed opinions from Justices Williams and Yelverton, the information that
Prohibition was granted, an indication of why it was granted, and a skeptical observation
about Prohibitions on 23 Hen. VIII notwithstanding the grant of one in the instant case.
Since only the two judges are mentioned, my guess would be that they were alone in
court and that Williams, who was against Prohibition, gave way to Yelverton, who was at
least inclined to favor one, with the thought that the whole court should resolve the issue
and could most conveniently do so on motion for Consultation, if the prohibited party
chose to press his case. It is not impossible, however, that other judges were present and
that Prohibition was granted by a majority over Williams’ dissent.
In any event, Justice Williams opposed Prohibition because “the statute inflicts
punishment on the offender”—i.e., appoints a penalty. Justice Yelverton replied “there
are many precedents in the Common Pleas for this.” The report then says that Prohibition
was granted and suggests, by a mere “wherefore”, that this was done because of what
Yelverton had said about the Common Pleas practice. I.e., either the two judges agreed
that a tentative Prohibition to draw full discussion was desirable because whether
divergence between the principal courts should be suffered was a serious question or (if
the decision was definitive) because the court thought it best to acquiesce in the position
of the Common Pleas, which had more experience with the jurisprudence of 23 Hen.
VIII. The report then concludes with the remark “…but the surest way is to take the
remedy of the statute.” There is no telling whether the explanation of the grant of
Prohibition and the final observation reflect what anyone on the Bench said, or only the
reporter’s impression of what the judges were thinking (or, with respect to the final
observation, the reporter’s own opinion that even if Prohibitions on 23 Hen. VIII had to
be accepted for the sake of inter-court harmony they were not a very good idea, and that
clients should usually be advised to sue for the penalty. This could of course also be what
the judges, including Yelverton, thought and may have indicated.)
Despite the skimpiness of the evidence, Foster is a significant case. It is as
explicit an instance as we have—though there are others less explicit—of one principal
court’s feeling constrained to follow the other, or at any rate worrying about whether it
ought to feel constrained, notwithstanding misgivimgs. It is most unlikely that the other
King’s Bench judges were unaware of the Common Pleas practice until Yelverton
pointed it out. Williams had practiced in the Common Pleas as a Serjeant for about a
decade before he was elevated to the Bench. It is thus likely that at least he was simply
convinced by the respectable theory that the penalty in the statute barred Prohibition and
disposed to doubt—again with greater explicitness than cases usually reflect—that one
court owes anything to the precedents of the other if they seem mistaken. Indeed, one is
tempted to speculate that resisting Coke’s influence—and overlooking the Cokean
“leading case”, Lewis and Rochester—could have had its positive attraction to some
King’s Bench judges. The suggestion, whoever made it, that suing for the penalty was in
any event the “surest way” to take advantage of 23 Hen. VIII makes good sense as advice
to lawyers advising clients. Recovering the penalty would probably as a rule cover the
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costs of being sued outside one’s home diocese or peculiar. Why not seek the
compensation even if Prohibition were available?
The next King’s Bench case, Pit v. Welby (1613) 57, echoes Foster in the sense
that doubt is again expressed as to whether Prohibition will ever lie to enforce 23 Hen.
VIII. The case is complicated by the circumstance that it involves an attempt to prohibit
the Court of High Commission, as well as by the unusual character of the proceedings
against plaintiff-in-Prohibition. For these aspects, see the End Note following this
chapter, which deals with the special problem whether the High Commission specifically
could be prohibited on the basis of 23 Hen. VIII.
The facts of Pit are not entirely clear as reported, but they seem to have been as
follows: A man was arrested by an official identified as “the serjeant of the mace” when
he was leaving church after a sermon. The arrestee sued the officer in the High
Commission on the ground that such an arrest was unlawful by virtue of a medieval
statute (See the End Note for the details of this claim.) The High Commission held that
the arrest (for what does not appear) was in itself justified, but that the officer had still
violated the statute by making it when the party was coming from church. Accordingly,
the Commission awarded the arrestee £6 as what are called “costs” (though they sound
more like damages, actual or punitive) “for the contempt” (i.e., I take it, violation of the
statute.) The officer sought a Prohibition to halt exaction of the £6, relying on 23 Hen.
VIII. The only particular reported is that he was cited out of an unspecified peculiar. It
does not seem to be disputed in general that an arrest made in church, or of someone
going to or coming from church, was an ecclesiastical offense, though questions were
raised in this case about the precise circumstances of the arrest. (See End Note.)
Bulstrode’s report starts with some skirmishing over the substance of the case (the
legality of the arrest.) That discussion was cut off when the judges noticed, or someone
pointed out to them, that Prohibition was sought on 23 Hen. VIII, not on the substance.
The judges then asked whether Prohibitions had been granted on that statute. A clerk of
the court—the “Secondary”, whose name was Man—replied that he had never known of
any. The question and the answer are appropriate and unsurprising so long as the frame of
reference is King’s Bench practice alone. (Foster is an exiguous counter-example that
could easily have been forgotten, and the sole Elizabethan case touching 23 Hen VIII
probably would have been, even if it were stronger than left-handed recognition that
Prohibition on the statute might sometimes be possible.) There is no sign in Pit of any
consideration of Common Pleas precedents and what the King’s Bench should do about
them. There hardly could have been, since plaintiff-in-Prohibition’s lawyer (Henry
Yelverton, son of Justice Sir Christopher Yelverton and later a judge himself)
immediately said that his side would not rely on 23 Hen. VIII, but on the merits of the
claim against the arresting officer. Later, counsel formally dropped the surmise invoking
23 Hen. VIII and framed a new one going to the merits. It seems probable that the
original surmise was hastily drawn, perhaps by an attorney; when the case became the
responsibility of a competent barrister, he very reasonably concluded that there was no
point in plunging the court into the interpretation of 23 Hen. VIII and the problem of
concord with the Common Pleas. The calculation was correct, for Yelverton eventually
got his Prohibition on his version of the substance. (See End Note.)
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In a case of 1615 58, the King’s Bench refused to prohibit when a man was cited out
of a peculiar to the court of the Archbishop of York. The reason given is that the peculiar
was in the diocese of York, so that the Archbishop was acting by force of his episcopal,
rather than his metropolitan, power. I do not see how this holding can be squared with
the words of the statute (“…no person shall be…cited…before any Ordinary…or any
other Judge spiritual out of the diocese or peculiar jurisdiction where [he lives]”) It may
be reasonable construction by intent against the words to lean on the preamble and say
that the purpose of the statute is to protect dioceses and peculiars against archdiocesan
tribunals, but not peculiars against the diocese. We have seen that there were few
Common Pleas Prohibitions based on citation out of a peculiar to the Bishop’s court—no
flood of precedents across the street. I cannot see, however, why anyone would want to
escape the “plain words” on this matter, except someone generally hostile to Prohibitions
on the statute. (As it were: “Why don’t these people bring penalty suits? If their
grievances are righteous they could put more good money in their pockets than they are
likely to have lost. Most of all, I am not disposed to spend my time on Prohibition cases
to the end of protecting petty and sometimes questionable ecclesiastical jurisdictions, the
inhabitants of which have not even been forced to venture beyond their own diocese.
Archepiscopal encroachment on the whole structure of local justice might be a problem
worth the courts’ attention.”) This may be close to the attitude of the King’s Bench
judges, except for one of them—Coke, now Chief Justice of that court. He is significantly
reported absent when this decision was made and is unlikely to have agreed with it,
though it does not contradict head-on anything in his Common Pleas record.
Coke did take part in Moore v. Cockein and Saunderson early in 161659.
Prohibition was denied in this case, but there is no conflict with Coke’s Common Pleas
opinions. The ecclesiastical suit was in the Arches against two co-executors. One of
them lived in the peculiar of the Arches and the other did not. Coke and the court held
that the suit was not proper to the Arches as a peculiar. I.e.: If one co-executor lives in X
and the other in Y, neither X nor Y has jurisdiction, or power under the statute to cite the
stranger. For that very reason, however, the suit was within the Archbishop’s
prerogative—not the probate prerogative expressly saved by 23 Hen.VIII, but the like
case—and outside the statute. Citation into the Arches, so far as the statute is concerned,
was as good as citation to any other archdiocesan court. (I do not think there is any
conflict between this and vague doubts in Lewis and Rochester about the Arches’
legitimacy as anything but a peculiar. So long as the Archbishop had jurisdiction and was
in conformity with the statute, it would be foolish to worry about where he sat—or,
realistically, about how he distributed his archiepiscopal jurisdiction among his various
deputies. Only when he tried to use the Arches’ location in London as an excuse for
usurping jurisdiction was there reason for concern about exactly what that court was. The
executor in Moore who did not live in the peculiar lived in London, so the Arches was the
most convenient archepiscopal court for him.)
Incidental features of Moore confirm that Prohibitions on 23 Hen. VIII were rare
in the King’s Bench and apt to meet fundamental opposition. Prohibition was originally
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granted in this case, to be reversed on motion for Consultation later. The original step
was apparently taken on Coke’s urging, over the objection that the statute provided a
penalty. Coke said that the matter was resolved in the Common Pleas—meaning,
presumably, the general enforceability of the statute by Prohibition—, for which he cited
a Carlisle’s Case (not independently reported, though it could possibly be an earlier stage
of Bishop of Carlisle, just below.) The original grant of Prohibition is explained by the
fact that the residence of both executors was not at that point before the court. I.e., the
executor who lived in London diocese complained of being cited into the Arches and was
clearly entitled to a Prohibition if the King’s Bench was willing to follow Lewis and
Rochester. Coke apparently persuaded it to. The existence of a second executor not coresident with the first came out when Consultation was moved for. Remarks by the
puisne judges on the ultimate issue—the appropriateness of archepiscopal jurisdiction
when co-executors live in different precincts—perhaps give hints of unfamiliarity with
issues concerning the statute, although there is no disagreement on the solution.
The next case, the Bishop of Carlisle’s, 60 came in 1617 or 1618, after Coke’s
dismissal. There is no sign of general objection to Prohibitions on 23 Hen. VIII, although
a writ was denied in the instant case for very sensible reasons. The Bishop held a living
in his own diocese in commendam. He brought a suit for tithes of that benefice in the
Archbishop of York’s court. I.e., the Bishop quite properly sued in his superior’s court
because as party-plaintiff he ought not to sue in his own. Citing the defendant out of his
home diocese was unquestionably lawful under 23 Hen. VIII, for the statute excepts cases
in which the otherwise correct judge is himself a party. The complication, however, was
that the Bishop of Carlisle had died before the litigation was concluded. His executors
revived the tithe suit in the Archbishop’s court, whereupon the defendant there sought a
Prohibition, claiming that the circumstances justifying the archepiscopal suit had ceased
to obtain. The King’s Bench denied Prohibition on the ground that there is no violation of
the statute when a suit has been lawfully commenced in a given jurisdiction and
circumstances change later. Justice Dodderidge spoke learnedly for the court. He
produced common law parallels designed to say in effect that the ecclesiastical system of
permitting a suit to be revived by a litigant’s representatives—i.e., not requiring them to
start a new suit—had temporal analogues. The common law would sometimes do what
the ecclesiastical law sanctioned—deny a party’s abstract rights in order to bring ongoing litigation to a conclusion. Dodderidge also made the practical argument that the
archdiocesan suit might have been fully tried and ripe for judgment when the Bishop
died. If the executors had to start over in the diocesan court, their testator’s expenses for
a virtually complete lawsuit would go down the drain. In sum: While an argument for
Prohibition could be made in Bishop of Carlisle on the narrowest verbal construction of
23 Hen. VIII, the judges were surely right to hold that the statute did not intend to
interfere with the ecclesiastical system for reviving litigation and to cause a waste of time
and money in circumstances like those of this case.
A decision is not reported in Gastrell v. Jones (1623) 61, but the judicial remarks
incline against Prohibition. A writ was sought to stop a tithe suit in the Bishop’s court on
the ground that the suit should have been brought before an Archdeacon with peculiar
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jurisdiction. It is probable, though not explicit in the reports, that defendant resided in the
alleged peculiar, since 23 Hen. VIII was invoked. The alternative would be that the land
where the tithes were produced was within that district. In any event, the Prohibition
case was pleaded to a demurrer. Details of the pleading are not given: indeed, the reports
are generally sketchy. But the judicial remarks suggest that two issues were perceived:
(a) Conceding that what the Archdeacon had should count as a proper peculiar, does the
statute protect his jurisdiction against the Bishop? On the second discussion of the case,
Chief Justice Ley seems to say “No” to this, on the ground I have argued is dubious—that
the statute is directed only against archiepiscopal incursion and forcing people to answer
outside the diocese in which they live. In other words, Ley’s opinion appears to apply to
any peculiar in the Diocese of X as against the Bishop of X. Possibly, however, his point
is narrower—only that it is a contradiction in terms to say that one is an Archdeacon of
the Diocese of X and to claim peculiar jurisdiction at the expense of the Bishop of X. At
least this Ley clearly held, for he said that even if the Archdeacon’s claim to exclude the
Bishop was based on prescription the statute would not protect his jurisdiction. I.e., an
Archdeacon who throughout the period of prescription had been sole first-instance judge
in a given district had no rights against the Bishop as far as the statute was concerned.
The reason is that an Archdeacon by the nature of the office does not have an interest
adverse to the Bishop’s. In the beginning, he was presumptively made Archdeacon by the
Bishop—in effect, made his agent or delegate—and being in that position he cannot
prescribe against the Bishop.
(b) Was it actually made out in this case that the Archdeacon held his position in
such a way that he could have peculiar jurisdiction? He does not seem to have shown a
prescriptive title. Counsel opposing Prohibition said as much at the second discussion,
with the implication, contrary to Ley, that he at least might be within the statute if he had
claimed prescription. (At the first discussion, someone—but who is unclear—said more
positively that he could take away the Bishop’s jurisdiction by prescription, though the
speaker did not think he had set up a prescriptive title.) Rather, it was pleaded that the
Archdeacon held his authority “by commission.” The unidentified speaker at the first
discussion said that it was not shown by what commission he was authorized.
Implication: there might be such a thing as a commission that would give an Archdeacon
jurisdiction on such terms that the Bishop would be excluded from concurrent jurisdiction
in the district. But as it was, per the speaker, a commission of the requisite sort was not
shown. The vaguely pleaded commission might be, as it was put, “by composition”, and
that sort would not exclude the Bishop from concurrency. I cannot say just what these
terms mean. It sounds as if the commission’s origin in some sort of agreement between
the Bishop and the Archdeacon would be fatal to the Archdeacon’s pretensions regardless
of what it said. In any event, Justice Dodderidge accepted this line of reasoning and said
that he would favor Consultation unless plaintiff-in-Prohibition showed better cause
“tomorrow.” Counsel opposing Prohibition at the second discussion stated a somewhat
different theory: The Archdeacon’s court must exist either by the Bishop’s “institution”
or by prescription; since prescription was not shown, the Archdeacon’s court must have
the alternative basis; that being the case, it is “in the Ordinary’s right”, and hence suits
may be taken away by the Ordinary. The implications seem to be: (1) One cannot be
made—“instituted” or “commissioned”—an Archdeacon by anyone except the Bishop,
not even by the King or the Pope. Such higher authorities can perhaps give a peculiar
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jurisdiction in the Diocese of X, but they cannot at the same time make the holder
Archdeacon. The office by its nature is in the Bishop’s appointment. (2) Whatever the
Bishop purports to do, he cannot exclude himself from concurrent jurisdiction in the
Archdeacon’s district. Or rather, contrary to Ley, he cannot do so by any other means
than not interfering in the Archdeacon’s suits for long enough to generate a prescriptive
title in the Archdeacon.
Although the reports of Gastrell are unsatisfactory, the case is of some
importance as the only one on 23 Hen. VIII that relates to archdeaconries, a
commonplace feature of the ecclesiastical judicial structure. Assuming the rest of the
court would have agreed to deny Prohibition, either for Dodderidge’s reason or for Ley’s,
the case is at least discouraging to the proposition that people who would ordinarily
expect to be sued in Archdeacons’ courts could invoke the statute if cited into the
diocesan court. There are too many loose ends, including the difference between the two
judges, for it to be fatal for that proposition in all circumstances, but litigants using the
case for guidance would be well-advised to obey the Bishop’s citation and not bother
with pursuing Prohibitions. A cleaner rule than the case produces—that Archdeacons are
not directly within the statute and cannot bring themselves within the protection accorded
(verbally at any rate) to peculiars—would make sense. When a reason could be found,
the burden of protecting petty jurisdictions and saving the subject only minor
inconvenience is something the common law courts could do without.
In two Caroline King’s Bench cases, 23 Hen. VIII is discussed more thoroughly
than ever before, principally by William Noy as counsel. Like several cases above in this
study, these testify to Noy’s exceptional ability as a lawyer. The first, Arundell and
Wife v. Willis and Wife (1628) 62, does not strictly add to the gloss on the statute,
because no judicial opinions are reported and decision of an issue apart from 23 Hen.
VIII could have determined the case, but some of the most important reflection on the
statute occurs in counsel’s arguments.
The ecclesiastical suit, in an archepiscopal court, was for defamation. Arundell’s
wife, Joyce, allegedly said that Willis had committed adultery and incest. Arundell et ux.
sought a Prohibition, and the case proceeded to formal pleading. Plaintiffs-in-Prohibition
pleaded that Joyce lived in the diocese of Exeter when she was summoned to the
archdiocesan court, so that 23 Hen. VIII was violated. (The declaration did not say that
the words were spoken in Exeter, though nothing to the contrary appears and nothing was
made of this.) For the rest, plaintiffs in Prohibition claimed an applicable pardon.
Defendants-in-Prohibition (Willis and his wife, Susan) pleaded that the Vicar General of
Exeter, under the Bishop’s seal, had requested the archiepiscopal judge Sir Henry Martin
to determine the case. Apparently the only reason given in the request-letter was that the
Willises prayed that they might sue outside the diocese. The plea went on to aver, in
completely general language, that the canon law allowed such a request for removal. For
the rest, the Willises pleaded facts concerning the pardon, intending to make out that it
was not applicable. To this plea the Arundells demurred.
Counsel for the Arundells declined to “trouble the court” with arguments going to
23 Hen. VIII. He took this course because he regarded his demurrer as confessing what
was pleaded—viz. not only the fact that a request for removal in the form described had
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been made, but also that such request was allowable by ecclesiastical law. Accordingly,
counsel devoted himself entirely to arguing that the plea going to the pardon, though
confessing as to fact, failed to make out that the pardon applied. Counsel on the other
side—Noy—did not take the opportunity offered him to omit discussion of 23 Hen.VIII,
but spoke at length about it. The bearing of the case on the statute mostly lies in the
implications of the lawyers’ strategies.
The Arundells’ counsel would appear to have thrown away a good thing. The
removal request had two strikes against it: (a) The Bishop did not make it in person—not
necessarily a flaw, but arguably so in the light of several cases. (b) No real reason for
removal was recited. Did counsel by demurring to the statement that the canon law
allowed “such request or instance” really debar himself from attacking the removal? In a
general formulation: When a plea expresses an erroneous legal conclusion (if the one
expressed here can be regarded as erroneous), does one confess that the conclusion is true
by demurring, as one admits a “fact”? The question is tricky. It would probably not be
hopeless to argue that the removal remained attackable as to legality despite the
demurrer, whether or not the argument would be successful.
What then was the lawyer’s game? I should suppose he thought he had a winning
case, or at least a very promising one, on the matter of the pardon. He may simply have
considered it unnecessary to complicate things with a deep pleading question, may have
doubted his capacity to develop the necessary arguments, may have sincerely preferred to
spare the court. On the other hand, I suspect him of craftiness. He may have hoped to lure
the other side into concentrating entirely on the pardon, figuring he was likely to win on
that, and if he didn’t, to hold the removal and the effect of the demurrer in reserve. After
all, waiving an argument is not the same as demurring. The court would probably be
willing to listen if later on the Arundells—perhaps more gracefully through another
lawyer—went back to objections to the removal and claimed the demurrer was not
concessionary in the crucial respect. Prohibition proceedings were ostensibly in the
public interest—a reason both for hearing a waived argument and for at least trying to
give the demurrer minimum effect. The meaning of an important statute is also of interest
to the public. Even if they were unable to prevent it in the end, the judges could not be
entirely happy with statutory interpretation imposed by demurrer, so to speak. Of course
a case in which that happened would not be a precedent for cases in which the statute’s
meaning was directly at issue, but precedents erode; just why a decision some years ago
was made gets forgotten (as we have not infrequently seen happen in Prohibition law.)
My main reason for suspecting art on the side of the Arundells’ counsel is that the
opposing lawyer acted as if he knew he was being lured away from the hardest issues—
the most important ones from a public point of view—and invited to stake his case on the
pardon. He refused to be lured. Declaring that he wanted to speak about the statute, he
showed why, in his opinion, the demurrer did indeed confess the legality of the removal. I
think he also argued by implication that it was in fact legal, whether the demurrer
confessed it or not, though this is less evident.
The opposing counsel was William Noy. His approach admits of two explanations,
which are not mutually exclusive. He may have seen, as I suggest, that the other side was
trying to maneuver him into saying nothing for the moment about the removal and the
demurrer, intending to come back to those issues only in a pinch. He preferred not to be
maneuvered and thought it good tactics to impress the court right now with what he
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considered strong arguments for the view of the ostensibly waived issues that served his
side. Noy may also have had motives of politics or conviction to use the opportunity the
case gave him—use it to prove that the interpretation of 23 Hen. VIII favored by the
ecclesiastical establishment was correct with respect to at least one section of the act. The
section is vital, for if causes could be removed virtually at will, or upon the mere petition
of a party who preferred to sue a man outside his home diocese, the establishment would
have little more to win. The rule would be that suing in an archdiocesan court—the
significant example—requires only the permission of the diocesan in the individual case.
This limits what the archdiocesan interest would have liked ideally, but not very much in
practice. Permission would probably not be hard to get, especially if the archdiocesan
authorities made their desire to take the suit known or “requested permission.” Good
advice to a litigant who chose an archdiocesan tribunal would be “Go ahead, but be sure
to remind the judge to ask for a letter of permission from the Bishop.” Again, it is
important to remember that the archdiocese was the appellate court and that ecclesiastical
appeals were wide-open—i.e., all determinations below, including fact-finding, were
reviewable. If an appellate court says to the court of first instance, “We want to decide
this case ourselves now and obviate the need to decide it later on appeal”, it takes an
inferior judge stubbornly insistent on his rights and eager for work to say “No”. Operated
in good faith, such a system is not nonsense. Appellate courts could be expected to claim
only hard and high-stakes cases likely to be appealed however decided, or less likely than
“small potatoes” to be expertly handled at the local level. Good faith may be an idealistic
hope for the early 17th century, and even if it obtained the subject would be victimized,
contrary to the manifest intent of 23 Hen. VIII. In a sense, Noy may have aspired to do
competently what several eminent civilians arguing in Prohibition cases had botched. The
judges did not try to prevent him from having his say.
The report of Noy’s argument is not all easy to follow. It would be my guess that
the reporter did not catch every articulation in a rather intricate speech. I am reasonably
confident of the following reconstruction, however:
For the concessionary effect of the demurrer, Noy cited a Year Book case holding
that demurrer to a claim that a living was void by ecclesiastical law confessed that it was
void—i.e., bound the court so to take it. The generalization is that pleaded statements
about ecclesiastical law must be taken as true if the other party demurs. Note that this is a
narrower rule than that “legal conclusions” can be confessed in pleading. The problem in
Noy’s argument is whether the narrow rule is sufficient to the needs of the present case.
It is of course literally true that defendants-in-Prohibition here made a statement “about
ecclesiastical law.” But does the statement not carry an implicit conclusion about the
statute? Applying the language of Chief Justice Hobart in Jones v. Jones, is it not implied
that the removal section has no “restrictive” effect? I.e., if removal for no reason or
virtually any was permissible by ecclesiastical law when the statute was made—and so
remained as a pure matter of ecclesiastical law, in abstraction from the statute—the
statute altered nothing. Indeed, it endorsed removal to the degree ecclesiastical law
permitted. Hobart showed why this reading is implausible, though he was unable to show
what limits the statute put on the removal power, if in fact it was previously so broad as
to defeat the purpose of the act. I think the following point in Noy’s argument is his
answer to this objection.
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After Noy’s argument, the judges held per curiam for defendant-in-Prohibition,
saying only that the plea was good despite the objections to it. The reporter notes in effect
that the decision in this form leaves us in suspense as to what was decided. All that can
be said is that a Prohibition on 23 Hen. VIII failed when it almost certainly should not
have succeeded. When we cut through the elaborate arguments on a fully pleaded case,
we get a removal request from a peculiar to a Bishop, so that the parties were not forced
to go outside their home diocese. We get a removal upwards of a criminal prosecution of
persons too refractory for the peculiar judge to handle—probably a good enough reason if
reasons should be shown. The joint declaration is probably a nearly clinching ground for
Prohibition. The denial of Prohibition is not a setback for the policy of the statute, and
there was no judicial endorsement of Noy’s strong arguments on the pleading level.
Gobbet’s Case,63 the last on 23 Hen. VIII before the Civil War, turned in part, and
in the upshot decisively, on the statute’s removal-by-request provision. The ecclesiastical
suit was for defamation, viz. the words “He is a cuckoldy knave.” Counsel seeking
Prohibition, Bulstrode, started out arguing that the words simply did not constitute
ecclesiastical defamation. In support of this, he relied on the precedent of a Prohibition
granted for the words “He is a knave and a cheating knave.” In the instant case, the
King’s Bench denied Prohibition on this alleged ground because the precedent and this
case were different. The judges were clearly right in making a distinction. To find
ecclesiastical defamation in the precedent-case is close to impossible. If the words were
defamatory at all, they would be actionable at common law by virtue of the aspersion
“cheating.” The only basis for claiming ecclesiastical defamation would have been the
theory that vague scurrilities could be prosecuted in ecclesiastical courts, as uncharitable
or unneighborly, precisely when and because the common law would not touch them.
Most authority, however, held that ecclesiastical defamation required imputation of an
ecclesiastical offense. The court in Gobbet took a decidedly liberal, perhaps questionable,
view of this requirement of a specific “ecclesiastical interest.” After all, the ecclesiastical
plaintiff was not said to have committed an ecclesiastical (sexual) offense, but to have
been the victim of his wife’s unchastity. Nevertheless, in denying Prohibition the court
said “it is a disgrace to the husband as well as to the wife, because he suffers and
connives at it.” This language implies that to be defamed the husband himself must be
charged with some kind of wrongdoing within ecclesiastical cognizance—i.e., he should
not be taken as simply suing on behalf of his wife. Was the word “cuckoldy” construed as
meaning that the husband was cuckolded repeatedly, whence his connivance, or at least
unwillingness to discipline his wife—conduct with the flavor of pimping, which in a few
cases was treated as an ecclesiastical offense—should be inferred? Or did the judges
think the words no more than prima facie defamatory as an imputation of something like
pimping, conviction depending on actual proof of the husband’s complicity in his
cuckoldry? In any event, the court, except for Chief Justice Richadson, who was absent,
denied Prohibition.
Having lost on his first argument, Bulstrode moved for Prohibition on the ground
that his client was being sued in the Arches, contrary to 23 Hen. VIII, because it appeared
63
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by the libel that he spoke the words in London diocese (i.e., not within the peculiar of the
Arches.) Note Bulstrode’s assumption that the jurisdictionally decisive fact was where
the words were spoken, not where the speaker lived, about which nothing is said. Note
also that the appearance of the allegedly decisive fact on the face of the libel is
emphasized (but it seems doubtful that a bare, controvertible surmise of that fact would
be an inadequate basis for Prohibition. Quaere.) The report introduces Bulstrode’s
second motion by a mere “secondly”. It is not clear whether both claims—no actionable
ecclesiastical defamation and violation of 23 Hen. VIII—were in the original surmise, or
whether the surmise was amended after failing on the first claim. Since, however,
Richardson’s absence is not mentioned when the court’s unanimous decision on the
second claim is reported, it seems likely that the discussion of that claim was at any rate
on a later occasion.
The case for Prohibition now resting solely on 23 Hen. VIII, Justice Jones spoke
to say that he was informed by Dr. Duck, the Chancellor of London diocese, that the
Archbishop of Canterbury had the Bishop of London’s standing permission to proceed in
any London suit begun in an archdiocesan court. (The report’s formulation would seem to
preclude removal of a suit already begun in a diocesan court to an archdiocesan one, even
if the diocesan judge requested or consented to the removal.) Instead of a more formal
mode of consulting civilians, Jones was apparently delegated by the court to confer with
Duck, or else he did so on his own initiative. Having reported that Duck told him of a
long-existing “composition” between the Bishop and the Archbishop, Jones concluded
that the Archbishop enjoyed “quasi a general license.” Satisfied of this fact, he seems to
have thought that 23 Henry VIII posed no problem—as far as the statute is concerned, a
general permission based on an agreement is as good as ad hoc permission or request to
take a particular suit. (The legality of such an arrangement by ecclesiastical law appears
to be taken for granted. Duck may of course have assured Jones on this score as well as
on the factual score of the “composition” and practice. Whether he did or not, the report
gives no indication of concern over the possibly relevant distinction between “What have
the ecclesiastical authorities been doing?” and “Is the practice clearly lawful by
ecclesiastical standards?”) Jones adds one supporting consideration, whether speaking for
himself or passing on an argument made by Duck: “for this reason”, the Archbishop
never makes visitation of London diocese. How this cuts is not self-evident. I suppose it
goes to show the two-sidedness and therefore genuineness of the “composition”: The
Bishop gave up as much of his diocesan jurisdiction as the Archbishop chose to assume;
in return, the Archbishop gave up his inherent power to hold visitations of the diocese. I
take it that the power of visitation would cosist primarily in power to proceed on
presentment against offenders normally subject to episcopal jurisdiction. Thus, in
exchange for giving up one mode of invading diocesan territory, the Archbishop gained
another. Quaere tamen.
The other judges agreed with Jones. At least no discussion after his speech is
reported, and Prohibition was denied.
End Note: 23 Hen. VIII and the High Commission
A word needs to be said on the intersection of the law on 23 Hen. VIII and that on
the Court of High Commission. That court and its statutory foundation, 1 Eliz. c. 1 (the
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Elizabethan Supremacy Act), are treated in detail in Ch. 3 of this Volume. The point to be
emphasized while our focus is still on 23 Hen. VIII is twofold: (1) Almost obviously, 23
Hen. VIII did not and could not apply directly to the High Commission. (2) On the other
hand, the existence of 23 Hen. VIII had significant influence on the interpretation of 1
Eliz., a highly problematic subject.
The High Commission was an extraordinary ecclesiastical court of first instance.
As will appear in Ch. 3, there was extensive judicial debate over whether the Commission
could proceed in any recognized ecclesiastical cause if it saw fit, or only in a defined part
of the whole territory of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Granting the latter position, there were
many problems as to how the restricted portion appropriate to the High Commission
should be defined. If, however, the Commission was to operate at all as a first-instance
court with a national, or at least archdiocesan, scope, it could not be banned from
summoning people out of their home dioceses. The simplest route to saying that 23 Hen.
VIII can never be the basis for objecting to a High Commission prosecution is to say that
when 23 Hen. VIII was made the High Commission did not exist. Surely, this argument
runs, that statute operates to prevent abuses that could have occurred when it was
passed—primarily encroachment by archdiocesan courts on diocesan ones, plus invasion
of one Bishop’s jurisdiction by another or encroachment—archepiscopal or episcopal—
on smaller entities, peculiars and perhaps archdeaconries. The Henrician statute simply
had nothing to do with a new ecclesiastical court created nearly thirty years later.
I have found one brief report that appears to embrace straightforwardly this way
of ruling out all relevance of 23 Hen. VIII for High Commission cases: Ballinger v. Salter
(P. 13 Jac. K.B. 1 Rolle, 174, and the nearly identical Harg. 45, f. 29.) No context is
reported, only a per curiam holding that 23 Hen. VIII does not extend to the High
Commission because that tribunal was erected by 1 Eliz.; as it was put, the intent of 23
Hen. VIII was not to provide for a court that “simply did not exist” (“ne fuit donque in
esse”—MS.)
Hawes, above in this chapter (Note 8), is discussed in the text for a general
holding plausibly attributable to it: 23 Hen. VIII does not permit removal of suits from
the defendant’s home diocese by request of the original court after that court has taken
steps to decide the case. (So in the abstract; specifically, the original court may not
convict a man of an offense and then request another ecclesiastical court to take over his
punishment.) The court requested to handle Hawes’s punishment, however, was the High
Commission. The Commission obliged by imprisoning him. Whether it had any power to
imprison—not generally, of course, a power of ecclesiastical courts—, and if so, the
extent of such authority, were highly controverted questions (see Ch. 3, passim.) But de
facto the High Commission imprisoned, and consequently its right to do so—whether in
general or in the particular case—was often challenged by Habeas corpus, rather than
Prohibition. Hawes, being imprisoned, brought a Habeas corpus. That writ demands that
the jailer justify holding the prisoner. In Hawes, the return on the Habeas corpus (jailer’s
justificatory statement) told the story spelled out in the text (remission to the High
Commission for punishment at the original judge’s request after the party’s conviction.)
The question before the Common Pleas was the adequacy of the justification; it was held
inadequate per curiam.
Although the report does not tell much about the judges’ thinking, it seems to me
clear that the imprisonment was considered unjustified because 23 Hen. VIII did not
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permit the original judge to request removal from the diocese for punishment, or for retrial and punishment, after conviction. Coke stated that rule in generalized form without
opposition. The decision in Habeas corpus does not, however, support the rule as sharply
as a Prohibition stopping the High Commission from accepting the case would have
done. Returns on Habeas corpus were sometimes held inadequate for not saying enough
to permit the common law court to judge the legality of the imprisonment. Of course they
were held inadequate if the common law court thought either that the High Commission
lacked jurisdiction over the sort of case in question or that its imprisoning power, if it had
any, did not extend to such a case. A bare per curiam statement that the return in Hawes
was insufficient could be based on such formal or substantive grounds without
necessarily implying the rule that removals by request must be confined to suits which
have not yet been “commenced” in the original court. Faced with the holding alone, one
could plausibly imagine that the return failed to spell out the reasons for removal in
enough detail. (Is mere non-performance of a sentence sufficient reason without some
further explanation of why the regular process of excommunication backed by De
excommunicato capiendo could not be used effectively to reduce the party to
conformity?) On the substantive side, it would have been more than plausible—probably
correct—in 7 Jac. to say that the High Commission lacked jurisdiction in adultery.
Presumably—though this is a separate and significant question—a court with neither
first-instance nor appellate jurisdiction over a given offense cannot take over a case
involving that offense by request of the original judge. In short, the per curiam holding in
Hawes—reduced to an unexplained “this return is insufficient”—is not strong as a strict
precedent, even though it is indicative of judicial thinking on the interpretation of 23 Hen.
VIII.
We do, however, have a bit of information beyond the bare holding. The report
says that the court also held “that this is not against the clause of the statute [of] 23 H[en.]
8 c. 9, that a superior ordinary by request and consent of the inferior may determine
matters out of the proper diocese.” Justice Walmesley then adds “that is another case.” I
can only take this further language as saying that the holding is not inconsistent with or
subversive of the statute’s conferral of power to remove by request. It does not, obviously
enough, deny that the statute affirms such a power in general; nor does it imply that
removal to the High Commission is ruled out; nor imply so much as that Prohibition
should be granted on a surmise identical with the return on Hawes’s Habeas corpus
(remember that a Prohibition would be challengeable by Attachment and subject to
validation or invalidation on formal pleading.) From Coke’s point of view, such
guardedness may tend to understate what Hawes could at least arguably be taken to
mean. Walmesley at any rate (who was less inclined then Coke to restrict the High
Commission’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction and more inclined to restrict its use of secular
sanctions—see Ch. 3) wanted to be sure that the court’s hands were free to engage anew
with practically any questions on the removal provision of 23 Hen. VIII that might arise
in the future. Quaere, however, for I do not think the report’s language beyond the bare
holding that Hawes’s detention was not sufficiently justified is easy to interpret.
Pit v. Webly is discussed in the text (Note 34) for the significant evidence it
provides on the King’s Bench view of whether Prohibitions based on 23 Hen. VIII should
be granted at all. The suit in which Prohibition was sought in that case was in the High
Commission. The Prohibition was in the event, however, not sought on 23 Hen. VIII.
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Plaintiff-in-Prohibition started out on that basis, but with the court’s encouragement
dropped his claim resting thereon. Instead, he claimed that he had simply committed no
offense pursuable in an ecclesiastical court, the High Commission or any other. The
complaint against him was an interesting and unusual one—that a public official had
committed an ecclesiastical offense by making an arrest in violation of medieval statutes.
Plaintiff-in-Prohibition having abandoned his surmise based on 23 Hen. VIII, there was
of course no occasion to discuss whether the statute applied to the High Commission. (In
the upshot, the Common Pleas was inclined to prohibit, but put off decision pending
further consideration. The parties settled, however, before any decision was made. The
case is noted again in Ch. 3.)
23 Hen. VIII was frequently mentioned in cases on the jurisdiction of the High
Commission (Ch. 3.) These references are noted in Ch. 3 when they occur. I shall not
discuss them here in so far as they relate to the Commission’s basic or original
jurisdiction for the reason stated at the beginning of this Note: Obviously 23 Hen. VIII
could not, properly speaking, “apply” to the High Commission without undermining that
tribunal and the special purpose it was meant to serve by the statute constituting it, 1
Eliz., c. 1. Therefore when 23 Hen. VIII was invoked by way of claiming that a suit
originally brought before the Commission should not have been, 23 Hen. VIII was
necessarily being used in an indirect argumentative way, as opposed to taken as actually
mandating that the Commission may not touch that sort of suit. The argument from 23
Hen VIII with respect to original High Commission jurisdiction is intelligible and sound.
It comes to saying that the policy of 23 Hen. VIII should be taken into account in
construing 1 Eliz. The later statute should not be read as undermining the policy of the
earlier one more than could be helped, or more than allowing the Commission reasonable
scope to accomplish its purposes required. This was all the more true, it was argued,
because 1 Eliz., among its many provisions (the section of the act that authorized the
High Commission is only a small part of the whole), re-enacted 23 Hen. VIII. The upshot
of the argument for the powerful collateral relevance of 23 Hen. VIII is that the High
Commission’s jurisdiction was meant to be relatively limited. By this argument, it was
not coterminous with ecclesiastical jurisdiction, though one vein of judicial opinion held
it to be. Granting some limitation, my “relatively narrow” covers an extensive range of
debate about how narrow, a question on which numerous considerations were brought to
bear other than upholding the policy of 23 Hen. VIII.
We shall see in Ch. 3 that lawyers relying on 23 Hen, VIII in High Commission
cases could sometimes sound as if they thought the act mandated restricting the
Commission’s scope with the normal force of statutes. On the delicate score of historic
distance, I am not sure that the distinction between an “argument from powerful collateral
relevance” and a true “statutory mandate” was quite available to 17th century lawyers.
There is indeed one way of taking 1 Eliz. that obviates the need for the distinction: viz.
holding that 1 Eliz. positively confers on the Commission jurisdiction over a couple of
specified ecclesiastical crimes—probably only heresy and schism—and positively denies
it anything else by re-enacting 23 Hen. VIII. Although this position was taken seriously,
it demands narrower limits on the Commission than could plausibly, or at least actually,
be sustained. The Commission certainly was limited by the common law courts, in part
owing to a perceived need to save 23 Hen. VIII from subversion, but it was not kept
within the most extreme possible limits, nor probably—cf. Ch. 3—within less narrow
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ones reducible to a clear and largely agreed-on general rule. I therefore think the analytic
distinction between “applying” 23 Hen. VIII to the High Commission and trying to
construe 1 Eliz. in a manner reasonably compatible with the policy of 23 Hen. VIII is
ineluctable, whether or not it was recognized by contemporaries in something like my
terms.
There remains one topic to be addressed here: how the process for removal of
suits by request or permission of the diocesan court relates to the High Commission.
Abstractly, two questions about removal arise:
(a) May the original judge ever request or permit removal to the High
Commission, as opposed to another regular ecclesiastical court? Saying “No” makes
sense via the argument that 23 Hen. VIII can hardly be taken as either limiting or
empowering a court that did not yet exist. As bringing a suit originally in the High
Commission could not be objected to as a violation of 23 Hen. VIII, so removing a suit to
the Commission with the diocesan judge’s consent cannot be considered authorized by 23
Hen. VIII. This argument is complicated by the re-enactment of 23 Hen. VIII by1 Eliz.
itself, but not fatally. It remains arguable that a statute revived without revision still
means what it meant when it was made, and there is no reason to say 23 Hen. VIII meant
that diocesan suits could be moved with consent, not only to then-existing tribunals, but
to any new ones that might be created in the future.
On the other hand, the mere non-reference of 23 Hen. VIII to the High
Commission or any other later-created ecclesiastical court can be used to reach the
opposite conclusion: If suits commenced in a new court cannot violate a statute
antedating that court, why should such a court’s entertainment of a suit removed to it
violate the statute? Removing suits begun elsewhere to the High Commission might be
ruled out—either flatly or unless duly requested by the original court—by construction of
1 Eliz., but not by the merely irrelevant 23 Hen. VIII.
(b) If we grant that there is no in-principle objection to removing suits to the High
Commission, must they, to be so removable, at least fall within substantive High
Commission jurisdiction—i.e., must they be suits which, if brought originally before the
Commission, would be unobjectionable? If, among the various possibilities, 23 Hen. VIII
were taken to have an implied reference to courts created after its enactment so as to
authorize removal to them (subject to the statutory requirement of request in due form),
would any ecclesiastical suit be removable, or only those that could have been pursued
originally in the High Commission? Would a heresy prosecution be clearly removable,
but not a commonplace suit for tithes (a standard example of business inappropriate for
the Commission)?
On these questions, I have found little in the reports. Hawes implies faintly that
removal to the High Commission is per se lawful, but that was not, so far as the report
indicates, held expressly, nor need it have been to justify the decision in that Habeas
corpus case. The most that can be said is that if the judges all thought removal to the
High Commission flatly unlawful they would have had an easy route to liberating the
prisoner. It was not difficult, however, to liberate him unanimously on other grounds, not
all of which were necessarily shared by all the judges. The case furnished a good
opportunity not to have a debate on the tricky and possibly divisive issue whether
removal to the High Commission was lawful at all.
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That the issue was divisive in the Caroline Common Pleas appears from the one
piece of significant evidence I know of, the case of Coventry and Stamford. The case is
discussed at length in Ch. 3. Here I shall summarize it separately only as it bears on the
removal power and 23 Hen. VIII. This aspect comes out only in Littleton’s report (M. 4
Car. C.P. Littleton, 194. See Ch. 3 for the full reportorial picture.)
In the course of discussion of whether the suit in question belonged in the High
Commission—a discussion one would suppose concerned a suit originally brought
there—Justice Hutton observed that it was actually before the Commission by way of
removal: The alleged offense (essentially laying violent hands on a clergyman in the
course of arresting him unlawfully) was first presented to an Ordinary conducting a
visitation. The Ordinary then “certified” this presentment to the High Commission and
“prayed in aid.” At this point, Hutton’s only comment on the fact he brought to the
court’s attention is that the procedure (referring a presented offense to the High
Commission) “may be” and “is usual.” “May be” would seem to mean “is lawful”,
though it is perhaps less strong than saying so outright. The thought might be closer to
“…is commonly done and so far as I know has not been questioned legally.”
Chief Justice Richardson speaks next, probably with the intent of saying that in
his opinion too there is no objection to removal. All he actually says is that the High
Commission may “donque” proceed by ecclesiastical censure. I think the force of the
“donque” is probably: “Since the suit is properly before the Commission by removal, that
court may clearly proceed with the case, but it must confine itself to using regular
ecclesiastical sanctions (as punishment if it convicts and for any interlocutory purpose)—
i.e., it may not use the secular sanctions which would be available to it in circumstances
that do not obtain in this case.” Earlier in the discussion, before the judges were reminded
of the removal, Richardson had expressed the same view—i.e., the Commission’s
jurisdiction is clear enough, but only ecclesiastical sanctions may be employed.
Justice Yelverton then intervened with a somewhat cryptically stated opinion, but
I think the purport is clear: Contrary to Richardson, Prohibition (which was being sought
in the case) should not be delayed until the Commission had actually employed secular
sanctions. Rather, it should be presumed that the Commission would proceed by fine and
imprisonment. There is no point in withholding Prohibition on the off-chance that the
Commission will confine itself to spiritual sanctions in a case such that Prohibition would
certainly lie if it used secular sanctions. For the merits of this position, see Ch. 3. It has
no firm implication for removability as such, but would be compatible with a rule that
suits in which secular sanctions are usable may reach the Commission by removal. (It
would not be senseless to hold that other courts in the ecclesiastical system may send
suits to the High Commission in order take advantage of the temporal procedures
uniquely available to it. By contrast, forwarding a suit in which the Commission must use
only spiritual sanctions, while not necessarily purposeless in all circumstances, could
arguably not have advantages sufficient to compensate for the costs of depriving the
losing party of appeals—for there was no regular ecclesiastical appeal from the
Commission—and forcing the defendant out of his home diocese. Yelverton’s approach,
projected to such a rule, would, however, leave dangling the awkward question whether a
suit originally brought in the Commission and not amenable to secular sanctions should
be prohibited at once on presumption, or only after secular sanctions are imposed.) In
reply to Yelverton, Richardson repeated his opinion, this time straightforwardly: The
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Commission should be prohibited if it proceeded otherwise than by ecclesiastical censure,
but not before it had actually done so.
The report of Coventry ends, not with a decision to grant or deny Prohibition, but
with the court deadlocked on the issue. There is no evidence of the case’s being taken up
again. That is unsurprising, because plaintiff-in-Prohibition’s obvious move would have
been to drop his effort to get a writ until the High Commission exceeded spiritual
sanctions, in which event he could certainly have a Prohibition, and the Commission’s
obvious move would have been not to exceed those sanctions, if indeed it chose to carry
on with the case at all. The split in the court was Yelverton and Harvey (the latter of
whom is not heard from individually) in favor of immediate Prohibition versus
Richardson, who of course opposed Prohibition until a sentence was given and secular
sanctions were used, and Hutton, who at the end said he was in doubt. Leading up to this
outcome, the judges had a final round of discussion on the removability question.
In this last discussion, Richardson asserts Ordinaries’ unlimited power to remit
suits to the High Commission if they choose to. (This of course carries no implication
that the Commission is free to handle any removed case as it likes, which the Chief
Justice clearly did not believe.) Yelverton replies flatly that Ordinaries may not remit to
the Commission at will, because doing so is against 23 Hen. VIII. (This is most
straightforwardly read as saying that any removal to the Commission is ipso facto
unlawful, but it is not absolutely incompatible with the possibility suggested above that
removal of a suit amenable to secular sanctions might be countenanced.) Richardson
then tries a further argument for removal power, the intent of which I can do little more
than guess at. He brings up language in 23 Hen. VIII that gives some indication of
circumstances in which removal would be appropriate. The statute does not, as a good
deal of litigation in this chapter shows, give exhaustive rules as to what those
circumstances are, but it does expressly say that the Ordinary may remit when some of
the parties are fugitives who cannot all be found in a single diocese. The evident meaning
is that such suits may be remitted to the regular archdiocesan courts; there is no textual
reason to include the as yet non-existent High Commission. One might, however.
conjecture that Richardson brought up the fugitives case because there could be special
reasons for remitting to the High Commission rather than the regular archiepiscopal
authorities in that case. Some of the prospective defendants might have fled beyond the
bounds of a single archdiocese. It was sometimes argued (see Ch. 3) that aggravations
could render a case prosecutable in the Commission even though it did not involve an
offense intrinsically pursuable there; plural offenders who scatter in order not to be
triable together in one diocese can plausibly be seen as aggravated offenders. In short, if
the High Commission’s non-existence in 23 Hen. VIII is not assumed to stand fatally in
the way of removal of suits to the Commission—or perhaps if its re-enactment by 1 Eliz.
is considered to overcome that problem—there is an argument from convenience for
including the Commission in the provision for removal.
Justice Hutton speaks next, now apparently taking the position that 23 Hen. VIII
simply does not permit removal to the High Commission, but only to the original judge’s
immediate superior. This is at variance with his earlier suggestion that at least criminal
presentments at visitations could lawfully be removed to the Commission, but of course
he might have changed his mind after hearing argument and thinking more intently about
the problem. It tends, however, to make a mystery of his ultimate doubt. Why was Hutton

149

now not at one with Yelverton and Harvey, yielding a 3-1 majority for Prohibition?
When he expresses his remaining doubt, he explains it by saying that the Commission is
proceeding for reformatio morum, by which he must certainly mean “criminally” and
may mean he was satisfied that the proceedings were actually aimed at spiritual sanctions
only. He could possibly have wondered—and he professes no more than uncertainty—
whether, even though 23 Hen. VIII does not confer power to remove to the Commission,
usage and utility were sufficient to justify it in the case of a criminal presentment so long
as there is no reason to suppose secular sanctions will be used. This position is close to
the spirit of his first remark on removal, and it might primarily express objection to
Yelverton’s surely dubitable belief that the Commission’s intent to resort to secular
sanctions should be merely presumed. Quaere tamen.
After Hutton, Richardson makes an obscurely reported observation, which seems
only to say that the present case is an important one on the High Commission. I suppose
he is essentially saying to his brethren, apparently united against him, “Be careful of the
practical consequences of ruling out removal of any form of ecclesiastical criminal
proceeding to the Commission for handling by purely ecclesiastical methods. Is that
really in the interest of efficient law enforcement?” Hutton may have been touched by the
warning. Then Yelverton intervenes once more, this time to invoke the re-enactment of
23 Hen, VIII by 1 Eliz. on the side of his approach: The re-enactment shows that
Parliament was rigorously protective of Ordinaries’ jurisdiction. Why should there be any
exceptions? Then the inconclusive final result is reported. I have no evidence that the
removal issue was taken up again in the brief remainder of the High Commission’s career
(before the Long Parliament’s abolition of the court.) Although the outcome was
inconclusive, the weight of opinion in Coventry does not augur well for attempts to
remove suits to the Commission.
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CHAPTER 3—THE JURISDICTION AND POWERS OF THE COURT OF
HIGH COMMISSION
Section 1: General Introduction
Questions about the jurisdiction and powers of the Court of High Commission
were essentially questions about who should construe statutes and then about the meaning
of a particular statute: the Elizabethan Supremacy Act, 1 Eliz., c. 1. To all practical
intents, the statute created the High Commission. More precisely, having “reunited”
ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the Crown, the act authorized the monarch to delegate his
ecclesiastical jurisdiction to commissioners. That means the monarch was authorized to
establish an ecclesiastical court of first instance over and above the regular structure.
(The regular structure comprised at the first-instance level diocesan courts, peculiars,
Archdeacons’ jurisdictions, and archdiocesan courts to the limited degree that they had
“prerogative” to take first-instance cases; over these, appellate jurisdiction was exercised
by the archdioceses and ultimately by the statutory court of Delegates.) The monarch was
not obliged to set up such an additional tribunal. The High Commission existed because
he or she routinely exercised the statutory authority. This was done by successive patents
or commissions, not by a once-and-for-all constitutive act. There was never any question
but that the additional tribunal could be made a “high” or supreme court in the sense of a
court from which there is no ordinary appeal—i.e., no appellate recourse except a petition
for review addressed to the monarch. It was always constituted as a “high” court in that
sense, though there is no apparent reason why it had to be—i.e., why its decisions could
not have been made appealable to the Delegates or to a specially created standing review
agency. The monarch would presumably have needed only so to specify in the patent.
The serious practical question about the High Commission was whether 1 Eliz.
imposed any limits on the monarch’s authority to constitute such an ecclesiastical court. I
shall explain just below what was specifically involved in that problem. Let us first clear
the ground of two other matters.
(1) We have by now in this study seen enough practice involving statutes to
establish the following propositions as law, though they can be controverted by plausible
theoretical arguments and were sometimes challenged: Ultimate authority to construe
statutes belongs to the common law judges. Statutes are addressed to non-common law
courts and should be obeyed by them voluntarily, but these courts are not finally trusted
to interpret them. In this way, they are not the peers of common law courts, which do
have authority to interpret statutes directing what common law courts shall or shall not
do. In a few situations, a distinction is necessary between “ultimate” and “immediate”
power to insist on non-common law obedience to statutes as construed by common law
courts. I.e., occasionally Prohibition would be withheld until it was shown that a noncommon law court had been urged to take note of a statute in a particular construction
and had erroneously refused to. By and large, however, the power was “immediate”:
Plaintiff-in-Prohibition had only to surmise that a non-common law court had assumed
jurisdiction or was asked to, or had acted within its jurisdiction, contrary to statute;
Prohibition would be granted if the common law judges agreed with the interpretation
implied in the surmise.
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These principles are as applicable to the High Commission and 1 Eliz. as in other
contexts. I.e., if we assume that 1 Eliz. limits the powers of the High Commission, then
the common law courts, having decided that such-and-such are the limits, may prohibit
the High Commission from exceeding them. The High Commission is no more privileged
than any other non-common law court to determine for itself whether the statute limits it
and, if so, how. This is at any rate true unless there is something special about the High
Commission differentiating it from all other non-common law courts. I do not think such
a difference was ever contended for. Rather, the general principle that the common law
judges have a monopoly to construe statutes was most frequently challenged by or on
behalf of the High Commission. That is no doubt because the Commission was a highlevel agency with strong backing from the government. Its functions were regarded as
important, so that its independence of outside judicial scrutiny seemed especially worth
fighting for. Challenges to the common law monopoly were totally unsuccessful,
however. I shall note them when they occur in the argument of cases about the High
Commission, but it is just as well to anticipate what I think is clear from the cases: The
idea that the Commission ought to construe 1 Eliz. for itself was not taken seriously by
the only people who counted—the common law judges. They occasionally bothered to
overrule that theory when it was occasionally advanced, but there is no sign that it gave
them any real intellectual trouble. Whether the High Commission was limited by 1 Eliz.
and, if so, what the limits were—these questions caused plenty of trouble and produced
variances from judge to judge and court to court. They presume the judges’ title to
answer them authoritatively.
(2) I say above that “essentially” and “to all intents” the powers of the High
Commission were a question of the meaning of 1 Eliz. The qualifying phrases are
required by one consideration: If 1 Eliz., having restored the Crown’s ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, had not expressly authorized the monarch to delegate it to commissioners,
could he do so anyway? “Yes” is a more than defensible answer. Caudrey’s Case,
discussed in detail in Section 2 below, is the best-known occasion on which a common
law court said “Yes” judicially (if it actually did so in Caudrey, for which vide infra.) I
do not think the answer to the question matters very much, however. If the High
Commission clause of 1 Eliz. did not exist, and if we assume that the monarch “at
common law” could establish a body equivalent to the High Commission, then it is hard
to see how there could be limits on the monarch’s commissioning power within the
bounds of ecclesiastical law. If he set up such a body and instructed it to hold plea of
murder, he would obviously violate what can only be called constitutional law. By any
standard that belongs in the real world, the monarch manifestly could not without
Parliament turn a temporal crime, wrong, or claim into a spiritual one, thereby depriving
the subject of trial by jury and every other facet of due process of law. On the other hand,
I can see no argument from inherent limits on the monarch’s ecclesiastical supremacy
that would constrict his power to give a “prerogative High Commission” any or all parts
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. If he set up such a tribunal and authorized it to deal with
heresy, fornication, and tithe cases, there would be no basis for doubting it was duly
authorized.
Now, this deduction may be sound, but it is based on an assumption contrary to
fact. The High Commission clause of 1 Eliz. did exist; the monarch was expressly
authorized to establish an extraordinary ecclesiastical tribunal if he saw fit. Let us
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assume provisionally that the relevant clause in the statute puts, or purports to put, limits
on the monarch’s power to constitute a High Commission. Is there any doubt but that the
statutory limits should be enforced, whatever view one takes of the monarch’s power to
set up such a body “at common law”? If the monarch had no such power without the
statute, then obviously he has only such authority as the statute gives him. If without the
statute he could have established a Commission and given it any and all parts of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, then in so far as the statute limits his power—directly or by
implication of authorizing him to do less—then the statute cuts back his prior prerogative.
One can move onto high royalist ground and maintain that the prerogative in all branches
is beyond being restricted by statute (not just the most “absolute” part of the prerogative,
which is almost logically illimitable because it amounts to a reserve of emergency
powers.) But in my phrase above, that position does not belong in the real world. I do not
think it had the least influence on judicial discussion of the Commission’s powers.
When, however, it comes to construction of 1 Eliz.–granting that it could limit
powers the monarch may have had before—, attitudes toward the prior powers might
make a difference. If I believe that the monarch had no authority to establish a
Commission apart from the statute, my only course is to figure out what powers the
statute seems by its words, or was probably intended, to confer on him. But suppose I
believe that without the statute the monarch could have set up a Commission and given it
as much of ecclesiastical jurisdiction as he chose. I may be inclined—ceteris paribus, the
language of the act permitting and any intentions of Parliament I feel historically certain
about—to hold that the act was not meant to cut back the monarch’s pre-existing powers.
I may say that the act “declares the common law”, as indeed it does in general. I. e., in the
minds of the makers and their descendants in 16th-17th century England, Queen Elizabeth
was not made Supreme Governor of the Church by the Supremacy Act, not merely
restored to her father’s statutory position, but repossessed of an immemorial and
inseparable adjunct of the Crown, her rightful position “at common law.” It does not
automatically follow that every feature of the Supremacy Act, notably the High
Commission clause, is also declaratory. There is nevertheless a natural and legitimate
presumption that no part of a generally declaratory statute makes wholly new law, save
when the contrary is manifest (e.g., when a specific punishment is created and there is no
evidence that the “common law” offense declared in the act was previously punishable in
just that way) or there is clear textual or historical reason to suppose the contrary. (That
the Head of the Church before 1558 lacked power to constitute a High Commission is
virtually indemonstrable, for the simple and comic reason that the “common law”
Supreme Headship was not, speaking realistically, exercised during the long night of
Popery. If one was looking for positive evidence that the power existed, the “pretended”
and practiced authority of the Pope to delegate jurisdiction could be invoked, though in
English discourse one had to be careful about assuming that what the Pope did was
legitimate. It was nevertheless a good argument that specific powers claimed and used by
the Pope, rather than intrinsically inappropriate to the Head of the Church, were usurped
from the true Head, the English monarch.) Or, instead of emphasizing the declaratory
character of the statute, I may simply argue that it is unlikely that Parliament, with Queen
Elizabeth’s assent, would have meant to curtail the existing ecclesiastical prerogative, or
that statutes should always be construed to save the common law, or the royal
prerogative, when at all possible.
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This sort of disposition probably affected some judges. The monarch’s power
before the statute sometimes comes up in the cases. I suspect that asserting that the
monarch had such prior or independent power was usually a step on the way to
construing the statute in favor of the Commission. Yet those who adopted a less favorable
construction would probably not have denied that the power existed. They would simply
have said that there were good reasons to think that the statute curtailed it, that the High
Commission clause in 1 Eliz. was not declaratory though most of the statute was, and that
other principles of construction suggesting that the power remained unaltered must give
way to the makers’ clear contrary intention. Or, even more modestly, they might have
said that there were in effect two powers to create a High Commission, one conferred by
statute, one “at common law” and unaltered by statute. The latter could in theory be
drawn on, but that would have to be done unmistakably, and in practice the monarch
always quite clearly drew on the statutory power,
In the practical upshot, it was not necessary to worry much about the common law
prerogative, even for those judges who took a broad view of the Commission’s authority
and might occasionally invoke the prerogative to help their cause. The statute was
enough to worry about. Different judges saw different things in an act so drafted that one
is hardly obliged to see anything in particular. Their sense for words, habits of statutory
construction, historical beliefs, and policy preferences determined what they saw for the
most part. For some, a strong belief that the monarch remained in full possession of the
ancient prerogative may have been still another determinant.
In sum, the concrete problems that arose about the High Commission can be
regarded simply as questions about the meaning of 1 Eliz. Even if that is not quite true in
the most refined sense, the problems are still statutory in the first instance: If the statute
means that the Commission may be authorized to do x, then it may do x. Only if the
statute means that the Commission could not do x would one need to look for some other
basis for permitting it. Only if one is baffled by whether the Commission may do x by the
statute need one consider whether anything outside the statute could possibly be relevant.
*

*

*

*

Two sorts of problem about the High Commission arose frequently: (a) its
substantive jurisdiction; (b) its sanctions and procedural powers. Both problems are best
formulated by conceding that the monarch has in his patent authorized a given activity.
E.g., for (a), the monarch has said to the Commission “You may entertain complaints of
adultery”; for (b), “You may fine anyone convicted of the offenses over which I have
given you jurisdiction.” In both cases, the issue is whether the monarch’s authorization is
valid under the statute. Very few cases turn on construction of the monarch’s patent to the
Commission. I infer that that was usually either out of doubt or a question that could be
by-passed by courts that thought a given authorization would be invalid if conceded to
have been made.
Taking substantive jurisdiction first: There was never any doubt that the High
Commission could be authorized to proceed against very serious ecclesiastical crimes—
e.g., heresy, the most indisputable example. Beyond extremely grave spiritual crimes,
what parts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction could be assigned to the Commission was a wideopen question. I shall suggest here the main possibilities that I think can be called
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realistic in the light of the cases, indicating the general line of argument that supports
each. I shall of course state them in a more explicit and neater form than they usually
assumed in contextual discussion.
(1) The monarch may give the Commission any or all parts of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction. He is not obliged to set up a Commission at all, nor, if he does, to assign any
particular ecclesiastical causes to it. But if he has undisputedly assigned it a given type
of cause, then the Commission has jurisdiction (assuming always that it is an
ecclesiastical cause, that no attempt has been made to smuggle temporal matters into the
ecclesiastical sphere.) The words of the statute, which we shall look at below, are too
vague to stand in the way of this conclusion. No contrary intention can be reliably
established. As Supreme Governor, the monarch is responsible for seeing that the
Church’s legal system does its job effectively (which at some level of generality no one
would deny.) It would be sensible to authorize him to assign causes to the Commission
when, as the responsible and putatively best informed officer, he thinks it necessary. He
would presumably do so when he deemed that the regular courts were not handling some
category of business satisfactorily. Parliament cannot have anticipated, and is unlikely to
have pretended to, what necessities might be perceived in the future. The common law
judges have no competence to assess such necessities, but must assume that the monarch
has done so with proper consideration. This construction has the further advantage of
leaving the monarch with powers he would probably have in the absence of the High
Commission clause of 1 Eliz.
(2) There is a good deal of sense in the first approach, but it has disturbing
implications too. It permits the monarch to undermine the jurisdiction of regular
ecclesiastical courts and the ordinary expectations of the subject, while, no doubt,
assuming that he will not do so except on sober consideration of necessity. Flexibility to
manage the ecclesiastical legal system in the interest of effective law enforcement under
actual circumstances is valuable, and trusting the monarch to assess those circumstances
is basically justifiable,. But is it likely that Parliament would have given the monarch an
absolutely blank check? It is disturbing to suppose he had such absolute power “at
common law”, whether or not one can avoid so supposing. Since Parliament went to the
trouble of legislating, it stands to reason that part of its purpose was to restrict the
monarch to at least some extent, and the language of the statute encourages more than it
discourages seeing some restrictive intention. The danger of relying absolutely on the
monarch’s discretion is in any event not to be taken lightly. Localism in the ecclesiastical
system could be all-too easily subverted on perfectly honest, perfectly plausible
perceptions of necessity. Invite anyone who so desires to start an ecclesiastical suit in a
high-ranking, central, competently staffed court and all-too many people will take up the
invitation. It may be that for any given matter providing the option will be quite
justifiable, because diocesan courts are known by experience to handle some type of
business inadequately. (For a realistic example, it might be clear that local courts too
often defer to husbands, especially if they are important people, in “divorce” litigation, so
that the policy of ecclesiastical law, which aims to enforce decent treatment of wives, is
not fulfilled.) Nevertheless, the net effect of diverting a lot of litigation from local courts
would be unfortunate. Apart from the interest of those courts in their jurisdiction, such
diversion would contribute to the problem it was meant to solve. For if diocesan courts
are sometimes not very good, diminishing their practice and sapping their morale will
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probably make them worse. From the subject’s point of view, being cited to a supra-local
court is an inconvenience to be avoided if other things are equal, and ultimately more
than an inconvenience. For there is a sense in which people—Bad Men if you like—have
a “right” to fear only those tribunals and authorities that they have been accustomed to
think of as over them, and which are represented to them as the “normal” channels.
There may be good reasons for providing extraordinary alternatives, but they will have
trouble staying extraordinary, and the people they afflict will be aggrieved in their sense
of justice. Thus undermining localism, or making it possible to undermine it, would be
an evil even without the serious complication of a strong statutory endorsement of
ecclesiastical localism—namely, 23 Hen. VIII (revived by 1 Eliz. itself), the statute
discussed in detail in Ch.2 above.
Another powerful consideration on the side of restriction is the absence of routine
appeal from the High Commission. The right to a de cursu appeal cannot be regarded as
absolute in the shadow of 1 Eliz. for in so far as any causes at all can be assigned to the
Commission, losing parties can be deprived of appeals. But perhaps the necessity that
overrides the expectation of appellate recourse ought to be stronger than the necessity
that might be allowed to override localism. Parliament is unlikely to have been willing to
risk the right of appeal so far as to entrust it to the monarch’s discretion absolutely.
If, then, we admit values on both sides—the value of giving the monarch
discretion to confer jurisdiction on the Commission as unforeseen necessity may require
and the value of curbing his discretion so that it is not over-used for plausible but
shortsighted reasons—, is there a compromise formula? There are two major candidates:
One is that the monarch may give the Commission any part of criminal
jurisdiction appropriate to ecclesiastical courts, but no part of strictly civil. There are
problems about discriminating criminal from civil, to some extent problems peculiar to
ecclesiastical law. Let us defer those, however, until the cases touch on them. In general
defense of this formula, one may urge a legitimate association between “necessity” and
the criminal law. I.e., extraordinary measures are usually most justifiable when the
ordinary means of enforcing the criminal law are defective. Ordinary channels may not
work perfectly for civil purposes, but if they do not, only private interests, mainly
pecuniary, will be affected. It must be presumed that everyone loses if the criminal law is
not properly enforced. That the criminal part of ecclesiastical law was concerned with
morality and respect for religion, rather than basic security in person and property, need
not weaken the force of this point. Therefore let the monarch judge the necessity for an
extraordinary tribunal in criminal cases, and let the risks be borne, but let his discretion
stop there. If localism should be unfortunately subverted, there are some mitigations. A
criminal suspect perhaps has less “right” to a particular tribunal than a civil defendant.
Diocesan courts can perhaps be presumed less likely to be effective enforcers of criminal
law, especially against bold and resistant offenders, than to be adequate settlers of
disputes among people who take their troubles to court when they cannot resolve them
outside. Perhaps it is worse to deprive a man of a private interest, with a pounds-andshillings value, without right of appeal than to convict him of a crime without appeal.
One can of course say the opposite, but here it is important to remember the peculiar
character of ecclesiastical law. Waiving the question whether the High Commission can
be authorized to use secular sanctions, ecclesiastical courts could not hurt a convicted
“criminal” very seriously. A man erroneously condemned to pay tithes is out of pocket;
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one erroneously convicted of fornication need only pay the price of a symbolic act of
penitence. In any case, one convicted by the Commission of a grave offense, such as
heresy, has no appeal. It is hard to worry about the erroneously convicted fornicator by
comparison.
The second approach would say the trouble with the first is that it leaves the
monarch free to give the High Commission jurisdiction over extremely petty
misdemeanors. In the nature of things, ecclesiastical law covered a good deal that was
trivial. Anti-social behavior of the sort that moderns call “criminal” was temporal;
heretics are usually few; fornicators and adulterers are doubtless bad and doubtless many,
if all-too human; a lot of profaneness and uncharitableness is left over—things a liberal
society would consign to merely moral controls, but in which the Church was accorded a
legalized interest. It may not matter very much if petty misdemeanors do fall into the
High Commission’s hands, just as it does not much matter if speakers of “irreverent
words”—like, say, recipients of parking tickets in the modern world—may appeal their
convictions. If the monarch sees fit to give the Commission authority over trivia, and if
the Commission (if it has any choice when the complaint is privately initiated) consents
to bother with them, so what? Yet the desirability of giving the monarch discretion to
provide for necessities—the very argument that justifies not construing the statute too
stringently against him—is mocked if it leads to an unlimited conveyance of criminal
jurisdiction. It hardly can be necessary to supplement the regular courts in order to make
sure that swearers and defamers are prosecuted; their escaping punishment altogether is
hardly a sufficient evil to outweigh the disutility of violating regular channels. Localism,
while dispensable for the sake of catching big offenders, is precisely valuable in the case
of petty ones. Petty misbehavers should be punished at home, in front of their neighbors;
the diocesan courts should be encouraged to prosecute routine misconduct, to worry
about “moral tone” in the districts they are responsible for; they should be under some
pressure not to lapse into the role of purely civil courts.
Can we than find a better approach, within the same guidelines, than merely
splitting the civil and the criminal? Suppose we agree that the High Commission can be
given jurisdiction only over serious matters. Perhaps it is best to say “serious crimes”, but
let us say it in a tone that allows for the difficulty of distinguishing civil from criminal in
the ecclesiastical sphere—“serious matters with a criminal element”, meaning situations
in which it would be lawful to punish someone over and above ordering him to perform
acts which mostly reduce to specific execution of a duty to pay money. (E.g., I take it
that a tithe-payer can only be ordered to pay his tithes, an executor to pay so much to a
legatee, etc. If these duties are contested in good faith, and after losing in litigation the
tithe-payer or executor performs the order, there is no basis for considering these persons
“criminals”. If there is a penumbra—bad faith refusal to perform these duties before
ordered to by a court, for which something like a “punishment” distinct from an order to
perform now or face excommunication could be imposed—I have not encountered it
through the Prohibition cases. By contrast, I take it that a man sued by his wife seeking
alimony on grounds of cruelty and adultery may be punished for those offenses as crimes
upon a finding that he committed them, whether or not the wife is awarded the alimony
or legally may be in the particular circumstances. ) Then let us not impose too rigid a
meaning on “serious matters with a criminal element.” Let us not suppose we can list
such matters or recognize them by a mechanical criterion, nor suppose, improbably, that
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the statute-makers had a definite or self-applying test in mind. The common law court
must in the end simply look at the specific cases in which the Commission’s jurisdiction
is contested. They must use a little intuition to discriminate what is serious from what is
not, what has a genuine criminal element from what does not, what cases necessity could
plausibly justify giving over to an extraordinary tribunal from which there is no appeal. If
intuition is shaky, then let the courts avoid it so far as they can and discuss general
criteria, but let them acknowledge that there may be several criteria for seriousness, and
that these neither were foreseen by Parliament nor can be by anyone a priori. Criteria
must be suggested by cases that come up, assessed sometimes for their internal
convincingness (Can adultery not be a serious offense when the Ten Commandments
forbid it?) and sometimes with a certain judicial notice of the real problems of
administering the Church.
This approach is particularly useful with respect to a special problem that recurs
in the cases. The approach admits of saying that seriousness is not a kind of universal that
inheres in some crimes and not in others, but a function of context. It also helps one keep
in mind that what we are trying to do it is to uphold the Supreme Governor’s discretion
for use when it is necessary—perhaps even when its use is merely innocuous—, and
when the monarch’s discretion really is the best basis for determining how ecclesiastical
jurisdiction should be distributed, Cases on intra-Church discipline, primarily the
prosecution of clerical offenders, point up the advantages of such a position.
If the monarch gives the Commission authority over clergymen charged with
certain offenses, is it not hard to object? It is of course legitimate to say that some crimes
are simply worse in a clergyman than in a layman. One can put clerical fornication on
the most rigid list of serious crimes, while leaving lay fornication off it. But as one
shades off into lesser offenses, it will become unconvincing to call them serious even in a
clergyman. Is there still not something odd about challenging the Supreme Governor’s
title to make clergymen answerable in the ecclesiastical court he thinks most effective in
enforcing standards which it is in a sense his business to set? Contrary arguments can be
conjured up, but there is a strong point to be made.
Something like “To be a clergyman is a privilege, not a right” seems an
appropriate remark. Can a clergyman complain if the Church’s administration is so
arranged that he is liable to answer for his crimes where a layman would be spared
answering for crimes of comparable gravity? We grant that the monarch is cut off from
judging it “necessary” that lay swearers and defamers be liable to High Commission
prosecution. His judgment could be plausible enough—there is simply too much such
misconduct, and nothing is being done about it—, but we in effect presume that the
judgment will undervalue the disutility of violating localism, etc. Is the monarch’s
judgment that it is necessary for the Church to be administered internally by a certain
schema quite of the same order? Especially, is it not up to the Governor of the Church to
say what standards Church personnel shall be held to? He may correctly think that
profane laymen are not being punished sufficiently, but we foreclose him from doing
anything about it by tampering with jurisdiction. That is in part because it is not the
monarch but “the law” that makes swearing a crime and attaches a certain degree of
seriousness to it. But surely the monarch has a more creative role as head of the Church
to determine how serious profanity in a clergyman is and how much in need of the most
effective suppression. His judgment there is a policy judgment about what kind of Church

158

to have—one that tolerates peccadilloes in its clergy so long as their neighbors and
immediate superiors have no complaints or one that is vigilant for “counsels of
perfection.” What kind of Church to have is a different question from what kind of
country, what incidence of enforcement against laymen who violate some of the lesser
rules of ecclesiastical law is desirable. The former is much more clearly within the
monarch’s scope and outside the common lawyer’s.
In sum, the vaguest, most flexible approach—“Only serious crimes, to be sure,
but keep it open just what that means”—is the best basis for distinguishing laymen from
clergymen, Church law as a branch of “the law” for everyone from Church law as an
instrument for the internal control of an institution. The approach also admits of a
category of aggravation and a regard for the problems of effective enforcement that the
Church faced in the concrete circumstances of cases. It is possible that a given offense is
too minor as such to be given to the High Commission, but that the monarch’s purported
assignment of it should be held valid quoad aggravated cases and multiple or incorrigible
offenders? Or in so far as regular ecclesiastical courts are actually shown to have tried
and failed to bring an offender to justice, or to have been frustrated by such
circumstances as a number of offenders involved in a single crime who cannot be reached
within a single jurisdiction? Drawing a line between civil and criminal will not yield an
affirmative answer, nor will restriction of the Commission to a few specific crimes whose
gravity is beyond question in all circumstances. The “vague and flexible” approach can:
As it were, “Simply trivial or totally civil matters cannot be assigned to the Commission
whatever the monarch purports, but what falls outside those classes cannot be specified
until we have a concrete case before us. When we do, we may consider a variety of
senses in which a crime can be serious, or in which the reasonableness of letting the
Commission handle this case can be made convincing, within a general allegiance to the
principle that only ‘serious matters with a criminal element’ may be diverted to the
Commission.”
(3) The third approach has been intimated in discussing the alternatives: 1 Eliz.
empowers the monarch to set up a High Commission only for a small and special
segment of ecclesiastical criminal law. “Very serious crimes” is the correct generic
description, but it is mistaken to apply that category in the manner of the approach above.
The language of the act and especially the known historical circumstances under which it
was passed permit Parliament’s meaning to be specified much more exactly. The courts
ought not to intuit what is serious enough as cases come before them or play around with
a variety of plausible criteria, under the sway of the incorrect notion that the statute
intends to leave room for the monarch to divert causes to the Commission as unforeseen
necessities require. The statute enacts a criterion—one criterion—, perhaps not per verba
simply but by clear intent. The only discretion given the monarch is to decide whether to
have a High Commission at all (in effect—for the range of offenses he may assign to it is
so narrow that setting it up and assigning it only part of that range is no more than a
theoretical possibility.)
Specifically: Heresy and schism may be assigned to the Commission. The statute
is express as to those two crimes. Being express, it shows what it has primarily or
“paradigmatically” in mind—the most serious forms of religious misconduct. If there is
any possibility of going beyond heresy and schism, the paradigm operates to say that it
must be into other forms of religious misconduct only slightly less serious, or equally
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serious but technically distinguishable—somewhat as one might slide on an analogous
secular scale from treason to misprision of treason. Admittedly, however, construction of
the statute cannot stop at this point, cannot rest on the conclusion that nothing in the
moral section of ecclesiastical law is assignable to the Commission. For there is one, and
only one, further important word in the statute: “enormity.” This word points both
beyond the species “heresy” and “schism” and beyond the genus “serious religious
offenses.” But it does not point in the wide-open direction of any crime that can plausibly
be regarded as serious. Rather, the paradigm remains controlling even when it is
transcended. “Enormity” admittedly indicates moral offenses and admittedly lacks the
specificity of “heresy” and “schism.” But it is to be understood as extending only to those
crimes that can really be ranked with heresy and schism. To determine such ranking, one
must look at the quality as well as the quantum of the gravity.
“Exorbitant” was sometimes offered as a more descriptive synonym for
“enormous.” Both words, I think, were understood by people of the persuasion we are
talking about (as opposed to those to whom the words meant no more than “pretty
serious”) to touch such qualities as rarity in a world that is at all right-thinking and
sociable; abandonment of the spirit to evil, as opposed to letting the flesh slip under
temptation; violation of “nature”, where social conformity and conformity to the
fundamental institutions of society—Church and Family as well as State—are regarded
as “natural”, along with sexual orthodoxy, parental affection, children’s obedience, and
the like. The only non-religious offenses ever specifically suggested as eligible High
Commission crimes squarely within the present framework were incest and polygamy;
both meet the standards I have described. (A comparable secular derivation might go
from treason to the misprision, then to petty treason, perhaps to murder, but not to the rest
of the felonies, let alone misdemeanors. It is likely that such secular hierarchies
influenced thinking about the hierarchy of spiritual crimes for purposes of construing 1
Eliz.)
The extent to which the statute’s language permits or encourages this and
alternative approaches will be considered in detail below. The present approach
obviously gives greater value than others to the ends served by a restrictive
interpretation—localism and preservation of appeals. The most distinctive argument for
it, however, was historical construction of intent. The other approaches probably bespeak
a certain skepticism about history, or at least unwillingness to base construction on an
inevitably fallible version of the statute-makers’ immediate situation. In behalf of the
most restrictive reading, it was often urged that Elizabeth’s first Parliament was faced
with a special problem: a Catholic bench of Bishops left over from Queen Mary. Those
Bishops could obviously not be expected to enforce religious orthodoxy by the restored
true standards or conformity to the new Establishment. Least of all could they be
expected to enforce orthodoxy and conformity on their clergy, to the end of depriving
them of their livings, and on themselves. Therefore the monarch was enabled to set up an
extraordinary tribunal. It was never argued that the power to establish a High
Commission disappeared as soon as the special problem did; the words of the statute
clearly forbade that. One could at most wish that the monarch had seen fit to desist using
the power once the Marian Bishops were out of the way. (Some members of the
community, notably Puritans, no doubt did so wish. I would be surprised if many judges
participated in the wish, precisely because they show few signs of sympathy for Puritans.
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Those who took the statute most narrowly still took it in a sense that would often catch
Puritans, and most of them would probably have said a special instrument was necessary
for that purpose.) What was argued was that the statute, having been made to meet a
special problem, intended by its general terms only as much as was needful to meet that
problem (with a small penumbra thrown in, and not quite accounted for historically,
under the term “enormity.”)
We may turn now to problems about the High Commission’s procedures. The
main question, though not the only one, can be stated for its practical upshot as “May the
High Commission fine and imprison?” Several complications are concealed underneath
that formulation, however.
In the first place, the question of course asks, properly speaking, whether under
the statute the monarch may confer power to fine and imprison on the Commission. The
problem is best discussed on the assumption that Queen Elizabeth and her successors
have purported to grant such power (as they characteristically did.) We need not reach
refinements of the question to see that two contradictory answers are possible:
(1) Power to use secular sanctions may not be conferred on the Commission. The
statute does not say it may. Without express authorization, there is simply no reason why
it should be possible to give the Commission secular sanctions. Whatever part of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction may be conferred on it, up to the whole of that jurisdiction, it
remains an ecclesiastical court—special or supplementary, “high” or unappealable, but
still an ecclesiastical court. Ecclesiastical courts have certain procedures and sanctions—
as for sanctions, excommunication; power to order (payments, acts of penitence and
apology, behavior conformable to spiritual law and to non-pecuniary decrees in specific
cases, “submission”, satisfaction of litigative costs) under threat of excommunication;
power to deprive clerics. On excommunication is built the secular arm’s role pursuant to
De excommunicato capiendo. That is all. Power to fine and imprison in no way belongs
to ecclesiastical courts. If the monarch could create a High Commission without the
statute and confer any or all parts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on it, he still could not give
it secular sanctions or otherwise empower it to proceed in any manner except that in
which other ecclesiastical courts may proceed. He could no more give it secular
sanctions than secular jurisdiction. Only an express statute could alter this, and that is
lacking. The closer one is to saying that 1 Eliz. only confirms the monarch’s common law
authority, the clearer it is that he may not do more then relocate ecclesiastical jurisdiction
with the attendant procedures.
(2) 1 Eliz. does not in unmistakable words allow secular sanctions to be conferred
on the Commission. But its language, just by being unspecific, rather encourages than
discourages the belief that that was meant to be permissible. Common sense construction
by intent points the same way. The idea was to create a special court. It would not be
special enough, not enough of a supplement for cases of extraordinary necessity, if it
must be confined to ecclesiastical sanctions. Having an extra high-ranking court—
jurisdictionally limited perhaps—would be more useful for the situations that justify
having one at all if such a court could be given “teeth” that ordinary ecclesiastical courts
lacked. If the Commission is only justifiable because the regular courts cannot be
depended on to be effective, especially against serious and obstreperous offenders, then it
makes sense for the Commission to have the means to be more effective in the way that
counts most with the man in the street or the “criminal classes.” So Parliament is likely to
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have figured and once this is clear it becomes evident that Parliament chose its language
to insure the monarch discretion to authorize secular sanctions. He could not have
authorized them at common law, but the statute adds to his powers. Indeed, in order to
add this power—rather than cut back the common law powers—might be the best
explanation of why Parliament legislated. Of course there are limits. The monarch may
no more allow the High Commission to hang people than to prosecute them for felony,
but nothing follows as to fining and imprisoning in the various forms these sanctions
admit of.
The last phrase, “the various forms”, leads into complications. Power to fine and
imprison is not one simple entity. To start with the obvious, fining and imprisoning are
two operations. There is no case-authority for the flat proposition that the Commission
may be given one of those powers but not the other. Yet they are manifestly not the same
in people’s experience, nor do they diverge in the same way from normal ecclesiastical
sanctions.
A fine can be little else than a punishment, unless it is a commutation of a
punishment. The “unless” could be important. Suppose the Commission were expressly
authorized (by its patent) to impose a spiritual sanction or a fine—never both and never
imprisonment. (Although this is not a realistic supposition, the first part is not really
misleading. An express choice between spiritual punishment and fine was not offered, but
I have no reason to doubt that in practice the High Commission did not otherwise afflict
those whom it fined, except by imprisonment, which for the moment we omit.) The
Commission would then purportedly have a power not enjoyed by other ecclesiastical
courts, but the difference can be made to look fairly small. I do not know to what extent,
if ever, regular ecclesiastical courts accepted payment of money—to a victim or a
charity—in lieu of penitential acts. They professedly did not award damages (only
ordered payment of money due in the form of the value of tithes no longer renderable in
kind, legacies, and the like.) The power of a complainant to settle with a defendant for
money was at least open to question when the complaint had a criminal element—e.g.,
defamation. Even so, I wonder whether ordinary Church courts were debarred from
agreeing to absolve or to forgo any other expression of penitence in consideration of an
appropriate payment. Perhaps any such transaction can be represented as volunteered by
the party and merely accepted by the court as evidence of a repentant state of mind, with
the understanding that the court’s so much as making a suggestion would be improper, let
alone telling the party “Either make a payment or go unabsolved.” Power simply to
impose a fine payable to the monarch and collectable by Exchequer process (as High
Commission fines were) is certainly a significant step beyond any nebulous power to
“work out” a monetary satisfaction. The argument is only that it is not a “morally
gigantic” step: A special court needing extra “teeth” is allowed to “commute” the
spiritual penalty into a payment the party is coercible to make, whether he would prefer
the spiritual penalty or not. Though the payment is pretty hard to distinguish from a
secular fine, call it a “charitable contribution to the Supreme Governor” to put a better
face on it—the notion is not merely risible, for it is intrinsically seemly enough for one
who has offended the Church to make peace with it by doing something tangible for the
institution. Are these moderate thoughts not as imputable to Parliament as others?
In any event, once the possibility of conceiving a fine as a commutation is
considered, compromise paths are opened to the common law courts provided they do not
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hold a patent, authorizing fines, invalid on its face. A court could adopt the policy of
looking at the size of a fine in relation to the possible spiritual punishment due for the
offense in question. The reasonableness of a “commutation” could perhaps come under
common law scrutiny more easily than that of a mere secular fine imposed by a body
authorized to fine without any discernible limit on its discretion to set the amount.
Imprisonment can be a punishment, a worse one than a fine in most people’s eyes,
though of course that depends on quantities. In principle, it can be imposed—indeed
chosen by the party—in lieu of something else thought of as the primary punishment—,
just as a fine can, and imprisonment inter alia can be in lieu of a fine. One can imagine a
staunch Puritan who would much rather spend a reasonably determinate martyrdom in
jail than make some hypocritical gesture of penitence or submission at the behest of a
High Commission whose legitimacy he does not accept, or indeed than pay a fine he
regards as illegal. A good deal turns on “reasonably determinate”, to be sure. But is it
conceivable that the common law courts, however favorable to the High Commission’s
powers, could permit punitive imprisonment without ever looking at the length of the
sentence in relation to the offense? Could they possibly permit a man to be imprisoned as
long as the Commission pleased, without at least considering after a certain time whether
he has paid as full a price as can reasonably be demanded? Perhaps it is conceivable, but
it would take a hard man—or one very trusting that the monarch would surely relieve any
victim of real abuse. It would take a judge willing to say that an act of Parliament
permits the monarch and the High Commission to do anything to certain spiritual
offenders short of death and maiming. That is quite different from saying that Parliament
meant to allow secular sanctions in reasonable manner and amount.
Besides a punishment, imprisonment can be a means of coercion—“civil”
coercion of the sort used by courts of equity, whereby a man is committed only until he
performs an order; as the saying has it, he is “handed the keys of the jail.” Various
possible positions on the High Commission’s powers open out when one is mindful of
this. E.g.: The Commission may neither fine nor imprison punitively, but it may imprison
to coerce performance of a spiritual sentence. Or let us try a slightly different
formulation: The Commission may if it sees fit imprison a convicted person until he
performs a specified spiritual sentence instead of excommunicating him. Leaving aside
the pious pretense that it is better to be in jail than out of communion with the Church,
there is a sense in which the step from ordinary ecclesiastical process to High
Commission process in the form imagined is a modest one. Excommunication was
translatable into jail via De excommunicato capiendo. What we propose for the
Commission is not much more than a short-cut to the kind of coercion most effective
with most sinners. Of course there is some loss, for necessity’s sake, in “due process of
law.” De excomminicato would not lie every time someone was excommunicated de
facto; the process insured the common law courts a look at the circumstances and legality
of the excommunication. The availability of Habeas corpus, however, insures that at least
as well. A person imprisoned but not excommunicated is in fact better off than someone
imprisoned by virtue of De excommunicato, because the latter is almost surely
warrantably imprisoned—i.e., a return on Habeas corpus stating that the prisoner was
taken on a De excommunicato would be very hard to fault. Imprisonment of an
ecclesiastical defendant without the warrant of that writ must be adequately justified by
the return on Habeas corpus; any way in which the particular imprisonment was

163

unlawful—conceding the Commission’s generic power to imprison—would show up and
the prisoner be delivered. (Realistically, there was nothing de facto to prevent the
Commission from both excommunicating and imprisoning a man, simultaneously or
sequentially. I cannot say whether the usual practice was to do so. Legally, the question at
present under discussion is whether it might not have been plausible to hold that the
Commission may imprison if it is willing to forgo excommunication, or at least that if it
is to excommunicate at all it must excommunicate first and imprison without the De
excommunicato process only after a reasonable lapse of time.)
Permutations can then be generated: E.g.: The Commission may fine as a
punishment, but it may not imprison as a punishment. It may imprison to coerce
performance of a spiritual sentence, but not to coerce payment of fines, which must be
recovered like other debts to the Crown. (As I have already intimated, this latter rule has
good support from the cases. ) Further complications come in with further procedural
resources, ones which were used in practice. E.g.: Suppose the Commission orders a
party to perform a spiritual duty (say it orders a man not to abuse his wife); suppose it
imposes no secular punishment for past breaches of that duty, but orders the party to enter
into a bond payable to the King upon future breach. Is that lawful, assuming it to be
explicitly or by implication authorized by the patent? If so, does it represent a step into
secular powers notably more modest than all forms of fining or imprisoning? If ordering
someone to enter a performance bond is not objectionable as such, how about
imprisoning him until he is willing to enter the bond? Imprisoning him to coerce
performance of the primary duty after he has breached it, in lieu of suing on the bond?
Imprisoning only those who have both refused the option of a bond and violated the
court’s order? Fining them?
These observations will suffice to make the following point: “May the High
Commission be authorized to fine and imprison?” does not have to be answered “Yes” or
“No.” Indeed a radical “Yes” is a nearly untenable position, since it would open the way
to perpetual imprisonment and confiscatory fines. Short of a radical “No”, there are
numerous moderate positions. Moderation in general can be defended as a reasonable
construction of Parliament’s intent: Parliament meant neither to allow the Commission to
be given a full set of secular “teeth” nor to keep it from having any at all, thereby failing
to supplement the regular ecclesiastical system very significantly. Rather, it intended to
let such “teeth” be added as might make a difference in effective law enforcement,
without pulling the Commission away from the standard ecclesiastical model more than
was necessary to make a difference. A moderate spirit could be implemented by adopting
definite rules. An example, only one among various possibilities, would be: “The High
Commission may in effect operate like a court of equity. It may order penitential acts, or
other fully performable acts in obedience to the law or particular decrees, and coerce
performance by imprisonment. It may also imprison when orders reaching into the
indefinite future are broken, such as ‘Stop abusing your wife, stay away from her, and
pay her so much alimony every month.’ In the latter case, brief punitive imprisonment is
justified by the ‘contempt’, but it must be brief. The party must be offered the option of a
performance bond if the court is unwilling to assume that ‘brief punitive imprisonment’
will be enough to motivate his amendment, and he may be held for any length of time
only if he refuses the bond. That is all. Fines cannot be justified when by this limited
power to imprison the Commission has an effective means to see that the essentially
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injunctive remedies proper to any ecclesiastical court actually work. If sinners’
indifference to excommunication and the tediousness of translating it into imprisonment
via De excommunicato are the trouble with regular ecclesiastical justice—and what else
on the remedial front could be?—the problem has been solved.”
Alternatively, one might be an ad hoc moderate, setting no rules as to how far the
Commission may draw on its secular armoury, but inspecting each controverted case to
see if the use of secular sanctions seems justified by the circumstances—e.g., whether
there is evidence that a party has been, or is likely to be, unresponsive to spiritual
sanctions. The formal position behind this approach would be that the monarch’s
authorization of secular sanctions is valid only with an understood proviso: so far as
using such sanctions can be justified as a necessity in particular cases.
The three basic positions suggested so far (no secular sanctions—full power to
fine and imprison at least up to the limit of abusive excess—some secular powers, but
well short of that limit, variously specified) unfortunately do not exhaust the possibilities.
A further complication is introduced by the fact that ecclesiastical courts did not utterly
lack the power to imprison before 1 Eliz. They lacked such power “at common law”, but
a few statutes before 1 Eliz. enabled them to imprison in specific cases, notably heresy
and clerical incontinence. Omitting the details of the reasoning until we reach the cases, it
was arguable that 1 Eliz. intended to preserve these exceptional ecclesiastical powers in
the High Commission, but not in the other ecclesiastical courts. Various positions can be
generated if one grants this. E.g.: The High Commission may imprison for heresy,
because regular ecclesiastical courts once had statutory authority to imprison for that
offense, but it may not imprison for anything else (unless clerical incontinence, for the
same reason, granting that to be within the Commission’s substantive jurisdiction.)
Alternatively: Since the Commission may imprison heretics for the reason stated, it may
imprison generally for the narrow range of offenses within its substantive jurisdiction,
since those are like heresy and are only assignable to the Commission because they are; it
may fine in the same narrow range, since fining is the lesser punishment. Both of these
positions can be reached without taking a stand on whether the Commission could be
given secular sanctions in the absence of earlier statutes extending such sanctions to
ordinary ecclesiastical courts in specific cases. But one can grant the relevance of the
earlier statutes and still take one or another position on the other question.
Secular sanctions were the heart of the problem of what procedural powers could
be given to the High Commission, but not quite all of it. We have already noted the
question whether the Commission may order parties to enter bonds, even if there is no
attempt to back up the order by more than spiritual sanctions. The question may be
variably answerable according to the condition in the bond. (Besides bonds guaranteeing
performance of penance or good behavior in the future, we may instance general bonds to
abide by the award of the court and bonds to reply truthfully to interrogatories. One
should not assume that bonds of all types were equally legal or illegal.)
Another real-life problem is connected with the power to imprison, but not quite
the same: May the Commission be authorized to arrest defendants in the first instance—
i.e., to bring them before the court by attaching their bodies? If one utterly denies that the
Commission can be given imprisoning powers, the answer must be “No”—the
Commission may no more take a man prisoner in order to bring him before the court and
charge or question him than it may sentence him to jail after conviction. But the converse
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need not hold. One may grant that imprisonment is lawful after conviction, either as a
punishment or to coerce performance of another sentence, but still say that attachment of
the body at the commencement of a suit or prosecution is unlawful. At that stage,
arguably, the Commission must proceed like any other ecclesiastical court—cite the party
to appear and excommunicate him if he fails to. In so far as the Commission has any title
to use secular sanctions, it must, so to speak, have earned it—by convicting someone of a
crime within its jurisdiction. It is much less tolerable to permit an ecclesiastical court to
wield secular power over mere suspects or accusees, the more so because those courts
could lawfully cite people to appear in criminal cases without telling them why they were
cited before their appearance. To permit the High Commission to arrest without revealing
its reason is to let it exercise temporal power over people when it may lack any
jurisdiction. That is surely deplorable even if such abuse of arresting power would be
actionable false imprisonment, though it is of course possible that liability for false
imprisonment is a sufficient check on abuse.
The last important procedural power has already been discussed in Vol. II of this
study: power to conduct self-incriminatory examination. Suffice it here to say that the
Commission could be said to have such examining power where other ecclesiastical
courts did or might lack it. We have seen in Vol. II, however, that this theoretical
possibility did not come to much in practice. On the whole, the Commission was allowed
to use inquisitorial procedure within the same fairly generous limits as other ecclesiastical
courts and prevented from using it when other ecclesiastical courts clearly could not—
mainly when the tendency of the examination was to expose to temporal detriment and
when the articles of examination were not so revealed as to permit the examinee and the
common law courts to judge whether they related to an infra vires matter. Here we
should note that the Commission’s uncontested power, qua ecclesiastical court, to use
inquisition sometimes is capable of involvement with other issues. E.g.: If the
Commission proposes to conduct an intrinsically lawful examination and the examinee
refuses to respond, may he be imprisoned? Of course not if the Commission may never
imprison. But granting that it may do so sometimes, is this case more or less strong than
others? Might one argue, for instance, that the Commission really needs imprisoning
power to make recalcitrant parties cooperate with its due procedure for discovering the
truth within a narrow range of serious offenses—excommunication will do for
commonplace offenses and regular courts, but power to get at the truth of suspected
heresy must exist somewhere? If we grant that argument, then (by one line) power to
imprison cannot be excluded altogether, so it might as well be admitted for other
reasonable uses as well—especially, perhaps, if the Commission is confined to heresy
and the like. By another line, admitting imprisonment to compel cooperation in discovery
procedure entails nothing beyond itself. Because it is necessary to find out heretics, it
does not follow that it is necessary to punish even heretics, or to keep them in line in the
future. Order them to recant and excommunicate them if they refuse to; if they relapse,
prosecute them again or excommunicate them automatically. Once they are routed out,
are these spiritual sanctions, with the follow-up of De excommunicato capiendo, not what
the law appoints for heretics?
As the examining power is involved with other issues, so the High Commission’s
substantive jurisdiction is involved with its procedural powers. They are analytically
separable, but how one resolves the issues about each is bound up with how one resolves
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those about the other. I shall not spell out here the ways in which this is so. The general
type of question to keep in mind is: If one is convinced that the Commission is confined
to a few specifiable grave crimes, ought one to be generous in conceding secular
sanctions? Conversely, if one thinks that there would have been little sense in setting up
a High Commission without permitting it to be given secular sanctions for at least some
purposes, ought one to conclude that it was meant to be restricted to a few definite grave
crimes? E.g., does deprivation of appeals not weigh a great deal heavier when a man
stands to be fined or imprisoned without appeal than when he is only threatened by
spiritual sanctions? On the other hand, quite opposite correlations are possible:
Parliament authorized a High Commission when its horizons were dominated by the
Marian Bishops. All that was required was a tribunal with jurisdiction over the religious
offenses of which those Bishops were guilty, and the ecclesiastical power to deprive was
quite sufficient for dealing with them. Therefore no intention either to extend the
Commission’s jurisdiction beyond a narrow range of crimes or to give it secular sanctions
can be imputed to the legislature. Antithetically: The whole point about 1 Eliz. is that it
puts royal discretion to manage the Church and meet unforeseen necessities on a firm
statutory basis. The design is to let the monarch relocate ecclesiastical jurisdiction,
within very broad if any limits, when he judges that the regular system is not working
effectively. The effectiveness that is the end of the design would surely be better served
by authorizing the monarch to confer secular powers on the Commission at least for a
fairly broad range of possible uses, because merely shifting jurisdiction without any
increment of sanctions is not an obviously sufficient way to increase effectiveness when
it is putatively urgent to do so.
It will be evident from what has been said that issues about 1 Eliz. and the High
Commission were complex and criss-crossing. One ought not to be surprised by what the
cases will show: There was a lot of litigation; disentangling the issues and settling them
coherently came hard. A relatively super-charged political atmosphere—the government
and Church hierarchy strongly committed to the High Commission, loath to accept
adverse decisions—added to the judges’ already difficult task of construing baffling
legislation and sorting out the plausible policies that one or another interpretation would
serve. A further obstacle to the courts’ getting a clear focus on the issues and resolving
them decisively was the high incidence of Habeas corpus cases occasioned by the
Commission’s purported power to imprison.
Although they have their special problems in the present field, Prohibitions are at
least relatively capable of raising issues cleanly and comprehensively. In Prohibition, the
aggrieved party has the floor. A man might come and say, e.g., that he was ordered to
pay alimony by the Commission and imprisoned for refusal to enter a performance bond.
He at least has the opportunity to allege and argue that the Commission may not be given
jurisdiction in marital cases, may not imprison at all, may not demand a performance
bond, and even if it may sometimes imprison and if demanding the bond is not illegal,
imprisonment may not be used to enforce this sort of order. The judges may find one
ground for prohibiting in all that and prefer to leave other questions unresolved, but at
least they have been told, in whatever detail plaintiff-in-Prohibition elects, about what has
gone on in the High Commission, and they have been invited to consider several issues at
once and as they bear on each other.
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In Habeas corpus, on the other hand, the jailer—and behind him the committing
authority—has the floor. He is challenged to justify the imprisonment without saying a
word more than will satisfy that purpose. In Habeas corpus cases, therefore, the issues
about the High Commission tend to occur without the accompaniment of detailed
information. They are also overlaid with independent questions about Habeas corpus
policy. These questions concern how much detail is required in the justificatory statement
as a matter of form, how much benefit of the doubt should be given to a statement that is
sufficient for some, but not all, circumstances, and—subsuming the other questions—
what the Habeas corpus is essentially for and whether it ought in general to be
administered with a bias against the prisoner (leaving him to other remedies—Prohibition
or False Imprisonment—if, on a fuller showing of circumstances, he can make out the
commitment to be unlawful.) In addition, Habeas corpus admitted of three results—
discharge, bail, and remand. The middle option, bail, could be the basis for compromise
or inconclusive dispositions—bailing a man whose commitment might be lawful but
where holding him further seemed unnecessary, or bailing one whose commitment was
probably not lawful, but where keeping an eye on him seemed a tolerable qualification on
his not-quite-clear right to liberty. In sum, though issues about the High Commission’s
jurisdiction and procedures could be and often were decided straightforwardly on Habeas
corpus, the writ had the potentiality of diverting the courts to narrow grounds,
technicalities, and discretionary indecision. A practice exclusively based on Prohibition
might have conduced to easier settlement of the issues.
The overriding reason why the High Commission issues were hard to resolve is
that it is close to anybody’s guess what the relevant clause in 1 Eliz. provides by its very
language. I have thought it best to outline the possible paths down which policy
preferences and the sense of probable intention might lead a judge before looking at the
text of the act. Let us conclude with an inspection of the text and the hints in the language
that give some sort of countenance to the different possible positions.
The High Commission clause of 1 Eliz. follows immediately on the heart of the
act—viz. The clause which “unites and annexes” to the Crown all jurisdiction and
authority which had “heretofore been, or may lawfully be exercised for the visitation of
the ecclesiastical state and persons and for reformation, order, and correction of the same,
and all manner of errors, heresies, schisms, abuses, offences, contempts, and enormities.”
Following thereupon, the act empowers the monarch “by letters patent…to assign…when
and as often as your highness…shall think meet and convenient, and for such and so long
time as shall please your highness…such person or persons being natural-born
subjects…as your majesty shall think meet…to exercise, use, occupy, and execute under
your highness…all manner of jurisdictions, privileges, and preeminences, in any wise
touching or concerning any spiritual or ecclesiastical jurisdiction, within these your
realms…;and to visit, reform, redress, order, correct, and amend all such errors, heresies,
schisms, abuses, offences, contempts, and enormities whatsoever, which by any manner
spiritual or ecclesiastical power, authority, or jurisdiction, can or may lawfully be
reformed, ordered, redressed, corrected restrained or amended, to the pleasure of
Almighty God, and the increase of virtue, and the conservation of the peace and unity of
this realm, and that such person or persons so to be…assigned…, after the said letters
patent to him or them made and delivered…shall have full power and authority, by virtue
of this Act, and the said letters patent, under your highness…to exercise, use, and execute
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all the premises, according to the tenor and effect of the said letters patent…” I think it is
obvious that this language encourages the proposition that the patentees may be given
any or all parts of ecclesiastical subject-matter jurisdiction. It is hard to see off-hand how
any other conclusion is possible. Note especially (my italics) “to exercise…all manner of
jurisdictions…in any wise touching…any spiritual or ecclesiastical jurisdiction…”
On the other hand, there is nothing in the language obviously encouraging to the
notion that the Commission may be given secular sanctions. One can try to get mileage in
support of that from “…shall have full power and authority, by virtue of this Act,, and the
said letters patent…” and from “…according to the tenor and effect of the said letters
patent…” The straightforward reading of this language is that the Commission has
authority by virtue of the statute to the extent that the patent, pursuing the statute, gives it
authority. Since the statute says nothing whatsoever about secular sanctions, a patent
purporting to confer them would seem not to pursue the statute. It may be arguable,
however, that the statutory language calls attention to the patent so as to suggest that it is
to be an independent source of authority, as opposed to a mere implementation of the
statute. Would Parliament have added the “according to the tenor and effect” phrase
unless it meant to concede something to the monarch beyond mere power to do what the
statute manifestly authorizes (for without the added phrase it would manifestly authorize
him to give some or all parts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction cum ecclesiastical sanctions)?
I do not find this line convincing, but I believe it had some influence.
More persuasively, one may come down on language seemingly designed not to
exclude any powers which by any stretch of the imagination can be regarded as
ecclesiastical. If that is what Parliament was trying to say, then there is a case of sorts for
the proposition that imprisonment does not utterly and in every sense fail to qualify as an
ecclesiastical power. The phrases “All manner of jurisdictions, privileges, and
preeminences” and “in any wise touching” are critical for this theory, but especially
important is the language of the preceding clause. That clause defines what the monarch
has in his hands to convey to the Commission as any powers which have “heretofore
been” exercised. It is legitimate to take these words as covering not only the traditional or
“common law” ecclesiastical powers, but also any powers ever exercised in the past by
virtue of statutes. I have already noted that statutes no longer on the books had once
enabled ecclesiastical courts to imprison for heresy and clerical incontinence.
Once the former statutory powers are in the door, they can be generalized with at
least some tenuous plausibility. I.e., one can say the powers “heretofore” used to enforce
the ecclesiastical law included “power to imprison” or even “power to impose secular
sanctions”, as opposed to the mere power to imprison for a couple of specific crimes.
If we switch to the other tack and try to use the words of the act to restrict the
Commission’s substantive jurisdiction, there is language that must be got around. One
can perhaps argue that the broadest expressions (“all manner”, “in any wise”) are so
suspiciously broad that they can be discounted as careless, or as intended only to convey
the general idea that ecclesiastical jurisdiction can be delegated to special commissioners.
I say “suspiciously broad” partly because comparably vague and inclusive language is not
used in the preceding “annexation” clause. One cannot doubt that “all” spiritual
jurisdiction was annexed to the Crown in so far as that is a synonymous way of saying
the monarch was Supreme Governor—meaning inter alia sole titular head of, and
embodiment of the authority of, the entire ecclesiastical legal system. In actually
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describing what the monarch has, however, the “annexation” clause does not give a
picture of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in every dimension. Rather, it specifies what may be
taken as only one dimension of that jurisdiction—“power…for the visitation of the
ecclesiastical state and persons [etc.] of errors [etc].” Ecclesiastical jurisdiction so
specified is unmistakably made transferable to patentees by the High Commission clause;
part of the language is repeated almost exactly. The specified jurisdiction seems to be
made transferable over and above what amounts to “all jurisdiction” (note the “and”), but
that does not make much sense. For if the copulative is taken literally, the act would read
in effect, “The High Commission may be given any and all ecclesiastical jurisdiction and
also one part of it—viz. power to ‘visit, reform, [etc.]…heresies [etc.].‘ “Is it not better to
construe the relation between the vague preceding words and the more specific
subsequent ones as follows: “The monarch’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction may in general
principle be transferred to patentees, but what specifically may be transferred is his
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the sense that the basic ‘annexation’ clause above singles out
and emphasizes as what is notably repossessed by the Crown from the usurping Pope—
viz. power to ‘visit [etc.]’”?
To reach this construction, one perhaps needs to be convinced that Parliament
could not have intended to subvert localism or appeals, or that historically it had no
purpose in view that would justify risking those consequences. Nevertheless, there is a
verbal problem—a problem of making sense of language which on close inspection is
rather odd, rather hard to make out as deliberately chosen to give the monarch the freest
possible hand. In any event, while attention is focused on the words “to visit
[etc.]…heresies [etc.]”, restrictive possibilities are opened.
Take it, as the paraphrase constructed above requires, that the monarch is only
authorized to give the Commission power to “visit [etc.].” What does that mean? It is not
self-evident that those words describe anything narrower than the whole of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction. Let us then proceed by picking out the “weaker” or more general
expressions: The Commission may be given power to “redress, order, correct and
amend…all offences…which by any manner spiritual or
ecclesiastical…jurisdiction…may lawfully be…ordered, redressed, corrected, restrained,
or amended [so as to please God and promote virtue, peace, and unity.]” Arguably, an
“offence” could be any breach of ecclesiastical law, including breach of such duties as
the cultivator’s obligation to pay tithes or an executor’s to fulfill the desires of the
testator. Breach of the latter sort of duty may not be punishable, but it is surely subject to
“ordering”, “redressing”, or “amending” by ecclesiastical courts. God is presumably
pleased if tithes and legacies are paid when they are due, and something like the “general
welfare” of a Christian country—if that is not too loose a translation of “peace and unity”
plus “virtue”—is presumably served. On the other hand, it is surely fair, and on balance
more convincing, to take the words in question as referring exclusively to the criminal
side of ecclesiastical law. It is at least legitimate “strict construction” to say that
“offences” refers to crimes. If the statute-makers meant all breaches of duty remediable
in ecclesiastical courts they could have said so. The surrounding words either refer to
specific crimes, such as heresy, or to kinds of activity associable with crime in either
legal usage (“contempts”) or popular (“enormities”, “abuses”). “Reform” is also a pointer
to criminal law, especially because ecclesiastical law itself spoke of its criminal-penalpenitential side as “pro reformatione morum.” On the whole, it is sensible to discount a
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degree of statutory pleonasm in the act’s string of words and to follow the more
manageable ones to the conclusion that only criminal jurisdiction is meant.
Beyond this point, it is unnecessary to elaborate the possibilities of verbal
construction for the most important purposes. The resolution that confines the
Commission to heresy, schism, and maybe some allied religious offenses covered by
“errors”, plus those moral offenses that can be seriously considered equally “enormous”,
can obviously be criticized for sloughing “abuses”, “contempts”, and “offences.” It takes
some discounting for pleonasm plus construction by intent to conclude for only a very
narrow slice of criminal jurisdiction. A looser standard of seriousness is easier to see:
Heresy is high-powered company for utterly trivial “offences”; “abuse” can perhaps be
associated with such all-inclusive expressions as “misbehavior”, but its main affinities are
probably more with “pernicious examples” than with the occasional peccadillo or excess
of spirits; “contempt” may have a degree of specific content—deliberate disrespect for
the Church, which is more serious than “peccadilloes”, however it is manifested, and is
faintly redolent of religious error. (As will appear from the cases, there were special
problems about the more technical sense of that word—“contempt of court.”) As “peace
and unity” may be taken to point to criminal jurisdiction by association with the secular
“contra pacem”, so may the expression go to imply some restraint on foolishly
aggrandizing the High Commission: Peace and fellowship are hardly to be served, even if
“virtue” is, by making it possible for high officialdom to harass extremely minor sinners.
A final problem of verbal construction requires notice. The “annexation” clause
singles out, in addition to what is perhaps best identified as criminal jurisdiction
generally, power “for the visitation of the ecclesiastical state and persons, and for
reformation, order, and correction of the same.” The High Commission clause says
nothing about “the ecclesiastical state and persons,” but it does use the word “visit” in
addition to “reform [etc.].” If the High Commission clause stood alone, I do not think
“visit” would cause any difficulty. It would probably go only to reinforce the conclusion
that the act is talking about criminal jurisdiction, for it alludes to an ecclesiastical
procedure that fell on the criminal side: Bishops’ visitations of the localities in their
dioceses, at which presentments of a wide range of offenses were taken. Visitations, like
some secular inquests, had a broader information-gathering function than merely bringing
criminal offences to light and furnishing a basis for prosecution, but their form and
content are primarily associable with the enforcement of criminal law. (Minor enough
aspects of it, one must grant, so that “visit” conceivably militates against a seriousness
standard.) The “annexation” clause, however, connects “visitation” with “the
ecclesiastical state and persons.” It seems to call attention to the Crown’s supervisory
power over what I call above “infra-Church affairs” and over Church personnel. Only
after that does it move on to what looks like criminal jurisdiction in general.
From these observations, two contradictory arguments can be developed. Both
require the premise that quoad laymen the High Commission is largely restricted to
serious crimes. Upon that premise, the question arises whether the same standard applies
to clergymen and to some kinds of “intra-Church affairs” even when they involve
laymen. The first argument is that the word “visit” in the High Commission clause is a
link with the “annexation” clause: The Commission may be given what is mentioned in
the preceding clause—not all ecclesiastical jurisdiction, because the preceding clause
does not speak as generally as that, but criminal jurisdiction, or some part thereof, over
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everyone, plus further powers over “the ecclesiastical state and persons.” The latter
comprise all criminal offenses by clergy, even if the same crime in a layman would be
too minor for the Commission; sanctions only appropriate to clergy, notably deprivation;
in so far as ecclesiastical law admits of it, power to punish, deprive, or enjoin clergy and
other full-time Church personnel, such as officers of ecclesiastical courts, even without
charging them with an offense classified as criminal; more controversially, but perhaps,
non-criminal jurisdiction over laymen when they are directly involved in the internal
management of the Church or hold Church offices—e.g., churchwardens, parishioners
qua electors of churchwardens and parish clerks, lay rectors with respect to some duties.
The contrary argument would exploit the difference between the “annexation”
clause and the High Commission clause: Whereas the former seems to speak of a
supervisory function in the Supreme Governor, the latter does not repeat that language;
all it repeats is the word “visit”, inclusion of which is much less significant than omission
of “the ecclesiastical state and persons”; the slight change of language in the later clause
should be taken as deliberate—i.e., as signifying that supervision of the clergy and “intraChurch affairs”, while worth singling out as a right and responsibility of the monarch, is
not intended to be delegable except as it is comprised in the part of criminal jurisdiction
that is made delegable.
With this much guidance to the major issues on the High Commission, we may
proceed to the cases. Lesser issues will occasionally arise, but what I have outlined
covers nearly all that was problematic. In view of the complexity of this field, it may be
helpful if I express a view as to the “best bet”—the position on the main issues that seems
to me most recommended by a mixture of verbal construction and policy considerations.
In brief: The High Commission ought to be restricted for the most part to serious crimes.
There is good warrant for not taking “serious crimes” in the narrowest possible sense—
i.e., for letting the High Commission proceed in criminal cases if the monarch seems to
have intended it to do so without restriction, and if contextual consideration and
defensible general criteria can be invoked to make out that a particular situation is serious
enough to justify resort to an extraordinary tribunal. Loosening the standard for clerical
offenders is justifiable; one should be shy of letting the Commission take over “intraChurch affairs” to any larger extent than that. Use of secular sanctions is hard to justify
except by (a) the argument that Parliament intended to preserve, for the High
Commission alone, imprisoning power formerly given to ecclesiastical courts by statute
and (b) the argument that coercive imprisonment is a useful short-cut for making an
extraordinary tribunal more effective than regular Church courts. I would not think it
unreasonable to permit imprisonment in the situations literally covered by earlier
repealed statutes and to permit coercive detention subject to safeguards. (Insist on a
showing that penitential acts have been prescribed or a course of behavior enjoined and
that the party has refused to perform the penance or violated the injunction—in the latter
case, perhaps that he has been cited and warned of his danger before commitment; make
sure that people are not punished under color of coercive detention—i.e., that they are
not held when they express willingness to obey, and that they are given a hearing when it
is claimed that they have not done what they agreed to; recognize that coercive
imprisonment cannot go on forever—i.e., see that the obdurately disobedient are
released when they have paid in substitute form all that their conformity could be worth
to the Church in view of the offense in question.) Beyond this I would not go, Power to
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fine and to demand performance bonds can only be defended by sophistical arguments.
No secular punishments aside from the cases covered by earlier statutes can be found in
the words of 1 Eliz. Intent to make the Commission more effective than ordinary
ecclesiastical courts is reasonable construction outside the words. It is a sufficient
concession to that policy to let the Commission operate by rough analogy to courts of
equity—to detain coercively within reason and thereby to get quicker and surer results
than “the course of the law” sometimes produced.
End of Section 1
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Section 2—Cheinye v. Frankwell and Caudrey v. Atton:
Two Cases on the High Commission Not Arising on Prohibition or Habeas
Corpus
Summary
This Section is devoted to two special and intricate Elizabethan cases. (See the
text just below for their peculiar characteristics and relevance.) With reference to
straightforward issues about the High Commission’s jurisdiction and powers, the two
cases may be counted as authority for the propositions listed below. They can lay claim to
more extensive implications, but for reasons that appear in the text that claim should be
regarded with skepticism.
(1) The Commission may proceed against an incontinent clergyman. Whatever other
sanctions it may or may not apply, it may deprive such clergyman of his living upon
conviction—but this was not seriously controversial once the Commission’s jurisdiction
is conceded.
(2) Common law courts may not prevent the Commission from taking a suit on the
ground that another suit about the same matter is already pending in a regular
ecclesiastical court, assuming the suit is intrinsically appropriate to the Commission.
Taking a suit in such circumstances is improper, but the remedy must be found within the
ecclesiastical system. This is true despite the fact that there was no routine appeal from
the High Commission.
(3) The Commission may proceed against a clergyman who speaks against the Book
of Common Prayer or refuses to follow it. It may deprive him of his living upon
conviction on the first offense as well as upon a subsequent one. These propositions were
problematic because of hard-to-interpret provisions of the Uniformity Act (1 Eliz., c.2),
by which the Prayer Book was established and acts of opposition to it defined as crimes.
The problem is whether, under the statute, any ecclesiastical court could deprive a
minister for his first offense against the Prayer Book. To hold that the Commission may
do so is probably to hold that regular ecclesiastical courts also may and then, that there is
no objection to the Commission’s doing likewise.
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The Cases
Two Elizabethan cases on the High Commission have a special character, for
which reason they are treated in a separate Section. These cases, Cheinye v. Frankwell
and Caudrey v. Atton, did not arise on Prohibition or Habeas corpus, but by way of
special verdicts in common law actions. In both cases, the litigation was between a
parson deprived by the High Commission and his successor—litigation to test which
party was entitled to the property attached to the benefice. Although the specific issues
were different, both cases turned on whether the Commission’s sentence of deprivation
was lawful. In both, a jury found the facts and left the validity of the deprivation to the
judges. I.e., the schematic form of both verdicts was, “The High Commission purportedly
deprived Parson A, after which Parson B was inducted into the living and entered on the
property; whether A or B is entitled depends on whether A’s deprivation was valid,
which question of law we cannot speak to.”
These cases raise questions about the jurisdiction and powers of the Commission.
They therefore have implications for the normal contexts in which those questions came
up—Prohibitions and Habeas corpus. At the same time, their special form affects the
force of those implications. I.e., it does not automatically follow that analogous
Prohibition cases must come out the same way as the special verdict cases. In both
Cheinye and Caudrey, the High Commission “won”—the sentences of deprivation were
held lawful as far as the common law courts are concerned. The decisions therefore
arguably imply that the Commission should not be prohibited in analogous
circumstances. But that argument can possibly be opposed by considerations of
procedural context—in essence, by maintaining that the judges are freer to look into the
propriety of ecclesiastical proceedings in Prohibition than upon a special verdict. The
cases are accordingly discussed for their own sakes, though in the end attention is given
to their implications for Prohibition law.
Discussing them for their own sakes has certain collateral advantages as well.
Both were major cases of considerable difficulty. Cheinye was argued in the Queen’s
Bench and then upon a Writ of Error in the Exchequer Chamber, where the judgment
below was probably upheld. It therefore represents an especially solemn decision.
Caudrey, also a Queen’s Bench case, was a protracted and intricately argued lawsuit. To
one of its reporters, Coke, it seemed an outstandingly deliberate and far-reaching
decision. Some exception can be taken to Coke’s version of the case, but that does not
detract from its importance as a challenge to the lawyers and judges concerned. It
presents perhaps the most baffling set of issues ever faced by the courts in a case
touching the High Commission, or indeed the general subject of relations between the
temporal and spiritual legal systems. Caudrey is much more a case on the Uniformity
Act than on the Supremacy Act. Although the former comes up in some Prohibition and
Habeas corpus cases, it was never so thoroughly discussed. Giving Caudrey detailed
attention is therefore partly justified by the picture it gives of lawyers struggling with
another statute touching the Church courts, over and above the ones that were largely
interpreted through Prohibition cases.
Both Cheinye and Caudrey were triumphs for Coke’s advocacy. (For Caudrey,
this is knowable from manuscript evidence. Coke the reporter does not give himself
credit for the victory, and the other printed report, Popham’s, does not name the counsel.)
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There is irony in the fact that Coke, who by reputation (and more qualifiedly in reality)
became the High Commission’s worst enemy, had succeeded as a practitioner in winning
two pro-Commission decisions in notably tricky cases. The intrinsic difficulty of the two
cases and the careful attention paid to them by Coke and other good lawyers meant that
the debate reached beyond routine issues on the Commission’s competence to the wider
jurisprudential and constitutional bearings of those issues. For that reason, I consider the
cases worth the space required to work them out—for Caudrey a process complicated by
problems about the accuracy of Coke’s report in the light of other partially conflicting
ones. On the other hand, for the practical purpose of making out what the courts across
the board thought the High Commission could and could not do, the contents of this
Section are not particularly important. Neither case represents a commonplace situation.
Such questions as whether the High Commission could proceed for adultery and whether
it was entitled to use secular sanctions are the practical ones, on which the mass of
Prohibition and Habeas corpus law bears, but on which Cheinye and Caudrey cast only
oblique light. For the practical questions, the reader may go on Section 3 immediately
following.
The facts of Cheinye v. Frankwell (1584-88)64 as found by special verdict were
as follows: Cheinye, a beneficed clergyman, was presented to the diocesan court for
incontinence. He was given a day to clear himself by compurgation, made default, and
was subsequently deprived of his living. On appeal to the Arches, the sentence of
deprivation was reversed (why does not appear.) Cheinye was then presented again in the
diocesan court for the same act of incontinence and again a day was assigned for making
compurgation. Before that day he took a fresh appeal to the Arches (grounds not given.)
Pending the appeal, the High Commission summoned Cheinye, again for the same
incontinence, and deprived him. Frankwell was admitted to the benefice. Either he or
Cheinye sued the other in Trespass for taking away tithes. Title to the tithes depended on
whether Cheinye’s deprivation by the High Commission was valid.
Cheinye’s lawyer, Wroth, did not argue that the offense of incontinence in a
clergyman was too minor for the High Commission. He did not have to, because another
strong argument was available: viz. that the Commission may not take over suits pending
in ordinary ecclesiastical courts. The Pope, according to Wroth, had no authority to do
that, and the most that 1 Eliz. effected was to give the Queen and her commissioners what
the Pope had before. This rule will stand with the proposition that the Commission, if so
authorized by the monarch, may take any ecclesiastical case that is not already before
another court. Towards showing that it may not steal away pending suits, however,
Wroth made what became standard arguments for restricting the Commission: 1 Eliz.
does not intend to deprive the ordinary ecclesiastical courts of their jurisdiction by
permitting the Commission to be given a blank check. By re-enacting 23 Hen. VIII (cf.
Ch. 2 above), 1 Eliz. endorses that statute’s policy of localism. The effect of upholding
the Commission in any given case is to deprive the party of the appeals he would have if
the suit were in a regular Church court. At one point, Wroth says that lack of an appeal is
especially inconvenient when the effect is to “disinherit a parson.” With that he is not too
far from suggesting that incontinence is simply not “enormous” enough to be a High
Commission matter, even though he does not so argue explicitly. I.e., apart from the
64

See the extended note to Cheinye at the end of this Section.
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argument from the pending suit, it would be difficult to maintain that a clergyman could
not be deprived for heresy, say, by the High Commission, appeal or no appeal. Saying
that deprivation is too severe a penalty for the statute-makers to have permitted without
appeal should probably be understood with the addition “save in the rarest and most
serious cases, and incontinence is not one of them.”
Wroth also tried to pick holes in the formal legality of the Commission’s
sentence as found by the special verdict. We may omit these arguments, for the court
rejected them and they say nothing significant about the Commission’s boundaries. (In
effect, the judges held that the special verdict found the fact that the High Commission
deprived Cheinye, notwithstanding various ways in which, by strict construction of the
verdict, it was arguable that the body called the “High Commission” was not identified
correctly and the act of deprivation was not so described as to be unmistakably
identifiable as that body’s official act. So holding does not imply that the Commission
deprived Cheinye lawfully, the real question.)
On the substance, the Court accepted Wroth’s argument in its narrow sense, but
used its very premise to conclude against his client. I.e.: The judges held that the
Commission exceeded its authority in taking action against Cheinye when proceedings
were pending against him in the regular courts. They so held because, as Wroth had
argued, such intervention was contrary to the ecclesiastical law itself, and 1 Eliz. did not
permit the Commission to be given powers without a pre-existing basis in the
ecclesiastical law. On this premise, however, the court held against Cheinye. So far as
this court was concerned, Cheinye was found deprived by ecclesiastical process and
therefore not entitled to the tithes. His deprivation was erroneous by ecclesiastical
standards, but the proper way to rectify that was by appeal, A common law court was not
entitled to take note of an error in ecclesiastical law. Coke, of counsel with Frankwell,
was responsible for persuading the court to take this course.
It seems clear from the reports that the majority of the court adopted the position
above. Leonard’s report, however, though it accords on that, gives a strong pro-High
Commission speech by Chief Justice Wray, which amounts to a concurring opinion.
Wray says that one who sues in the Arches may “for his own expedition, and for to
procure due punishment against the offender” remove the case to the High Commission.
(Why the Arches specifically I do not know. Wray’s rule apparently includes under “one
who sues in the Arches” an appellee there—in this case a Bishop or his deputy
proceeding on presentment, rather than a private complainant. There appears to be no
question of the judge of the Arches requesting removal to the High Commission pursuant
to 23 Hen. VIII, as opposed to the party who is ultimately plaintiff, though he is
immediately appellee.) It is clearly implied that in Wray’s opinion there was no error.
The strict formulation would be that whether there was ecclesiastical error was irrelevant,
for it is extremely hard to say that ecclesiastical law generally permitted a party to
remove a suit to another, or a higher, court except by appeal. Wray’s position must
therefore be that the High Commission had been created precisely in order to permit what
ecclesiastical law did not—such removal, for the presumable end of seeing an offender
punished by fine or imprisonment (the only very meaningful sense of a “due punishment”
which could not just as well be imposed by an ordinary ecclesiastical court.) Again, there
is no sign that the Court as a whole agreed with this.
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Cheinye then brought a Writ of Error in the new Exchequer Chamber (created by
statute in 1585 to review King’s Bench judgments.) Two errors were laid: (a) The King’s
Bench was right in principle but wrong in application when it refused to act on its opinion
that deprivation was erroneous. Rectification of such error ought to be left to
ecclesiastical appeal if that were available, but there was no appeal from the High
Commission. Therefore the only remedy was for the King’s Bench to take note of the
ecclesiastical law and hold for Cheinye. (b) A further reason why the Commission’s
sentence was erroneous was advanced, this one not dependent on ecclesiastical law. Viz.:
If 1 Eliz. restricts the Commission in no other way, the statute only permits it to do as
much as the monarch authorizes it to. As the Queen’s agents, the Commissioners must
pursue their authority, which is to say that their commission should be read as a set of
instructions to proceed in such-and-such ways and only those ways. In the present case,
going by what the special verdict explicitly or implicitly said about the proceedings, the
Commissioners had not pursued their commission. That is because the commission
empowered them to give judgment upon proof by witnesses or the party’s confession. In
the instant case, they gave judgment against Cheinye without establishing as a fact, by
either of those two means, that he committed incontinence. Rather, they took it as a fact
when he pleaded the suit in the Arches as a reason why the Commission lacked
jurisdiction (as a common law court would take a demurrer on a plea in confession and
avoidance of alleged facts.) By Cheinye’s theory, the commission did not refer to a
“confession” in this special legal sense, but only to a direct admission of the crime.
How the Writ of Error turned out is not reported, but two judges speak to the two
exceptions, both tending to uphold the King’s Bench. The best guess is that the judgment
was affirmed. The argument that no appeal was available was made at the Bar by Fenner,
now representing Cheinye. Coke, still representing the other side, replied that the de facto
lack of an appeal did not interfere with the principle that an error within the ecclesiastical
system is beyond the common law’s cognizance. If the Delegates, the highest regular
ecclesiastical court of appeal, gave a sentence which a common law court regarded as
erroneous, Coke said, it would still be necessary to leave rectification to the ecclesiastical
system. There would be no ordinary appeal from the Delegates, but still, in a manner of
speaking, “the only remedy is ecclesiastical appeal.” So with the High Commission.
Coke made his point in this high-and-dry way, but it does not have to come to a
relentlessly hard rule. As Justice Periam observed, Cheinye was not really foreclosed
from reversing the erroneous sentence. According to Periam, civilians had been consulted
at an earlier stage of the present case and had certified as a matter of ecclesiastical law
that an appeal lay from the High Commission to the monarch. The civilians’ reason was
that before the Reformation one could appeal from delegates of the Pope to the Pope
himself. (There were grounds for doubting whether the monarch could review decisions
by the Delegates, in the sense of the “ecclesiastical supreme court” established by the
statute of 25 Hen. VIII, c.19. The question was whether the statute meant to forbid such
reviews. A small amount of pre-Civil War litigation on that matter—discussed later in
this study—tends to affirm the royal power to grant review commissions “of grace”,
though it is less than clearly decisive. Even, however, if the opposite conclusion were
reached, I do not think Periam’s point and the civilians’ would be affected. Had the Pope
set up a special first-instance court like the High Commission, it would necessarily have
been a delegation of his plenary powers, and its decisions would have been appealable to
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Rome as all ecclesiastical decisions were before the Reformation. Nothing in the
language of 1 Eliz. authorizing the High Commission puts obstacles in the way of royal
review of that court’s decisions comparable to those that 25 Hen. VIII arguable, though
improbably put in the way of review of the Court of Delegates’ decisions.)
In response to Coke, Fenner cited a case from 16 Eliz.: One Foxe was deprived for
incontinence on the last day of Parliament; Parliament pardoned the offense; the sentence
of deprivation was held void. I suppose this was meant to say that common law courts
will sometimes overrule sentences of deprivation without waiting on the ecclesiastical
system. (I presume the ecclesiastical court could and should give effect to the pardon. If
the first-instance court refused to, the party could presumably appeal the refusal as an
error. The ecclesiastical rule that appeal suspends sentence would seem to remove the
objection that the appellate court would be intervening to give effect to a pardon that did
not exist when the original court gave sentence. Quaere tamen.) Chief Justice Anderson
replied to Fenner that his precedent had little force because “it is against a general statute,
of which everyone ought to take notice.” I.e. (I take it): Of course common law courts
may enforce statutes, and if an ecclesiastical sentence which comes before a common law
court is deemed to violate a statute it should of course be treated as void. There is no
obligation to take the sentence as valid until it is reversed by an ecclesiastical court. That
situation is not like the present one, where the standard by which the ecclesiastical
sentence may be deemed invalid is ecclesiastical law. (Anderson assumes that
ecclesiastical error by the High Commission does not violate 1 Eliz.; it is no different
from error on the part of any other ecclesiastical court. Can the assumption be
questioned? Wroth and Fenner can perhaps be criticized for not maintaining the contrary
explicitly enough, but allowing the vulnerable argument from appeals to carry too much
weight. Is it likely that the statute-makers would have set up a court stringently limited in
its subject-matter jurisdiction, confined to criminal cases—in which the Church has a
collective interest—, not subject to ordinary appeal, and free to apply any unwarranted
version of ecclesiastical law? Setting up such a court is arguably not the same as erecting
a final court of appeal and giving it absolutely the last word. The latter of course could
administer its law irresponsibly, but the context militates against it—a context of prior
decisions submitted for review and of predominantly civil cases in which the court
usually has no motive except to do legal justice by its best lights.)
To the second objection—lack of appropriate proof or confession of Cheinye’s
incontinence—Justice Periam replied simply that it did not matter whether the
Commission had pursued its instructions. The sentence of deprivation was still void—
meaning presumably “voidable”, “erroneous” owing to the improper preemption of a suit
pending elsewhere. (I do not think Periam could mean that failure to pursue the
instructions would itself be an error uncontrollable by common law courts, for that would
surely be head-on violation of the statute.) The position is unpersuasive, it seems to me.
Why should the invalidity of the Commission’s sentence by statutory standards not be
taken note of, even though its invalidity in another sense cannot be reached? Chief Justice
Anderson took the bull by the horns more firmly, holding in effect that the offense was
sufficiently confessed, so that the instructions were not violated. He reached this via the
proposition that a party who appears before the Commission and refuses to answer may
be convicted as if he had confessed. Granting that the statute puts no obstacle in the way
of treating silence as confession, it follows reasonably enough that a pleading confession,
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or admission of guilt merely implied in taking exception to the Commission’s jurisdiction
before the Commission, is also as good as a direct confession. The underlying proposition
obviously needs defense. Why should the instructions not be narrowly construed, and the
statute construed as insisting that they be? There may of course be good answers,
including standard canons of construction. The instructions could have been written to
explain the sense of “confession” if the intent was to narrow the application of the term,
and the statute could have both limited the monarch’s power to instruct and commanded
strict construction of any instructions given pursuant to it.
To summarize the Exchequer Chamber stage: Both exceptions to the judgment
below were rejected, each on somewhat different grounds, by both judges heard from in
the report. No other judge contradicted Periam and Anderson or spoke in favor of
Fenner’s objections, so far as the report shows. We may take it as highly probable that the
Queen’s Bench decision was upheld and treat it as authority.
Does the Trespass case of Cheinye v. Frankwell have implications for Prohibition
cases? I suggest the following: (a) One certainly could use Cheinye as authority for
refusing to prohibit if it were complained that the High Commission had taken over a
case pending in a regular ecclesiastical court, but I am not sure one would be constrained
to. There is a difference between deciding whether to cut off improper ecclesiastical
proceedings by Prohibition and dealing with a special verdict in an action between party
and party. It makes conservative sense to hold that a verdict finding deprivation goes
against the deprivee, even though the common law court believes the deprivation
erroneous. There is a way in which the deprivee is at fault for not helping himself within
the ecclesiastical system, while his successor in the living cannot be blamed for assuming
the benefice was vacant. Prohibitions to keep one ecclesiastical court from infringing on
another were always problematic; such infringement could always be represented as error
in ecclesiastical law subject to appeal (cf. Vol. III, p.155 ff.) It was not unanimously
considered beyond the range of Prohibition, however, and the High Commission is surely
a special case—a court whose errors were at least not straightforwardly appealable and
the creation of a statute very specifically intended, according to almost all interpretations,
not to destroy the vested interests of regular ecclesiastical tribunals.
(b) It was held that the High Commission erred in depriving Cheinye because it
was bound by ecclesiastical law and failed to observe it. So holding discountenances the
theory that the Commission was not strictly an ecclesiastical court, but a statutory
tribunal on which the monarch was authorized to confer powers which ecclesiastical
courts did not have de jure. Most controversy was about power to fine and imprison. One
could of course, consistently with Cheinye, believe that the unexpressed intent of the
statute was to permit conferral of those specific powers—essentially because creating an
extraordinary court for a few “enormous” offenses would not have made much sense if
the intent was to leave the suppression of enormity to ordinary spiritual sanctions. It is a
more general license to the monarch that Cheinye stands in the way of—license in effect
to authorize a special variant brand of ecclesiastical law to be administered in the High
Commission alone. For example—the direct application of Cheinye—, the statute cannot
permit the monarch to give the Commission authority to take over suits already pending
in other ecclesiastical courts. At any rate, to see such permission it would be necessary to
find common sense or contextual reasons for it comparable to the possibly good grounds
for the secular sanctions; they would surely be hard to find.
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(c) The case may be counted, but not too strongly, in favor of the proposition that
clerical incontinence and power to deprive for that offense are within the High
Commission’s jurisdiction. Although the contrary was not directly urged, the judges
could have could have decided for Cheinye if they thought the subject matter was ultra
vires for the Commission; the sentence would not then have been an ecclesiastical error,
but simple contravention of the statute.
The second case in this Section, Caudrey (or Cawdry) v. Atton (Acton, or Hatton)
65
, is one of the best known on the High Commission. The reason for this is that Coke
not only reported the case, but took it as the occasion for what he called his “Treatise on
the King’s Ecclesiastical Law.” The “Treatise”, appended to Caudrey, is inserted as a
special section at the beginning of Vol. 5 of Coke’s Reports. It is a historical
demonstration that ecclesiastical supremacy had attached to the English Crown from the
remotest time and had been recognized or asserted in one way or another in all ages, so as
to keep the title alive even at the nadir of Papal usurpation. The “Treatise” is the classical
statement of the lawyer’s version of Anglican Erastianism. In considering Coke’s
multifarious and stormy dealings with the ecclesiastical authorities, it is important to
remember how implicitly he believed that the Royal Supremacy was an immemorial
feature of the law and an inseparable part of the constitution—a belief, be it said, that can
cut several ways. It is not the “Treatise” that concerns us here, however, but Caudrey’s
Case.
One of the several resolutions in the case, as Coke represents it, suggested the
large themes of the “Treatise.” That was the court’s holding, in connection with one of a
number of debated points, that the monarch could have created a High Commission
without the authorization of 1 Eliz.–could have created it, that is, by virtue of the
“common law” ecclesiastical supremacy which the “Treatise” proceeds to prove.
Caudrey as reported by Coke is the clearest holding to that effect. Publication of the
report made this “resolution” widely available knowledge. I have no reason to think the
proposition was much doubted in the legal community. The interesting question is what
it implies. I have suggested in the Introduction to this Section that the answer is probably
“Not much.” There is no sign that Coke himself ever repudiated the “resolution” in
Caudrey that begot his “Treatise”, but when he was a judge he certainly did not take it to
mean that the monarch could confer unlimited jurisdiction on the Commission by
prerogative. What may have been implied by asserting the prerogative in Caudrey itself
will be considered below.
Another question is prior to that one: Did the court in Caudrey actually resolve all
Coke says it did? Skepticism is permitted by other reports, especially a good MS. (Add
25,211). The MS. does not quarrel with Coke on the basic shape and outcome of the
case. The only question, here as on quite a few other occasions, is whether Coke
“improved” the case retrospectively, reformulating what was argued and held so as to
bring it a little closer than reality to what ought to have been. By stating the question I do
not imply an affirmative answer. I shall, however, first discuss the case as it appears in
the MS. and then come back to whether Coke’s version is significantly at odds.
About the facts of the case, the reports do not differ in any way that matters for the
substance. (There are some discrepancies with collateral implications, principally for the
65

See the extended note on Cheinye and Caudrey at the end of this Section.
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accuracy of Coke’s report—see the Note.) Like Cheinye above, Caudrey arose on a
special verdict in a common law action (Trespass according to Coke and the other printed
report, Popham; Ejectment according to the major MS., the other MS. saying nothing on
this point; the difference does not matter for the legal issues.) Again as in Cheinye, a
deprived parson (Caudrey) sued his successor in the living to try the validity of the
deprivation. The jury found the manner and cause of Caudrey’s deprivation by special
verdict, leaving it to the court to judge its validity. In substance, he was deprived by the
High Commission for preaching against the Book of Common Prayer and not using it in
the required way in conducting services (which means almost certainly that he was a
Puritan.) There were reasons unique to the particular offense and the circumstances for
doubting that Caudrey was deprivable (a) by any ecclesiastical court and (b) by the High
Commission in any event. (I must let these reasons come out as they arise in argument,
instead of summarizing them in advance, in order not to distort the case as argued.)
Besides putting the substantive legality of the deprivation in question, the special verdict
raised some technical problems—essentially how strictly the verdict should be construed,
or whether some arguable flaws or ambiguities should be taken for or against Caudrey.
Going by the MS., Caudrey’s counsel. Finch, led off with the technical points: (1)
The special verdict found that Caudrey was deprived by the High Commission, but it did
not find expressly that the members of the Commission were natural-born English
subjects, as 1 Eliz. required them to be. Therefore, by Finch’s theory, whether or not the
deprivation was substantively lawful, it was not a fact before the court that a lawfully
constituted body had pronounced the sentence. Finch maintained that although the judges
might know of their own knowledge that the Commissioners were native subjects, they
were not entitled to act on that knowledge, but were bound by the record. He argued
further that although the special verdict implied that the native-birth requirement was
satisfied (by saying that the Commission was appointed “secundum tenorem actus” this
was insufficient—strict insistence on explicit findings was required in construing special
verdicts. For both of these points he cited various authorities on judicial notice and on
going by implication in the matter of special verdicts and related contexts. (2) The
special verdict stated that Caudrey was deprived by the Bishop of London (a member of
the Commission) “with the assent” of several other named members. Finch maintained
that this language failed as a finding that a formally lawful sentence had been given. His
reason was that High Commission sentences must (by the terms of the patent presumably,
for 1 Eliz. imposes no such requirement) be the joint act of at least three members—
whereas the verdict represented the sentence as the act of only one, to which others
merely assented. If I understand his drift, Finch argued in support of this point that it is
especially important to insist on the formal correctness of ecclesiastical acts, because
once their formal correctness is granted their validity by ecclesiastical law may be
(though he did not think it was in this case) beyond common law scrutiny.
From these matters, Finch moves on to the substantive validity of the deprivation.
He starts off by urging that the offense of speaking against the Prayer Book is not malum
in se as a matter of ecclesiastical law or otherwise. It was admittedly an illegal and
punishable act in the sense of a malum prohibitum. That is because it was made unlawful
and subjected to punishment by the Uniformity Act (1 Eliz., c.2.) But in Finch’s view the
statute did not declare pre-existing law, or merely attach specific sanctions to activity that
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was already wrongful or intrinsically wrongful. Rather, the statute created—as it were ex
nihilo—the crime of speaking against the Prayer Book.
Several lines of argument can proceed from the premise that speaking against the
Prayer Book is malum prohibitum only. Although the report does not make the structure
of his speech totally clear, I think Finch can be credited with using the phrase in all the
possible ways. He argues for his conclusion—that Caudrey was not validly deprived—
both from the premise that the offense is malum prohibitum and without that premise. To
expound Finch’s argument in its complexity, a preliminary word about the problems of
applying the Uniformity Act is necessary.
For clerical opponents of the Prayer Book, the Uniformity Act appoints the
following sanctions:
(a) Upon conviction for a first offense, forfeiture of a year’s income from the
offender’s benefice plus six months’ imprisonment.
(b) Upon conviction for a second offense (meaning an offense committed after the
first conviction), a year’s imprisonment and the offender to be deprived of his benefice
ipso facto. (I.e., upon a second conviction the living is automatically vacant; it is not
necessary to go through the formality of a suit to obtain a judicial sentence of
deprivation—an ecclesiastical suit, for only ecclesiastical courts could deprive judicially.)
(c) The statute gives secular courts jurisdiction over all the offenses it creates or
appoints sanctions for, including clerical opposition to the Prayer Book. The statute also,
however, gives ecclesiastical courts authority to “reform, correct, and punish by the
censures of the Church” anyone who commits the offenses specified in the act. I.e., a
system of essentially concurrent jurisdiction was set up. How exactly it was meant to
work was the source of the problem in Caudrey and sometimes a difficulty in other
cases. Clearly only secular courts could impose the two clearly secular punishments
designated in the act—forfeiture of income and imprisonment (apart from the possibility,
not anticipated by the statute-makers or discussed in this case, that the High Commission
uniquely might be allowed to use imprisonment as a “censure of the Church”, provided
the offense fell under its jurisdiction.) Clearly ecclesiastical courts were not in general
debarred from proceeding against the same offense and punishing it by spiritual
sanctions. For the instant case, the ecclesiastical role quoad first offenders is all that
immediately concerns us, for Caudrey was admittedly a first offender. Finch’s job was to
show that the role assigned to ecclesiastical courts by the statute did not include power to
punish a first offender by one “censure of the Church”, viz. deprivation of the living.
That conclusion, however, can be defended in two different forms.
(1) Ecclesiastical courts may not touch a first offender at all; the only procedure
available against him is secular prosecution. The reason is that the only punishment to
which he is made liable is one that only a secular court can impose. It is helpful, though
not essential, to this conclusion to posit that the offense—speaking against the Prayer
Book by a clergyman—is a malum prohibitum, for committing a malum prohibitum can
only expose one to the statutory penalty attached to the offense. Arguably, the statutory
penalty here is solely forfeiture of income plus imprisonment, to which only a secular
court can sentence a man. I say “helpful but not essential” because one could argue that
the statute simply or “positively” limits punishment of the first offense to the secular
forfeiture and imprisonment, whether the crime is malum in se or malum prohibitum.
But if one denies that the statute has such an intent or effect, the classification of the
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crime makes a difference. An open-and-shut secular malum prohibitum—let us say
importing Irish horses without a license—is probably not punishable at all except as the
statute appoints a penalty—say £10 per horse—and not punishable in any other way,
even by a smaller fine. A clear malum in se is by definition punishable somehow;
discretionarily within limits if neither legislation nor ius non scriptum prescribes a
definite punishment (such a prescribed punishment could perfectly well be imposable by
ecclesiastical courts only.) A statute appointing a definite penalty for a malum in se may
go to exclude all other punishments, but whether it does is a question of interpretation. If
the statute is not construed to have such exclusive effect, penalties that would have been
lawful before remain lawful—perhaps not only lesser penalties, but usually lesser ones
because it is generally hard to read penalty-creating statutes as not intended to set
maximum penalties. There is a certain justification for regarding ecclesiastical sanctions
as generically “lesser” than temporal ones, and in any event their different character and
purpose tend to suggest that a statute imposing a definite secular penalty for a malum in
se may not mean to affect concurrent ecclesiastical penalties—granting that
ecclesiastical jurisdiction is not tolled by the act imposing the secular penalty (another
question of interpretation.)
(2) Ecclesiastical courts are not excluded from proceeding against a first offender,
but they may not punish him by deprivation. Rather, they are confined to lesser spiritual
sanctions, such as admonition or penance. This position comes to saying the statute does
not appoint forfeiture plus imprisonment as the only punishment for the first offense. It
appoints those punishments directly and, by the implication of its reservation of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, authority to impose spiritual sanctions for offenses in the
statute, “the censures of the Church.” Those “censures”, however, should be taken to
mean “censures other than deprivation.” This conclusion can be reached by two routes:
The first is to say that the emendation—“other than deprivation” – is implied by the
statute’s making deprivation the consequence of the second offense. It would be odd for
Parliament to have provided for ipso facto deprivation only after a second offense if it
intended for clergymen to be deprivable by ecclesiastical process on the first offense.
Once there has been a conviction—a secular one, or even perhaps an ecclesiastical one
eventuating in a lesser sanction than deprivation—, it may be perfectly lawful for
ecclesiastical courts to proceed for a subsequent offense and deprive. If there are
problems about that, we need not reach them. What is clear is that the statute-makers
thought deprivation too severe a punishment for a clergyman who has gone wrong only
once—or, more precisely, who has not once been called to account and thereby put on
warning.
(2) It is not necessary, convincing though it may be to construct an implied
limitation on the ecclesiastical censures applicable to a first offender from the statute’s
linking deprivation to second offenders. For one thing is even clearer: Surely the statute
permits ecclesiastical courts to punish people only by lawful ecclesiastical censures—
lawful, that is, by the standards of ecclesiastical law. Now (as we shall see Finch trying
to show), ecclesiastical law does not permit deprivation of clergymen because they have
committed mala prohibita. If it can be proved that speaking against the Prayer Book, at
least on the first offense, is unmistakably a malum prohibitum, then it follows that
Caudrey was wrongfully deprived.
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Finch puts this line of argument first in his discussion of the substance. It has the
advantage of avoiding any real construction of the statute’s intent. The words of the
section saving ecclesiastical jurisdiction say that spiritual courts may use any “censure of
the Church” against any offender, with no distinction between first and subsequent. By
the letter, that may seem to include deprivation. But one qualification must be
understood—not because something intended was not said, but because no one using
language normally would consider it necessary to put in an express qualification.
Obviously “any censure of the Church” means “any lawful one”, “any censure that
ecclesiastical law allows to be imposed in a given situation.” Deprivation is simply not a
lawful censure for a malum prohibitum –just as, say, hanging is not for the in se crime of
fornication. A statue could no doubt make deprivation imposable by ecclesiastical courts
for a malum prohibitum, and possibly the Uniformity Act has that effect with respect to
second offenders, but it certainly does nothing of the kind with respect to a first offender.
On the other hand, the disadvantage of this argument is that it calls on a common law
court to look into the ecclesiastical law and invites the response that they are not
competent to judge ecclesiastical law (cf. Cheinye above.) For that reason, Finch
necessarily addressed himself to wider questions about the statute’s intent and how to
make applied sense of its puzzling features.
With these considerations in mind, we may look at Finch’s several points. Be it
noted that he says nothing specific to the High Commission. The contention is that no
ecclesiastical court, High Commission or other, was entitled to deprive Caudrey for his
first offense. So far as appears, Finch saw nothing to be gained by arguing that the
Commission lacked jurisdiction to proceed against a clerical defamer of the Prayer Book,
except in so far as all ecclesiastical courts lacked it with respect to the first offense. At
most, a brief and somewhat cryptic remark at the end of his speech touches the High
Commission in particular. The following are Finch’s specific arguments:
(a)Towards establishing that by ecclesiastical law a clergyman may never be
deprived for a malum prohibitum: There is authority to show that a clerk may be refused
(i.e., the patron’s nominee may be turned down by the Bishop) because he has committed
a malum in se—perjury is the example in the case cited. Finch takes it for granted that a
clerk may not be refused because he has committed a malum prohibitum. He assumes
further, as is clearly reasonable, that a clergyman already installed in a living may not be
deprived for a cause that would not justify excluding an uninstalled candidate.
(b) Towards establishing that speaking against the Prayer Book by a clergyman is
unmistakably a malum prohibitum: Finch recognizes that the offense can be assimilated
to schism. I.e., it could be argued that although the specific act of speaking against the
Prayer Book is “created” by the Uniformity Act, it is not really “created ex nihilo.”
Rather, the statute operates to specify what shall count in the future as a species of
schism, a pre-existing malum in se. Finch does not give a fully articulated counterargument, but he suggests an approach. Schism, he says, means separation from the unity
of the Church; it is analogous to sedition, or separation from the body of the respublica.
With schism so defined and analogized, Finch asserts, rather than argues, that speaking
against the Prayer Book is not an instance of it. The thought, I suppose, is that merely
saying one disapproves of a prescribed liturgy (or even, perhaps, the “civil disobedience”
of refusing to follow it exactly, if Caudrey was convicted of that too) does not bespeak
the anti-social spirit required for schism and its secular cousin, sedition. It is like
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expressing disapproval of a particular secular law (or perhaps even disobeying it with
willingness to take the consequences), rather than like the acts and utterances that would
constitute sedition—expressions of contempt for the law or the government generally,
active steps short of treason to subvert the government.
(c) Towards clearing away a possible objection to classifying the offense as a
malum prohibitum: Finch says that not coming to church, another offense subjected to
secular sanctions by the Uniformity Act, is a malum in se. He proves this by citing
Fitzherbert (i.e., an authority antedating the Elizabethan Settlement) for the point that
Prohibition does not lie to stop an ecclesiastical prosecution for failure to attend church.
The utility of this citation is not brought out in the report, but I suspect it is twofold. First,
it might be possible for someone to suppose that the offenses collected in the Uniformity
Act are all of the same sort—all mala in se or all mala prohibita. To leave such an
impression uncorrected would invite an opponent to discover that not coming to church is
a malum in se and then to argue that speaking against the Prayer book must also be, or at
least that the intent of the statute must be to permit all the offenses it covers to be
punished as if they were in the higher class to which some belonged. So arguing is the
more plausible because not coming to church (which by the statute includes skipping a
single Sunday without a valid excuse) seems the more minor offense and was in fact
subject to a lesser statutory punishment. Therefore Finch anticipates: The two offenses
are not of the same nature; what makes one a malum in se and the other a malum
prohibitum is not that one was morally worse, but that one was prosecutable in
ecclesiastical courts without any legislated basis, whereas the other could not be
prosecuted there before the Uniformity Act.
Secondly and more significantly, Finch takes up the fact that the text of the statute
is different with respect to the two offenses, He introduces his point by saying that the
offense of failing to attend divine service is “at the censures of the Church.” The phrase
is directly out of the statute; the idea is that ecclesiastical sanctions apply to the two
offenses in rather different ways. The Uniformity Act expressly makes non-attenders
liable to the censures of the Church and to a forfeiture of 12d. per offense, the forfeiture
to be levied by the churchwardens by distraint. Speakers against the Prayer Book are not
made liable to the censures of the Church in comparable express terms. In so far as they
are liable to them at all, it is by virtue of the statute’s separate, general saving clause for
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. But in view of the difference between the section on failure to
attend church and that on speaking against the Prayer Book, is the best conclusion not
that the latter are not subject to ecclesiastical sanctions at all, at any rate on the first
offense? An intelligible pattern can be seen: Not attending church, a malum in se, was
prosecutable in ecclesiastical courts and solely punishable by spiritual sanctions before
the statute. The statute affirms the status quo by subjecting the offense to ecclesiastical
censures in terms and then superadds a secular penalty. It is significant that no secular
jurisdiction to impose the pecuniary penalty is conferred, but only a power to distrain. (A
basis for involvement of the secular courts is created, for the churchwardens’ distraints
could of course be challenged, like any other distraint, by ordinary common law process,
but that is different from creating secular authority to punish.) Speaking against the
Prayer Book, a malum prohibitum, is not expressly subjected to the censures of the
Church, but solely to forfeiture and imprisonment imposable as a punishment after
conviction exclusively by secular tribunals (I presume without discretion to mitigate.)
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The best conclusion seems to be that the crime, at least on the first offense, is simply not
liable to ecclesiastical censures, as it was not before the statute. We have, in short, an
argument for position (a) above—ecclesiastical courts may not touch a first offender
against the Prayer Book in any way. As I have shown, however, it is possible to retreat
from that position and still maintain that such offenders are not liable to deprivation.
(d) Argument (b) above acknowledges the difficulty raised by schism and
disposes of it, leaving the implied conclusion that if speaking against the Prayer Book is
not schism it must be a malum prohibitum. Later, Finch acknowledges that the either-or
choice may not be compelling. His argument shifts to an amended proposition: Not only
is deprivation unlawful for any malum prohibitum; it is unlawful also for some mala in
se—“unlawful” meaning still by the standards of ecclesiastical law, without reference to
the positive effect of the Uniformity Act.
Towards establishing the general point that deprivation may not always be
imposed when a clergyman commits a malum in se: There is authority that clergymen
may not be deprived for riot or drunkenness, yet those are mala in se.
Towards showing that even if speaking against the Prayer Book is a malum in se
(short of schism), it is still not punishable by deprivation on the first offense: On the
distinctly intra-ecclesiastical authority of Linwood, the offense of “speaking against
religion” is punishable only by excommunication the first time; on a second offense a
clergyman may be deprived. Linwood, that is to say, gives a kind of countenance to the
view that the Uniformity Act “declares” an existing malum in se—“declare” meaning
here not simply “restate” but “redefine”, “specify for altered circumstances that x shall be
taken as an instance of the existing genus y.” One should, I think, say only “a kind of
countenance.” The position is not compelling, not preferable to the view that speaking
against the Prayer Book is a malum prohibitum. Indeed, it is probably dubious to admit
“redefinition” as a form of “declaration”, at least in the absence of statutory language
professing to impart the flavor of an old bottle to new wine. More concretely, it is
puzzling to see how denouncing a Prayer Book that made no pretense to exist before
1559 (and made no pretense to be the only order of worship acceptable to God) could be
other than a crime that came into existence with the Prayer Book. If ecclesiastical courts
could proceed for “speaking against religion” before and after 1559, it would seem that
after that date they must mean something like what they meant before—something more
basic than expressing disapproval of some features of a new document. Perhaps
wholesale denunciation of the Establishment would count; perhaps ecclesiastical courts
would be entitled to take note of new documents and new legislation towards making out
a speaker’s generally defamatory intent “against religion”, but surely bare speaking
against the Prayer Book derives its criminality solely from the statute that makes it
criminal and need not have done so. (Suppose the Uniformity Act had not created the
offense, but had merely required the use of the Prayer Book in churches. It might still be
legitimate to take note of the statute in the larger context of making out that a man had
spoken “against religion”, but it would be hard to find criminality in an isolated critical
utterance. By the statute as it is, but only by it, it is probably not too strong too say that
the least of such utterances is criminal in a clergyman, at any rate if they occur in a
sermon. With possible ambiguity as to whether public utterances outside church services
count, the act makes it criminal for a clergyman to “preach, declare, or speak anything in
the derogation or depraving of the said book, of anything therein contained, or of any part
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thereof.” Non-clerics are forbidden under criminal penalties to speak publicly to the
“derogation, depraving, or despising” of the Prayer Book of any part of it. Quaere
whether “despising” –together with the statute’s mention of ballad-makers and stageplayers as prospective defamers especially in need of warning—points to a slight
difference of standard, a sense in which tone, intent, and effect were meant to be a little
more relevant in the lay case than the clerical. “Deprave” in 16th century usage is
probably no stronger than “derogate”—“cause something to be less well thought of”—
without necessarily making it an object of ridicule or contempt. ) If these arguments are
not accepted, however,—if one insists that speaking against the Prayer Book is
continuous with the prior crime of speaking “against religion”—nevertheless, Linwood
shows that deprivation may not be imposed until the second offense.
(e) Now Finch turns away from making out that speaking against the Prayer Book is
not a deprivable offense by ecclesiastical law and toward straight construction and
application of the statute. He starts by maintaining that the statute’s “affirmative”
language imposing a penalty for the first offense implies the “negative” addition “and not
otherwise.” This argument runs into the canon of statutory interpretation that attributed
greater force to “negative” than to “affirmative” imperatives—in other words, that
opposed reading restrictive implications into positive statements. Nevertheless, it is
perfectly sensible to suppose that statutes setting penalties for mala prohibita do carry the
implication “and not otherwise”, not because of their grammatical form, but because of
their legal character. More seriously, the argument runs into the clause of the statute
reserving to ecclesiastical courts power to punish all the offenses mentioned in the act. It
is a little strange to read “and not otherwise” into the provision for forfeiture and
imprisonment when this act goes on to provide for what looks like an “otherwise.” If,
however, Finch’s point were conceded, position (a) in the analysis of the issues above
would be established and the case clinched: If the statute excludes all punishment for a
first offense except forfeiture and imprisonment, then it excludes all ecclesiastical
censures, including deprivation.
(f) Finch next argues for preferring the secular law when it collides or overlaps with
ecclesiastical law. This argument is quite clearly an attempt to overcome the weakness in
(e). As I suggest, it is not very convincing to say that the surface meaning of the statute
excludes ecclesiastical courts from meddling with first offenders against the Prayer Book,
when a prominent clause of the act seems to go out of its way to not to exclude them
from anything covered by the act. Therefore Finch moves from the “surface meaning” to
a general policy of the law and of statutory construction.
In one form, his argument comes to the unreasonableness of “double vexation.”
Exposing people to both spiritual and temporal punishment for the same act is suspect. So
is any form of “double exposure.” The common law tries to avoid it and does so by
taking jurisdiction itself when a competing tribunal has a plausible but ambiguous claim
to a share of jurisdiction. (To show that his point transcends temporal-spiritual relations,
Finch cites a dictum by Babington in Y.B. 8 Hen. VI, f.31. All Babington says is that a
franchise may not have cognizance of a battery that starts outside the franchise and
continues within it. The act of beating a man from one place to another is a single
trespass, liable to only one suit, and the suit must be at common law despite the
franchise’s “plausible but ambiguous” claim to jurisdiction when the tort was committed
inside its boundaries.) No doubt a statute could impose two punishments administered by
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separate tribunals for one offense, but the assumption should be that statutes do not
intend such unfair and inconvenient arrangements. If the “surface meaning” of the
Uniformity Act rather suggests that Parliament did intend to impose two-way liability,
the statute should nevertheless receive “reasonable construction. It should be construed
to save the policy of the law. The best interpretation is therefore that the act imposes only
one punishment, and when the choice is between a temporal and a spiritual one the
former should be preferred.
(About double vexation in a stricter sense Finch does not speak, but he may have had
it in mind. If a man can be prosecuted in a spiritual court and punished by ecclesiastical
censures, and subsequently be prosecuted in a temporal court and punished by forfeiture
and imprisonment, or vice versa, he is literally twice vexed for the same act. That is
considerably worse than merely being in a position, prior to prosecution, to be “hit from
either side”, even though the lesser evil is an evil. It is a source of uncertainty as to the
cost of misbehavior, which may mean less effective deterrence despite the appearance of
menace to the right and to the left. The fairness of indistinguishable culprits’ being
exposed to very different fates as luck has it is in any event highly questionable. Double
vexation proper would be preventable only by a rule that previous prosecution in the
other jurisdiction is a good plea to stop a second prosecution for the same crime. There is
nothing in the Uniformity Act to require such a rule, which is an additional reason to
suppose that it does not confer double jurisdiction.)
In its second formulation, Finch’s point does not so much stress the moral
doubtfulness and legal inconvenience of exposing people to two punishments as the mere
policy of the law whereby temporal jurisdiction was preferred over spiritual when there
was in some sense a choice. The argument shows that there are common law contexts
where secular law is held to preempt a field in which ecclesiastical law seems to have a
legitimate interest. It concludes that a statute which is ambiguous as to the apportionment
of jurisdiction between secular and spiritual tribunals should be construed as giving
secular courts exclusive authority, even though the statute deals with matters of interest to
the Church. The step from premise to conclusion can be disputed. Insisting on the
temporal law’s general title to be preferred over the spiritual is still worthwhile for the
more modest purpose of reinforcing the point just above: If double punishment is
intolerable, there cannot be much doubt but that the secular should win—the punishment
with “teeth”, obviously put in the statute for that reason. It does not hurt to add that
letting it win out is consonant with a more general policy.
Finch defends the principle that “when the spiritual law meets with our law [the
latter] will hold plea” by several citations:
(i) The best is Brooke, Prohibition 14, 22 Edw. IV. The case there is an ecclesiastical
suit for defamation prohibited, not necessarily because the suit was as such inappropriate
to the ecclesiastical court, but because a common law suit was subsequently brought
turning on the same questions of fact. In other words, the ecclesiastical court was not out
of bounds, or involved in something in which it had no legitimate interest; the common
law was simply preferred in a situation in which it would be inconvenient for the same
matter to be tried twice. An abbot allegedly detained a married lady against her will “to
make her a meretrix.” Her husband talked about the episode, whereupon the abbot sued
him in an ecclesiastical court for defamation. Then the husband, on the wife’s behalf,
brought an action of False Imprisonment. The ecclesiastical suit was prohibited, and
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Brian, the only judge who appears in the Abridgment, held that Consultation should not
be granted. The report does not tell what the defamatory words were. By later standards,
if the husband said “The abbot falsely imprisoned my wife”, the words would probably
be actionable at common law and therefore not permissible as the subject of an
ecclesiastical suit—contra if he had said “The abbot seduced, or tried to seduce, my
wife”. By the standards of 22 Edw. IV, before the development of common law
defamation in the 16th century, it is probably all one—a perfectly appropriate
ecclesiastical suit, prohibited only because the common law acquired a preemptive
interest in ascertaining the facts via the action of False Imprisonment.
Brian goes on in the Abridgment to cite other cases showing, as he puts it, that
“where the common law may meddle, the spiritual court shall not meddle.” The
generality in a sense serves Finch’s purpose, but the other cases are less useful than the
principal one. They come to saying that the ecclesiastical courts may not entertain suits
for breach of oaths to pay debts, make feoffments, and the like. The prohibitability of
such suits can be conceived in different ways. They simply to not occur in the period of
this study—the breach of faith jurisdiction of the Church had dried up, and any attempt to
revive it would probably have been seen as invasion of the secularized field of contract. I
admit that my language is anachronistic—conceptualization of contract as a “field” came
very slowly. I still suspect that the unarticulated response had become natural—
ecclesiastical courts are out of bounds if they touch promissory behavior in any way
under the pretext of an oath. In Brian’s time, Church courts’ proceeding for breach of
faith may have looked perfectly appropriate as such—e.g., when the effect was to enforce
a “contract” unenforceable at common law. It seemed objectionable only when it so to
speak “crowded” the common law by taking up a case which might literally come up at
common law—e.g., ordering payment of a debt today when tomorrow the creditor might
bring an action of Debt. (A “contract” to make a feoffment is trickier. In Brian’s day, the
court really “crowded” would have been the Chancery—the enforcer of contracts to
convey land via the doctrine of uses. The common law was pre-eminently protective of
real-estate interests, however, and perhaps the Chancery’s role was tolerated only
because it was both familiar and restrained. I.e., it enforced only considerate promises—
mainly if not exclusively sales—, whereas ecclesiastical courts, turned loose, might have
caused the transference of real property in a wider range of circumstances provided there
was an oath. In short, Brian’s supporting cases may have been closer to his principal case
than they would have looked later.
I belabor these refinements somewhat because the generality stated by Brian will
cover what I call the “paradigmatic” Prohibition—stopping an ecclesiastical suit when
the plaintiff could just as well have sued at common law (cf. Vol. III above.) That is all
very well, and possibly it is in effect what Brian meant to cover. The trouble is that the
principle so understood may hurt Finch’s case more than it helps it. It seems to me shaky
to draw an interpretation of the Uniformity Act from the mere fact that Prohibitions were
used to insure the common law’s monopoly over some kinds of litigation. It is too easy to
reply that the purpose of these Prohibitions is to keep ecclesiastical courts out of territory
where they have no business being, whereas the Uniformity Act on its very face
acknowledges their interest in the offenses it deals with and assigns them some sort of
role. If, on the other hand, Brian’s point in historical perspective is different, it lends
better support to Finch. The Uniformity Act might intend to exclude ecclesiastical courts
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altogether from a limited part of the enforcement role, when their participation would
especially threaten awkwardness or injustice. So, per Brian in one understanding,
Prohibitions may sometimes be used to prevent inconvenience, even when there is no
pretense that ecclesiastical courts are drastically out of bounds, or could not in slightly
altered circumstances do what they are in these circumstances stopped from doing. (The
differences are, of course, refinements. Part of the justification for “paradigmatic”
Prohibitions is that an ecclesiastical suit could be started today and have one outcome,
when a common law suit for the same object could be started tomorrow and have a
different outcome. I doubt that that would in later perspective have seemed the central
justification—as it was for what I call Prohibitions to prevent collateral infringement of
common law interests, where the ecclesiastical suit is not “for the same object” or in any
way inappropriate in itself, but involves issues closely enough related to the possible
subject of common law litigation to pose a danger of prejudice. The two categories may
not have been so distinguishable in Brian’s perspective. For that matter, since Caudrey
antedates most of the rich development of Prohibition law in this study, the distinctions I
make here may not have been so evident to the lawyers involved as I am inclined to think
they would have been later.)
(ii) Another of Finch’s citations—Y.B. 2 Rich. III, 22—is also useful for his purpose,
although the judges in the Year Book are divided on the relevant point. Each of the
parties in the case claimed to be the executor of S. One of the contenders pleaded that he
had challenged the will under which the other claimed to be executor and finally
overturned it on appeal to Rome, wherefore his adversary was no executor. The issue
debated on this pleading was whether ecclesiastical invalidation of a will automatically
means that the person named executor therein is not the deceased’s executor from the
point of view of English law. We may omit the reasoning on both sides and note only that
two judges thought that the invalidation does not necessarily have that effect. Part of their
point—what is valuable to Finch—is that English law should take precedence over
ecclesiastical in an ambiguous situation. They thought there was an ambiguity because by
English law a person could for some purposes act as executor before probate; the
pleading conclusion that a man named executor in an invalid will could not be executor
was therefore not airtight. (Only rigor in pleading was in question, I think, nothing in the
real world. I take it that the executor in the invalid will would not be rightful executor,
but what the pleading said was that he was not executor at all, in any sense. That was
presumably true by ecclesiastical standards, but not quite by English.)
(iii)Finally, Finch cites a “Davy’s Case at St. Albans” for what became a familiar
proposition if it was not already one at the time of Caudrey: A common law action will
lie for the aspersion “whore” if the woman slandered avers that she lost a prospective
marriage as a result. The point for Finch is that although calling someone “whore” is
normally ecclesiastical defamation, the common law acquires an interest when temporal
loss is claimed and by virtue of that interest has exclusive jurisdiction.
As I suggest above, the utility of establishing what Finch’s citations go to establish is
not overwhelming, but his idea is interesting, and his introducing it is a nice illustration
of the way his argument covers every angle. If one concedes that the Uniformity Act
does not clearly oust ecclesiastical courts from dealing with first offenders against the
Prayer Book, it is still reasonable to say that the statute is ambiguous in the mere sense of
confusing about exactly how it means some kind of concurrent spiritual-temporal
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jurisdiction is to work. It sets up “a kind of concurrency” in general terms, but for some
specific situations it deals with, such as first offenders against the Prayer Book, it is hard
to believe, though not impossible, that full concurrency could be intended. To resolve the
doubt in favor of full concurrency, per Finch, would be to violate in the realm of statutory
interpretation a policy of preferring secular courts that is usually observed in other
circumstances. It would be like letting the abbot’s defamation suit go forward because in
one sense it was not objectionable, or like tolerating an ecclesiastical suit for “whore”,
even though there was temporal damage, merely because in general ecclesiastical suits
for that slander were lawful.
(g) Finch also urges the royal interest in favor of his construction of the statute: If
only the secular punishment can be imposed on the first offender, the Queen will profit
from the forfeiture of a year’s income. If the first offender may be deprived, she will lose
this profit. The statute-makers seem to have intended that she should have it and therefore
should not be read as undermining their own intention by a subsequent general provision.
Moreover, when there is doubt about a statute’s meaning, it is legitimate to count the
royal interest—part of what moderns would ball the “public interest”, be it
remembered—towards tipping the balance.
This point only argues against allowing deprivation of first offenders, not against
other spiritual sanctions. One might suggest, however, that the simplest way to insure the
Queen’s interest is to exclude ecclesiastical courts from touching first offenders at all. If
an ecclesiastical court “got there first” and imposed a sentence short of deprivation, there
would at least be a problem about vexing the party again in the temporal courts, and
another one as to whether the forfeiture could be imposed on the strength of an
ecclesiastical conviction without retrying the party in a secular court. It would also be a
problem whether secular proceedings for a repetition of the offense after ecclesiastical
conviction must result in deprivation, with loss of the forfeiture. Short of the legal and
moral problems, if we assume that retrial would be allowable but necessary to gain the
forfeiture, conviction of a man already punished would probably be hard to obtain. The
Queen’s interest would only be completely safe if the ecclesiastical court “got there
second” and afflicted a man already in jail, without income and with additional spiritual
censures—perhaps not a bad thing to a rigorist.
(h) Near the end of his argument, just before making point (g), Finch adds a double
edged concessionary twist. His purport throughout is that ecclesiastical courts had no
power to deprive before the statute and gained none by the statute. He now adds “but
admitting that this offense would have been punishable by deprivation by the common
law, yet that is now altered by this statute, but inasmuch as it [the statute] gives authority
to the Bishop to deprive for this offense it is good proof that he had no authority before.”
In other words, I take it, “you can’t have it both ways.” If you say the offense was subject
to deprivation before, then the best reading of the statute, on the grounds above, is that
the statute changes the previous law. It is better taken as cutting off a pre-existing
ecclesiastical power than as confirming one. If, on the other hand, you construe the
statute as conferring power to deprive—well, you are wrong, but in any event you have
excluded yourself from arguing that the power existed before. The statute is better
mistaken as a grant of new jurisdiction than as a confirmation of old—now let us see if
you can make a serious case for the former. (One side of this point may be useful for the
purpose that Finch shows no sign of pursuing, viz. arguing against High Commission
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jurisdiction specifically. If the statute gives new jurisdiction, it would appear to give it to
the regular ecclesiastical courts only, for the language of the clause that might have that
effect speaks of “Archbishops, Bishops, and…their officers. “ Arguably, for the High
Commission to have jurisdiction it would be necessary to show that the relevant powers
were vested in the ecclesiastical system before the statute. If that is not showable, or if the
other side were willing to stake its case on showing that the statute gave the jurisdiction
to deprive, then nothing was given to the Commission. A de novo donation ought to go
only to the designated recipients.)
Finch, for Caudrey, is succeeded in the MS. report by two lawyers on the other side,
Hutton and on a later day Attorney General Coke. Hutton’s points were as follows:
(1) He takes issue with Finch’s argument that the special verdict failed to find that
Caudrey’s deprivation was a formally sufficient judicial act because it attributed the
sentence to one Commissioner with the assent of others. Hutton maintains that the
language of the patent permitted such procedure. He also claims common law analogues
for treating certain acts “with A’s assent” as A’s acts.
(2) He excepts to Finch’s proposition that clergymen are never deprivable for mala
prohibita, claiming authority to show that they are deprivable for the malum prohibitum
of letting a house attached to the living decay.
(3) He does not challenge Finch on the actual meaning of the Uniformity Act, but
falls back on the proposition that if Caudrey was wrongfully deprived the remedy is by
appeal within the ecclesiastical system. Since this proposition recurs in both Coke’s
speech and what was said from the Bench, let us note here the difficulty it seems to
present—a much worse one than the same point in Cheinye. If the Uniformity Act
confers no jurisdiction on ecclesiastical courts, either de novo or by confirmation, or if it
removes jurisdiction from them, how can it be mere ecclesiastical error to take
jurisdiction contrary to the statute? Is that plausible except on the radical premise that
any statute regulating ecclesiastical courts is only enforceable on ecclesiastical courts by
themselves? In Cheinye, by contrast, the High Commission hardly violated the
Supremacy Act, save for the sense in which the statute can be said to command the
Commission to apply the real or correct ecclesiastical law to cases in its jurisdiction. It is
plausible to say that that statutory imperative can only be enforced within the
ecclesiastical system, where the expertise lies.
One reading of the Uniformity Act does, however, tend to support Hutton’s argument.
It should be articulated in making the argument, as it is not in the report, but perhaps it is
understood. Suppose one says that deprivation of a first offender is unlawful by nonstatutory ecclesiastical standards, but that the statute itself in no way, by words or intent,
actually bans the application of that sanction to a first offender by ecclesiastical courts.
Then clearly enough depriving such an offender is ecclesiastical error. The only sense in
which it might be considered a violation of the statute within common law control is the
sense in which the same can be said of the High Commission’s sentence in Cheinye—the
statute implicitly commands correct application of ecclesiastical law, and common law
courts responsible for the statutory rights of the subject may enforce even that
requirement, at least against flagrantly unwarranted decisions or against a court from
which there is no guaranteed appeal. The best riposte to this is intelligently anticipated by
Finch: The reason deprivation of a first offender is bad ecclesiastical law—because the
offense is a malum prohibitum—is itself derivable, in part though not exclusively, by
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interpretation of the statute; the interpretation is common law business; ecclesiastical
courts are not entitled to hold implicitly that the statute does not does not create the
offense or deem it a malum prohibitum, whether or not a reasonable case for regarding it
as a malum in se could be made by ecclesiastical lawyers independently of the statute.
Needless to say, the underlying thesis—that the statute does not have the positive effect
of ruling out deprivation of a first offender—is vulnerable, for reasons shown by Finch.
For the rest, it seems to me that these problems can only be avoided by focusing on
policy for handling special verdicts. I.e., one can argue that special verdicts finding
formally sufficient judicial acts by ecclesiastical courts should be uniformly taken as
finding acts which are either valid or voidable within the ecclesiastical system; the
common law courts may sometimes be entitled to scrutinize the validity of such acts, but
they should do so by way of Prohibition.
(4) Finally, Hutton makes an argument tending to uphold the High Commission’s
jurisdiction, as opposed to that of ecclesiastical tribunals generally, the point omitted by
Finch. Hutton claims authority in the form of a holding from 23 Eliz. that the
Commission may take cases normally within episcopal jurisdiction without the Bishop’s
consent. The immediate relevance of this would be to argue that although the Uniformity
Act in terms reserves jurisdiction to Archbishops and Bishops, the High Commission
may meddle with the offenses covered by the statute if the monarch gives it authority to.
The premise would seem to be that the Commission may be authorized to take any
ecclesiastical case, since many of the Uniformity Act offenses are hard to construe as
“enormities.” It is implied that the statute of 23 Hen. VIII (Chap. 2 above) is no more a
bar to the Commission than the language of the Uniformity Act. With its implications,
Hutton’s claim is much too broad in the light of virtually all decisions on the High
Commission’s jurisdiction. A more modest proposition is perhaps tenable: The
Uniformity Act does not intend to exclude the Commission from prosecution of crimes
covered by the act if they are in themselves serious enough. Obviously, I should think,
only mala in se would qualify, and only some of those, but perhaps clerical
subversiveness, if it can be made out to be a malum in se, would be sufficiently grave.
We come now to Coke’s argument in the MS. It is not easy to come to terms with.
The first part is a learned and high-flying discourse much to the same effect as the
“Treatise” in 5 Coke’s Reports—an assertion of the monarch’s ecclesiastical supremacy
at common law. I suspect Coke must be understood as speaking in part in favor of the
monarch’s prerogative for its own sake, in his capacity as Attorney General, as well as
for the party, Acton, who was trying to have Caudrey’s deprivation upheld. The
important question is what he hoped to accomplish for his client in the case at hand by
insisting elaborately on the Supreme Headship at common law.
To start with, the argument is presumably meant to cover the first technical quibble
raised by Finch. If the monarch by virtue of the common law prerogative could create the
equivalent of the High Commission without statutory warrant, he could arguably not be
bound by the statutory requirement that the Commissioners be natural-born subjects. This
seems to involve a large and dubious assumption, however—that the Supremacy Act
does not or could not limit the pre-existing prerogative. Coke seeks to avoid being
challenged for assuming too much by noting a feature of the special verdict: The jury
found in terms that the Commission was appointed “authoritate suprema” and not
“virtute actus tantum.” (One would suspect that it was told by the trial judge so to find.)
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Coke therefore seems to be urging the theory that the monarch has two powers—an
unlimited common law one and a (possibly) limited statutory one. In any given instance,
it may be questionable which one he drew on in constituting a High Commission, but
here there is no question because the jury found as a fact that the Queen drew on her
common law supremacy. 1 Eliz. does not recognize and narrow a pre-existing
prerogative; it leaves that prerogative intact and confers a new and separate power more
limited or not as the case may be.
Secondly, asserting the common law prerogative goes to say that the High
Commission may be given any part of ecclesiastical jurisdiction if the monarch chooses
to draw on the prerogative. It cuts off such arguments as “The statutory power to create a
High Commission is only power to create a special tribunal for enormous crimes;
whatever else is true, speaking against the Prayer Book is not an enormous offense.” A
more important argument, in the present context, is not so clearly cut off—viz. that the
Uniformity Act created the offense of speaking against the Prayer Book, and all the
common law prerogative in the world would not give the monarch power to confer
jurisdiction over an offense that did not exist at common law. If, however, one can rebut
Finch’s arguments and make out that the offense in some way antedates the Uniformity
Act, it is helpful to assert the common law prerogative. If the prerogative is separate
from the powers conferred by the Supremacy Act, the prerogative should be exercisable
without reference to limitations imposed on ecclesiastical jurisdiction by the Uniformity
Act. If speaking against the Prayer Book is a “common law” ecclesiastical offense, the
monarch, so long as he draws on the prerogative, may assign it to any ecclesiastical court,
even though qua offense created by the Uniformity Act it is prosecutable only in regular
ecclesiastical courts.
As we have seen, however, these arguments do not answer anything that Finch
certainly said, apart from the “technical quibble”, though they respond to possible
arguments on his side. Finch’s claim was not centrally that the High Commission had no
business dealing with Caudrey, but that ecclesiastical courts generally had no business
proceeding against him, or at least no authority to deprive him. The most interesting
question about Coke’s lead-off argument is whether he conceived it as an answer to
Finch’s central contention.
I think it is possible that Coke conceived his argument as having that potential. He is
at pains not only to prove the monarch’s supremacy at common law, but to show its
strength. I shall not go into his illustrations and authorities one by one, because they
essentially cover part of the same ground as the printed “Treatise.” The effect is to show
how very much the monarch as Supreme Head can do, as well as showing that his
headship had been continuously recognized in spite of Popery—how very much he could
have done without statutory acknowledgment of his supremacy and can now do
notwithstanding it. For example, according to Coke, the monarch could, as easily without
Parliament as with it have accomplished what the Fourth Lateran Council actually
accomplished: alteration of ecclesiastical law so that tithes must henceforth be applied to
support of parish priests. Most tellingly of all, for this point speaks to a living issue rather
than a historical fantasy, Coke asserts strongly that the monarch may “suprema
authoritate” grant commissions to review sentences by the Delegates. (I.e., the statute of
25 Hen. VIII, c. 19—does not hedge the common law prerogative so as to make decisions
by the Delegates unreviewable in any way. That is an entirely respectable position, but it

195

was not a unanimous position, and judicial decisions later than Caudrey are ambiguous.
Coke says that he could show “seven precedents” of commissions to review decisions by
the Delegates. He undoubtedly could—there were several practice precedents for such
commissions, but their legality had not been upheld judicially, and when the effect of the
statute finally came to be scrutinized by the courts strong arguments were advanced on
both sides. Coke was not strictly entitled to treat the legality of review commissions as a
fact, though so regarding it was reasonable on the best evidence available when he
spoke.)
Coke’s emphasis on the strength of the common law prerogative is encouraging to the
following construction of his intent with respect to the case at hand: The ecclesiastical
prerogative will by itself justify spiritual punishment of a clerical defamer of the Prayer
Book, including deprivation. If there were no Uniformity Act requiring exclusive use of
the Prayer Book, the monarch could make a prerogative order to the same effect and
could direct ecclesiastical courts to punish at least clergymen for disobeying the order or
expressing disapproval of it. Laymen would no doubt pose a problem—to the degree that
the monarch used the prerogative to make new rules, laymen would have a strong claim
that they could not be subjected to liability without Parliament, even as lay members of
the Church. But the prerogative amounts to very broad power to manage the Church
internally, which includes making rules for the clergy and punishing them for violations.
It makes no difference whether the rules are strictly new (let us avoid ultimate questions
by assuming, realistically in our context, that the rules are about “order and discipline”,
not fundamental religious matters.) Perhaps mala prohibita as a general class cannot be
punished by deprivation—new rules made by Parliament on subjects within ecclesiastical
jurisdiction without express authorization of deprivation as a remedy against clerics—but
rules made by virtue of the prerogative properly used are outside that limitation.
Now, one can obviously say that this hypothetical is all very well, perhaps, but in fact
requiring the use of the Prayer Book and imposing penalties for offenses against it were
not effected by prerogative but by statute. Even if the Uniformity Act, like perhaps the
Supremacy Act, did not limit the prerogative, the prerogative was not employed, so the
question remains pure and simple what the statute provides, including whether in the
relevant aspect it creates a malum prohibitum or declares an already existent malum in se.
The only reply I can think of to this is to fall back on the “suprema authoritate” in the
special verdict: It is a conclusive fact in this case that the action taken against Caudrey
was by virtue of the monarch’s prerogative authorization. It takes some doing to stretch
that phrase from a basis for saying the High Commission acted legally because it was
authorized by the Queen to entertain this kind of case to saying that the very crime and its
punishment, at least before the High Commission, were creations of the prerogative, but
perhaps Coke was ready to suggest the stretch.
The argument is certainly extreme. I do not think Coke in propria persona can have
been comfortable with its implications. I shall show below that Coke’s own report of
Caudrey reflects no such argument. There, assertion of the monarch’s prerogative in the
reported “resolutions” of the court figures as a gigantic tail wagging a miniature dog.
That in itself is a reason for doubting that Coke actually did mean to use the ecclesiastical
prerogative to evade all problems about the construction of the Uniformity Act. But if he
meant so to use it, he must be given credit for characteristic cleverness in the persona of
advocate. For if the argument would sell, it amounts to a splendid gambit, an end-run
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around all the complexities raised by Finch, a way not to face the meaning of a none-toointelligible statute. Perhaps the relative pettiness of the immediate objective and its
salutariness from an Establishment point of view would tend to make the argument
vendible. For the end of all was to be rid of a non-conformist minister. Convince a court
that is unlikely to be sympathetic with Puritans that the Royal Supremacy in all its
historic color is probably sufficient justification for dealing harshly with Caudrey, and
perhaps the court will look past the tangles of Finch’s all-too impressive defense of a
wretched displaced non-conformist. After all, the court is only asked to construe a special
verdict in favor of the Crown and the ecclesiastical authorities—and in favor of an
innocent successor to Caudrey, who stands to lose his living. (A Prohibition case, where
the court is nominally asked to protect the “royal dignity” against encroachment, is
perhaps a less eligible occasion for going a bit light on the hard problems of the law.)
Coke puts his assertion of the common law prerogative first and devotes a
disproportionate part of his time to it, if the MS. reflects reality. This is a ground for
surmising that it might carry conclusive weight. His argument in the MS. goes on to
further points, however.
(1)With specific citations, Coke restates the argument already made by Hutton that if
deprivation of Caudrey was erroneous the error was one of ecclesiastical law, not subject
to the scrutiny of this court. His first citation is Cheinye. I have already discussed how
that case is both relevant for this one and convincingly distinguishable. Coke emphasizes
the most hardboiled side of Cheinye, stressing how hardboiled it was: In that case, the
High Commission did not simply err in a matter of pure ecclesiastical law (by taking over
a case pending elsewhere); it violated the terms of its patent by sentencing Cheinye on a
presumptive confession, without factual investigation of his guilt. In his own report of
Caudrey (there is no intimation of this in the MS.), Coke says that Caudrey was deprived
on non-appearance—i.e., like Cheinye, without direct proof of his guilt—and that
exception was taken thereto. The exception was based on the Uniformity Act, not the
Commission’s patent, as in Cheinye, for the statute speaks of offenders convicted “by
verdict of twelve men, or by his own confession, or by the notorious evidence of the
fact.” I.e., the statute seems to exclude a default judgment. The difference between
violating a statute and violating a patent may make the cases distinguishable on this
point, but if Caudrey was in fact condemned by default Cheinye’s relevance as a
precedent is enhanced.
Coke’s other citation, Bunting v. Leppingwell, held that common law courts may not
force their standards on ecclesiastical courts in some circumstances even though interests
in the common law sphere are affected. A woman was sued for wrongfully marrying B
when she was pre-contacted to marry A. Her husband, B, was not named as codefendant, as he would have to be in a common law suit against a married woman. The
court held that the ecclesiastical decree dissolving the woman’s marriage with B could
not be interfered with, even though the effect was to bastardize B’s children without his
having had a hearing. Thus, even quite objectionable ecclesiastical results must be
accepted, including those that produce temporal loss—e.g., Caudrey’s loss of his freehold
living, if indeed he was wrongfully deprived. The precedent is well-chosen.
(2) At last Coke reaches the Uniformity Act. Rather than painfully expound it, Coke
advances a clever argument anticipated by Finch. If, Coke says, a clerical defamer of the
Prayer Book cannot be deprived for his first offense, he cannot be deprived for his second
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offense either, except after secular conviction of the second (when his judicial
deprivation would be nugatory, since he is already deprived ipso facto.) That is absurd;
ergo the first offender may be deprived. Although not all the steps are articulated in the
report, I think there is no doubt but that Coke hit on a substantial difficulty in the statute.
One does not have to accept his reasoning, but it demands attention.
I can best explain Coke’s argument by first expressing what the common sense
interpretation of the statute seems to me: A first offender may, pace Finch, be punished
by minor ecclesiastical censures before the secular courts touch him. He may not be
deprived, however, until he has once been convicted and punished by secular courts and
has committed the offense again at a time subsequent to said conviction. But then
ecclesiastical courts may prosecute him and deprive him upon finding him guilty of such
second offense. They need not wait on the secular tribunals to prosecute and convict a
second time. For if they did have to wait, the statute’s saving of ecclesiastical jurisdiction
would be nearly empty as far as clerical offenders are concerned. They would be
debarred from using their serious sanction for clerical discipline, deprivation. They would
be limited to the vain motion of pronouncing sentence of deprivation on someone already
deprived. To all intents they would be confined to punishing clergymen by minor
sanctions. For second offenders, that would not be to much purpose. Why impose
admonition or penance on someone who is liable to ipso facto deprivation? Better to
promote his prosecution in a secular court and see that he receives the condign
punishment. There is still less point in visiting minor sanctions on someone who has
already suffered a second secular conviction and the greater penalty of deprivation plus a
year in jail.
I see nothing in the language of the statute sufficient to defeat this interpretation.
Coke’s strategy, however, is to knock it out by concentrating on the second offender:
Either no meaningful power to deprive is reserved to ecclesiastical courts, or they have
such power against first offenders as well as later ones. It is not true that the statute poses
no obstacle to allowing second offenders to be deprived by ecclesiastical process without
waiting on a second secular conviction. For this contention, Coke has sound, if tricky,
verbal grounds—hardly good enough, it seems to me, to overcome a “common sense”
guess at what the ill-drafted statute intends, but still persuasive.
The statute says that a first offender “lawfully convicted, according to the laws of this
realm, by verdict of twelve men, or by his own confession, or by the notorious evidence
of the fact” shall forfeit a year’s income and be imprisoned for six months. This
language plainly refers to secular courts, for the act subsequently makes it clear that
ecclesiastical courts may only apply ecclesiastical censures, which do not include
forfeiture or jail. Speaking of second offenders, the statute says that one who “shall after
his first conviction eftsoons offend, and be thereof in form aforesaid lawfully convicted”
shall be imprisoned for a year and deprived ipso facto. “In form aforesaid” obviously
refers to the first-offenders clause—i.e., repeats the requirement that conviction be by the
laws of the realm, by verdict, confession, etc. The first-offenders clause refers only to
secular tribunals. Therefore the second-offenders clause refers only to those. Therefore
deprivation can only follow on conviction, in the manner specified, by a secular tribunal.
Therefore ecclesiastical courts may never deprive, unless in the empty sense of depriving
someone already deprived. That is absurd for the reason the “common sense”
interpretation above gives. If the ecclesiastical courts’ reserved powers mean anything,
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those courts must have power to deprive at some point. But the sections of the statute we
have looked at do not countenance ecclesiastical deprivation after one secular conviction
any more than they countenance it before. Therefore the only part of the statute that
authorized ecclesiastical deprivation at any point is the general clause permitting
punishment of all offenders against the act by the censures of the Church. Those censures
are in no way defined to exclude deprivation, and no distinction is made between first and
second offenders in the clause permitting their use. Therefore first offenders may be
proceeded against in ecclesiastical courts and deprived if the court does not see fit to give
the culprit a second chance (whereas automatic deprivation requires two secular
convictions. Note that this is both a corollary and an advantage of Coke’s theory. The
statute could be read as providing that a second conviction in an ecclesiastical court as
well as in a secular one would result in ipso facto deprivation, though of course the other
sanction, imprisonment, could not be imposed. But that is incompatible with Coke’s
reading. It is also improbable. The statute-makers are likely to have wanted to insure that
a man would incur certain deprivation only after enjoying secular process of law.
Ecclesiastical could after all not be obliged to deprive a second, or a thirteenth, offender.
By Coke’s theory, the price of this benign and probable result is that a first offender is in
danger of deprivation if the ecclesiastical court gets its hands on him before a secular one.
Freer and easier interpretation, merely by likely intent, would avoid the price.) So, with
some spelling out, I take Coke’s point to be. It has considerable force and is squarely on
the statute. If accepted, it removes all need to rely on the Royal Supremacy at common
law, all need to persuade the court that it may not scrutinize ecclesiastical error, and,
failing the second, any need to make out that there was no ecclesiastical error (either
because deprivation for a malum prohibitum is not always unlawful or because speaking
against the Prayer Book is not a malum prohibitum.) The argument’s only fault, if it is
one, is that it takes the words of the statute very seriously. A cynic might say that gives
the statute-makers too much credit—that rougher guesswork about their intentions is a
better bet.
(3)Coke’s last point, like his others, has the “something extra” that distinguished his
advocacy. He starts by saying that the Uniformity Act, being in the affirmative, does not
abolish any pre-existing authority. As I observe in discussing Finch’s argument, this
position as such is sound and standard. Express “negative” or disauthorizing language
was usually necessary to do away with an existing jurisdiction, remedy, or procedure
when a new one in the same area was enacted.
This point is obviously only of use if ecclesiastical courts could in fact proceed
against the equivalent of defamers of the Prayer Book before the Uniformity Act and
punish first offenders by deprivation. Coke does not rebut Finch’s cogent arguments that
no such power existed. It is possible that the high-sounding argument about the Royal
Supremacy is meant in part to cover this weakness. I.e., it may be necessary to admit that
ecclesiastical courts could not deprive for mala prohibita, nor for the malum in se of
“speaking against religion” on the first offense. The only resource may be to argue that
the monarch could at any time alter the ecclesiastical law, at least quoad clerical
discipline, and by virtue of the special verdict had presumptively done so.
Coke does not, however, rest content with assuming the problematic premise—prior
ecclesiastical power—and asserting that the conclusion is obvious by accepted canons of
statutory interpretation. His final effort, as I understand it, implicitly admits that the
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conclusion may not be so obvious and finds a reason for it beyond the “accepted canons.”
I have already suggested, in connection with Finch, why the Uniformity Act’s
“affirmative” appointment of secular procedures and sanctions may not obviously leave
intact other procedures and sanctions admitted to exist—why, as Finch puts it, a
“negative” (“and not otherwise”) may be implied in this affirmative: There is no
particular reason why a statute creating a new civil remedy should be construed to take
away an old one without express evidence of such intent, but a criminal statute is not in
the same boat. The precept that “affirmatives” do not imply “negatives” has no higher
status than the rule that penal acts should be construed strictly. The latter maxim is
applicable to the instant case. There is plenty of reason why an act appointing a stiff
penalty for a first offense, but explicitly sparing first offenders the further grave penalty
of automatic deprivation, should be construed as limiting what can be done to first
offenders by any tribunal, if necessary even at the expense of prior powers.
Coke’s final strategy is to shift from the Uniformity Act to the Supremacy Act. He
claims to have a “clincher” for the purposes of the case at hand, for he introduces his last
remark with the phrase “but to oust [or overcome—d’ouster] all argument in this case.”
Coke’s point is that the Supremacy Act expressly authorizes the High Commission “to
proceed as has been used before this statute.” To spell out: Let us grant that the
Uniformity Act, albeit without express negative language, destroys any pre-existing
power in regular ecclesiastical courts—the Archbishops and Bishops specified in the
“censures of the Church” clause—to deprive for a first offense. That might be equivalent
to destroying all ecclesiastical power to deprive for a first offense if the Uniformity Act
stood alone. To preserve the power would at any rate require falling back on the reserve
of royal prerogative and the special verdict. But for present purposes it is not necessary
to fall back on those. The letter of the Supremacy Act is sufficient. For that statute in
terms permits the High Commission to do anything that could previously be done by
ecclesiastical courts, whether or not it still lay in the power of regular ecclesiastical
courts. Therefore, granting that before the Elizabethan Settlement any ecclesiastical court
could have punished by deprivation, the High Commission may do so now. It makes no
difference whether the Uniformity Act destroys other ecclesiastical courts’ power to
deprive.
This argument of course involves interpretation of the Supremacy Act. It requires
giving literal force to the words “…such jurisdictions [etc.]…as by any ecclesiastical
power or authority have heretofore been…exercised or used…” But Coke’s interpretation
was to enjoy considerable favor. Its usual application was to prove that the High
Commission could imprison for heresy because episcopal courts once had power to do so,
though by repeal of the relevant statutes they no longer had it. It is if anything more
convincing to argue that the High Commission may deprive for defaming the Prayer
Book because regular courts could once do so. That is true because power once exercised
solely by virtue of now-repealed statutes may be trickier to bring under
“heretofore…exercised” than prior de jure power. The argument of course still needs the
shaky premise that power to deprive defamers of the Prayer Book did in a meaningful
sense exist before the Elizabethan settlement.
With this Coke rested. The court’s immediate response, according to the MS., was to
delay responding. Chief Justice Popham, noting that the case was of great consequence,
said that the judges wanted to advise with their brethren of the other common law courts
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as well as among themselves. On a later day, Coke moved for judgment, and it was
entered for his client.
The report gives the judges’ position in the form of a per Curiam opinion:
(a) The first proposition endorsed is that Caudrey’s deprivation was good because the
statute in the affirmative does not take away the authority which spiritual courts had at
common law. Nothing is said as to why one should assume that spiritual courts did have
relevant authority at common law.
(b) The court held that deprivation by one High Commissioner with the consent of
others was good enough. No large theses about the common law prerogative or the
meaning of the Supremacy Act are put forward. Rather, the opinion distinguishes
between a judicial act and a property transaction; A Dean cannot make a lease of land
belonging to the Dean and Chapter “with the assent of the Chapter”; the lessor must
appear (in pleading or a special verdict) to be the Dean and Chapter as a body. The
standard for a judicial act is less exacting; “this is the act of one judge with the consent of
two others” is equivalent to “this is the act of three judges as a body.” The point is pure
common law. Nothing is said about the other technicality raised—whether the special
verdict was defective because it did not say the High Commissioners were all native
Englishmen.
(c) Finally the court held that whether or not Caudrey was duly deprived his
deprivation was at worst only voidable within the ecclesiastical system. (“Also, admitting
that the deprivation is not duly done, yet without question it is not void, but voidable only
by suit in the spiritual court, and so inasmuch as it is not void at this point [adhuc], the
parson [Caudrey] is out of possession of the parsonage, for he is not parson, and so
cannot enter there and make a lease at this time [wherefore the fictitious lessee must lose
in an action of Ejectment.]” I have already said what I think is wrong with this argument,
but it does follow Cheinye at least superficially, and it does take advantage of Finch’s
weakest sector. (His attempt to show that Church courts had no prior authority to deprive
someone in Caudrey’s position led him into propositions about ecclesiastical law, which
invite the response that ecclesiastical courts are the only competent judge of their truth.)
The proposition that ecclesiastical courts may have had prior authority, and that whether
they did is an ecclesiastical question, combined with the court’s perfectly traditional view
that the affirmative statute did not take away any prior authority that existed, in a sense
justifies the decision. It seems to me, however, that the court as reported by the MS. was
all-too willing not to tangle with the meaning of the Uniformity Act—too willing to treat
as a reality the rather phony issue whether a crime which common sense would say was
unheard of before the statute was already within ecclesiastical cognizance and to evade
deciding how the statute-makers actually meant to have offenders dealt with. To do him
justice, Coke showed the court rather more elegant ways to get where it wanted to go
than the court shows any sign of taking up. Resorting to a per Curiam opinion in a case
as carefully argued as this one probably signifies, let us say, a preference for letting
Coke’s theories about the prerogative stand non-contradicted and uninvestigated and for
not sinking into difficult questions that might have to be resolved in favor of a nonconformist.
The task remains of comparing the MS. with the printed reports. Popham’s report
overlaps both Coke and the MS. and differs from both in its presentation of the court’s
holdings. Like the MS., it does not have the court embracing any far-reaching doctrines
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about the monarch’s prerogative. For the arguments of counsel, the report is negligible. It
notes briefly the technical points made by Finch (without naming him or the opposing
counsel) and his thesis that the Uniformity Act banned deprivation until the second
offense (without any of the subtleties of his argument.) As to the court’s opinion, Popham
distinguishes the following holdings:
(a) Deprivation by one Commissioner with the assent of others is unobjectionable
because it is good ecclesiastical form; that is the proper standard, rather than rules
applicable to the judicial acts of a secular commission.
(b) It is not a fault that the verdict failed to find the Commissioners native subjects,
for two reasons: (1) Common intendment—i.e., if the verdict said nothing even by
implication on the subject, it would be presumed that the Commissioners were natives
unless the contrary were asserted as a fact. (2) Actually, the verdict did say something by
implication, viz. that the Commission was appointed “secundum tenorem & effectum
actus.” That is a sufficient finding that the Commissioners met the native-birth standard
and any others. {Note that the court read the verdict as referring to a Commission
constituted pursuant to the Supremacy Act, not to the Queen’s common law prerogative.
(c) Caudrey’s deprivation was lawful because the Uniformity Act is in the
affirmative. I.e., (as the Popham version explains) the language fixing a penalty for a first
offense restricts only secular courts to that penalty, leaving ecclesiastical courts
unaffected. As in the MS., there is no justification of the proposition that ecclesiastical
courts had any prior authority to leave intact.
(d) The Supremacy Act and the High Commissioners’ patent warrants their punishing
the offense at discretion. So I take the words: “…by the Act and their commission, they
may proceed according to their discretion to punish the offense proved or confessed
against them, and so are the words of their commission warranted by the clause of the
Act.” I am not sure what this holding adds. There could possibly be, despite (c), some
doubt whether the Uniformity Act leaves regular ecclesiastical courts with power to
deprive. But since, as (c) says, it does not cut off ecclesiastical jurisdiction over first
offenders altogether, the permissiveness of the Supremacy Act supports the conclusion
that at least the High Commission may be authorized to use any ecclesiastical sanction.
(e) The Uniformity Act saves ecclesiastical jurisdiction. To add this as a separate
holding only underscores the obvious. It does not solve the problem whether
ecclesiastical jurisdiction is saved quoad deprivation of a first offender.
(f) The last point in Popham seems only to reinforce (d) –the wide statutory warrant
for conferring powers on the High Commission, including powers not enjoyed by regular
ecclesiastical courts. It is first said that “all the bishops and popish priests were deprived
by virtue of a commission warranted by this clause in the Act.” This does not seem to be
more than a historical truism—that early in Elizabeth’s reign the High Commission was
used to get rid of Catholic clergy. Secondly, the report cites a recent case in which all the
judges allegedly agreed that the Commission, being duly warranted by its patent, was
entitled to fine a “vicious liver” 200 marks. Asserting the Commission’s power to impose
secular sanctions in the context of the present case—where there was no direct question
about that power—seems to say that the Commission’s power to deprive cannot be
challenged even if ordinary ecclesiastical courts are not conceded the same power.
(Quaere how compelling that is. Because secular sanctions available to no ecclesiastical
court without—pace Coke’s high prerogative theories—statutory warrant can be given to

202

the Commission, that court can also be excepted out of a statute limiting the use of an
ordinary ecclesiastical sanction in a particular situation?)
To summarize: Aside from the technical exceptions to the verdict, Popham’s report
differs from the MS. mainly in the omission of one important point—the court’s holding
that the rightfulness of Caudrey’s deprivation was an ecclesiastical question. Secondly,
Popham has the court upholding the High Commission’s specific authority to deprive,
which tends to moot the matter omitted.
Turning now to Coke’s report: After stating the case, Coke summarizes the
arguments of Caudrey’s counsel (not identifying them by name.) The summary contains
some points and emphases that do not appear in Finch’s argument in the MS. On the
other hand, it does not reflect the complexity which that argument seems to me to have.
This is not to say that Coke is unfair to the losing side or represents its case so as to make
weaknesses prominent. On the contrary, he gives a clear and solid argument, which
certainly conveys the essence of what can be, and was, said on Caudrey’s behalf. All I
suspect him of is just that—formulating the essence with some loss and possibly some
gain. Finch might have thought his various angles and authorities too boiled down to
“what it comes to”; he might have had to give Coke credit for a better statement than his
own of parts of his contentions and for adding some considerations he failed to develop.
Coke attributes four arguments to Caudrey’s counsel, of which the first comprises the
substantive points. The other three are the technical exceptions to the verdict, plus the
further argument, absent from the MS., that it was unlawful to deprive Caudrey by a
default judgment even if his deprivation was otherwise justifiable. Nothing about Coke’s
representation of the technicalities seems to me to vary from the MS. His picture of the
substantive contention has two distinguishing features. First, it speaks more clearly than
Finch in the MS., if more exclusively, to the policy of the Uniformity Act. It addresses
what common sense cannot miss after all is said that can be about mala prohibita and
mala in se, affirmative and negative statutes, and the like: Viz. the Uniformity Act
appears to be “moderatum & aequum “in that it intends to spare non-conformist clergy
until they have been put on warning by the solemnity of conviction and punishment for a
first offense. (To embroider in my words, not Coke’s: The act appears to allow for what
realistic and even-tempered legislators in 1559 ought to have allowed for—that a new
liturgy coming in a succession of new liturgies was not going to please everybody, that
the Settlement would not at once be accepted by some of those who would have preferred
to settle somewhere else. Wise legislators would be both, insistent and indulgent,
insistent that the clergy recognize the Settlement and start cooperating right now,
indulgent in the light of recent history and an agitated climate of opinion. The Uniformity
Act seems to practice both virtues by making a first offense highly penal, but not running
men out of their livelihoods and the Church’s service until it has really been brought
home to them that the Settlement is for keeps and demands respect.) In so far as Coke
emphasizes, rather than represses, the strong common sense appeal of the losing case, he
sets up the winning one as a triumph for the “artificial reason of the law”, the paradoxical
deep truth of our societal understandings, embedded in the law that oftentimes belies
what seems to make sense. Could he have been conscious of this effect? It is a
“paradoxical deep truth” to which his “Treatise” will point: The Royal Supremacy is so
embedded in English hearts and institutions that what everyone would have thought—
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that the Pope, however wrongfully, had at least successfully enjoyed supremacy over the
English Church through much of its history—comes out a very superficial semblance.
Secondly, Coke introduces a two-pronged argument specific to the High
Commission: The clauses preserving ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the Uniformity Act
speak only of Archbishops, Bishops, and other Ordinaries; therefore the High
Commission is excluded. If, however, this proposition is denied and the High
Commission is conceded as much jurisdiction as other ecclesiastical courts, then it is
limited in the same way as other courts—i.e., may not deprive for a first offense. This
argument, in both branches, is clearly relevant. Save for a hint, it is missing from the
MS., which of course need not mean Finch did not make it. If he left it out, the cause
would not necessarily be negligence. He might have figured that there was little hope of
persuading the court that the Commission’s deprivation of Caudrey was unlawful if the
court could not be convinced he was simply not deprivable. That would probably be a
realistic calculation both practically and legally. (Practically because there is not a lot of
sense in excluding the Commission from doing what other ecclesiastical courts may do
by way of clerical discipline, when there is no lay interest in local justice and the
avoidance of secular sanctions without secular process of law; because offending the
Church dignitaries to no great purpose is foolish; because it is pretty vain motion to undo
one tribunal’s longstanding sentence of deprivation when the same sentence could be
obtained in another—a different matter from prohibiting proceedings in the wrong court
before they have occurred. Legally because it is pretty literal reading of the statute to take
its mention of Archbishops and Bishops as intended to exclude the High Commission.) If
Coke ascribed the argument to Caudrey’s counsel without the warrant of what they
actually said, motives are assignable. It was he who needed an argument specific to the
High Commission in order to refute it, and refutation opens the way to his higher themes.
From his summary of the arguments on Caudrey’s side, Coke proceeds to the
“resolutions” of a unanimous court, cast as responses to the “objections” above.
Arguments on the side he himself represented are not given, and there is no mention of
his own role. These are the “resolutions”:
(a)The substance and the exception to Caudrey’s having been deprived by default are
covered by one resolution going to interpretation of the Uniformity Act. It has several
sub-divisions:
(1)The affirmative statute does not take away any existing ecclesiastical power (as
was held according to all accounts.)
(2) Secular and spiritual punishments have different ends and means—“the one to
punish the outward man, the other to reform the inward.” Only Coke’s report has the
court articulating this truism. What function does it serve? As we have seen, it is dubious
to deny a penal statute restrictive force just because it does not use express negative
language. It is a better argument to say that a statute appointing a secular penalty has no
restrictive reference to spiritual penalties without express language, because by the
principle stated the two kinds of penalty simply “fail to meet.” So to speak, the legislature
may mean to exclude other secular penalties when it appoints one affirmatively, but it
hardly means to abandon souls to the devil. It may of course insist that ecclesiastical
courts follow Parliament’s judgment as to what “treatment” is good for souls in particular
circumstances, instead of using their own discretion, but the odds are against Parliament’s
wanting so to insist. For the most part, legislation reshapes and corrects secular law.

204

Therefore highly explicit evidence of intent to limit the remedial discretion of spiritual
courts must be shown.
Secondly, I would speculate that emphasizing the distinct end of spiritual law is
helpful for reaching the conclusion that Caudrey’s deprivation was not ecclesiastical
error. I.e.: Assume for the sake of argument that whether there was ecclesiastical error is
not beyond common law scrutiny. One approach to deciding whether there was error is to
take on such specific questions as “May deprivation be used as a sanction for a malum
prohibitum?” and “Is the seeming statutory offense of speaking against the Prayer Book
actually an instance of a longstanding ecclesiastical crime for which deprivation is an
eligible sanction?” Another approach is to say that the very end of improving the “inward
man” requires that courts with that function have wide discretion in the choice of
sanctions. They are never engaged in applying the penalty to the crime that has been
committed, but in deciding what will do the particular criminal the most spiritual good.
Perhaps if there were perfectly certain answers to the specific questions above—
analogous to an unmistakable Parliamentary intent to curb ecclesiastical discretion—it
would be possible for an outsider, such as a common law court, to say “The ecclesiastical
court has erred.” Short of that, there must be a strong presumption that application of any
sanction on the list of recognized spiritual ones is an exercise of lawful discretion and
therefore “correct ecclesiastical law.” To say otherwise belongs only to insiders—
superior ecclesiastical courts, part of whose function is to reconsider the discretionary
decisions of inferiors. Leaving aside the special case of the High Commission (or
dismissing it in the cavalier manner of Cheinye), the generosity of ecclesiastical appeals
is reason for supposing that inexpert “spiritual physicianship” will almost always be
corrected. Without at least the presumption that any spiritual sanction is lawfully
applicable at discretion to any crime within ecclesiastical cognizance, the ecclesiastical
system would be turned into something foreign to its purpose—a mere structure of rulebound courts, indifferent to the inward man so long as the outward gets what by the law
he has coming to him. (It is ironic that “mere rule-bound courts” are what Puritan hypersensitivity to inward states saw in the ecclesiastical system.)
(3) The statute in any event expressly saves ecclesiastical power to apply any
sanction hitherto used to the offenses in the act. As above, creating a new temporal
sanction does not take away the old ecclesiastical ones; in addition, if instead of creating
some new sanctions the statute said nothing at all about penalties—but merely
commended the use of the Prayer Book in churches—ecclesiastical courts would have
authority to apply their traditional censures at discretion to clerics who disobeyed or
“depraved” it. (I take it that this means even if the saving had been omitted as well, but a
fortiori with it.) The question is still left open whether deprivation of a first-offending
clergyman for offenses against the Prayer Book or the equivalent was really “hitherto
used” and not against positive rules of ecclesiastical law, except as the point above about
the distinct end of spiritual law is a kind of answer.
(b) One High Commissioner acting with the assent of others is unobjectionable
because (as in Popham) it is good ecclesiastical form. The court’s opinion in Coke
elaborates with the generality that faith and credit should be shown to judicial acts in the
ecclesiastical sphere. For this the two cases used by Coke in his MS. argument are
cited—Cheinye and Bunting. The cases and the generality they support are brought up
solely in connection with the technical objection to the verdict.
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(c) The Commissioners will be presumed native subjects. Three reasons are given
for this. Two are the same as Popham’s (“common intendment” and the verdict’s having
found generally that the Commission was constituted in accord with the Supremacy Act.)
The third is that the Supremacy Act is declaratory, so that the High Commission could
have been created without statutory warrant. Here and only here, in connection with the
technicality about the Commissioners’ nationality, are the grand theories urged by Coke
in his MS. argument touched on. As reporter of the court’s “resolutions”, Coke says the
statute was held declaratory partly on the basis of its title (“An Act Restoring to the
Crown the ancient Jurisdiction over the state ecclesiastical etc.”) and partly on the basis
of its “body” But there is no indication whether the judges actually said anything about
the body of the statute, nor of how they proposed to apply the declaratory theory to the
case at hand, even to the quibble about the Commissioners’ native status. Coke launches
into his “Treatise” without any real transition; what exposition of the “body” of the
statute effectively means is the whole elaborate historical case for the common law
prerogative. Coke admits frankly that this is his own contribution. There is no similar
admission as to other features of the reported “resolutions.”
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Notes to Cheinye and Caudrey
1. (Cheinye) The reports of this case are as follows. Note that details suggest that
the history of the litigation was somewhat more complicated than the accounts in the text.
If so, it makes no difference; I have synthesized all reports in recounting the case.
Harg. 15, f. 134b. Dated M. 26/27 Eliz. Court not specified. Gives Cheinye as
plaintiff in the action of Trespass. States the facts and gives argument by Wroth for
Cheinye.
Harl. 6687, f. 730. Sub. nom. Cheyny v. Frankwell. Dated T. 29 Eliz. Court not
specified, but the source is Coke’s interleaved Littleton, which runs to Queen’s Bench
cases in which Coke was involved (as we know he was in this one from Leonard.) Does
not state facts but summarizes the issues and rulings. Hard to read, but agrees with
Leonard as to what was decided. If dates in the two MSS. are correct, note that the gap
between M. 26/27 and T. 29 is rather large.
Leonard,176. Sub.nom. Frankwell’s Case. Dated T. 30 Eliz. Has Parson
Frankwell deprived and the unnamed new clergyman suing Frankwell for carrying away
tithes.
Leonard describes both the first round and the Writ of Error. The former is plainly
in the Queen’s Bench, for Coke and Wray speak individually. (Arguments on the side
opposed to Coke are summarized, without naming the lawyers.) The Writ of Error is
clearly in the new Exchequer Chamber, for the judges who speak, Anderson and Periam,
were Common Pleas judges who would have sat on that court.
These things would scarcely be worth mentioning if a disturbing note were not
introduced by Justice Periam, for he refers to a time when the ccase was in the Common
Pleas. (At that time, he says, the civilian Dr. Clark was consulted about whether an
appeal would lie from the High Commission.) It seems unlikely that “Common Pleas”is a
mere slip for “Queen’s Bench” , because the Common Pleas judge Periam remembered
the episode precisely, including the civilian’s name, which would suggest that it took
place in his court. One can only speculate as to how the same case, or at least the same in
substance, got into both the Common Pleas and the Queen’s Bench. The best guess is
that Cheinye and Frankwell sued each other in different courts but eventually agreed to
have it out in the Queen’s Bench, whereupon the Common Pleas suit was dropped. Small
oddities in the reports—dating and confusion about which party was plaintiff and which
defendant—give that hypothesis a little support.
Add. 24,845, f. 129b is a strange report, which probably amounts to notes on
Cheinye. The case is summarily stated at the end of the document: Incumbent “Cheney”,
being deprived by the Bishop of Lincoln appealed to the Archbishop, pending which
appeal Cheney was sued before the High Commission and deprived by that court. The
points in the document are ones which the straightforward reports show were made in
Cheinye, or at least points relevant for that case.
The document is dated M. 15/16 Eliz. , however, (court not indicated.) It starts
with the generality that the High Commission has power to deprive, and someone
identified as “Recorder” is reported to have said that there had been several such
deprivations. The document states next that “this case” was before a Bishop and that
while it was pending the party was sued for the same cause before the High Commission,
which latter suit was “not good.” (“This case” sounds like Cheinye.) The document
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proceeds to report the opinion given by a civilian “being there”: A person sued before an
ecclesiastical judge should not be sued for the same cause before any other ecclesiastical
judge; further, an erroneous ecclesiastical sentence is “avoidable” by appeal, and appeal
suspends execution, but a sentence given by the Pope or the King’s commissioners will
be “void” by a supplication to the King to make a new commission or to the Pope to
make new delegates; such supplication does not, however, suspend execution of the
existing sentence.
The document then jumps to P. 25 Eliz. (close to Cheinye, but still a little earlier
than the clear reports of the case.) Remarks by Fenner—whom we know to have been of
counsel in Cheinye—are given: It had been adjudged in the King’s Bench that if
“Commissioners” give sentence in time of Parliament and then the same Parliament
pardons the offense by the general pardon the said sentence is void, and therefore—per
Fenner—when “commissioners” give erroneous sentence “it will be void in itself [en lui
mesme.]
Next, “in the same term” (P. 25 presumably) it was disputed between two
civilians whether, if a suit is pending before a Bishop or Archbishop and “it” (presumably
a suit for the same cause) should be commenced before Commissioners and judgment
given the sentence will be void or voidable, and thus (i.e., likewise) if a sentence is given
before an Archbishop pending a suit before a Bishop. It was also said “there” (probably
=on the same occasion) that appeal ought at common law to be taken within 10 days after
sentence, though “now” he has 15 days, but “supplication” (for royal intervention) may
be brought within 2 years and there will be restitution of the profits, but supplication lies
after 2 years (i.e., presumably, if the new royal commission reverses the earlier sentence
there is restitution only if “supplication” for such a new commission was timely, but
supplication may be made at any time, except that if it is delayed beyond 2 years and
reversal results there will be no restitution.
The brief explicit reference to Cheinye follows. My best guess is that the material
in the document reports early proceedings in that case and precedential citations therein,
unless some of it reflects only the research of a lawyer concerned with the case.
2. (Caudrey) There are some problems about the reports of Caudrey. These bear
immediately on no more than factual trivia. Because Coke’s reporting of this case is so
singular, however (see text), one should be especially inquisitive about its literal
accuracy. Substantial differences among the reports, discussed in the text, are the main
evidence on that, but oddities in the trivia may also be suggestive. The picture at the end
of this note of what Coke may have been “up to” is meant cum grano salis—as a
projection from both the details and the substance that is worth considering, but hardly as
solid as the comparison in the text between Coke’s report and a very convincing MS.
Bare references for the case, omitting dates, which are part of the problem, are as
follows:
(a) 5 Coke’s Reports, 1. Sub nom. Caudrey’s Case (and the name of the other party is
given in the body of the report as Atton.)
(b) Popham, 59. Sub nom. Cawdry v. Atton.
(c )Add. 25,201, f. 65b. Cawdry v. Hatton. Very fragmentary notes on Coke’s
argument in the case. Adds nothing except one citation contributed by the reporter.
(d) Add. 25,211, f. 87. The important MS. Relied on principally in the text.
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(e) Harg. 7, f.34. Sub nom. Cawdry’s Case. Although this MS. presents some
problems of legibility, as Add. 25,211 does not, it is all but identical with the latter.
One of these two reports is evidently a copy of the other.
As for dating: Coke dates the case, by its original enrollment as H. 33 Eliz., but
records that it was not decided until H. 37. (Popham’s dating is the same.) That is slow
progress, but not necessarily reason for surprise apart from a discrepancy in the reports as
to the cause of action. Coke and Popham both say that the action was Trespass Quare
clausum fregit, the special verdict being rendered upon a plea of “Not guilty.” Add.
25,211, the strong MS., together with Harg. 7, is dated M. 36/37 and gives the action as
Ejectment. The date itself is compatible with Coke. The MS. does not say that the court’s
decision was handed down in the next term, H. 37, but it implies as much, while showing
that it was argued on two different days in M.36/37. For the MS. tells us that the judges
wanted to deliberate and gave their opinion on a motion for judgment “another day.” It is
more than likely that this “other day” was in the next term. (The incomplete MS.
Report—Add. 25,201—giving only the argument of Coke as counsel in the case, is also
dated M. 36/37, confirming the chronology.) Whether the action was Trespass or
Ejectment is of no importance for the substantive issues, but I do not think we can let the
discrepancy go at that. These small matters bear on the “dramatic” structure of the case
and hence on the reliability of the different accounts.
If we had Coke’s report alone, we would have an action of Trespass commenced in
1591 and decided in 1595. The impression would be of a difficult case, as this one
certainly was, reargued on several occasions and finally decided in the most thorough
fashion. Indeed, Coke says it was: “Et haec causa pro tribunali per advocatos utriusque
parties, & de tribunali per Judices saepius tractata est, & post magnam & maturam
deliberationem, & cum caeteris Judicibus consultationem…adjudicata…” (Coke wrote
his report of Caudrey in Latin, presumably to make it continuous with his “Treatise”—
see text—for which he considered the learned language appropriate. He thought, as he
says, that contents of the “Treatise” were important for the general public—the “educated
public” in modern parlance—to know about; concealing them in the jargon of the legal
fraternity would have been a pity. Coke was translated so early and is so familiarly
known in English that it is sometimes forgotten he wrote and first published his Reports
in Law French.)
If we had Add. 25,211 alone, we would have an action of Ejectment argued late in
1594, perceived as difficult, put off for “deliberation and consultation with other judges”,
and probably decided early in 1595. Moreover, we would have a per Curiam opinion,
not a decision rendered in the form of separate speeches by all the Justices, as Coke’s
words “from the Bench by the judges often argued” imply. (Coke does not actually give
arguments by individual judges, but that is in itself unsurprising. He did not
characteristically write “narrative” reports, but summed up the holdings of the court. In
this case, however, there is good MS. Evidence that there were no individual judicial
arguments in open court, whereas Coke creates the impression that he is merely not
spelling them out. ) From the fact that the case was argued at the Bar in M. 36/37, it of
course does not follow that it was not argued any number of times before. But I wonder.
As I show in the text, the debate by counsel in M. 36/37 was thorough. When that debate
was concluded, the judges reacted as one would expect after hearing a hard case ably
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argued—they took time to advise. One would hardly suppose that they had heard of it off
and on for four years.
Finally, Add. 25,211 provides a bit more evidence that the action was Ejectment than
merely saying so. For as that report renders the per Curiam opinion, it contains language
specifically appropriate to judgment in Ejectment and not appropriate to Trespass.
What then is to be made of the discrepancies? It seems out of the question that there
were two separate and simultaneous lawsuits between the same parties to try the same
matter, both decided in H.37. In general, the clearest ring of authenticity comes from
Add. 25,211, simply because it is a narrative report—the arguments of named counsel
given in order, their speeches recorded in enough detail for successive lines of reasoning
to stand out, citations abundantly noted by the reporter. I therefore conclude that an
action of Ejectment was argued for the first time in M. 36/37 and decided in a relatively
cursory way in H. 37. Yet Coke and Popham testify to an action of Trespass begun in H.
33. I suggest that there was such an action, but that it was dropped before it was
decided—not necessarily without ever having been discussed, but probably without
thorough discussion. One explanation might be that Caudrey was advised to try to get his
deprivation reversed within the ecclesiastical system before pressing a common law test
of its validity. A few years later, that having failed and the parties being still at odds, a
new suit’ was commenced, Ejectment this time (possibly chosen as the slightly “higher”
action when the litigation was clearly to be seen through to a showdown,) Some
confusion or conflation took place when Coke prepared his report. The same is true of the
author of the report in Popham. (The book called Popham’s Reports was published late
in the 17th century and is of uneven quality. Connection with Chief Justice Popham—who
presided over the court that decided Caudrey—is dubious, though the publisher claimed
that most of the volume was taken from MSS. in Popham’s hand.) Both Coke and
Popham cite the roll number for H. 33 where the action of Trespass was entered. Perhaps
they found that case in the rolls and confused it with the action of Ejectment they
remembered the debate of. Nothing in the substance would arouse suspicion in someone
who had forgotten the details.
All this goes to cast doubt on Coke’s memory and his proximity to the case when he
composed his report. Doubt based on these trivia goes to reinforce the touch of
skepticism that should always greet a well-wrought Cokean report, even when there is no
other source to compare with it. Did the judges really “resolve” the points Coke has them
“resolving” in quite the terms he gives? The volume of the skepticism should rise a bit
with the addition of a piece of information supplied only by the MSS.: Caudrey was won
by Coke, won by an argument that does credit to his powers. Ordinarily, Coke was not
given to suppressing his victories, but here, perhaps, one can imagine a different
temptation, essentially a literary one: A great case, after maturing for four years, yields
deeply thought through resolutions, on the basis of which a legal scholar erects a
“Treatise” of considerable historical and constitutional interest, and also of patriotic or
Papist-confuting appeal. Tempting, is it not, to make it seem so? A better picture emerges
than the one that Add. 25,211 seems to put closer to the photographic truth.
The latter would run this way: Coke, Attorney General, makes an effective argument in a
new case, whose complexity is revealed to the judges by able advocacy on both sides.
Coke wins. The judges find enough in his several arguments to be persuaded that his
client should win. But they are aware that they have not thought through every angle.
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Rather than lay down too much law, rather than embrace every theory that proceeded
from the Attorney General, and rather than speak too freely about politically sensitive
matters, they grasp at the essential and avoid the histrionics of “great cases.” The Chief
Justice sketches out the court’s opinion on enough points to settle the case, and judgment
is entered. The victorious Attorney General is perhaps a bit disappointed to have offered
more than was received.
Later, with a “Treatise “ to write—for which Coke’s argument in Caudrey per the
MS. was a kind of first draft—it may have seemed no more than poetic license to make
the style of the decision look a little grander than it was. As the text shows, Coke claims
that the court accepted the doctrines of his “Treatise” and his argument. At the same time,
he subordinates those doctrines to a minor issue in the case easily resolvable without
reference to them. If license was taken at all, it was taken modestly, for Coke does not
pretend that the broad ideas in the “Treatise” and argument were the real reason the case
was decided as it was.
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Section 3: The High Commission before Coke’s Chief Justiceships.
Courts headed by Coke (the Common Pleas from 1606 -1613, the King’s Bench
from 1613-1616) handed down a disproportionate share of rulings on the High
Commission’s scope by way of both Prohibition and Habeas corpus. This gives prima
facie countenance to Coke’s reputation as the Commission’s arch-foe. It suggests a
pattern similar to that formed by cases on 23 Hen. VIII (Ch. 2 above.) It is possible that
23 Hen. VIII would never have come to be enforced by Prohibition, or at least that it
would have been interpreted to place fewer restrictions on intra-ecclesiastical operations,
without Coke’s influence. It may be useful to ask whether his influence was similar with
respect to 1 Eliz. and the High Commission—whether without Coke the Commission
would probably have been allowed to take a wider, or even unlimited, range of
ecclesiastical cases away from the regular courts and to use secular sanctions freely.
One must not, however, jump to conclusions about the answer. The sub-category of High
Commission cases already discussed in this study—those on self-incrimination—Vol. II,
Ch.5—stand as a warning. Coke’s courts were the favored place to challenge the
Commission’s use of inquisitorial procedure, as to challenge its jurisdiction and
sanctions. In both cases the figures signify something—that lawyers and litigants had
better reason to expect sympathy and judicial willingness to take on the Commission
from the Cokean courts than from others. But that expectation could be reasonable as a
rough practical legal prediction without entailing that Coke’s courts clearly held positions
more adverse to the Commission than others .One can choose a court in the vague hope
of favorable treatment without calculating in a stricter sense that one would probably fail
in the alternative court. The self-incrimination cases warn against concluding too much
from a general bias, for there is reason to doubt that the Cokean courts embraced different
standards for the permissible use of inquisition than other prior and contemporary courts.
Might it be thus with respect to other questions about the High Commission? The answer
can only be reached by looking at what was decided, and at the comparability of cases, in
detail. I shall, however, try to keep the focus on Coke’s contribution by taking careful
stock of the law on the High Commission in so far as it was settled before he ascended to
the Bench, and then of the law as he left it to his successors. To that end, we shall first
look at the Elizabethan cases and secondly at the Jacobean ones, mostly from Popham’s
King’s Bench, that precede Coke’s Chief Justiceship of the Common Pleas.
*

*

*

*

Sub-section (a): Elizabethan Cases
Summary
There are not many Elizabethan cases on the jurisdiction and powers of the
High Commission. From these, however, one distinct position emerged in the Court of
Common Pleas around 1600. It is not until after James I’s accession that the King’s
Bench took significant stands on the principal issues about the Commission. The
Common Pleas position was in essence: (a) Any and all parts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction
may be conferred on the Commission. (b) No secular sanctions may be given to it. This
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contrasts with the predominant Jacobean and later view: (a) Only some parts of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction are assignable to the Commission. (b) Within this limited range,
or at least part of it, temporal sanctions may be employed. The main architect of the lateElizabethan Common Pleas position was the senior puisne Justice, Walmesley. Some
resistance to it on the part of the Chief Justice, Sir Edmund Anderson, is detectable, but
in the upshot unanimity was achieved. Four cases—Mary Barham’s, Smith’s, Whitewit’s,
and Poole v. Gray—furnish solid discussion by counsel and the judges of the
Commission’s sanctions and procedural powers, documenting the court’s considered
opinion that only spiritual ones are available to the Commission (principally
excommunication and its established secular follow-up, De excommunicato capiendo.) It
is an evident strength of the Walmesley- Common Pleas position that the “secular followup” existed, for it forces the question whether additional powers were really necessary for
the ecclesiastical system to be effective; the case for a supplementary tribunal, albeit with
the same powers as other ecclesiastical courts, is perhaps more convincing.
The only evidence from reports of judicial attitudes earlier than the last years of
Elizabeth I’s reign comes from a Serjeants’ Inn discussion by all the judges (1587). This
upholds the use of secular sanctions and militates in favor of unlimited substantive
jurisdiction so long as it stays within the bounds of ecclesiastical law. One decision
against the Commission was, however, made early and remained the law: In Habeas
corpus the High Commission must explain in some detail why it has imprisoned
someone; it may not, as the Privy Council could, merely invoke its authority to justify an
imprisonment. More generally, there is indication in Elizabethan cases that
“transcendent” views of the High Commission, which enjoyed favor in ecclesiastical
circles, made no impression on the common law judiciary. That is, the prevailing opinion
was that the monarch had no authority by prerogative or by a highly permissive
interpretation of 1 Eliz. to confer whatever jurisdiction and powers he liked on the
Commission. The Commission’s dependence on the statute and the statute’s capacity and
tendency to impose at least some limits on the tribunal it created gives every sign of early
acceptance.
With this much said, one should note that it would be misleading to suggest that
the proposition “so long as the case is within ecclesiastical jurisdiction the High
Commission may handle it” was firmly accepted. There are intimations of the view,
which prevailed later, that a High Commission case must have at least some degree of
special seriousness above the common run of ecclesiastical litigation. In nearly all the
cases however, the Commission’s substantive jurisdiction was upheld if it was
controverted—plausibly enough given a fairly broad view of that jurisdiction. Working
out what its limits were and narrowing it to a manageably specific group of “enormous”
criminal offenses was largely left to the future.
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The Cases
My earliest relevant report is of Hinde’s Case,66 in all probability the case of that
name several times referred to as a precedent in discussions of self-incrimination. (Vol.
II, Ch. 5.) The present report, however, says nothing about the important rule in that
context which Hinde and a few other roughly contemporary cases were cited to support
(the rule that ecclesiastical courts, including the High Commission, may not expose
people to potentially self-incriminatory questioning when they are concurrently liable to
ecclesiastical prosecution and, via statute, to secular prosecution for the same offense.)
Nor does the report of Hinde go to the substantive jurisdiction and punitive powers of the
High Commission. Rather, the case as reported endorses the fundamental principle on
which the many later uses of Habeas corpus to raise questions about the Commission’s
jurisdiction and punitive powers all depend. It would appear that the principle was
uncertain nearly two decades into Elizabeth I’s reign; having been laid down in Hinde, it
was so far as I know subsequently unchallenged. The brief report of the case gives the
conclusion and adds an important distinction: When Habeas corpus is brought to
demand justification of a High Commission imprisonment, it must be substantially
justified—i.e., why the party was imprisoned must be spelled out, so that the common
law court can examine whether he was imprisoned for sufficient cause; it is not enough
to do what the High Commission tried to do in Hinde—just say that he was imprisoned
by the order or the authority of the High Commission. The Common Pleas then added an
express contrast with imprisonment by order of the Privy Council. (“But if one be
committed to prison by the commandment of the Queen’s Privy Council, there the cause
needs not to be shewed in the return, because it may concern the state of the realm, which
ought not to be published.”) Behind the scanty report there clearly lies a major issue
about the conception of the High Commission, whether or not this was deeply debated in
Hinde: Is the Commission the ecclesiastical analogue of the Privy Council—the
manifestation of supreme authority on the “spiritual” side that answers to the monarch’s
and Privy Council’s on the “temporal”, of which power to imprison without showing
cause is a necessary adjunct? Or is the Commission, as it were, “just another court” with
powers, real or purported, to imprison? Hinde says “just another court” , and so the law
remained at the level of general principle (i.e., the decision need not eliminate all dispute
about how detailed a “spelled out” return on a High Commission Habeas corpus has to
be.) It is incidentally noteworthy that the court’s position on the Privy Council’s
imprisoning power looks taken for granted—unsurprisingly for the mid-Elizabethan
period, though it became an agitated question in the 1620s.
The next relevant document reports an opinion rendered by all the judges at
Serjeants’ Inn. 67 It relates to a real case, for particularities are given. A.B. promised
marriage to E. F. and committed fornication with her “in Greenwich-house, being in
service with one of the Queen’s servants.” A. B. then married another woman. For this
offense, the High Commission fined him 200 marks and certified the fine to the
Exchequer. The question discussed at Serjeants’ Inn was the legality of the fine. There is
no telling whence the question was referred—quite possibly from the Exchequer, in
66
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M. 19 Eliz (i8/19 or 19/20?) Eliz. C.P. 4 Leonard, 21.
T. 29 Eliz. at Serjeants’ Inn . Savile, 82 and 114.
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connection with whether steps for the collection of the money should be taken. Savile
reports the discussion at two places, identically except that in one place he says all the
judges agreed and in the other that the greater part did. What at least a majority agreed on
was sweepingly supportive of the High Commission: Under 1 Eliz. and the current
patent, the Commission may both fine and imprison “for all offences and misdemeanors
corrigible by Ecclesiastical power and jurisdiction.” Note that the opinion by implication
goes beyond asserting the legality of temporal punishments, for it is so stated as to
suggest that the Commission may handle any ecclesiastical crime, not only enormous
crimes. If one is entitled to doubt whether the judges meant to go that far, one must still
take them as recognizing that fornication compounded by breach of promise to marry—
and perhaps aggravated in its scandal by proximity to the Queen—was a High
Commission matter. The judges then qualified their opinion: Although discretionary,
fines imposed by the Commission must be reasonable and imprisonment must not exceed
a convenient time. It is implied that common law courts might use the Prohibition to
prevent imposition of definite sentences deemed unreasonable and the Habeas corpus to
discharge from both an excessive definite commitment and, after a reasonable time, from
an open-ended one designed to coerce. Absence of appeal from the Commission is given
as a reason for insisting on limitation of its punitive discretion.
Partlet v. Butler (1596)68 is significant for the jurisdiction of the High
Commission on one point. In this case, the Commission was prohibited from proceeding
for defamation of a clergyman on the ground that a common law action would lie for the
words in question. To this intent, it signifies only the uncontroversial proposition that the
Commission is an ecclesiastical court, wherefore any subject matter beyond ecclesiastical
jurisdiction generally is also beyond the Commission’s. The defamatory words here,
however, were allegedly spoken during divine service, so that the additional and properly
ecclesiastical offense of disturbing divine service was also involved, which offense would
have been committed whether or not the words were defamatory. The Prohibition was
accordingly framed to extend only to the defamation. The decision accordingly implies
that disturbing divine service—hardly the most grievous of crimes in all forms—is
appropriate to the Commission. No attempt was made to maintain the contrary.
The first sign that some undoubted ecclesiastical crimes are too minor for the
High Commission appears in an anonymous Common Pleas case of 1599.69 The crime in
question was laying violent hands on a clergyman. The judges agreed that an
ecclesiastical court could proceed for the offense, but doubted whether the High
Commission could, “for they understand (intend) that they may not determine such petty
things.” Immediately, they wanted to advise and see whether there were any relevant
precedents, but a Prohibition would seem eventually to have been granted, because
according to the report the final result of the case was a Consultation—i.e., there must at
some point have been a Prohibition for the counter-writ to undo. While the Consultation
is unexplained in the report and could simply represent a decision on deliberation that a
High Commission suit for the offense was unobjectionable, one further circumstance is
reported that could account for the Consultation independently: Defendant in the High
Commission pleaded self-defense and witnesses had been examined in the Commission
68
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M. 38/39 Eliz. K.B. Harl. 1631, f. 148b; Lansd. 1059, f. 256, sub nom. Parlor v. Butler.
P. 41 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1065, f.10b.
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by the time Prohibition was sought. That is to say, plaintiff-in-Prohibition could plausibly
be held to have forfeited his right to a writ by waiting too long to seek one. Although
delay in pursuing Prohibitions usually did not bar them (cf. Vol. I, Ch. 3), it may be
arguable that waiting too long is least excusable when one’s claim is only that one is
being sued in the wrong ecclesiastical court.
From the same term and court as the first intimation of an “enormity” test for
High Commission jurisdiction came the important Habeas corpus case of Mary
Barham70. This case shows the Common Pleas perhaps close to agreement that the
Commission had no secular punitive or coercive powers whatsoever; in addition, one
judge, without reported objection by others, both embraced an “enormity” standard in
general terms and applied it to exclude High Commission jurisdiction in the common run
of marital suits.
Barham brought Habeas corpus after being committed to the Gatehouse prison.
The Keeper’s return said she was committed by the Bishop of London and two fellow
High Commissioners (Byng and Stanhopp) for disobeying “divers sentences given before
them concerning contract of marriage between her and William Dennys.” The less
complete report, Lansd. 1065, is express that Dennys or Dennis was suing Barham;
neither report is very specific about the cause of action, but breach of contract to marry,
with or without further complications, seems likely. The Keeper also said that when
Barham was in his custody De excommunicato capiendo was brought against her.
(Clearly the High Commission had excommunicated her—lawfully or not depending on
its jurisdiction—as well as sending her to jail without a De excommunicato—lawfully or
not depending on its procedural powers. Its—or Dennys’—proceeding to sue out a De
excommunicato perhaps suggests that committing her directly was conceived as an
interim measure rather than a properly punitive or coercive one—a matter of securing the
party until her imprisonment on De excommunicato could be processed. Nothing would
exclude the hypothesis that the High Commission itself, at the time of this case, had no
aspiration to secular sanctions stronger than a short-term power to keep excommunicated
persons from eluding imprisonment by De excommunicato capiendo.)
Barham was represented, Lansd. 1065 tells us, by Serjeant Harris who argued
flatly that the High Commission had no power to imprison, such power being ruled out
by Magna Carta (Ch.29.) In effect, imprisonment by any ecclesiastical court does not
count as imprisonment per legem terrae. Justice Walmesley, speaking first from the
Bench, strongly agreed (“What authority have the High Commissioners to imprison the
body of any man [?] [I]t is directly against Magna Charta [,] nullus liber homo &c.”) He
went on to say that although the Queen was authorized by statute to appoint High
Commissioners, and they were required or permitted to proceed according to their
commission, the language means “according as their Commission is guided & warranted
by law, for the Queen hath only that authority which the Pope had before.” (If you like,
obviously commitment by Papal order before the Reformation was not commitment by
“due process of law” as understood by Magna Carta. Implicit in Walmesley’s position is
the proposition that 1 Eliz. did not “amend Magna Carta” by permitting the monarch to
70
P. 41 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1074, f. 303b (the fuller report, from a series most
exceptionally in English) and Lansd. 1065, f.12 (skimpy, but accordant and useful for a
couple of details,
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authorize ecclesiastical courts under the new regime to exceed the Pope’s powers—a
sensible reading of Parliament’s intentions, though it did not hold up in the long run.)
Justice Glanville spoke next, agreeing “with all this…which Walmesley hath
said”, subject only to a faint note of hesitancy. (He emphasized that he was speaking
“under correction.”) Glanville than added, “the chiefe cause of the foundation of the High
Commission was for correction and deprivation of Bishops and heresy, not baptizing of
children, & such heinous crimes, & not for matters of matrimony and such inferior
causes.” In short, Glanville, unlike Walmesley, moved from sanctions to jurisdiction and
articulated a version of the “enormity” test. The two judges then underscored their
opinion on sanctions by saying expressly that excommunication was the ecclesiastical
courts’ “utmost authority.” As Walmesley vividly put it, “theyr sword can give noe
deeper wounds, but they are Faine to crave ayde of the temporall sworde, and sue out a
Cap[iendo] excommunicat[o] for theyr bodyes.” And Glanville drove in once more the
sense in which Magna Carta was a formidable obstacle to any other construction
(“…without doubt the meaning of the statute was in noe case to disannul Magna Charta
soe sacredly established.”) (It is, I think, clear from this language that Magna Carta was
not regarded as unrepealable—only possessed of a prestige and longstandingness such
that without unmistakable evidence of intent to repeal or amend it other statutes should
not be interpreted as doing so.)
Chief Justice Anderson, speaking last, was alone uncertain. He says nothing
substantive at odds with Walmesley or Glanville, only that it would be advisable to look
at the statutes and the commission before resolving the case, “or els we shall do rashly.”
It is hard to say what Anderson thought closer study of the authorizing documents might
reveal, but it was scarcely unreasonable to want to consider whether anything in the
chapter and verse might stand in the way of releasing the prisoner. Walmesley and
Glanville had made no pretense of exact exposition, but spoke from a confident general
sense of what the current law was against the background of Magna Carta.
In the event, when the court turned to the mere case before it, the discussion of the
High Commission’s jurisdiction and sanctions virtually vanished into abstraction. For all
the judges agreed that now—De excommunicato capiendo having been brought against
Barham—she could not be bailed (or, a fortiori surely, released outright.) In other words,
however illegally she was held before the De excommunicato was obtained there was
nothing illegal about holding her prisoner now. (Whether there is any technical way of
wiggling out of this conclusion I do not know—any conceivable ground for bailing her
immediately and forcing whoever was responsible for executing the De excommunicato
to catch her anew,) In the end, the only action taken by the Common Pleas was to order
Barham transferred from the Gatehouse prison to the Fleet. Her counsel requested that
this be done, and perhaps it would have been done without the request. Justice
Walmesley noted that the Fleet was the “proper prison of this court.” (Might there be a
testy note in Walmesley’s remark, as if to say, “The High Commission’s unlawfully
throwing someone into a prison of its choosing is certainly no excuse for keeping her
there when valid grounds for her imprisonment subsequently appear; if this court is de
facto the agent of her now-lawful detention, let her be put where this court’s ordinary
prisoners would.”? Again, I am unable to say whether any finer points of De
excommunicato procedure could be relevant.)
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The reports of a Queen’s Bench case of 1600, Lovegrove v. Prynne,71 yield faint
dicta on High Commission jurisdiction, though the case is centrally a holding that the
ecclesiastical suit should be prohibited as inappropriate to any Church court. That suit
was brought in the High Commission by a clergyman, Prynne. The libel had two
elements, (a) defamation and (b) battery or at least assault with intent to beat. I.e., on the
second count the libel used the “or at least” expression instead of firmly claiming battery
(presumably legitimate ecclesiastical pleading though it would not be acceptable at
common law.) The suit was prohibited (a) because the alleged words—“goose”,
“woodcock”, and other unspecified “opprobrious words”, but presumably the level of
opprobrium was about the same as “goose’s”, were too trivial to support a defamation
suit, lay or ecclesiastical; and (b) because taken as a complaint of assault—as the second
claim must be taken in the absence of a definite claim that Prynne was beaten—the case
belonged to the common law. Prynne’s counsel, Wilbraham, moved for Consultation,
arguing that ecclesiastical courts may proceed for a mere assault on a clergyman, but he
was unsuccessful. In the process of turning down the Consultation the judges conceded
that if battery has been claimed ecclesiastical courts would have jurisdiction, by virtue of
the ancient statute Articuli cleri, under the rubric of laying violent hands on a clergyman.
The report of the case written by Francis Moore, who was Lovegrove’s counsel, has the
court in its closing remarks saying specifically that the High Commission may entertain a
suit for “violent hands”, but may not entertain one for slanderous words about a
clergyman –any slander, it would seem, not just one consisting in such aspersions as
“goose”. (Without doubt regular ecclesiastical courts could hear claims of defamation,
whether of clergymen or others, provided the words were not actionable at common law,
were not ridiculously trivial, and perhaps, by a further and distinguishable criterion,
provided that the words were construable as imputing an ecclesiastical offense to the
plaintiff.) To the extent that Moore’s language is deliberate and accurate, the Queen’s
Bench may have delivered two dicta about the High Commission specifically.
Smith’s Case (1600) 72 again raised the question of High Commission sanctions in
the Common Pleas. Though there were complicating circumstances in Smith, it basically
strengthens the position to which the court was tending in Barham. The case was as
follows: Anne Stock was cited before the High Commission for adultery. She was
convicted and subsequently excommunicated (presumably for refusal to do assigned
penance or to obey an order to refrain from her adulterous behavior.) The High
Commission sent a pursuivant, armed with its letters missive, to take Anne prisoner. I.e.,
it proposed to arrest her on its own authority, by-passing the De excomminicato capiendo
procedure (That procedure may not have been available to the Commission at the time
the pursuivant was sent, since it became so only after forty days from excommunication.
An excommunicate could of course make himself or herself hard to find before the
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Moore, 607 (undated); Lansd. 1059, f.346 (nearly identical report from a series
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H. 42 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1065, f. 44b (much the fuller report) and Croke Eliz., 741, sub.
nom. Tho[mas] Smith v. Smith.
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regular commitment process could be put into effect.) The pursuivant and five henchmen
entered Anne’s husband’s house and broke a cistern (so I read the report) in which they
thought the woman was hidden. The local constable and John Smith, presumably a
neighbor (who, we are told incidentally, was a Common Pleas attorney) intervened to
assist the Stocks against the invaders and prevented the pursuivant from “proceeding in
this manner against the peace.” Mr. Stock, Anne’s husband, subsequently brought an
action of Trespass for housebreaking against the pursuivant and his associates. Smith was
meanwhile cited before the High Commission for the “rescue”—one should probably say
in stricter legal terms for contempt of the Commission in obstructing its officers and
process. He obtained a Prohibition. The reported debate is on motion for Consultation.
Serjeant Warburton, for Smith, took the fundamental position against use of
temporal sanctions by the High Commission: Spiritual courts have three sanctions—
suspension, excommunication, and interdiction. The Commission, as a spiritual court, is
confined to those. 1 Eliz., on which the Commission is grounded, makes no alteration of
the previous law in this respect. Taking and imprisoning a person is a temporal function,
to be carried out by De excommunicato capiendo in the case of ecclesiastical offenders .I
call this the “fundamental position” in contrast to a narrower one possibly sufficient for
this case: To stop the High Commission proceedings against Smith, it might have been
enough to claim only that the pursuivant’s manner of going about his business—entering
the Stocks’ house by force and abusing Mr. Stock’s property while searching for Anne—
was unlawful, wherefore Smith’s effort, in collaboration with a peace officer, to stop
these actions was not unlawful. Serjeant Warburton, however, must have thought that his
client would be at least as well-served by attacking the fons et origo of the proceedings
that Smith eventually got swept into—the High Commission’s project of arresting Anne
Stock, illegal even if carried out with scrupulous rectitude. (Given Warburton’s highly
probable awareness, from Barham, of the way the wind was blowing in the Common
Pleas, the advice was good. Allegations about the pursuivant’s behavior would have
raised factual questions that going directly to the Commission’s legal powers would
sidestep. I should not think it plausible to maintain that the third party, Smith, could
commit an offense against the High Commission by getting in the way of its officers
regardless of the legality of what they were doing, unless perhaps he could be charged
with excessive or unprovoked violence, and then it would be hard to make out that the
remedy would not be at common law and belong to the pursuivant and his men as
individuals.)
Serjeant Harris’s position on the other side was equally radical (and incidentally
the opposite of the one he had defended in Barham): 1 Eliz. unites all temporal and
spiritual jurisdictions in the Queen, which “joint and absolute” authority she has
transferred to the Commission. Therefore the only question is what specifically she has
authorized the Commission to do. The question is easily answered here because,
according to Harris, the current patent expressly authorized the arrest of persons “found
in adulterous manner.” (The phrase may have a wider reach than “convicted—or indeed
convicted and excommunicated—for adultery”, but it must surely include those cases.)
Harris’s language is so broad that besides what it clearly covers—power to confer any
part of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the High Commission and power to give it temporal
sanctions—it could conceivably be stretched even to conferral of secular jurisdiction.
Such a construction would present grave problems, and though it is more than Harris

219

needed on the premise “if the attempt to arrest Mrs. Stock was perfectly legal the
arresting court may lawfully prosecute someone who tries to thwart the arrest.” Erasing
limits on the Commission’s jurisdiction so far as possible does, however, have the
advantage of weakening the contrasting proposition “even if arresting and imprisoning
Mrs. Stock for adultery was perfectly legal, ecclesiastical proceedings against Smith look
dubious—should any tort or crime he may have committed not be a common law
matter?” Admittedly, Harris did not so far as the report indicates show chapter-and-verse
from the patent to the effect that interfering with a lawful High Commission arrest is a
High Commission offense. If, however, the Commission could be given even more than
comprehensive ecclesiastical jurisdiction and secular sanctions, there may be some basis
for arguing that “incidents” of its jurisdiction and procedural powers are given to it at
least by implication. Harris’s final remark in his speech may be meant to push this latter
point. What he says is that “the suit in spiritual court is wholly other [tout auter] than the
cause of action here.” He possibly means that the ecclesiastical suit against Smith, a
legitimate incident of the Commission’s proper proceedings against Mrs. Stock, does not
take away Smith’s right to bring a common law action (no more, one might say, than Mr.
Stock’s later action of Trespass was barred by anything that might be determined
between the Commission and its officers and either Anne Stock or Smith.) Sed quaere.
Before making that last point, Harris added to his sweeping defense of the High
Commission a rather interesting comparison, though I am not sure it adds any real force
to his contentions. “…The commission (i.e., the patent)”, he says, “will be of as great
force as a custom is.” A custom, of course, if it is immemorial and to the judges’ eye
reasonable, will defeat the common law. Harris must be saying that by 1 Eliz., anything
the monarch authorizes the High Commission to do in the patent is as lawful vis-à-vis the
common law as if the same practice were warranted by custom. That is at least a strong
restatement of the length to which Harris was ready to go, or his clients the
Commissioners wanted him to go. It may, on the other hand, sound a slight note of
moderation in the sense that owing to the reasonableness requirement a custom cannot
trump the common law in just any respect. Harris may have intended to concede that the
patent could not confer unlimited common law powers on the ecclesiastical Commission,
but could, well short of that, confer secular powers useful for the effective discharge of
its proper business. The comparison was not pursued; complex problems could have
arisen if it had been.
Chief Justice Anderson, speaking first from the Bench, did not, as he did not in
Barham, go at once to the major issues about the High Commission. By the end of his
brief speech, however, he appears to concede that the question before the court—whether
the Commission may proceed against Smith—depended on whether arresting Mrs. Stock
was infra vires, which is to say it depended on the “major issues.” Before reaching that
point, Anderson enunciates the general principle that when a suit is “well-commenced” in
an ecclesiastical court, and in the course of that suit a “common law thing” comes up, the
ecclesiastical court may still proceed. This principle was often stated in civil cases (there
are examples passim in Vols. I-III above.) It was often honored rather in the breach than
the observance, but it is possible that some judges insisted on it categorically, or at least
were reluctant to make exceptions. (Going by the letter of Anderson’s words, he stated
the principle in especially strong form, for he says that the ecclesiastical court shall
proceed “notwithstanding any Prohibition.” This is stronger than saying “ecclesiastical
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courts should not be prohibited when a common law issue arises in an originally
legitimate ecclesiastical suit”, for it suggests that even if the ecclesiastical suit is
prohibited the ecclesiastical court should still proceed. That would seem to imply that the
Church court and parties there are not attachable for violating the Prohibition. Quaere.
Anderson finishes off this point with “et issint econtra” [“and so the other way around”—
?] As ecclesiastical courts should be left alone to decide common law questions
“incidental” to deciding ecclesiastical questions in common law suits—? But what would
that mean? I should have thought that some ecclesiastical questions that must be decided
in order for a common law case to be resolved—such as whether two people are
married—were simply by the common law itself triable only by ecclesiastical
certification, while others were ultimately resolvable by the common law court, subject to
a frequently honored moral obligation to seek civilian advice on doubtful questions.
Perhaps Anderson was no more than tempted by Smith to give voice to his probably overbroad, but plausible, theory of the relationship between the spiritual and temporal legal
systems, one tending to limit Prohibitions more than they were limited in practice.)
In any event, the application of Anderson’s principle to the case at hand must be
that if the High Commission was, so to speak, rightfully possessed of “Anne Stock’s
Case”, it was free to deal with Smith’s conduct as an “incident” thereof, not worrying
about whether what he actually did was a “common law thing” (a thing which would
raise no legal question except the thoroughly temporal one “Did he commit unjustifiable
assault or battery?” The alternative would be detaching Stock from Smith and holding
that the High Commission had jurisdiction to proceed against interference with its
process even though the form of the interference would have come to an ordinary
common law tort. Anderson’s approach, to its credit, was more principled than that. As I
have already shown, however, Anderson realized at once that his suggested approach was
of no use unless the High Commission’s sending its pursuivant with his missives (the
equivalent of a warrant for Anne Stock’s arrest) was lawful, and hence that the major
issues about the Commission’s powers must be faced. His brethren got to that conclusion
more directly.
Justice Walmesley, the senior puisne judge, spoke after Anderson. (The Chief
Justice normally gave his opinion last, but there is nothing irregular in variations,
especially when a judge had an observation short of his ultimate word on the case, as
Anderson’s opening point here was.) Walmesley’s opinion in Smith is entirely consistent
with his opinion in Barham, but somewhat different in tone and emphasis. There is no
mention of Magna Carta, invocation of which is a bit melodramatic and even problematic
if scrutinized closely. (As I point out above, a subsequent statute could permit something
which Magna Carta by itself should be taken to forbid. It may have been the part of good
sense not to declaim about what a scandal it would be to “repeal Magna Carta”, but to
stick to straightforward argument as to what the statute now in question does mean.)
Arguing in this case, Walmesley as reported does not construe 1 Eliz. elaborately, but
takes it as obvious that the statute permits giving only spiritual jurisdiction to the High
Commission; if the Commission’s patent purports to give it more it simply fails to, since
nothing the statute says about the patent is clear or explicit enough to allow the patent to
countervail against the statute’s otherwise plain intent. (The formulation here is mine, but
I think it comes to what Walmesley thought.) Nothing said by Walmesley or any judge
in this case suggests any limits on the substantive ecclesiastical jurisdiction conferrable
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on the Commission, much less any doubt as to whether it could be authorized to deal with
adultery. It is perhaps noteworthy that for Walmesley saying that the statute confined the
High Commission to spiritual jurisdiction sufficed to say that it was confined to spiritual
sanctions and procedures, as well as spiritual substance. In other words, to Walmesley
and perhaps most late-Elizabethan judges the distinction I have steadily employed in this
study between substance and sanctions might have looked meaningless. I believe it is
necessary to expound –in the sub-sections below—what might be called “the 17th century
synthesis”, a predominant though not unanimous position: some substantive jurisdiction
but not nearly all of it, may be given to the Commission, and some temporal sanctions.
But it may have taken time, increased litigation, and fresh political breezes for such a
compromise to look so much as intelligible to many lawyers,
Walmesley’s main effort in Smith was not to belabor his fundamental beliefs
about 1 Eliz., but to develop a strong supplementary argument in support of his position.
He observes that the statute of 5 Eliz., (thus another statute quite close in time to 1 Eliz.)
confirmed the De excommunicato capiendo procedure and modified some details of it.
The basic inference is that Parliament is unlikely to have intended, or to have understood
1 Eliz. as intending, that the refurbished De excommunicato could be evaded by one
ecclesiastical court via a power to arrest and commit directly. Moreover, 5 Eliz.
appointed a penalty for persons against whom a De excommunicato had been issued if
they failed to turn themselves in. The Queen would therefore lose her penalty if the High
Commission could effect excommunicates’ imprisonment on its independent authority.
Besides, Walmesley goes on to say, the common law provides the writ De cautione
admittenda for someone who has been imprisoned on De excommunicato capiendo and
has made submission: the writ orders the ecclesiastical court to assoil him. (“Submission”
presumably means doing whatever is required to satisfy the spiritual law and entitle the
party to have his excommunication lifted.) In short, the ecclesiastical courts do not have
an unchecked discretion to keep a person in the state of excommunication and in jail. As
the secular arm comes to the aid of the Church by imposing a secular sanction, so it
comes to the aid of the subject by seeing that the Church does not abuse the assistance it
is given. Thus, Walmesley says, to find in the Supremacy Act an intent to let the High
Commission be given imprisoning power would be to do the subject out of a common
law right, as it would do the Queen out of a statutory entitlement bestowed on her shortly
after the Supremacy Act. It would mean that one ecclesiastical court could imprison
people perpetually, contrary to the whole purpose of the De cautione procedure.
Walmesley sums up with the maxim ex errore sequitur error, which perhaps in context
says, “Err in construing 1 Eliz., maybe not implausibly in view of the vagueness of its
language, and you alter or confuse the law on various scores that the makers of the act are
most unlikely to have anticipated.”
To close, Walmesley makes one further point: “And for the manner of the action
it is out of course also, for by the common law no one may enter a house to arrest
anyone’s person unless by open doors except only in cases of felony or treason, and if the
Queen makes a commission to the contrary it will be held for nothing.”, citing Year
Books. I take this to say that even if 1 Eliz. did permit the High Commission to be given
imprisoning power it would not follow that it could be given, or was given by the current
patent, an exemption from the general rule on arresting officers’ title to break into houses.
Construing that into the statute would be several degrees more farfetched than allowing it
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to infringe the De excommunicato procedure and its incidents, indeed to the extent of
threatening their destruction. It would confer on the monarch in one context a power
which he or she simply did not have at common law. (I.e., per Walmesley, the monarch
had no prerogative to authorize breaking into a house to effect an arrest for less than
felony, however special or pressing the occasion or carefully specified the authority. The
application of this point to the instant case would seem to be: If the pursuivant and his
assistants were manifestly violating the common law, surely Smith’s interference with
them could not be an ecclesiastical offense, even if the attempt to arrest Mrs. Stock was
in itself perfectly legal, and even if Smith’s interference with an arrest carried out in a
proper manner—as if the pursuivant had entered through an open door or was admitted to
the house by someone within it—would count as an ecclesiastical offense.
After Walmesley’s speech Anderson intervened again by remarking, “The example
that lately was at Northampton greatly moves me, for there on such occasion a man in
defense of himself and his house killed another, and often felons enter on pretense of
such commissions, & by authority, whereby great mischiefs may ensue.” I take it that this
expresses agreement with Walmesley’s last point and suggests a softening of any
disinclination to prohibit Anderson may have had. He seems to say that the rule against
breaking in to arrest anyone short of a felon is indeed important to preserve, partly
because felons could use commissions—forged or crookedly obtained, I suppose—to
gain admittance to houses unless such commissions were illegal no matter what.
Whatever the circumstances of the case at Northampton Anderson remembered, it
impressed on him that illegal entries to make arrests, or with pretense of such a purpose,
can lead to dire results—people can get killed and be caused to kill in (presumably
justified) self-defense.
Justice Glanville speaks next; like Walmesley, he is consistent with his opinion in
Mary Barham’s Habeas corpus. He expresses his agreement with Walmesley in terms,
stating their common view in language we have encountered before: What 1 Eliz. does is
“reduce absolute jurisdiction in causes spiritual (my italics) …to the Crown”, such
spiritual jurisdiction having been “by usurped authority…invested in the Pope”; there is
simply no reason to suppose the statute “ordain[s] any new spiritual jurisdiction”, as
opposed to “reducing” (restoring) that which already existed; the Crown’s temporal
jurisdiction was untouched by the statute because it had never been usurped. (So any
notion that by 1 Eliz. the monarch gained new temporal authority, which he might
transfer if he liked—to an ecclesiastical agency if he chose—is cut off. Glanville does not
quite articulate this, but it is intimated in his choice of language.) Glanville then adds a
strengthening argument: If the High Commission may imprison an excommunicated
person directly, it may by the same line of reasoning execute a heretic (i.e., directly order
the execution of someone it has convicted of heresy and excommunicated), which
manifestly it may not do, but must deliver the perpetrator to the secular arm for
execution. (Glanville does not spell out the rule on heretics, but a long legislative history,
rooted in the idea that the Church may not kill or “shed blood” could be invoked.)
Justice Kingsmill speaks next, expressing agreement with Walmesley and
Glanville. I think his one-sentence reported opinion might be meant to say a bit more
explicitly than the other judges do that “no temporal substantive jurisdiction” implies “no
temporal sanctions”, but the words are too slight and general for that to be clear. Justice
Glanville then spoke again to add one further argument, another significant strengthening
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of the case against the High Commission. 1 Eliz., he says, must surely leave the new
ecclesiastical court it authorizes in the same procedural position already occupied by
ecclesiastical courts generally (excommunication its highest sanction, beyond which De
excommunicato capiendo takes over.) For if the statute meant to create any different
procedures for the new court it would have “ordained” them expressly. An important
reason for so believing—in addition, perhaps one should say, to common sense and the
context of 1 Eliz.—is that when other new courts were created by statute a distinctive
process to be used by them was laid down in the act. Two Henrician secular examples are
cited, the Courts of Augmentations and Wards and Liveries. (In other words, I take it, a
new statutory court meant to proceed somewhat differently than in a well-known preexisting way—common law or ecclesiastical—is customarily given a specified process
by the creating legislation; past practice implies the rule that either the new process is
specified or no new process is brought into being. ) The reporter says that the other
judges “well-allowed of this reason.”
Three justices having spoken decisively in favor of the Prohibition, Serjeant
Harris made one further attempt. He does not add any new arguments to his earlier
speech, but tries again to focus the judges on the patent, insisting that whatever else is
true the statute does say clearly enough that the High Commission’s current powers are
what the current patent gives it. The judges replied, however, that the patent refers to the
statute and according to the intent and purpose thereof shall be expounded. The court’s
decision was apparently unanimous; Croke’s concordant synoptic report says it was. If
Chief Justice Anderson had any lingering reservations he did not express them, unless
perhaps by not speaking for himself on the central issues.
Barham and Smith, the one on Habeas corpus and the other on Prohibition, have
together the effect of a “leading case” for the Common Pleas. The most basic limits on
the High Commission—its dependence on 1 Eliz. and construction of the statute as
putting some limitations on what the Commission could do or could be authorized to—
were fixed. Later Common Pleas decisions would tighten restrictions on substantive
jurisdiction and somewhat loosen those on procedural powers. With respect to the latter,
however, Barham and Smith can still be said to have established the principle that any
pretense on the Commission’s part to go beyond standard ecclesiastical procedure was
subject to strict scrutiny.
The remaining Elizabethan cases from the Common Pleas are in line with Barham
and Smith; one adds detail and specificity to the procedural restrictions. The case of
South v. Whitewit (or Whetwit) 73 is so close in date and form to Smith that one might
suspect it of being a version of the same case. The specific facts, however, are different,
so it is probably best taken as separate, though legally identical. (Whitewit’s wife
slandered South—nothing said in the reports to explain how her words were so much as
colorable ecclesiastical defamation. South sued her in the High Commission, which
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Owen, 145; Harg. 12, f. 188. The reports agree, but the MS. has a little more detail.
Neither is dated, but Justice Glanville, who speaks individually in the MS. –not in
Owen—died in July, 1600. Both reports oddly refer to the statute of 5 Eliz. when the
discussion appears to be about the basic 1 Eliz. This is probably confusion with the
statute of 5 Eliz. confirming and revising the De excommunicato, which is brought up by
Justice Walmesley, as in Smith.
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excommunicated her— whether after trial or for failure to respond to the citation the
reports do not say. A pursuivant was sent to take Mrs. Whitewit prisoner, which he did
after breaking into Whitewit’s house in the middle of the night. Mr. Whitewit “rescued”
his wife, for which he was summoned to come before the Commission. He sought and
got a Prohibition. Whether the reported discussion is on his original surmise or on
motion for Consultation does not appear.) The same judges speak as in Smith, one by one
and so far as the report shows they make the same arguments. The MS. report may
contribute a significant detail in that it has Chief Justice Anderson by name agreeing with
the other judges both on the large questions and in emphasizing that, whatever else, the
pursuivant’s breaking in to arrest for an offense below the rank of treason and felony was
unlawful.
In my last Elizabethan case, 74 Poole, a priest, sued Gray in the High Commission
for laying violent hands on him. Generously displaying what it supposed its powers to
be, the Commission (1) fined Gray £10 “for the Queen”; (2) excommunicated him; (3)
enjoined him to procure absolution and “submissively” acknowledge his offense in “the”
(presumably his) parish church; (4) ordered him to pay Poole £20 for costs; (5)
committed him to prison at the Commissioners’ pleasure and until he paid the Queen’s
fine and the “damages” (presumably Poole’s “costs” above); (6) ordered him to be bound
to perform the “submission.”
Gray sought a Prohibition alleging (1) “the custome & lawes of the land quod
omnia placita de transgressione &c.” [Abbreviations in the Latin spelled out. I am not
sure what legal source is referred to, but the principle is clearly that all pleas of trespass
belong at common law. It is implied that Poole’s suit, at least as handled by the High
Commission, was nothing else than a plea of trespass, viz. battery.]; (2) nullus liber homo
[from Magna Carta, c. 29]; (3) language in the reputed statute Articuli cleri which gave
or confirmed ecclesiastical courts’ jurisdiction to entertain suits for laying violent hands
on a clergyman, expressly barred spiritual courts from imposing a pecuniary penalty for
it.
The Common Pleas issued a special Prohibition (so designated in the Lansd. 1074
report) quoad the fine, “expenses”, and imprisonment. (I.e., the Prohibition did not touch
the High Commission’s jurisdiction over violent hands nor—given its jurisdiction—the
excommunication and the injunctions to do spiritual acts appropriate to a convicted and
excommunicated person. Interestingly, nothing is said about requiring Gray to enter a
bond to perform the spiritual part of the sentence against him.) When the special or
partial Prohibition was delivered, the Bishop of London and other Commissioners
released Gray from prison but “bound him from court to court” (i.e., made him enter
another bond to appear before the Commission at regular intervals.)
Later Serjeant Williams, clearly representing Gray, came to the Bar and prayed
Attachment “for this contempt.” I.e., Williams’s position was that letting Gray out of jail
while doing nothing about the fine or the costs/expenses/ damages was not full obedience
of the Prohibition. I think Williams’s procedural move here is unusual—i.e., asking the
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Poole v. Gray. M. 44/45 Eliz. C.P. Lansd. 1074, f. 405; Lansd. 1058, f. 54b. The latter
report is not headed by the names of the litigants, but a note at the end says “Grey was
one of the parties.” Lansd. 1074 is the fuller report; Lansd. 1058 does not disagree, but
see text for significant supplementary information it provides.
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prohibiting court, upon an informal showing of what had happened, to approve
Attachment instead of simply suing out an Attachment-on-Prohibition (pursuant to which
the attachee could plead either that he had done what the Prohibition demanded or that
the Prohibition was wholly or partly ill-granted.) Be that as it may, the Common Pleas
judges took the occasion to argue the legality of all disputable actions taken by the High
Commission before it was prohibited. Williams should probably be credited with a useful
short-cut and perhaps even with doing the High Commission a favor. For if the Common
Pleas gave the dignitaries on the Commission clear advice about their rights they might
be able to correct any inadequacies in their response to the Prohibition without actually
being attached or forced to plead formally in what might turn out to be a hopeless cause.
They could still accept Attachment and controvert it if they chose to, banking on a Writ
of Error if the Common Pleas should order attachment—instead, I suggest, of letting its
opinion be known and holding back until the Commission undid anything the Common
Pleas said was ultra vires. One should not, I think, say the Commission was merely
foolish or stubborn in its response to the Prohibition. Previous cases had only said
unmistakably that the Commission may not imprison, and in this case it had backed off
from imprisoning. It was entitled to the court’s opinion on fining, taxing costs—or
perhaps over-taxing them as a concealed way of imposing damages—, and possibly
insuring performance by compulsory bonds, even though the Prohibition here does not
seem to have been directed against that practice.
The case was discussed by the puisne judges, Chief Justice Anderson being absent
in the Star Chamber. Justice Walmesley was true to form. After reiterating his view that
the High Commission had no power to imprison and no sanctions beyond
excommunication followed by De excommunicato capiendo, he said expressly that no
power to impose a fine existed. He said further that the Commission had no power to
assess damages, “for in this case there [is] no differ[ence] between dam[ages] & costs for
all runne under ye name of damag[e]s but only p[ro]ceed quoad correctio[n]em
tantu[m].” The meaning of the last clause raises a question: Does Walmesley mean that
ecclesiastical courts including the High Commission may not tax bona fide litigative
costs? Or that they may but “in this case” had obviously awarded damages by charging
Gray the large sum of £20? Or that clearly labeled costs within the bounds of possible
bona fides may be charged, even if suspiciously large, but “in this case” the High
Commission had not successfully camouflaged the damages as costs (perhaps by using
the word “damages” in the bond Gray was compelled to enter)? In any event, Walmesley
ruled out detectable civil damages as firmly as criminal fines. He did not comment on the
use of bonds in itself.
Justice Warburton (Glanville’s replacement on the court) followed up on
Walmesley’s last phrase, “quoad correctionem tantum” (i.e., the High Commission like
other ecclesiastical courts may proceed only to the end of punishing by spiritual
sanctions—“correctio.”) Per Warburton, “That correction must also be moderate for in 2
Hen. IV they imposed soe great a punishment upon an offender that he was faine to agree
with his adversary and thereupon had a Prohibition.” The test for excessive spiritual
punishment is interesting. Would this be the right formulation: If the punishment is so
severe that a “reasonable man” would usually rather pay off his adversary it exceeds
ecclesiastical power? There would otherwise be an easy ruse to impose a pecuniary
sanction in effect.
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Serjeants Daniel and Williams then intervened to cite a case they had “had in
experience” (had encountered in their practice—it is not independently reported) to
confirm Warburton’s point that moderation should be enforced on the High Commission.
In that case, Haurforth v. Cotten , “The hie Com[m]is[sion] assessed a fine of £200 upon
C[otten] for incontinency and extreated it into ye excheq[ue]r & upon all ye matter
disclosed there we had it discharged there by all ye barones.” This case does not
unmistakably support what Warburton was probably saying, for he appears to agree with
Walmesley that no pecuniary penalty may be imposed and to add that even spiritual
punishments must be moderate. Haurforth does not as described seem to rule out fines
altogether, but to hold that if a fine is excessive none of it may be collected. It might also
imply that Exchequer process, rather than Prohibition, is the way to challenge an
immoderate fine. The decision can, however, be taken to uphold not just “Spiritual
punishments must be moderate”, but a broader principle: “All ecclesiastical punishments
must be moderate. That is true if they are spiritual and thus intrinsically lawful. It is also
true if the punishment in itself is questionably lawful, or indeed if it is lawful for the High
Commission by virtue of special statutory powers given to that tribunal; if immoderation
is present, the legality of the type of punishment need not be reached.” So Daniel and
Williams would seem to take their case. There is nothing to bar saying that pecuniary
penalties should be cut off altogether if excessive whatever common law forum gets the
chance to stop them, the Exchequer by discharging an apparent debt referred to it for
collection or other courts by Prohibition.
After the interruption, Justice Warburton resumed to make a closing point. I think
his intent was probably to defend attaching the Commission as Williams proposed
(equivalently, to hold the Prohibition violated despite Gray’s release from prison, or
notwithstanding any possible argument that the Prohibition had been obeyed with respect
to the central and clearest illegality committed.) For a paraphrase, perhaps: “This case is
important for all interests concerned; it is just as well to settle the questions it raises
comprehensively and by a strong measure, rather than get involved in niceties as whether
the Prohibition was ‘essentially’ obeyed or not.” Warburton’s words in Lansd. 1074 are:
“This suit is double for it concernes the credit of ye Church wherein they may deal quoad
Correc[t]io[n]em and it concernes the amends of the wrong to the p[ar]ty wherein they
may not decide quoad damn[u]m. They might as well to surcease in all dependencyes as
in the principall matter.” The report ends with “Kingsmill ad idem”—i.e., the judge not
yet heard from agreed with Walmesley and Warburton, probably by saying no more than
that he agreed.
The briefer Lansd. 1058 report of Poole v. Gray accords with Lansd. 1074 but
adds some significant details. (1) Gray’s fine was estreated into the Exchequer. This
means that imprisoning Gray in part to coerce him to pay the fine—as Lansd. 1074 has
it— was not instead of subjecting him to normal process for collecting a debt to the
Crown, but in addition.
(2) The judges are said to have agreed that “if [ecclesiastical defendant] alleges
that the tort which the [ecclesiastical] plaintiff had was de son tort demesne & they of the
Court Christian will not allow this plea Prohibition lies.” I take this, applied to the case at
hand, to mean that if someone in Poole’s position complains of “violent hands” and
someone in Gray’s, admitting that he did lay hands on the plaintiff, claims self-defense in
effect—i.e., that he was only responding to plaintiff’s “own tort” by attacking him— the
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plea must be allowed and tried as to fact, or else the ecclesiastical court will be prohibited
from handling the case. (For Prohibitions sought on the ground that an ecclesiastical court
has improperly disallowed a defensive plea, see Vol. II, Ch.2) Lansd. 1074 gives no
indication that this matter was discussed over and above the powers of the High
Commission specifically. Its being discussed strongly suggests that Gray urged the
improper disallowance of his defense as a ground for Prohibition in addition to his
multiple complaint of ultra vires behavior on the Commission’s part.
(3) Per Lansd. 1058, it was “shown” that the Commissioners after receiving the
Prohibition “still bind” Gray by surety to perform their decree. This probably indicates
that binding Gray “from day to day” did not merely oblige him—legally or not, a
question that cannot be answered without going into whether the use of bonds was in
itself a temporal procedure unavailable to any ecclesiastical court—to attend on the Court
until he had satisfied the properly spiritual injunctions he had been given. Rather, he was
still bound to pay the fine and the costs or damages. Therefore it was clearer that the
Commission had disobeyed the Prohibition, and was subject to Attachment, than if it had
simply done nothing positive to cancel the fine and the civil award. Justice Warburton in
Lansd. 1058 seems to say this in essence when he says that “certes” Attachment lies
because “in [illegible word] and the dependencies they proceed against the Prohibition.”
It would seem that there was judicial doubt about Williams’ motion for immediate
Attachment, I take it because the case in one way raises a problem about what
“proceeding against a Prohibition” consists in. (If a court has already imposed a fine and
taken the routine first step to get it collected, and then the court is prohibited quoad
finem, doing nothing to rectify the misstep hardly seems to be proceeding in violation of
the Prohibition.) Warburton escaped this problem by finding the perpetuation of the bond
after the Prohibition a sufficient “positive step” incompatible with the Prohibition.
(4) A further remark by Justice Walmesley reported in Lansd. 1058 indicates, I
think, that he was basically aligned with Warburton on the Commission’s immediate
attachability, but concerned about the procedure. For he says, “It seems to me that a
special writ should be formed for this purpose.” My spelling out of Walmesley’s
thinking would go as follows: Yes, the Prohibition has been disobeyed. The High
Commission should be held in contempt and attached now; it is not necessary to sue out a
regular writ claiming a contempt for which Attachment is the legal remedy, to which writ
the Commission must plead. But what is the procedural form for such an immediate
Attachment? Do we not need a new writ to effect that (whatever would be involved in
framing one—perhaps instructing the clerks of the court to draw up a new judicial writ
for the judges’ approval)?
(5) In the event, Lansd. 1058 tells us, the court did not order attachment here and
now, but assigned a day to show cause that “attachment should not issue.” This
information comes right after Walmesley’s remark— (4) above. Although the delay is
unsurprising, it could represent a compromise response to Walmesley’s procedural
qualm. The court would seem to have asserted its power to attach without a “special
writ”, not to mention a writ of Attachment and the formal pleading it would entail, while
avoiding the appearance of heavy-handed action and giving the Commission the floor to
object. As I suggest above, the Commission may not have been unhappy with this
solution: better to be merely prohibited and (probably) no more than compelled in the
instant case to rescind everything the Common Pleas took exception to than to lose in
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full-scale Attachment-sur-Prohibition proceedings, which would constitute a legal record.
I do not think Serjeant Williams’ innovation affected the future; there is probably little
point in departing from the standard rule “obey the Prohibition or face formal
Attachment” outside a case like Gray, where there are tricky questions as to whether a
multiplex Prohibition has clearly been disobeyed. In such a case, an informal mode of
procedure may have advantages somewhat analogous to granting Consultation on motion
even though not all the information needed to justify the writ is strictly before the court.
In Gray, the information “not strictly before the court” was what the High Commission
had done after receiving the Prohibition.
(6) Finally, Lansd, 1058 contains a sharper phrase (though hardly a clarifying
one) than anything in Lansd. 1074 on the relationship of “costs” and “damages”. The
words are, “…where by their law they may not proceed except ad correctionem, yet they
do otherwise by a color, and where they allow plaintiff costs of suit they include damages
also under name of costs.” This shows clearly enough that the Common Pleas thought the
High Commission guilty of fraud in calling damages “costs.” It gives no clue, however,
to how one tells in a given case whether the fraud has been committed or what the best
response to the danger of fraud would be. Allow no costs awards because they can too
easily conceal damages? Go by common probability and assume that a suspiciously high
charge labeled “costs” must be at least largely damages in reality? A tendency to leave
this problem hanging may be an inconvenience of the unusual procedure attempted in
Gray. On a straight writ of Attachment plaintiff could allege fraudulent “color”,
defendant could deny it, and a jury would decide.
In sum, on the major High Commission issues—leaving aside the procedural
twist—Poole v. Gray rounds out the accomplishment of the Elizabethan Common Pleas
by pretty well ruling out, as improper secular sanctions, not only the imprisonment wellcovered by previous cases, but also fines, damages recognizable as such, and excessive
spiritual penalties likely to force a pecuniary penalty on the party in practice. It also rules
out underhanded enforcement of secular sanctions by bonds, while leaving the use of
bonds to enforce spiritual ones undetermined. Substantive jurisdiction is left untouched
and by implication upheld for “violent hands”, as earlier cases do not question it for the
particular offenses involved in those cases, or attack the general proposition that all forms
of substantive ecclesiastical jurisdiction may be conferred on the Commission.
Sub-section (b): Jacobean Courts before Coke’s Chief Justiceships
(Common Pleas, 1603-1606; King’s Bench, 1603-1613)
Summary
The only case in the Common Pleas between James I’s accession and Coke’s
appointment to head the court was decided on recognized narrow grounds of Habeas
corpus procedure: the necessity of a full and specific return. Judicial dicta on the
substance re-emphasize denying the High Commission all temporal sanctions without
limiting its ecclesiastical jurisdiction to any particular class or classes of suit.
The two earliest Jacobean cases in the King’s Bench were also decided on Habeas
corpus procedure. Judicial commentary in these cases, however, went beyond that
subject. Especially important is a speech in one of the cases (Needham’s) by Coke when
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he was still at the Bar and Attorney General. Whether he spoke as counsel for the
prisoner or for himself as adviser to the court, he defended the view that the High
Commission had some imprisoning power, but only within a narrow range of serious
religious offenses. Moreover, he connected this point with an earlier King’s Bench
precedent (not independently reported) from the time of Chief Justice Wray (1574-1592.)
Though the wider implications of this position are problematic, and though the case at
hand was decidable without it, Coke at least dissociated himself –and King’s Bench
tradition—from the Common Pleas’ rejection of all secular sanctions.
A few reports from the King’s Bench under Chief Justice Popham (who died in
June, 1607) are tangled and complex. They are indeed primarily interesting for their
complexity; the discussions suggest a court feeling its way into the High Commission
issues it had not, in contrast with the Common Pleas, been much compelled to face in
Queen Elizabeth’s reign. Differences in the thinking of individual judges appear, but they
do not resolve either into sharp and durable differences or into clear consensus following
debate. Two propositions, however, can probably be considered firm King’s Bench law:
(1) The High Commission may imprison to coerce performance of spiritual
sentences, but not otherwise. This appears to have been Popham’s main conviction on
High Commission matters. It has the virtue of seeing in 1 Eliz. intent to give the
Commission an instrument for making enforcement of ecclesiastical law more effective.
That is to say, it responds to the argument that there would not have been sufficient point
in merely erecting an additional ecclesiastical court with the same powers as the old ones
had. One Justice (Tanfield) favored taking the principle –that the new court was meant to
have “teeth” ordinary Church courts lacked—a step farther and permitting punitive
imprisonment as well as coercive. Other judges, such as Fenner, were skeptical of
conceding a general power to imprison coercively, but did not clearly dissent from an
actual decision on that basis. The reach of the imprisoning power depends on the
Commission’s substantive jurisdiction, which the King’s Bench did not debate
comprehensively. (Coercive enforcement of sentences in a few grave criminal cases is
after all different from freedom to use imprisonment in petty cases as well.)
(2) It follows from (1) that imprisonment to enforce payment of a fine would be
unlawful. Fining in itself, however,—in lieu of a spiritual punishment or in addition—
need not be ruled out. In an oblique way, the early Jacobean King’s Bench still came
close to ruling it out in practice. There are signs of reluctance to hold formally that the
High Commission simply lacked power to fine. The reason was perhaps that it seemed
anomalous to confer imprisoning power in any form or degree and at the same time to
deny utterly that the conventionally lesser secular sanction of fining could be used. Since,
however, imprisoning to coerce payment of a fine was ruled out, there was only one way
to achieve payment—estreating the fine into the Exchequer. (That means referring the
fine to the Exchequer for collection as a debt to the Crown. Actually, there is one
alternative besides imprisonment—making the party enter a bond conditioned on
payment of the fine. It is unsurprising that the High Commission thought of this trick and
unsurprising that the judges found it unlawful.) The upshot of this line of thought is that
whether a High Commission fine was a collectable royal debt belonged to the Exchequer
to decide. Some of the King’s Bench judges claimed to know that the Exchequer had in
the relatively recent past decided with full deliberation that the fines were not lawful
debts, which must mean that in the Exchequer court’s opinion 1 Eliz. did not permit the
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High Commission to fine (as the contemporary Common Pleas held.) There is an
Exchequer story here which I am not in a position to tell, but there is no reason to doubt
at least the short-run truth of what the judges reported. (I.e., there was such a decision in
the Exchequer, whether of not it was followed later; purported fines imposed by the High
Commission were not currently being collected.) Some of the King’s Bench judges seem
to have thought that since such fines were realistically nugatory one might as well say
that fines could not legally be imposed; others seem reluctant to say that quite flatly, on
the strength of another court’s reading of the statute. The difference, however, comes in
practice to very little. (One school could say that the King’s Bench might as well prohibit
the High Commission from imposing fines and save the Exchequer the trouble of
rejecting it as a debt; the other school, perhaps a bit more punctiliously, might decline to
prohibit. “So what?” is a good question. No actual cases hang on the difference.)
The most famous Jacobean King’s Bench case touching the High Commission,
decided after Popham’s death, when Sir Thomas Richardson had assumed the Chief
Justiceship, was Fuller’s Case. Though elaborately argued in at least its final stage, in
consultation with the Common Pleas and Exchequer judges, and though decisive on a
peripheral point of “constitutional” significance in historical perspective, Fuller is of
slight importance for the basic High Commission issues. The following are the points
decided that bear on High Commission jurisdiction and powers. (There are some further
points of general significance for Prohibition law.)
(1) As for the long-run “constitutional” matter: The judges held, without any sign
of disagreement among themselves, that a lawyer arguing for his client in a common law
court has no immunity from ecclesiastical prosecution for remarks constituting
ecclesiastical crime. The ecclesiastical court in the case at hand was the High
Commission, and it was the Commission’s jurisdiction that was upheld, viz. its
jurisdiction to prosecute for schism, here allegedly committed in the form of a lawyer’s
statements in common law argument (specifically, Nicholas Fuller’s argument in
Maunsell and Ladd, for a full account of which see Vol. II, pp. 339 ff.) Schism was
uncontroversially a High Commission matter, so there was no jurisdictional issue apart
from Fuller’s contention that a lawyer speaking in the line of duty was exempt from
liability.
(2) Use of imprisonment in a clear infra vires case such as schism was upheld, but
within the bounds of the established King’s Bench principle that such imprisonment is
permissible only to coerce conformity with a spiritual sentence.
(3) The judges enunciated a limit on the High Commission which they probably
would have considered settled and uncontroversial law, but which had not previously
been so clearly stated: The High Commission has no jurisdiction over slander of itself.
That, together with other slanders of the “government”, lay or ecclesiastical, was a
common law offense. The High Commission was free to proceed against Fuller for
schism, which the judges thought he was sufficiently charged with, but it must not count
as schism what only came to slander of its authority. (In some places, the Commission’s
original charge against Fuller seems to confound the two categories, but the reports do
not give a detailed account of what the judges considered schism and what slander; the
Commission was warned off from the latter in general terms.)

231

(4) The proposition—uncontroversial by 1608 when Fuller was decided—that the
High Commission has no authority to expound 1 Eliz. or its own patent was strongly reemphasized.
Thus, for all its celebrity as a case on “advocate’s privilege”, Fuller was not a
weighty or innovative one on the High Commission’s jurisdiction and powers. It does,
however, present major problems of construction in itself; these are dealt with in detail in
the text.
I have found no cases in the King’s Bench between Fuller and Coke’s
transference to the Chief Justiceship of that court in 1613. This Sub-section concludes
with two extrajudicial opinions from 1604 and 1606. Although the earlier is of
considerable interest in itself, neither contributes importantly to the development of
doctrine concerning the High Commission. The 1604-5 opinion upholds the
Commission’s power to exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction in a new context with special
problems, but does not touch its authority to go beyond ecclesiastical sanctions. The less
formal opinion from 1606 (given in discussion at Serjeants’ Inn) denies the
Commission’s power to use imprisonment. It goes to show Coke still in line with
previous Common Pleas opinion at the very beginning of his service on that court (see
the next Section for his and his court’s subsequent change of position on imprisonment.)
If King’s Bench judges participated in the opinion, they would not have been quite in
accord with their earlier decisions. Coke himself was the reporter, however: he may have
characteristically attributed more unanimous agreement with his own views to other
judges than would have held up in adversarial debate.

The Cases
I have only one Common Pleas case earlier than Coke’s assumption of the Chief
Justiceship of that court in June, 1606. Chambers’s Case (1605) 75 was a Habeas corpus.
Chambers having been committed by the High Commission and having brought a writ,
the sheriff responsible for his custody returned only that he was imprisoned for diverse
contempts against the King. The vagueness of this return afforded sufficient grounds for
disposing of the case, and it was ultimately decided on that basis. When the case first
came up, however, two judges,Walmesley and Daniel, went straight to the broader issues
about the High Commission’s powers. (The other puisne justices, Warburton and
Kingsmill, may have been present, for the report says no one contradicted Walmesley and
Daniel. It says expressly that Sir Francis Gawdy, who in August, 1605, succeeded
Anderson as Chief Justice of the Common Pleas after sixteen years as a King’s Bench
judge, was absent.) In keeping with the court’s Elizabethan position, Walmesley and
Daniel said flatly that the Commission had no authority to imprison and that 1 Eliz.
confined it to ecclesiastical law even if the patent could be read as purporting to give it
powers not warranted by that law. By way of dictum so far as the present case goes, they
also said, somewhat more qualifiedly, that the Commission may not fine and estreat fines
into the Exchequer. On this point, they conceded that “there has been opinion delivered to
the contrary”, but added that “since that time they have changed their opinion.” It is not
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explicit whom “they” refers to, but I think it must mean the Barons of the Exchequer. If
that is correct, Walmesley and Daniel would seem to be granting that it was the
Exchequer’s role to decide whether High Commission fines were legally collectable. But
if Exchequer opinion was now clearly against the lawfulness of such fines, perhaps any
obstacle to other common law courts’ prohibiting them would be cleared away.
Walmesley and Daniel then added a further argument, the full implications of
which seem to me somewhat elusive. Their words are: “And great mischief arises thereon
[reference of ‘thereon’ unclear], for if a man is cited before them for only a petty thing,
yet he will have a pursuivant sent for him who is 40 miles from him. And it has been seen
recently that a man & his wife and 1 of his children were cited before them, &the child
paid for his miles as well as the man or his wife.” Off-hand the picture projected from the
recent episode would seem to be of a pursuivant sent to arrest defendants, at least for the
purpose of bringing them before the Commission. Naming several co-defendants from
the same family and charging a man by the mile for conducting three people a
considerable distance back to the Commission’s seat would result in a large bill of costs
if the party summoned lost the suit against him. The costs would arguably amount to a
pecuniary penalty even without a fine (cf. Poole v. Gray above.) Banning all forms of
taking people into custody, of course including punitive or coercive imprisonment, would
cut that off (not to mention the flagrant behavior of pursuivants sent to make arrests in
two of the Elizabethan cases above.) The judges’ essential thought may therefore be:
High Commission power to take parties into custody can ramify into more mischief than
jailing convicted persons to punish or to coerce performance of spiritual sentences. Even
if the latter could be justified by 1 Eliz.’s presumed purpose of more effective
ecclesiastical justice, the abusive by-products cannot be. Therefore a flat ban is the only
solution.
A further thought is also possible, however: Even if pursuivants were and were
allowed to be nothing more than process-servers, costs could still be inflated to a degree,
by charging by the mile for the pursuivant’s own round trip. If (as the judges had just
said) punitive fines are ruled out, must one not consider what to do about costs as well—
if not barring them altogether, at any rate scrutinizing the size of the bill and whether the
Commission has contributed to inflating it?
Tantalizingly, Walmesley and Daniel emphasize that the abuses they outline
could be practiced on someone accused of a very minor offense or civil wrong. The
obvious way to deal with that would be to have some criterion of seriousness for
permissible High Commission cases. But if that solution crossed the judges’ minds they
do not say so. Reluctance to consider it, but instead to believe that stringent elimination
of secular sanctions was the only justifiable way to restrain the Commission,
characterized the Elizabethan Common Pleas and may well have been as far as the early
Jacobean court would have gone. (In practice, it should be said, that approach would
probably have prevented most High Commission interference with petty offenders. Why,
after all, should a Commission forbidden to touch people in their personal liberty and
pocketbooks go to the trouble of pursing the spiritual correction of small fry? Serious
offenders are another matter—people who ought to feel the hand of ecclesiastical justice
and be made examples of, but might not if lack of zeal or favoritism affected regular
diocesan courts. Indeed, private complainants might as a rule need to feel strong outrage
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at a serious grievance to prosecute in an august court away from home, if embarrassing
the adverse party were the only advantage over local prosecution.)
Chambers was adjourned after the first discussion. When it was taken up again on
a later day in the same term, the full court, including Chief Justice Gawdy, was present.
The case was now unanimously resolved in the prisoner’s favor without mention of the
High Commission’s sanctions. The basis for the resolution—quite sufficient and
precedented (see Hinde above)—was that the return on the Habeas corpus was
inadequate : saying only that Chambers was imprisoned for “divers contempts”, it did not
give the Common Pleas enough information to judge whether he was committed for a
valid cause. As the court pointed out, for all that appeared Chambers could have been
imprisoned for a “temporal thing”, or for a contempt for which he should instead have
been bailed. (There is no indication of criteria for distinguishing a bailable contempt of
an ecclesiastical court that has not strayed out of the spiritual sphere from one not
bailable. Talking about bailability necessarily assumes imprisoning power as well as
limits thereon, but the court now chose to by-pass whether the power existed. In summing
up its ground for discharging Chambers, after saying merely that the return was bad for
“uncertainty” the court added, “and [for] not showing the degree of the offense.” The
latter phrase could be significant. Does “degree” mean only “what, or of what kind, the
offense was”, or does it mean “degree of seriousness among ecclesiastical offenses”?
Could the implication of the word be that some offenses, though spiritual, are too minor
for High Commission jurisdiction? Or that all ecclesiastical offenses are within the
jurisdiction but some not grave enough to punish by imprisonment? Or not serious
enough to hold a man for if he can and will put up bail? Quaere.)
The unexceptionable decision in Chambers was buttressed by a little obliquely
related authority. A case from Dyer—254—was cited for showing that conclusory
language (criminosus and inhabilis, criminal and unqualified), even though supported by
specific allegation of peccadilloes (haunting taverns and [participating in] unlawful
games) was insufficient to permit judging of some point about a presentee to an
ecclesiastical living or his presentor—perhaps whether the former was clearly rejectable
by the Bishop or whether the latter had forfeited his right to present for the immediate
vacancy. Also cited was a rule that a valid Chancery bill may not be brought for “divers
lands and tenements” but must say which ones.
Resolving Chambers on general Habeas corpus law rather than on the High
Commission’s powers may have been in deference to the Chief Justice, who as a veteran
King’s Bench judge may have been unready to agree with the strong restrictions on
secular sanctions pioneered by the Common Pleas. (Since Gawdy died in 1606, making
way for Coke’s appointment, he left no record of his opinion about the predominant
Common Pleas view.) It is of course impossible to tell whether the puisne judges would
have preferred to press the issues specific to the High Commission if that could have
been done without dividing the court. They may all on consideration have approved the
idea that if a “narrow grounds”, procedural route to decision is easily reachable it should
usually be taken.
Once the court had shown where it stood, a motion was made that the sheriff
holding Chambers be allowed to amend his return. The motion was denied because “the
mittimus by which he was committed to prison & the return agree in words, so that the
sheriff has done all that is in him to discharge himself, so that he may not amend it or
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make it better.” (I.e., the High Commission ordered the sheriff to commit Chambers for
“divers contempts.” When the sheriff was asked by Habeas corpus to justify holding the
prisoner, he did all he could by passing on the reason for the detention exactly as it had
been given to him. He is not in the position of a jailer who may be allowed to amend
because he has over-abbreviated or summed up too vaguely the grounds communicated to
him. Realistically—since the sheriff was in all probability a neutral participant interested
only in doing his job according to law—the court’s decision means that the High
Commission was denied the opportunity to commit people with a sketchy statement of the
reason, then re-write the order for commitment [Mittimus] in the event a common law
court on Habeas corpus thinks the return unsatisfactory. Such shoddiness—if intentional,
presumably meant to keep the prisoner himself ignorant of just what he had allegedly
done wrong—should surely be disciplined.) Chambers was accordingly discharged
outright.
We may now turn to King’s Bench cases from the period between James I’s
accession in 1603 and Coke’s translation to the Chief Justiceship of the King’s Bench in
October, 1613. Several antedate the span during which Coke presided over the
Common Pleas, 1606-1613. Those from Coke’s Common Pleas years raise the question
whether the large number of decisions about the High Commission during that time
affected King’s Bench law on the subject. The question cannot easily be discussed,
however, until the Common Pleas cases have been inspected in detail. I shall immediately
describe the King’s Bench cases straightforwardly.
My first two King’s Bench cases conform to the type of Chambers: decisions
based on Habeas corpus law, rather than the court’s view of the High Commission’s
powers. Both, however, present significant variations.
In Bery’s (or Birry’s) Case (1605)76, the original return on Habeas corpus said
only that Bery was committed for “certain ecclesiastical causes” (Add. 25,205 says that
he was committed “by means of Dr. Newman.” This may have been specified in the
return, but I do not think it affects the legal questions. The role of this civilian in the case
is unclear.}The court rejected the return as too general. In this case, however, the
(unspecified) returning officer was allowed to amend. The new return said that the
prisoner was committed “for unreverend speeches to Dr. Newman & saucy carriage
toward him.”
The second return was also disallowed, and Bery was discharged. For all that
appears from Add. 25,205 the discharge might have been outright, but Godbolt has it that
the prisoner was put in bail to appear de die in diem before being released. Add. 25,205
says that the amended return was rejected “for generality too.” The implication in the
circumstances of this case would be that a specific enough return would need to give the
content of the “unreverend speeches” and an indication of what acts were deemed “saucy
carriage.” The court in fact gave an explanation of its thinking on the score of “saucy
carriage” (identical in both reports) and in so doing contributed the case’s most important
point. The reported words: “And it was held that if he had not put off his cap or not given
the wall to him, although those are misdemeanors, yet they may not imprison him for
them.” This would seem to mean: (a) Though minor forms of disrespect toward clerics
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and Church dignitaries are ecclesiastical offenses (analogous to common law
misdemeanors, I should think— not, from the examples given, actual ones) and though as
such they are not outside the reach of High Commission jurisdiction, they may not be
punished by imprisonment. (b) The High Commission has power to imprison for serious
offenses, wherever the line between petty and serious falls—serious in any event does not
include disrespect in forms hardly worse than bad manners.
For its final point, touching self-incrimination, Bery is treated in Vol. II above (p.
339.) By whatever way the issue arose in this case, the court’s opinion was that binding
someone to answer interrogatories before he has been furnished with the charges against
him is invalid. For present purposes, note that the High Commission was not altogether
forbidden to use bonds, say to enforce cooperation with its processes or performance of
its sentences, only bonds meant to obligate a person to answer questions no ecclesiastical
court was entitled to ask.
In Needham’s Case, from the same term as Bery (there is no way of telling which
case was taken up first) ,77 the return on Habeas corpus said that the prisoner was
censured for speaking opprobrious words of Price, a minister, for which he was fined £20
and committed (to the Gatehouse prison) until he paid the fine. The court agreed that the
stated cause of imprisonment was insufficient; the words called “opprobrious” should be
given expressly “so the Court can judge.” This is all the report says strictly about the
disposition of the Habeas corpus. There is no information as to whether Needham was
discharged outright or bailed, or as to whether amendment of the return was sought or
allowed. Nor are there any observations from the court as a whole on power to fine or to
imprison in order to coerce payment of a fine. There is no reason there should be, for on
the bare Habeas corpus question the decision seems open-and-shut: Unspecified
“opprobrious words” might constitute common law defamation; they might be so vague
or such commonplace vilification as not to be pursuable in any court, ecclesiastical or
lay; they might (if the court was ready to think along these lines, as Bery suggests it was,
not be utterly beyond the High Commission’s reach, but too trivial a manifestation of
disrespect for the kind and degree of punishment imposed to be allowable.
The report contains further important material, however. (a) It is noted at the end
of the report that “Needham sued Prohibition and had habeas corpus”. Furthermore, the
“opprobrious words” for which Price sued Needham are given—“a knave priest & fitter
to weare a white cloke than a blacke.” The Prohibition is the likely source of the actual
words, since as plaintiff seeking that writ Needham would have had to recite them. I am
not sure what the insulting edge of the utterance is. Could “priest” and “white cloke” be
meant to say by innuendo that Price had Popish tendencies, suggesting in turn that
Needham had Puritanical ones? Possibly, but even so the opprobrium would be very
indefinite, admitting of the mitior sensus of “nearly meaningless aspersion—conveyed
mostly by ‘knave’—whatever intention one might suspect to be behind it.” However one
takes them, the words seem well-qualified as the sort of “letting off steam” outburst,
virtually without factual content capable of being assessed as true or false, that would be
hard to make out as routine ecclesiastical defamation. The report does not say whether
Needham got his Prohibition, but he probably had a good chance for one without regard
to the High Commission’s powers.
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(b) Speeches by Justice Fenner and Attorney General Coke are reported, both
going beyond “the bare Habeas corpus question.” Coke may speak as Needham’s
counsel, but he says so much more than was necessary to get Needham released that one
wonders whether he was not speaking for himself as amicus curiae. (He makes some incourt appearances as Attorney General in which it seems likely that he was representing
the government rather than a private client. That cannot be true in this case, for the views
he expresses can hardly be what the government wanted to hear. My guess would be that
his high office and prestige would permit his being allowed to address the King’s Bench
in propria persona: analogously, Serjeants sometimes spoke in the Common Pleas
without being of counsel for one of the parties, as in effect ex officio advisers to the
court.)
Justice Fenner’s first speech makes one point without elaborating what conclusion
it leads to: “…if one speaks opprobrious words of a minister & is [proceeded against] for
them in Court Christian & wants to justify them he will not be suffered, for as they say,
Est contra caritatem.” I.e.: Construing the remark strictly, ecclesiastical courts take the
position that truth is not a defense in one special category of defamation, when the words
are spoken of a minister. In that case, the ecclesiastical view is that uncharitable (contra
caritatem) speech is punishable even if true—to which should perhaps be added “and
even if expressive of an unfavorable value judgment or hostile attitude, though not
assessable for truth or falsity.” Questions can be asked as to whether the “truth defense”
was clearly acknowledged in ecclesiastical law across the board, and also whether it was
enforced by lay courts as a required conformity with common law standards. (See
Ambler v. Metcalfe, Vol. II above, p. 46, where the question is touched but not addressed
head-on, and passim in Vol. II for the general legitimacy of insisting that ecclesiastical
courts imitate the common law as closely as possible in such matters as available
defenses and standards of proof.) Fenner would seem to imply that the defense was
usually good in ecclesiastical law, or at least insisted on by common law courts wielding
the Prohibition, except that the Church courts claimed an exception for opprobrious
words spoken of a minister, which common law courts had at any rate not yet overruled.
Granting Fenner his premise, what does he want to make of it? One or both of the
following, I should think: (1) Over and above the obvious vagueness of the return, it is
especially important that this court know the exact words judged opprobrious, lest
language constituting common law slander, or language that does not meet the most
minimal standard for “defamatory” or “disrespectful”, not only be punished by an
ecclesiastical court, but also be sheltered from the truth defense. (2) Assuming, on the
other hand, that disclosure of just what Needham said revealed that it had enough factual
content to call true or false, and assuming that the words were appropriate to
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the truth defense must be made available to the defendant in
the Church court. Whatever else ecclesiastical courts should or should not be allowed to
do in the area of speech-offenses, they may not so far depart from the common law model
as to punish someone who has only spoken what he can show to be true. Whether
Needham had so spoken could obviously not be ascertained without a fuller return.
(Again, Vol. II, passim. The position that “the common law model” often has a strong
claim to be followed by ecclesiastical courts and that the truth defense in defamation is an
instance, was plausible but problematic.) It is worth noting that in various contexts
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Justice Fenner was not very indulgent toward ecclesiastical courts, including the High
Commission.
Coke’s speech, following Fenner’s observation, starts by saying that the return on
Needham’s Habeas corpus was “without doubt bad”, but he does not say so for, as it
were, the general reason that the return was too general. Rather, at the outset he locates
the return’s inadequacy in its failure to say that “the party is a schismatic, heretic, or the
like.” The return must be “special” (specific), he says, so that “this court can judge of the
heresy.” I.e., Coke implies, as he later makes explicit, that the High Commission’s
authority extends only to the gravest ecclesiastical crimes. To support his point broadly,
without immediately referring to the High Commission, he cites a case from 4 Edw. IV:
An excommunicated man said “his corn grew no worse [for his having been
excommunicated];” he was cited by his Ordinary “and committed as a heretic by the
statute of 2 Hen. IV” (i.e, by the statute De heretico comburendo, which permitted
ecclesiastical courts to imprison heretics—they could then be turned over to the secular
authorities for burning.) The alleged heretic brought Habeas corpus in the King’s Bench.
The Ordinary returned that the prisoner was a heretic, and the return was adjudged bad.
The Ordinary, clearly being allowed to amend, then revealed what the heresy consisted
in. The prisoner was delivered: In the court’s view his irreverent utterance about
excommunication’s apparent lack of temporal consequences did not constitute heresy
“because it did not concern any fundamental part of religion.” (Though I cannot say how
precisely known the case of Edw. IV was, its hero’s skepticism about what one need fear
from God in this world merely by being excommunicated was a familiar anecdote.) The
moral for the present case would be that a return on a High Commission Habeas corpus
must first say “heresy” or the like to establish the imprisoning court’s jurisdiction and
then explain what that court counts as heresy.
Coke then turns to the High Commission in particular, with the observation that
“their authority is to be well considered.” He points out that at common law Ordinaries
had no power to fine or imprison before 2 Hen. IV authorized them to commit for heresy.
The report is not clear as to the step he took from there, but I suppose it is the argument
that the existence of statutory imprisoning power before 1 Eliz. justifies, as is necessary
to justify, reading the Supremacy Act as conferring on the High Commission alone
imprisoning power covering only heresy and its near relatives. Coke in any event says
that the High Commission is an ecclesiastical court founded “merely” by 1 Eliz. (This
tends to cut off the argument that powers beyond those conferred by the statute could be
given to the Commission by patent on the strength of the monarch’s common law
prerogative.) 1 Eliz., Coke continues, was made when the (still Catholic) Ordinaries
were suspected of being remiss in punishing “heresy, error, and schism” (a little more
than just heresy), and was made in order to punish “enormous schisms and heresies, &
not to deal with every petty offence against ecclesiastical law or private controversies, for
“that would toll Ordinaries’ jurisdiction.” Note from the last phrase that for Coke it was
central that the statute’s intent was to keep infringement on the regular ecclesiastical
courts’ jurisdiction to a minimum. Although this is not mentioned in the Needham
speech, saving the policy of 23 Hen. VIII (Ch. 2 above) could be, as it came to be, an
important further argument for the construction.
Here, so far as I know for the first documentable time, Coke stated the view of the
High Commission which in its basic features characterized him on the Bench. (1) The
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Commission’s jurisdiction—not only its imprisoning or secular-sanctioning power—is
limited to “enormities.” (2) Given jurisdiction, imprisoning is not ruled out (and perhaps
not fines and bonds, sed quaere). The present case adds that commitments, if challenged,
must be justified by showing what specific words or acts were taken by the Commission
to be “enormous.” Both of these features depart from the Elizabethan Common Pleas
position, of which Justice Walmesley may perhaps be considered the father.
Coke concludes his speech by citing an important precedent. The case is not
named, precisely dated, or described in detail. But, per Coke, it was ruled “in the time of
Sir Christopher Wray” (Chief Justice of the Queen’s Bench 1574-1592) that the High
Commission may “commit solely in great & enormous offences in which they proceed ex
offic[io] for the peace of the church & in cases of heresy & not in any/every (ch[esc]un)
case between p[ar]ty & p[ar]ty.” Note the precedent supports Coke on power to commit,
but not in terms on substantive jurisdiction, Note also that it says explicitly, as other
sources we have examined so far do not, that High Commission imprisoning power
applies only to criminal cases in a stricter sense than “criminal” by itself necessarily
signifies—the Commission must be proceeding ex officio. Though not quite as broad as
Coke’s opinion, the ruling from Wray’s time shows more sharply than other hints we
have noted that the Elizabethan Queen’s Bench was not in line with the Elizabethan
Common Pleas.
After Coke’s speech, Justice Fenner made a further remark: The High
Commission has “come to” proceed according to their instructions, “but what those
instructions are no one can know, and also no one can see what their commission is, for it
is not enrolled, which seems to me a great abuse.” The application of this is not evident.
The observation shows, as his first speech does more subtly, that Fenner was no friend of
the High Commission. It suggests that any attempt on the Commission’s part to claim
that its actions were authorized by its instructions or commission should be rebuffed, the
more so because these documents were not in the public domain. The argument (which
we have seen made) that the statute permitted the Commission to do whatever the
monarch permitted or told it to in the patent would have received short shrift from
Fenner.
My next piece of evidence 78 is only a nota without context: Justices Williams and
Tanfield, “on Serjeant Nicholl’s motion”, said that the High Commission had no
authority to impose a fine on anyone or imprison him for non-payment thereof. They go
on, “if they may impose a fine, it must be estreated into the Excheq[uer].” At first sight
there appears to be an ambiguity as between “fining is flatly unlawful” and”fining at least
may be lawful, but imprisonment to coerce payment is not—estreatment into the
Exchequer is the only allowable procedure to realize the fine.” I think the ambiguity is
dispelled, however, by a further remark from Williams. He says the matter was debated
“at large” in the Exchequer in a case in which he was of counsel, and it was “finally
adjudged” that the High Commission may not impose a fine. (The case is very likely the
same one Williams cited as counsel in Chambers above.) With this addition, the two
judges’ thinking can be spelled out as follows: We can now say safely enough that High
Commission fines are “flatly unlawful”, but it is not strictly ours to say. So long as the
Exchequer would or might regard High Commission fines as lawful and handle them like
78
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other estreated debts to the Crown, we would have no clear power to interfere. The
Exchequer having with full deliberation ruled out such fines, however, there is no
obstacle to our saying they are simply ruled out, as in our opinion they should be. If the
Exchequer had not disallowed estreating High Commission fines, it would be our option
to decide whether imprisonment to coerce payment should be permitted as a
supplementary means of enforcement. To permit it as the sole means—assuming contrary
to fact that we were inclined to think that fines are authorized by 1 Eliz. –would be a
breach of inter-court comity. Besides strong convictions on the statute’s meaning, such a
step would involve either saying (outside regular appellate channels) that the Exchequer
was wrong or disputing (whether or not it is in the abstract disputable) the Exchequer’s
primary responsibility for deciding whether an alleged debt to the Crown is really due.
In the Habeas corpus case of Williams (1606)79 , the return said: (a) The
complaint for which Williams was committed to the Gatehouse was incontinency,
irreverent words “given” to the Bishop of Llandaff when he was sitting in his Consistory,
and slanderous speaking of the Bishop’s wife. (b) On conviction, Williams was enjoined
to make purgation and do penance, fined, and ordered to pay costs. He paid the fine, but
was imprisoned for nonfeasance of the rest of the sentence.
With respect to (a) –the original cause of prosecution, incontinency, may be
vulnerable. Is incontinence serious enough for the High Commission? If not, however,
speech-offenses against a high ecclesiastical dignitary and his family, especially when
aggravated by disturbance of order and expression of contempt for the judge in a Church
court, might well be infra vires. Even so, in the light of Bery and Needham, it would not
be out of the question to ask for specification of the words spoken to the Bishop and
about his wife, for the words ought perhaps to appear to be ecclesiastical defamation
(even with the “contempt of court” element added.)
The King’s Bench as reported did not, however, say anything about the return
quoad the substantive case against Williams. That is unsurprising, partly because of the
problems about attacking the original prosecution I have suggested, and the more so
because the return as a whole posed two perfectly clear legal questions: (1) Even if the
High Commission may not imprison for any other purpose, may it do so to coerce
performance of a purely spiritual sentence? (2) Should a costs award be considered a
legitimate part of a spiritual sentence (and if so, should the return give the amount of the
costs or itemize them lest costs include covert damages?)
While the King’s Bench judges confined themselves in Williams to the
Commission’s punitive and coercive powers, they did not just address the legality of
imprisonment to enforce spiritual penalties, and they said nothing about the costs. (It
should be noted that abuse of costs had been made an issue of in the Common Pleas, but
not in the King’s Bench.) The judges’ discussion of Williams therefore raises questions of
interpretation going to its premises.
The first time the case came up, Chief Justice Popham said the High
Commissioners may not imprison for a fine imposed by them, nor take an obligation for
it to the King’s use, but must estreat the fine into the Exchequer. But if the
Commissioners impose penance “or other lawful ecclesiastical censure”, they may
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imprison the party quousque he conforms. Justices Fenner, Tanfield and Yelverton
agreed with Popham (leaving only Justice Williams unheard from—he may of course
have been absent.) In short, the whole court or most of it was at one on the nature and
extent of the imprisoning power (leaving aside the costs, in which none of the judges took
an interest.) Popham’s remark on fines can be taken as a dictum, save for one twist:
Suppose Williams had been imprisoned to coerce payment of his fine and performance of
his penance—i.e., for one lawful and one unlawful purpose. Should he not, perhaps, be
released in consideration of the wrongful aspect of his commitment, though he might
reasonably be bailed to constrain him more mildly to perform the rightful part? (Release
on bail would probably obligate him to report to the High Commission from time to time
so that it could be ascertained whether he had conformed to the spiritual sentence. He
would probably be subject to recommitment at the Commission’s discretion for obdurate
resistance, and at any rate he would be in danger of excommunication and its
consequences.) In the actual case, by contrast, Williams had paid the fine voluntarily .It
seems disproportionate to be harder on a man who has acknowledged his wrongdoing to
the extent of making monetary amends for it without being coerced than on one who
refuses all cooperation with the High Commission. Therefore Williams should be
discharged on at least as favorable terms as someone released from partially illegal
imprisonment.
If this is the conclusion to which Popham’s thinking tends, his insistence that the
High Commission may not commit to force payment of a fine does not reduce to a dictum
added to his on-the-issue holding that imprisonment to compel performance of spiritual
sentences is lawful. He needs to say that “imposing a fine” is in a sense as improper as
imprisoning to coerce payment of a fine, for “imposing” one at all can have the effect of
inducing a person to pay up at once if he is able; the only way for the Commission, in a
manner of speaking, to “fine” is to estreat immediately into the Exchequer, which agency
may eventually collect the money, provided its judicial branch considers a payment to the
monarch assessed by the High Commission a lawful debt to the Crown. (Popham
probably knew as well as Justices Williams and Tanfield in the nota just above that the
contemporary Exchequer was unfavorable to High Commission fines. It remains correct
toward Exchequer jurisdiction to say that sums the High Commission thinks should be
paid to the Crown should be referred to the Exchequer for evaluation. They should not,
however, be coerced by imprisonment, guaranteed by bonds, or—by the reasoning I have
been exploring—“imposed” in the sense “ordered”, so that the party is given the
impression that the sooner he pays the better he may fare with the authorities.
The analysis I have pursued has the virtue that it predicts what eventually
happened to Williams—he was released on bail. But his release did not occur until after
two more discussions of his case among the judges. A few loose ends in the analysis of
Popham’s and three puisne judges’ first pronouncement need commentary before moving
on to later judicial remarks:
(a) The picture of Williams paying the fine but resisting the spiritual penalties is
puzzling. Why might someone do that? There are several possibilities. (1) The belief that
paying the fine might save one from imprisonment, even if one knew or surmised that
this was not legally guaranteed. Behind this belief might lie the further one, which could
be cynical and could be Puritan, that the Commission cared more about the money than
about whether penance and the like were actually performed. “Caring more about the
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money” need not proceed from a low desire to enrich the Crown. It could reflect the
perfectly rational view that fines deter, whereas performance of spiritual penalties,
especially nominal performance by people who do not repent of anything they sincerely
regard as wrong and do not respect the court bearing down on them, is unlikely to affect
the future very much. (2) A purer religious attitude: As it were, “Let my persecutors have
the lucre they seek to extort from me illegally, but let them not have the satisfaction of
seeing me hypocritically perform their ceremonies—they may accommodate me in their
jail for a while if they must.” (3) We of course do not know that Williams really had paid
his fine, only that the High Commission said so. The Commission might well waive the
fine by returning that it was paid, correctly predicting that the chances of being allowed
to hold Williams for the spiritual penalties only was better than the chance of realizing
the fine, either through an Exchequer unlikely to be cooperative or by its own coercion.
Even apart from the risk of losing all by trying for too much, a less cynical view of the
Commission than that suggested above might credit it with thinking spiritual discipline of
misbehaving Christians more important and more clearly its role than exacting a
pecuniary penalty—and after all, the bite of jail is for most people a more memorable
punishment than a fine even when the keys to the jail are in the prisoner’s hand.
(b) It is worth noting that the High Commission did not say that Williams was
imprisoned as a punishment. In Bery and Needham a punishment may have been
intended, but instead of saying so the Commission tried to conceal what it was behind
vague language. The High Commission’s course in Williams reflects the failure of that
expedient. Yet from earlier than these three cases we have not seen the King’s Bench
decisively ruling out punitive imprisonment. The case from Wray’s time cited by Coke in
Needham is the closest thing. Williams’ offenses hardly meet the standard of gravity
Wray thought required to justify any imprisonment, coercive or punitive. The Popham
opinion in Williams lowers that standard for the coercive variety quoad spiritual
penalties. The much sharper Common Pleas opinion against secular sanctions may have
deterred the High Commissioners or their advisers from supposing they could persuade
the King’s Bench to take a radically different stance, extending to the punitive
imprisonment of an offender of Williams’ grade.
(c) It bears re-emphasizing that Popham and his colleagues ruled out not only
imprisoning to enforce payment of a fine, but also taking a bond conditioned on payment.
While it may be tenable to hold that requiring a performance bond of an ecclesiastical
defendant is intrinsically secular and therefore ultra vires by the same token as fining and
imprisoning, Williams shows why such bonds for fines must be excluded without
reaching so broad a rule. The judges stress that the only way the High Commission could
fine was to estreat the fine into the Exchequer as a debt to the Crown, whether or not they
thought the Exchequer likely to allow it as a debt. Obviously, if the Commission could
demand a bond payable to the King on forfeiture it could secure payment without the
Exchequer’s cooperation. It could in effect insure itself against an unfavorable
Exchequer view of High Commission fines (A further and more abusive step would be to
put a penalty in the bond so that the party would be under pressure to pay the principal
sum of the fine without disputing its legality in the Exchequer. I do not know whether
Exchequer procedure would admit of such a ruse and assume that equitable protection
against the penalty would be available, perhaps in the Exchequer itself. But a naïve
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person might still be frightened into paying the principal to avoid trouble, if not serious
risk of incurring the penalty.)
Williams’ Case was taken up for the second time on another day in the same term
(P.4 Jac.) On this occasion, Justices Fenner and Williams said flatly that the High
Commission may not “assess fines” or imprison. Fenner must have thought better of his
concurrence with Popham on the earlier day, if he and Justice Williams meant their point
to be as absolute as it sounds in the report. (Note the phrase “assess fines.” Could the
“assess” make the meaning “do anything that resembles fining, even if the Commission
simply estreats the sum due and resorts to no form of enforcement on its own”?) Justice
Tanfield disagreed. He too had changed his mind since the earlier discussion. As starkly
as Fenner and Williams say the Commission may not “assess fines” or imprison, Tanfield
says “they may well do both.” He gives two reasons: (1) He reads the statute as allowing
the High Commission to proceed according to its discretion (“iuxta sanam discretionem
suam”—the report uses the Latin.) I take this to mean that the Commission may go
beyond regular ecclesiastical sanctions at discretion, as deemed necessary, though it may
not imply that no limits on the abuse of discretion may be enforced by common law
procedures. (2) If the High Commission may not fine and imprison it has no more power
than an Ordinary, “which were in a manner to make the statute idle.” In making this
point, Tanfield is the first judge we have encountered to suggest a reason for the High
Commission’s existence to compete with the one that has several times come to our
attention. One might formulate the two reasons this way:
Reason I—Historically, the Commission was created because the Ordinaries left
over from Queen Mary’s reign were unreliable. It was for suppressing religious offenses
at the level of heresy that they were really unreliable, which favors the inference that the
Commission was intended to have jurisdiction only over such grave matters. But even if
one is unwilling to draw that inference, it was and still is true that the value of having a
High Commission reduces to the value of having a supplementary ecclesiastical court. It
does make sense to have one, even when there is no longer a general cause to distrust the
regular courts on the score of heresy and the like. For it may always be the case that
Ordinaries here and Ordinaries there will be deficient in zeal to enforce all parts of
ecclesiastical criminal law or in competence or freedom from bias to apply the civil
branch correctly. From this—the conception of the High Commission as a concurrent
supplement—the appropriate inference is that that the Commission, as “just another
ecclesiastical court” with the same jurisdiction as any other, cannot go beyond regular
ecclesiastical sanctions. Parliament can hardly have intended to give one ecclesiastical
court extensive temporal sanctions to be used against anyone who happens to be caught
in its grasp, down to the pettiest malfeasor. (Does this not probably represent the
reasoning of Justice Walmesley?)
Reason II—Tanfield’s reason: A mere overlapping supplementary court does not
make much sense. It may have for a brief time around the enactment of 1 Eliz., but one
should assume that a statute not expressly made temporary, and which has stayed on the
books for many years and been frequently put into execution, has a serious long-run
purpose. Having one high-ranking ecclesiastical court with discretion to use secular
sanctions when that seems necessary is a more cogent purpose than having an extra court
with no more effectual means for exacting obedience of the ecclesiastical law than the
regular tribunals have. Such a court could at best (i) cause some offenders to be
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prosecuted and, if convicted, punished spiritually who might otherwise, on account of
this or that contingency, escape those fates; and (ii) permit private complainants to
choose their court. Intent to create such a court is a weak explanation compared to
creating a new tribunal with “teeth” the regular courts lacked.
Beyond the unresolved difference between Fenner-Williams and Tanfield, the
report gives no further information on events in P. 4 Jac. Two notations at the end carry
the case into the next term (Trinity.) (1) In that term the whole court is said to have
agreed that the High Commission may not commit “for their fines assessed”, but “make
estreats into the Exchequer.” It would appear that both sides of the debate in Easter were
persuaded, perhaps by the Chief Justice, to retreat on fining (which was not directly in
issue in Williams, since the prisoner had already paid the fine.) The retreat on neither side
need have been a drastic reversal. Justices Fenner and Williams would not have had to
concede more than that it was too extreme to say the Commission may not “assess” a
fine; they may not have granted more than that it was the Exchequer’s business to pass on
the validity of estreated fines (and they may well have thought that the Exchequer would
not uphold them.) Tanfield would only have had to concede that bonds or imprisonment
should not be used to enforce fines: estreating was the “due process”; if the realization of
fines was being frustrated by the Exchequer, perhaps that should be changed by
legislation or judicial negotiation, perhaps it must be suffered, but it does not affect the
Commission’s legal power under the statute to fine. The point is not empty formalism, for
a party who paid the fine, as the prisoner Williams had, would have satisfied a substantial
part of his ecclesiastical duty and have at least a moral claim to lenient treatment in other
respects—he would not have paid “of his own folly.” Someone who failed to pay could
not only be imprisoned to coerce performance of spiritual sentences, but also as a
punishment for his original offense, by what I take to be Tanfield’s position.
(2) As I have already noted, the report says at the very end that the prisoner
Williams was delivered with bail. No summarizing tally of the judges’ positions is given.
The best projection from the information we have would be that three justices (Popham,
Tanfield, and Yelverton) thought the imprisonment was perfectly lawful, Fenner and
Justice Williams probably dissenting, though upon the first discussion Fenner went along
with imprisonment to back up ecclesiastical sanctions. Popham and probably Yelverton
might have limited imprisonment to coercion of spiritual performance, with Tanfield
alone ready to support punitive imprisonment.
Though justly imprisoned per the majority, the prisoner was nevertheless
released. Only one of the majority would have needed to favor release, but there is
nothing to suggest that the decision was not unanimous. Decisions in Habeas corpus
cases to release with bail are often hard to interpret. (This is illustrated in some of the
cases involving self-incrimination—Vol. II, Ch. 5) One always-present consideration is
that whatever imprisoning power, punitive or coercive, the High Commission had, it
could not plausibly be entitled to hold people perpetually. Release by the common law
court’s discretion after the prisoner had served a reasonable time in relation to the gravity
of his offense—with bail if the commitment was initially lawful and the Church’s interest
in the party’s conformity remained unsatisfied—is the best general formula. The prisoner
Williams would have spent only a matter of weeks in jail—part of Easter term, the
interval between terms, and part of Trinity—but his original misbehavior was not very
grievous. As I have suggested, his payment of the fine, leaving (aside from the

244

undiscussed costs) only the spiritual penalties, which could have been addressed by
excommunication, would quite reasonably be counted in his favor. (It would be a nice,
though entirely speculative, irony if Justice Tanfield, the strongest supporter of secular
sanctions, was firmly for letting the prisoner go: A perfectly legal secular punishment had
been accomplished, just what the statute, in Tanfield’s opinion, meant to allow.)
Another case from the same term as Williams 80 requires mention here only for a
remark by Chief Justice Popham at the end of the report. Popham’s words are puzzling;
the reporter may have caught only a fragment of what he said. The comment does
however, tend to confirm Popham’s view in Williams of the High Commission’s
imprisoning power. The case itself was about the writ called Vi laica removenda,
whereby the sheriff’s assistance could be called in to remove a clergyman from physical
property attached to a living if he was not entitled, or was no longer entitled, to occupy it
but would not vacate voluntarily. Whether this procedure could be used in the
circumstances of this case and, if so, whether the procedure was followed properly gave
the King’s Bench judges trouble and evoked divided opinions; no resolution is reported.
The High Commission was involved with the case in that it deprived a beneficed
clergyman called Smith “upon the new canons” (i.e., for some unspecified infraction of
the 1604 canons) and also committed him to prison. The Vi laica was brought by the
person entitled to present the next incumbent; the issues on the Vi laica were the more
complicated because, Smith being absent in jail, the eviction proceedings were a matter
of ousting his wife and servants, who remained in possession of the minister’s residence.
Except for Popham’s final remark, nothing in the discussion of the case touched High
Commission questions. If the Commission’s jurisdiction, act of deprivation, and act of
imprisoning could have been challenged by Prohibition or Habeas corpus, they were not.
Popham’s reported words are: “if the High Commission may commit one
quousque he submits to the censure of the Church not in other manner [no punctuation].”
If the “if” is a slip, Popham would be reiterating his opinion in Williams, with the “not in
other manner” making it clearer than before that only coercive commitment to enforce
spiritual sentences was lawful. But what does this have to do with the Vi laica case? One
conjecture occurs to me. Popham’s thought spelled out as follows might fit the context:
“If [as I believe is true, but in any event assuming it is] the Commission may commit
someone until he submits to the censure of the Church and not otherwise [i.e., not as a
punishment for his original offense or to compel payment of a fine], is there not reason to
doubt whether Smith was lawfully imprisoned? If a clergyman is deprived of his living
are there likely to be other censures of the Church to which he ought to submit? There
possibly could be, but one must wonder whether imprisonment on top of deprivation is
not a dose of temporal punishment in addition to an already severe ecclesiastical sanction.
If we assume the imprisonment was unlawful, could the Vi laica be affected? Could it
matter that the sheriff took action against Smith’s wife and maid-servant when Smith’s
absence was in a sense explicable by his unlawful detention, though obviously as a free
man he could have been absent on a given occasion?”
I cannot answer the concluding question for want of sufficient understanding of
the Vi laica law. The judges’ discussion of the case, however, though too brief to clarify
much, makes me wonder whether concern about the legality of Smith’s imprisonment
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could not have come up in further debate. (Justices Yelverton and Fenner appear to think
that neither a deprived clergyman nor his servants or family may be removed by Vi laica.
Justice Williams thought that if the minister is merely absent his servants—nothing said
about the family—may be removed. Popham thought that if the servants or wife keep
possession by force they may be removed and committed. In the instant case, however,
Mrs. Smith and the servant girl do not seem to have used force, The sheriff used a little,
first by breaking in when the servant refused to admit him and then preventing the wife,
who was out when he arrived, from entering, though she expressed her desire to and
signified that she was not surrendering possession. Justice Tanfield essentially agreed
with Popham and emphasized that even though Smith was in prison he remained in
possession through his servants, and that merely by preventing Mrs. Smith from reentering he “removed” her as a matter of law. Amid this confusion and disagreement—I
can against only ask—could the possibility that the case might not have arisen if Smith
had not be wrongfully imprisoned have been focused on as a way out?)
The important Habeas corpus case of Maunsell and Ladd (1607)81 has been
exhaustively discussed in Vol. II above, because it is about the High Commission’s
power to require accusees to answer self-incriminating questions and imprison them in
order to coerce them to answer. The argument of this exceptionally well-reported case
was far-ranging. It inevitably touched questions about the High Commission broader than
the immediate issue—about its power to imprison at all and the general nature and scope
of the tribunal. I shall not try to abstract everything the prisoners’ lawyers and the judges
said that transcends the self-incrimination question in which such remarks are enmeshed,
but refer the reader to the detailed presentation of the case in Vol. II. Two points,
however, may be usefully picked out as contributions to the on-going debates about the
Commission’s jurisdiction and procedural powers, other than its interrogating power.
(1) Maunsell and Ladd were imprisoned, per the return on Habeas corpus,
because they were unwilling to answer a question about a conventicle. Exactly what they
were asked is unclear; it was probably whether they had participated in such an unlawful
religious assembly. No issue was made in the case as to whether proceedings against
conventicles or alleged conventiclers fell within the Commission’s substantive
jurisdiction. This is evidence that the activity was a grave enough religious offense for
the High Commission. It may have been thought to amount to schism, or at least to be
close enough, but there was no discussion of the matter. Counsel vehemently attacking
the Commission on its interrogating power and more did not suggest that if conventicling
was illegal at all by ecclesiastical law it was a relatively minor offense within diocesan
jurisdiction.
(2) The prisoners had been held for nine months at the time they brought their
Habeas corpus. It was cogently argued by Ladd’s counsel (Fuller, for whom see the next
case below—Vol. II, pp. 344 and 350-51 for Fuller’s argument) that even granting that
their imprisonment was initially lawful they could not be held longer than three months.
The argument depends on the contention that any imprisoning power the Commission
81

P.5-T.5 Jac. K.B. Vol. II, pp. 340-370. For documentation, Note 14, p. 430. One
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possibly had was owing to the statute De heretico comburendo (2 Hen. IV, c. 15) , which
expressly provided that heretics imprisoned by ecclesiastical courts must be tried within
three months of their commitment. Chief Justice Popham rebutted Fuller vigorously.
Which side of the debate is the stronger seems to me uncertain—see Vol. II for analysis.
Nowhere else in reported cases is the permissible duration of High Commission
imprisonment so expressly raised. All that can be said about the exchange in Maunsell
and Ladd is that Fuller did not persuade Popham of his three-month rule—none of the
other judges comments.
(3) Noy’s brief report is of a single remark by Popham. It basically says that the
High Commission may imprison if it is proceeding within its jurisdiction. The passage is
of interest because of the Chief Justice’s way of making that point, for he founds the
power to imprison on the power to fine. “[I]t hath been adjudged”, he says, “that a fine
imposed by the High Commissioners was estreated into the Exchequer. And that was
levied by process out of the Exchequer, and well. And if they may impose a fine, they
may imprison, and it hath been so used these 50 years, without any repugnancy, if the
offence be ecclesiastical and belong to them.” The language here is puzzling. What court
“adjudged”? That a fine was estreated and was subsequently levied seems rather a fact
than something adjudged. Perhaps the “and well” is the clue to the idea: For the fifty
years the High Commission has existed, fines have been imposed and collected through
the Exchequer. The practice has at least gone unchallenged and may have been judicially
endorsed, perhaps by the Exchequer or perhaps by other courts, either directly by refusal
to prohibit fining or at least collaterally—e.g., by holding that the Commission may not
imprison to enforce fines because estreating is the correct procedure (even if by current
Exchequer law actual collection could be blocked—which Popham may not have
believed.) In any event, it is notable that in this speech Popham takes the power to fine as
the entering wedge for use of temporal sanctions by the High Commission. His thought
seems to be “If a court can fine, surely it can imprison.” On the surface that jars with the
assumption that jail is a heavier sanction than a fine, but remember that Popham held
High Commission imprisonment lawful only to coerce performance of spiritual penalties.
A fine is hard not to see as a punishment, unless perhaps by seeing it as a forced
commutation of spiritual sanctions: coercive imprisonment, savoring of civil commitment
by courts of equity, can be reasonably regarded as lighter.
Maunsell and Ladd brought in its train Fuller’s Case.82 Although celebrated,
Fuller is not well-reported. Almost all solid information about the case comes from 12
Coke, one of the two posthumous volumes of the Reports, for the accounts in Add.
25,213 and Noy are cursory. Coke reports the case in the form of “resolutions”, which he
says were agreed on by the Common Pleas and Exchequer judges as well as those of the
King’s Bench, where the case arose. (Whether Fuller was formally adjourned into the
Exchequer Chamber for decision by all the judges or only discussed informally by the
whole Bench, perhaps at Serjeants’ Inn, does not appear. I think the latter is more likely,
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since the procedural setting at the crucial point to which the resolutions relate was a mere
motion for Consultation to reverse a King’s Bench Prohibition. By participation in the
deliberations of all the judges, as Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, Coke would have
had direct knowledge of the resolutions and no doubt a role in working them out.) The
resolutions certainly give a clear rendering of judicial opinion on the issues of the case;
they suffer from the fault of all reporting of ultimate conclusions alone, to which Coke
was partial, in that they do not tell us about debate on the way to that end, though
inferences about the intermediate steps are sometimes possible. In addition to the three
reports, a copy of the official record of Fuller is preserved among the manuscripts
consisting largely of reports. This document is useful for some narrative details and
occasional hints of how legal issues may have been seen, but like all official records it
supplies no direct evidence of the thinking of counsel and judges.
The bare narrative of Fuller—synthesized from the documents, none of which
gives the whole story—is as follows: In the vacation between Trinity 5 Jac., when
Maunsell and Ladd was argued for the second time, and Michaelmas, Fuller was
summoned before the High Commission and accused of culpable utterances in the course
of his argument as Ladd’s counsel in that case. He obtained a Prohibition from two
King’s Bench judges, Fenner and Croke. In Michaelmas, the Prohibition was partially
undone by Consultation. It is out of the discussion of the motion for Consultation that
Coke’s resolutions came. The High Commission then proceeded against Fuller and
convicted him of schism and erroneous opinions. He was fined £200 and committed to
the Fleet prison. Thereupon he brought a Habeas corpus in the King’s Bench. Counsel—
“Serjeant Harris Minor” and Serjeant Hutton—were assigned to Fuller. They took two
unspecified exceptions to the return, but the court, with all judges participating, held it
satisfactory and remanded the prisoner.
The official record of the case gives us the whole of Fuller’s surmise to have a
Prohibition, in repetitious legalese. We do not, however, have any information about
argument from the surmise—i.e., argument as to why, assuming factual statements in the
surmise to be true, a Prohibition should or should not be granted. There almost certainly
was no such argument: The Prohibition was granted by two judges in vacation; Fuller’s
exhaustive complaint could hardly fail, and did not as the case was later decided, to state
some ways in which the High Commission had exceeded its jurisdiction; granting
Prohibition fairly casually, especially outside court, if there was prima facie justification
and leaving serious debate until Consultation was moved for was common enough.
Coke’s resolutions, on the other hand, give a good picture of what the judges held on the
fundamental High Commission issues by way of deciding on what scores the
Commission might proceed against Fuller and on which ones they might not—i.e., how
much of the Prohibition stopping all proceedings should be upheld and how much should
be reversed by Consultation. We lack only give-and-take debate of these matters.
The most striking absence in the materials is any extended discussion of the
question that to modern eyes is likely to seem the most interesting: Is a lawyer arguing in
court for his client liable to be prosecuted for words which, if spoken in other
circumstances, would or might be a speech-offense? Less generally, is a common lawyer
arguing for his client in common law proceedings answerable to ecclesiastical courts for
utterances which, outside that context, would or might be ecclesiastical offenses? It is, I
think, clear from Fuller’s surmise that he claimed a broad “advocate’s privilege”, though
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exactly what he claimed presents some problems. (For a detailed analysis of his claim,
addressed to those problems, see the End Note at the conclusion of this Section.) From
Coke, it is entirely clear that the judges rejected any comprehensive privilege. Resolution
# 4 contains the holding that rules out such privilege, because it is specifically about a
counselor arguing in court. It starts with the general point that if a counselor “scandals”
(slanders) the King or the government, temporal or ecclesiastical, he has committed a
misdemeanor and contempt of court; he is subject to indictment and, if convicted, to fine
and imprisonment. I.e., slandering the authorities in common law courtroom argument is
a common law offense; it is such even if the slander is of ecclesiastical authorities; no
“advocate’s privilege” protects the slanderer. Resolution # 4 then emphasizes expressly
that ecclesiastical courts do not have jurisdiction (even if the slander is of ecclesiastical
authorities.) Resolution #3 spells out the application of this principle to Fuller’s Case:
Charges made by the High Commission against Fuller claiming that he had slandered the
Commission were outside its power; it had improperly charged him with offenses
determinable at common law. Therefore, per Resolution #3, the Consultation was
qualified by a clause forbidding it from pursuing slander of itself (or—the clause adds for
good measure—anything else “punienda et determinanda” at common law or by statute.)
Resolution #4, however, goes on from the general point to add that if “he” (i.e., a
counselor) “publishes” heresy, schism, or error he may be corrected by ecclesiastical law.
Therefore, per the Resolution expressly, Consultation was granted. (I.e., the only reason
for not letting the whole Prohibition stand was that inter alia the High Commission
charged Fuller—or plausibly charged him—with some or all of the three serious religious
offenses herewith affirmed to be within its jurisdiction.
I shall return to the other Resolutions and to detailed implications of #s 3 and 4.
The present point—that #4 rules out Fuller’s claim to an “advocate’s privilege”—is clear
in itself. The steps to this conclusion are unknowable from the documents we have, but
some speculation may be warranted. Normal procedure would be for the motion for
Consultation to be argued for and against in the King’s Bench (the alternative
dispositions being to uphold the Prohibition in toto, reverse it in toto, or to take the course
actually taken in the end—Consultation for part of the High Commission suit, Prohibition
stands for the rest.) Following debate by counsel, if the King’s Bench judges did not feel
ready to give their opinions, they could have adjourned the case for further discussion.
Not routinely, but naturally enough in so far as the case can be seen as difficult or
important, they might have conferred privately with the judges of the other major courts,
announcing their decision only after such conference. This is one route to Coke’s panjudicial Resolutions. The other would be to hear no argument when the motion was first
made, but to adjourn the case for argument before the judges of all three courts. Either
way, there would have been public debate between Fuller’s counsel, or Fuller
representing himself, and counsel for the High Commission. The judges—whether the
whole Bench or the King’s Bench judges only—might interrupt or participate in such
debate, but they were of course not obliged to. At the end of debate, the judges might
have given their individual opinions seriatim, but they were perfectly free to hold off
until they had had time to confer among themselves. Ultimately, they might have made
an order without publicly stating their reasons, announced a unanimous per Curiam
opinion with a statement of reasons, or delivered individual opinions with dissents and
concurrences on distinctive grounds articulated.
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It is surprising not to have reports of adversarial debate on the motion for
Consultation in Fuller, since the case must have attracted interest, partly because of its
politically lively subject matter concerning the High Commission and Puritanism and the
more so because it concerned the rights of lawyers in the line of duty. (Cf. the excellent
reporting of Fuller’s antecedent, Maunsell and Ladd.) Of course reports of adversarial
debate may be found, or at any rate may once have existed. Nevertheless, it seems to me
that the absence of any is suspicious enough to suggest the possibility that there was no
open-court debate on the motion and that Coke’s Resolutions are the product of irregular
procedure on the part of the King’s Bench. Although I am on conjectural ground, I think
a plausible story can be told.
Let us try to imagine the perspective of the King’s Bench when the High
Commission moved for Consultation instead of accepting the Prohibition and leaving
Fuller alone. With his Puritan sympathies and his Puritan client Ladd, Fuller may not
have been a favorite of most judges, but. I can still imagine their rather wishing that he
had been left alone. Determination on the High Commission’s part to punish him for
whatever it could salvage as within its jurisdiction must have looked like a vendetta even
to eyes not particularly hostile toward the Commission. A gratuitous vendetta against a
barrister arising from his in-court words cannot have been a happy prospect even to
judges inclined to think—as in the event they all agreed—that nothing could be done to
shield a common law advocate from prosecution for proper High Commission offenses.
Gratuitousness is not hard to see. Maunsell and Ladd was still not finally decided when
the Consultation in Fuller was sought. I do not think, however, that the Commission
could have had much to fear about the probable outcome of that case—nothing like a
desperate need to silence Fuller lest upon re-argument he and his co-counsel should be
successful in liberating their clients though they had failed heretofore.
It is true that the King’s Bench in Michaelmas was altered in composition from
the court that in the preceding Easter term and (minus the dying Chief Justice Popham) in
Trinity had listened to Fuller et al. and sent their clients back to jail, where they remained
pending final decision. A major shake-up of the King’s Bench occurred late in Trinity:
On June 25, 1607, Sir Thomas Fleming was moved from Chief Baron of the Exchequer
to be Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in succession to as Chief Justice Popham, who
died on June 10; Justice Tanfield was promoted to Chief Baron of the Exchequer; and Sir
John Croke was appointed as his successor on the King’s Bench. Therefore, if Maunsell
and Ladd were moved again—as no evidence I know about suggests it was—the parties
would have faced a court with two judges who had not previously sat on the case and
without the two (Popham and Tanfield) who when they were members of the court had
been strongest against the prisoners on their duty to answer and the legality of
imprisoning them for refusal. Despite this circumstance, however, I doubt that there
would have been a significant chance of reversal in midstream upon another hearing of
Maunsell and Ladd. That is partly because it would have required the novice judges to
overrule the two former ones who, besides having heard argument from the beginning of
the case, probably enjoyed the highest intellectual prestige on the court, one of them the
late venerable and formidable Chief Justice. If another round would have offered any
prospect of the prisoners’ being liberated, almost certainly with bail, it would probably
have been on the still-open ground that High Commission imprisonment must eventually
end. (By the time of the motion for Consultation in Fuller the prisoners would have
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served a good year.) I conclude that the motion, rather than being seen as a strategic
move, must have worn the aspect of a vendetta—or, more mildly, a manifestation of mere
zeal to make an example of Fuller and strike a blow against Puritanism. As such, the
King’s Bench judges cannot have been eager to act on the motion, though of course they
must.
In this situation, I can imagine the judges’ preferring to avoid a regular hearing.
Having one would involve giving the floor to Fuller’s counsel, if not to Fuller himself, to
attack the High Commission with renewed vigor and especially to enlarge on the scandal
and attack the legality of prosecuting an advocate for doing his best on a client’s behalf.
It would likewise give the High Commission the floor to elaborate the justification for
doing what it probably could not be denied the right to do—punish schism committed
even in the course of advocacy—, but which a court with a regard for comity should be
reluctant to do. For a member of the family of courts under the King to put another in the
position of having to stand by while occurrences inside its courtroom are scrutinized from
without—while words listened to and argued with inside are identified from the outside
as “enormous” crime—is not a graceful way to foster correct relations between courts.
Having been put in that embarrassing position, a sensible thing for the King’s Bench to
do—instead of staging a vendetta and counter-vendetta—would be to confer informally
with their brother judges in the hope of responding to the motion without adversarial
debate and with the authority of pan-judicial consensus. Coke’s Resolutions fulfill that
hope, though one can only conjecture about the motives and steps that led to them.
For a more complete picture of the state of Maunsell and Ladd when Fuller arose,
see the account of the former in Vol. II. The reflections in the paragraphs just above can
be enriched by noting two specific features of Fuller’s claim to a Prohibition in the
official record. Towards strengthening his case for “advocate’s privilege”, Fuller sates
that he was assigned to be Ladd’s counsel and that Maunsell and Ladd was still pending
when he was summoned by the High Commission. I doubt that either allegation adds to
the substance of his claim that he could not be prosecuted for what he said as an
advocate. (See End Note.) Both, however, add sharpness to the moral conundrum I have
suggested the motion for Consultation posed for the King’s Bench. The first emphasizes
that Fuller was serving as an “officer of the court” in a strong sense—not a highly
partisan lawyer brought in by Puritan interests to vilify the High Commission as much as
possible in the process of speaking for his Puritan client. (In its charges against Fuller, the
High Commission represented him very much in the latter light.)
I do not know what the court’s rules and practice were with respect to the
assignment of counsel. Apart from Fuller’s Case, I have seen nothing to suggest that
parties bringing Habeas corpus could not, or normally did not, have counsel engaged by
themselves on hand when they were brought into court in obedience to the writ.
Assignment occurs twice in the present case, however—Fuller’s appointment to represent
Ladd and the appointment of two Serjeants to represent Fuller in his own Habeas corpus.
Ladd could well have been a poor man, who got his writ with no more than the help of an
attorney, appeared without a barrister, requested that one be assigned him, and was
routinely given one. Fuller himself, as a prominent barrister, could presumably have
arranged for his representation, even from jail. He might certainly have preferred not to
speak for himself, if that would have been allowable, having already tangled
unsuccessfully with the King’s Bench over Maunsell and Ladd. He might also have
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thought it in his interest to be represented by court-chosen lawyers presumptively free
from any motive except to expound the law in his favor as well as they could. If that was
his desire, even if alternatives were legally open to him, the court would seem to have
been bound to make an assignment despite his presumable ability to find and pay
counsel. With respect to the assignment of Fuller to represent Ladd, it is of course
possible that Fuller was in a sense disingenuous in formulating his claim to a Prohibition.
He could have been technically court-appointed although behind the scenes it was made
known that he wanted to be assigned and that Ladd wanted him. The court may have
customarily gratified such off-the-record preferences. At one point in the official record
Fuller says that he was not only assigned as Ladd’s counsel, but “retained.” The
additional word suggests, as one would expect, that court-appointed counsel must be
accepted by those they were chosen to represent. About all this, however, I am obliged to
conclude with a quaere.
Calling attention to the undetermined state of Maunsell and Ladd, like calling
attention to Fuller’s assignment as counsel, probably does not affect the claim to
Prohibition. I.e., if one can commit—let us say heresy—by what one says in common law
advocacy, there is no plausible ground for making it a matter of law that the advocate
should be left at large, perhaps to commit a deadly offense again, until the case he is
arguing is finished. On the other hand, if the ecclesiastical authorities are so impatient to
pursue their heretic that they interrupt common law proceedings, they can hardly expect
indulgence from the common law court. In Fuller, they were not indulged in three ways:
(1) A comprehensive Prohibition was issued, as opposed to a tailored one inhibiting the
High Commission from proceeding in inappropriate ways but permitting it to proceed
quoad the serious ecclesiastical offenses Fuller was charged with. In a sense, the King’s
Bench interrupted the High Commission’s business in response to the Commission’s
interruption of its business, though of course it could have done that without Fuller’s
calling attention to the “interruption.” (2) The King’s Bench may have denied the High
Commission the opportunity it might have preferred to debate the motion for
Consultation openly. (3) The Consultation issued with the concurrence of the court’s
Common Pleas and Exchequer colleagues was carefully drawn to emphasize limits on the
High Commission, as we shall see in detail. Although the Commission was permitted to
carry on its prosecution of Fuller quoad religious offenses, it was expressly told what it
could not take note of. These spelled-out restrictions are not likely to have been welcome
to the Commission.
I shall shortly return to the Consultation phase of Fuller’s Case and the rest of
Coke’s Resolutions. Let us first, however, for the sake of narrative continuity, look at the
case’s final phase.
Having been permitted by the Consultation to proceed against Fuller for his
alleged religious offenses, the High Commission did so. He was convicted, fined, and
imprisoned, whereupon he brought Habeas corpus. The reports tell us that Serjeants
Hutton and Harris were assigned to speak for Fuller and that they urged two exceptions to
the return. Then we are told that Fuller was remanded—by unanimous decision per Add.
25,213. There are no straightforward reports of what was argued for and against holding
him. A few hints in and inferences from the sources can, however, add something to the
bare account.
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The most significant clue is Coke’s Resolution #6: “Resolved, that the special
Consultation being only for heresy, schism, and erroneous opinion, if they convict Fuller
of those things & he recant, that he shall never be punished by ecclesiastical law.” Thus,
in issuing the qualified Consultation that allowed the Commission to proceed against
Fuller at all, the judges in effect laid it down that he could be imprisoned to coerce
recantation, but not otherwise. This applies what by 1608 was well-established King’s
Bench law—High Commission imprisonment is lawful only to enforce spiritual
sanctions, not to punish and not to enforce fines. The return on Fuller’s Habeas corpus
must have said that he had not recanted and was therefore being held.
What, then, could Fuller have hoped to gain from his Habeas corpus, beyond
putting his enemy—the High Commission—to trouble? What arguments could there be
for his liberation, given that he had not recanted and was detained only to make him do
so? It may be that the very sparsity of the reports is a kind of clue toward answering this
question. Add. 25,213 says only that the Serjeants took the two unspecified exceptions
and that the judges all agreed that the return was sufficient: Coke says only that the jailer
returned the cause of detention. Do these matter-of-fact sounding statements perhaps
suggest that one of the Serjeants’ exceptions was formal in the way we have seen in some
previous cases? I.e., without positively arguing that Fuller could not plausibly have been
convicted of schism and error, counsel may have maintained simply that the return did
not show enough of what he said in Maunsell and Ladd for the court to make any
judgment on whether his conviction could have been justified. For all we know, lacking
the text of the return, the justification was stated minimally, perhaps so minimally that the
return was reasonably challengeable. I take it as clear law from earlier speech-offense
cases that although deference was due to the ecclesiastical court as competent judge of
what schism and error consist in, the High Commission could not in Habeas corpus get
away with saying no more than “the prisoner was convicted of speaking words adjudged
to constitute schism”; it must give enough of the language so adjudged to let the common
law court see that the conclusion “schism” was at least prima facie convincing enough.
From Fuller’s verbatim recital of the charges against him in his application for
Prohibition (official record) we know that the High Commission used the terms “schism”
and “error” generously and did in a manner say what remarks by Fuller in Maunsell and
Ladd were considered to amount to those offenses or to evidence of them. I think
questions can probably be raised as to whether all the utterances recited were
schismatical, or at any rate lucidly shown to be. (See End Note for detailed analysis of the
charges.) For the present, it is enough to note that the King’s Bench judges knew the
charges too and so knowing had granted Consultation quoad prosecution of grave
religious offenses. For this reason, they may in the Habeas corpus have been
undemanding of great specificity (and the High Commission may not have felt pressed to
give a very detailed justification.) That is to say that the Serjeants may have had a quite
good argument from formal insufficiency, but also that the judges’ overruling it is
unsurprising. I.e., the judges already knew that the schism-and-error charge was not
ridiculously fabricated; the alternative to remanding Fuller would probably have only
been to permit amendment of the return, which would probably only have led to more
detail sustaining at least the plausibility of his conviction; if Fuller really was a victim of
abuse of ecclesiastical law, perhaps he had better try False Imprisonment
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A second clue to Fuller’s possible grounds for release from prison is provided by
Noy’s report. One can, I think, wonder whether Fuller’s claim to some sort of
“advocate’s privilege” had been as thoroughly or as subtly explored in adjudicating the
motion for Consultation as it might have been. The judges as reported by Coke seem to
move a little hastily from “there is no such privilege to protect a lawyer who commits the
secular offense of slandering lay or ecclesiastical authorities” to “a lawyer in the lay
system cannot in any way be protected from ecclesiastical prosecution for ecclesiastical
offenses, at any rate major ones.” Noy indicates that the matter was broached again in
Fuller’s Habeas corpus, though in the form of a more modest claim to privilege than
Fuller probably advanced in his surmise for Prohibition. All Noy says is that “Lee’s
Case” was vouched, as well as “Mitton’s Case in the time of Lord Dyer.” These cases are
almost certainly the Leigh and Mitton that figured prominently in Maunsell and Ladd (see
Vol. II.) Their importance there was for the principle that the High Commission had no
authority to compel defendants to answer questions under oath when a true answer would
amount to confession of a common law offense. Noy, however, cites Leigh/Lee for
another point: “that Lee being an attorney of the court was bailed because of his
necessary attendance in court.” It is then said that “so it was ruled in Mitton’s Case.” (To
this Noy then adds, “And in that case it was agreed that the High Commissioners may
commit to prison.” The reference is probably to Mitton alone, but whether it is also or
instead to Leigh/Lee makes no difference. One or both of those cases decided originally
that the High Commission has some imprisoning power, a point little contested by the
King’s Bench though for a time discountenanced by the Common Pleas.) Here it is the
party’s position as an attorney that matters. It seems likely that in Fuller’s Habeas corpus
the Serjeants brought up these early cases to show that “officers” of common law courts
were privileged against High Commission imprisonment to the extent that they should,
though lawfully committed (and a fortiori answerable in ecclesiastical courts and subject
to other sanctions), be released on bail in order to fulfill their office for the court’s
convenience. It is of course not necessary that a barrister should enjoy the same privilege
as an attorney, much less a clearer one. That he does not is implied in the unexplained
decision to remand Fuller. Fuller’s emphasizing that he was counsel in a still-pending
case might seem to strengthen his claim to temporary protection, but it does not appear to
have moved the judges.
To conclude the discussion of Fuller, let us note the further features of the
Consultation. Two of Coke’s Resolutions, #1 and #5, are about procedural law. They
were prompted by Fuller and amount to endorsement of the procedures followed in the
case, but they say nothing about the jurisdiction and powers of the High Commission. (#1
holds that Consultations—in contrast to Prohibitions—may not be granted in vacation; #5
upholds granting Prohibition to stop ecclesiastical suits altogether when they are partly
infra vires and partly ultra and later returning the infra vires parts to the ecclesiastical
court by Consultation on motion. This is said to be common practice, whereas partial
Prohibitions stopping only the ultra vires parts, though permissible, are rare. For these
points in Fuller, see Vol. I, pp. 306-308, 319.) To Resolution #5 six “general rules about
prohibitions” are appended, with the notation that Prohibitions (or rules about them) are
rarely encountered in “our books.” None of these has any particular relevance for Fuller.
They have every appearance of a personal touch of Coke’s—bits from his collection of
lore suggested by the general discussion of Prohibitions and Consultations. The source
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may be Bracton or other ancient treatises, since the rules are in Latin; it is true enough
that there is not a lot of Prohibition law in “our books” in the sense of the Year Books.
Resolution # 2 lays down the general principle that construction of 1 Eliz. and
letters patent pursuant thereto belongs exclusively to the common law courts. The
principle is applied to justify one of the qualifications in the Consultation in Fuller: The
Commission is permitted to proceed so long as it stays away from exposition of its own
patent and interpretation of 1 Eliz. I do not think that as of 1608 the generality was in
serious doubt in either principal common law court. Its unequivocal statement by all the
judges, however, together with its practical embodiment in Prohibition law—for the
Resolution says in effect that the High Commission (and presumably by extension any
ecclesiastical court) may be explicitly prohibited from infringing the “common law
monopoly”—contribute at least to clarification of the law.
With respect to the exposition of patents, a significant supporting analogue is
cited: If the King has a benefice donative by letters patent, the holder of such a benefice
is not visitable or deprivable by ecclesiastical authority, but only by the Chancellor or
commissioners under the Great Seal. (I.e., besides an ordinary advowson—a
“presentative” benefice—it was possible to own a “donative” one. The owner could
grant the living to a clergyman directly instead of nominating one to the Bishop. A
donative benefice belonging to the King might have the further characteristic that it could
only be granted by letters patent. The rule cited means that the holder of such a benefice
is not subject to ordinary ecclesiastical discipline; his behavior as a beneficed clergyman
can only be investigated and punished by the Chancellor— the issuer of letters patent
responsible for seeing that their beneficiaries do not obtain them corruptly or abuse their
intent—or by a special royal commission in effect constituted by letters patent—i.e., by a
a document bearing the Great Seal ) This rather arcane rule relevantly supports a common
type of Prohibition—to prevent ecclesiastical courts from construing letters patent,
usually ones pardoning various offenses including ecclesiastical crime. Fitting it exactly
to the High Commission seems to me a bit tricky, since 1 Eliz. could have given the
Commission authority to construe its own patent. Towards arguing that it does no such
thing it may be useful to be able to say, “Any such empowerment of the Commission
would involve making an exception from the principle, operative in other contexts, that
ecclesiastical courts may not scrutinize letters patent even when they relate to Church
interests or proceedings affecting the Church.” Cf. “1 Eliz. could amend Magna Carta,
but overwhelmingly explicit textual evidence would be required to make out that it does.”
Resolution # 3, already discussed for its applied point, starts with the
generalization that any question about what power belongs to ecclesiastical courts
belongs to the common law, for which the venerable authority of Bracton is cited. (Bk. 5,
De exceptionibus, f. 412.) The passage in Bracton is scarcely more than a statement of the
generalization in the form of saying that if ecclesiastical judges were entitled to decide on
their own jurisdiction they could proceed as they liked, ignoring the King’s Prohibition
(the surrounding passage is about 13th century Prohibition law.) Neither the general
principle nor its implied ground—that in a system comprising temporal and spiritual
courts ultimate authority to determine how jurisdiction is to be divided, must rest
somewhere and it does rest with the King’s courts—cannot be called controversial in the
17th century. I suppose the ancient authority is cited with the thought that being clear
about the King’s “sovereignty” over inter-jurisdictional questions should help dispel any

255

doubt about the matter actually in question—common law authority over slanders of the
ecclesiastical “government.” Perhaps: If ecclesiastical courts had the last word about
whether derogation of their authority is criminal, they might as well have it with respect
to the substance of their jurisdiction.
With one exception (an anomalous case dealt with at the end of this sub-section),
Fuller concludes the cases decided in both courts before Coke presided over them
successively. To complete the mainline account of both principal courts before Coke’s
Chief Justiceships, we need to note two early-Jacobean extra-judicial events. (As at other
points in this study, I deal occasionally with extra-judicial proceedings when accounts of
them occur among law reports. Here as elsewhere, at least with reference to the first
event, it is possible that there are fuller and better records of such proceedings among
classes of documents I have not investigated. Cf. explanation of the boundaries of the
study in Vol. I, “General Introduction.”) Both of the extra-judicial opinions in question
here are affirmative of some of the High Commission’s claims. Neither, however, is
inconsistent with the case law as of the time the opinions were rendered.
The first episode, in 1604 or early 1605,83 was a solemn government-initiated
conference attended by all the judges and the principal state dignitaries. The object was to
get a public declaration by the judges in support of several anti-Puritan positions of
importance to the government, and that object was attained. There is no reason to see in
this conference an adversarial encounter between the government and the judges. In this
respect, the 1604-5 conference contrasts with a similarly full-dress conciliar meeting in
1611 discussed in the Section following. The latter was an attempt, probably prompted by
a particular case, to put pressure on the Common Pleas to alter that court’s handling of
the High Commission—significantly in areas other than Puritanism. The former may of
course have been less than welcome to some judges, as an effort to secure precommitment on issues that might arise judicially, but it was basically addressed to the
judges in their recognized capacity of legal advisers to the Crown. In affirming the
legality of the government’s views on several points, it is unlikely that the judges said
anything they did not fully believe. It is perhaps worth noting that neither the Attorney
General, Sir Edward Coke, nor the Solicitor General attended the Conference (the roster
is listed by two reports, Croke and the MS.) That probably only signifies that having
lawyers present to argue for the government’s preferences would have been out of
keeping with the spirit of an encounter between the King seeking advice and his Justices.
The conference was prompted by two recent events, the propagation of a series of
canons for the Church of England in 1604 and the Puritan Millenary Petition presented to
James I at the beginning of his reign. (New petitions modeled on that one were probably
expected in response to the canons, or some may already have been in circulation.) The
83

Croke Jac, 37 (dated M.2 Jac.); Noy, 100 (dated H. 2 Jac, 13 February); Harl.3209, f.
58b (dated 13 February 2 Jac. –report series labeled “Reports of Mr. Andrew of Lincoln’s
Inn.”) Croke is the fullest report, but the three are entirely consistent. The discrepancy in
dating is unimportant; both dates are plausible, but the one specified by two reporters is
slightly more probable. “13 Feb., H.2 Jac.” puts the conference at the beginning of 1605.
It must in any event follow by a certain interval the issuance of the canons early in l604
and fall close to the end of November, 1604, when a period of grace for conforming with
the canons given by royal proclamation ran out.
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Chancellor opened the meeting with a “long speech” (Croke) deploring both Puritans and
Papists as “disturbers of the State” and then asked the judges their opinions on three
matters. The judges responded unanimously to all three. Per Croke, they said in reply to
the first inquiry, before going to the substance, that they had already conferred about the
question. This shows that they were not taken by surprise and suggests that the
conference was rather a ceremony to publicize the judges’ foreknown agreement with the
government than an expected occasion for debate. Presumably the same opportunity to
prepare responses to the second and third questions was afforded.
(1) The first question was whether the High Commission could deprive Puritan
ministers for refusal to conform to ceremonies prescribed by the new canons. (The
designation “ceremonies” covers some 18 canons concerning the conduct of divine
worship—out of a total of 141, which as a whole takes in many aspects of Church
administration. The extent to which the clearly “ceremonial” canons were innovative is
open to question, but at least they insisted on practices which de facto had not been
regularly observed by some clergymen and were objected to by Puritan consciences,
touching such matters as the use of the sign of the cross, kneeling, and following the
Book of Common Prayer exactly.) It is the limitation of the first question to the High
Commission that makes the conference of interest for the present discussion of the
Commission’s jurisdiction and powers. Why was the pressing question not simply the
validity of the canons and the appropriateness of deprivation as a sanction for flouting
them applicable by any ecclesiastical court? It looks as if the government foresaw that
regular Church courts were not likely to prosecute non-conformity with the canons very
vigorously, nor to deprive local clergy of their livings even if they were prosecuted and
convicted. The expectation seems realistic. Whatever the distribution throughout the
ordinary Church hierarchy of a certain sympathy for Puritanism, one or another degree of
disapproval, and distaste for newfangled regulations, one could predict reluctance on the
Bishops’ part to adopt a policy of strong enforcement. A mere fatherly preference for
dealing gently with erring members of the clerical community must have combined with
fear of upsetting local relationships by offending the patrons whose friends, relatives, and
protégés would be the victims of deprivation. In sum, the appearances suggest that the
government and the central hierarchy intended a campaign to get rid of Puritan
incumbents, knew that the High Commission would have to do the job, and wanted the
Commission’s legal authority made clear before it was challenged in particular cases.
Why, however, was it challengeable? Let us assume that ecclesiastical courts
generally were free to enforce the canons, by deprivation if they saw fit, and that the High
Commission could entertain or initiate any kind of ecclesiastical suit (as most case law as
of 1604-5 suggests most judges thought it could.) Is there an argument that the
Commission should be debarred from enforcing the canons by deprivation even though
regular ecclesiastical courts were not debarred?
Such an argument can, I think, be made out from the reports. The judges said
unequivocally that the argument is invalid, but it must have been taken seriously enough
by the government and hierarchy to recommend cutting it off by judicial pronouncement
before it was urged in perhaps numerous attempts to prohibit the Commission. I would
propose constructing the argument against the High Commission’s power to enforce the
1604 canons by deprivation as follows: The Commission was simply created by 1 Eliz.
The monarch may have been authorized to give the new court jurisdiction to enforce any
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or all ecclesiastical law existing at the time 1 Eliz. was enacted. Obviously, however, new
requirements of ecclesiastical law that came into being in 1604 were not covered. Even if
the line between innovation and codification in the canons is sometimes disputable, they
cannot be used as a source of law by a tribunal that had no such source when it acquired
its powers; the burden of showing that any rule contained in them antedated 1 Eliz. would
rest on the Commission (and be very hard to sustain.) So, granting the validity of the
canons and in consequence their enforceability by regular ecclesiastical courts, violation
of these new or newly propounded rules would not be within the High Commission’s
cognizance. New Parliamentary legislation would be necessary to extend the
Commission’s jurisdiction to ecclesiastical law added or altered after 1 Eliz.
I so reconstruct the argument against the High Commission because that is what
the clearly reported opinion of the judges seems to answer. The burden of their opinion is
that 1 Eliz. did not create the High Commission as a new court. Rather, the statute is
strictly declaratory. What it clarifies or pins down in certain terms, for present purposes,
is that restoration of the monarch’s erstwhile usurped ecclesiastical prerogative included
his power, not only to alter or reformulate the canon law without Parliamentary assent,
but to establish new tribunals to exercise any or all parts of substantive ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, using any or all recognized ecclesiastical sanctions. The substantive
jurisdiction contemplated by 1 Eliz. included lawful future additions to the body of
ecclesiastical rights and duties. (Membership in that body would presumably be
determined by subject matter. There might be ambiguous cases, but rules prescribing
what clergy must do in the conduct of religious services would seem to be a clear one.)
The ecclesiastical sanctions already existed—there is no implication in this opinion that
new sanctions could be added; the existing ones were freely available to new tribunals,
including deprivation. (It should perhaps be observed that although the opinion goes only
to the monarch’s prerogative, and indeed implies that a document such as the 1604
canons could have been issued solely on his authority, the Church had internal
consultative procedures which propriety, at least, required to be used. The 1604 canons
were in fact prepared by the Convocation of the Clergy for Canterbury Archdiocese, with
the King’s leave and approval. He followed up on their enactment by a proclamation
giving notice of them, commanding obedience, prescribing deprivation of nonconforming clergy, and allowing a few months’ grace for ministers to come into
conformity before the sanction would be applied. The judges in their opinion commended
him for these measures.)
(2) The second question put to the judges went to a possible hitch in the reply to
the first. In response to the opening general question about the High Commission’s power
to proceed against violators of the canons and punish them by deprivation, the judges
already said that the Commission was free to prosecute ex officio—i.e., without a libel.
The second question was expressly whether Prohibitions founded on the statute of 2 Hen.
V, c.3, could be employed to stop High Commission prosecution and deprivation of
offenders against the canons. The 15th century statute provided that ecclesiastical
defendants must be furnished with a copy of the libel by which the plaintiff commenced
his suit. It seems at first sight that if, as declared by the judges in reply to
Question #1, ex officio prosecution was permissible 2 Hen. V could have no relevance:
the statute in its terms is about the normal run of civil cases started by libel, not about ex
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officio—roughly “criminal” –suits. So the judges held in response to Question #2. Is that
clearly the right answer?
The problem raised by the second inquiry is what kind of case clergy who ran
afoul of the new canons might have made for invoking 2 Hen. V or what the government
was afraid of when it sought a separate, explicit declaration of the irrelevance of that
statute. It seems implausible to claim that a clergyman’s failure to follow ceremonial
requirements imposed by the new canons could not be prosecuted ex officio—by regular
courts even if the High Commission were to be excluded from jurisdiction. General
regulations for the performance of the Church’s religious functions would seem unlikely
to give many individual complainants a motive to sue misdoers by libel, especially a
respectable motive (a less than respectable one would be, say, a patron’s desire to get rid
of his incumbent in order to gain a new presentation, perhaps to be used for the benefit of
someone personally preferred by the patron.) The “party in interest” with respect to the
Church’s general ceremonial rules is surely, primarily, the Church at large; the purpose of
ex officio proceedings was surely to allow for representation of that interest. (Analogy
with moral offences pursued ex officio is close enough. Rarely will live-and-let-live
attitudes be overcome to produce private prosecution, save from dubious motives of
vengeance or enmity. If Christian morality is to be significantly enforced at all, it must be
on the initiative of the ecclesiastical courts themselves, given the absence of an adequate
separate system for “public prosecution.” (True, the Church had such a system of sorts in
the institution of Episcopal visitation. It is probably fair to say, however, that ex officio
prosecution found a place in the sun because presentment at visitation was too subject to
local prejudices and tolerances to turn up a large share of offenders, especially among the
relatively well-connected.)
In the light of these considerations and some indirect evidence, I think the
Puritans’ hope in 2 Hen. V, and the political authorities’ fear, was more solidly based
than in objection to ex officio proceedings as such. The purpose of requiring that
defendants be given a copy of the libel is plainly to insure that they have a full and
precise statement of the complaint so that they can prepare their defense. Although the
language of 2 Hen. V only covers suits started by libel, it remains a good question why
the equivalent of a copy of the libel should not be furnished to ex officio defendants, at
least in some sorts of cases. Let there be no libel; recognize the power of ecclesiastical
courts, in appropriate cases, simply to summon subjects before them, without—so far—
any notice of what they are summoned for. Would it not be reasonable now—before
proceeding to trial—for the ecclesiastical court serving as accuser to be required to
furnish the defendant with a written statement of the accusation and allow him some time
to prepare his response to a fixed claim? One can of course reply that it might be
reasonable, but 2 Hen. V does not require it: the statute is about what by the letter it
speaks of, cases in which there is a libel. So the judges declared in 1604-5. Naturally
enough, in the face of a Privy Council looking for crisp results, they made no excursions
into the legal anomaly, the gap between the law’s solicitude for fairness to libeldefendants and its at least formal indifference toward ex officio defendants.
There is, however, potential mileage in the anomaly; the government knew what it
was doing in seeking to have an inch disallowed lest it turn into miles. In general
jurisprudential terms, “The statute just does not apply” was not quite a final blow in
litigation when the doctrine of “the equity of a statute” was still good law, as it was in the
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early 17th century. That doctrine means that no claim of legislative intent is necessary to
extend a statute beyond what it says, only a showing that there is no significant
distinction between the situation the statutory language covers and some other situation it
does not. (The most familiar example is a statute giving a right of action to executors but
saying nothing about administrators. The latter were held to have the same right “by the
equity.”) Even without the doctrine of statutory equity, however, interpretation and
application of statutes was less rule-bound and more flexible in the early 17th century
than it later became. It would not be terribly surprising to find Puritan ministers
threatened with deprivation seeking Prohibitions with the argument that the intent of 2
Hen. V, or the mere policy of the law implied when the statute was made with reference
to libel-based suits, forbade exposing any accusee to serious loss without first giving him
a written statement of the particulars of the accusation; it would not be a miracle to find
some judge agreeing. Even if such a decision did not catch on as law, there would be a
precedent and there would be disputes in future cases. The best way to strike a “final
blow” to the use of 2 Hen. V would be by means of a unanimous judicial opinion in
advance of actual attempts to use it.
The specific situation we are concerned with favors the temptation to rely on 2
Hen. V one way or another. Offenses pursued ex officio that could only be penalized by
routine spiritual sanctions arguably do not demand the formality of written, spelled out
charges. Should the Church not be trusted to deal with her suspected erring children
though she does so without much legalism? But if the sanction of deprivation is
contemplated, the equities are radically altered. A man sued for tithes, let us say,
deserves, and by 2 Hen. V enjoys, a right to know just what his parson claims, for he has
a plain material interest, both in his pocketbook immediately and in the long-run value of
his land, in paying no more than is justly demanded. Is the material stake of a clergyman
in peril of deprivation not at least as weighty? He stands to lose not only his position in
the Church, but a common law interest, his freehold in the living, his life-estate in the
incomes and property attached thereto. Whether by in some extended sense “applying” 2
Hen. V or by merely pointing to the principle of justice animating it, excluding the statute
from any sort of relevance seems as harsh as overlooking the comparability of the
prospective deprivee’s plight with that of the tithe payer, the executor sued for a legacy,
or other like defendant. It is perhaps further arguable that at any rate the High
Commission should be bound by “something like 2 Hen. V.” A clergyman prosecuted ex
officio in a regular ecclesiastical court to the potential end of deprivation, even if given no
firm advance notice of the charges, had two ecclesiastical appeals ahead of him in the
event of conviction. The appellate process, in which all factual and legal findings were
reviewable, would perhaps be very likely to rectify any mistakes or injustices traceable to
hasty trial at the first-instance level or confusion and poor defense on the part of an
inadequately informed defendant. The protection of appeal was not available against the
High Commission.
Indirect evidence that 2 Hen. V was given relevance for more than the libelcommenced suits it applies to literally comes from the law of self-incrimination. For
detailed discussion of this matter, see Vol. II, pp. 404-405 and 410-416. In summary:
Throughout early discussion of inquisitorial procedure in ecclesiastical courts, there runs
a somewhat scrappy vein of consensus that when ecclesiastical defendants were lawfully
compellable to answer interrogatories under oath, whereby they might be required to
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incriminate themselves, they were entitled to be apprised in writing of the questions, or at
least the topics of the questions, in advance of testifying. (See Vol. II, Ch.5, passim.)
I have not, however, found this opinion tied to 2 Hen. V until Chief Justice Coke made
the connection firmly in the major Habeas corpus case of Burrowes et al. of 1616. There
was some hesitation between saying that the equity of 2 Hen. V ensured this right and
saying that the statute was strictly declaratory of the general principle of entitlement to
notice (i.e., 2 Hen V did not enact de novo that civil defendants must be given a copy of
the libel, but declared or explained that the general, common law principle so demanded.)
Either way, toward the end of his judicial career Coke had made up his mind that the
statute was the solidest prop to rest the right of notice of incriminating interrogatories on.
In Burrowes his King’s Bench colleagues give no sign of disagreeing with him, though
that case hardly settled the point. There were grounds indisputably rooted in the
precedents for deciding the case against the High Commission without taking up failure
to provide adequate notice of the articles of examination to the—Puritan—defendants.
The idea of relying on 2 Hen. V may have been Coke’s inspiration, which the other
judges may have thought hardly worth considering deeply when the case was easily
decidable without a theory of 2 Hen. V and when the need for notice of potentially
incriminating questions was already pretty well recognized. All that can really be said is
that upwards of a decade after the 1604-5 conference Coke did flatly reject the general
position on 2 Hen. V taken by all the judges at that conference, i.e., the position that
limits the statute to its literal meaning and disallows any penumbras. I have no evidence
as to whether Coke remembered the 1604-5 conference and was aware that he was
proposing a turnabout from the judges’ opinion there. It of course does not automatically
follow that if 2 Hen. V should be used to check incriminatory questioning it should also
be used to insure that clergy merely accused of disobeying the canons were entitled to a
bill of particulars; their conviction for that offense would seem unlikely as a rule to
depend on confessional evidence, as opposed to evidence of their conduct supplied by
witnesses. I should note that among the miscellaneous Prohibition cases not yet analyzed
in this study there are quite a few on the construction of 2 Hen. V in its straightforward
application to libel-based cases.
(3) The third question addressed to the judges was occasioned by the Millenary
Petition and perhaps the fear of similar petitions reacting to the new canons. It has no
direct bearing on jurisdictional law except for showing further that the judiciary shared
the rest of officialdom’s hostility toward Puritans and willingness to use sharp measures
against them. The question was essentially whether it was a punishable offense to petition
the King with an “intimation” that his turning down the petition would cause thousands
of subjects to be discontented. The judges’ reply was emphatically “yes”: with slight
variation in the language of the reports, such petitioning is “an offense finable at
discretion, and is near to treason by raising sedition by discontent, &c.” (Noy); “finable at
discretion, and very near to treason & felony in the punishment, for they tended to the
raising of sedition, rebellion, and discontent among the people” (Croke); “near to treason
and greatly finable” (Harl.3209.) One can only wonder whether the Privy Councilors
could have hoped for more, say a declaration that unlawful petitioning was treason or
felony, as opposed to dangerously close, or that discretionary imprisonment was available
as a punishment in addition to discretionary fining. Apparently after the judges had given
their basic answer to the third inquiry, per Croke, “many” of the Councilors said that
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“some” Puritans had spread a false rumor that King James intended to grant toleration to
Papists. This information prompted the judges to declare that disseminating such a rumor
would also be “heinously finable by the rules of the common law, either in the King’s
Bench, or by the King and his Council, or now since the statute of 3 Hen, 7, c. 1, in the
Star Chamber.” (Harl. 3209 tells the same story in slightly abbreviated form. 3 Hen VII
is the so-called Star Chamber Act, believed to have created that court though, it is now
thought, erroneously.) Some of the Councilors reported further that the King had
recently been informed of the rumor and disavowed in the strongest terms having the
tolerationist intentions attributed to him. It is worth observing, for the purposes of our
concern with the High Commission, that there is not the least suggestion that
ecclesiastical courts, including the Commission, would have the least color of jurisdiction
to proceed against improper petitioning or rumor-spreading touching the state’s religious
policy. That was purely common law business.
The later of the two extra-judicial reports bearing on the High Commission 84
presents no problems of meaning. It is valuable for recording an out-of-court opinion
from the winter of 1606 affirming the position on the High Commission that had pretty
clearly been reached by the end of Elizabeth I’s reign. Viz. the Commission may be
authorized to exercise all parts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but is strictly confined to
spiritual sanctions; the patent may not give it power to fine or imprison. The occasion for
this opinion was a post-prandial discussion at Serjeants’ Inn. We are told that the
question raised was whether the Commission may imprison and that “all” agreed on the
resolution, which spoke to substantive jurisdiction and fining as well as to imprisoning. It
is not certain that all the judges were present, but likely that the company included more
judges than the members of the Common Pleas and the Serjeants who practiced in that
court. Coke, who reports the question and resolution, was presumably present. As of a
time only shortly after his appointment as Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, he would
not appear to have departed from his court’s consensus, though he was later to do so.
There is nothing surprising in the sparely reported reasoning behind the Serjeant’s Inn
opinion. The premise that the monarch could have created a High Commission over and
above the ordinary ecclesiastical courts by prerogative is endorsed. The deduction from
that premise is that such a creation would be “just another ecclesiastical court”, with the
permissive implication that it may, if so authorized by the monarch, enforce all parts of
ecclesiastical law and the restrictive one that it may enforce them solely by spiritual
sanctions. A statute of course could add to or subtract from such jurisdiction and powers,
but there is no reason to say 1 Eliz. does so. That statute’s reference to the patent
constituting the Commission does not mean that the monarch may give it jurisdiction or
powers it would not have if it came into existence without a Parliamentary mandate.
One final case from the King’s Bench involving the High Commission, Pit v.
Webly, 85 came just before Coke’s transfer to that court as Chief Justice. This case was
settled by the parties before Prohibition was definitely granted or denied. The judges’
inclination on an unusual issue is, however, reported. Because the case touches on the
statute of 23 Hen. VIII, c. 9, it is discussed for that aspect in the End Note to Ch. 2 above.
In the event, after proposing to seek Prohibition on the basis of 23 Hen. VIII, counsel
84
85

12 Coke, 19. Dated H. 4 Jac.
P. 11 Jac. K.B. 2 Bulstrode, 72.
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dropped the attempt with the court’s encouragement. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition’s surmise
was changed so that 23 Hen. VIII was not mentioned and Prohibition was sought on
another ground, which alone concerns us here.
Pit is identified as “the serjeant of the mace.” He arrested Webly when the latter
was coming from church after a sermon. The report does not say who Webly was. He
could have been the clergyman of the church, but he might have had plausible legal
grounds for complaining about the arrest if he was only a member of the congregation
that heard the sermon. The report also informs us that the arrest did not take place on
Sunday, but of course there could be religious services including a sermon on other days.
One remark by counsel suggests that the arrest was after evening prayer. It is reported
further that Pit arrested Webly by warrant of a Justice of the Peace. Thus, as counsel
says, the arrest was “for the King”, rather than “between party and party”—i.e., it was not
pursuant to a civil dispute, as a creditor’s arrest of a delinquent debtor would be. Finally,
the arrest was affected “without tumult.”
Webly sued Pit for the arrest in the High Commission by libel. It will hardly seem
evident that Pit committed an ecclesiastical offense, much less a High Commission one,
in performing his function as a royal officer. Were it not for two medieval statutes, one
would suppose either that merely arresting a minister or worshipper in, so to speak, close
proximity to a religious service was a recognized ecclesiastical offense, or else that
Webly’s version of the facts, presented in his libel, was more damning than that presented
in Pit’s surmise, which is all that was before the court and what my statement of the case
above must mainly depend on. (The Webly version could have complained that Pit
invaded the church, interrupted divine service, created a “tumult”, or—if Webly was a
cleric—laid violent hands on him; the last of these was certainly an ecclesiastical crime,
and the others probably offenses which the Church would not have considered excusable
by claiming that they were committed in the performance of official duties.) In reality,
however, there were two crucially relevant statutes—50 Edw. III, c. 5, and 1 Rich. II, c.
15. It may seem pedantic to look in detail at these two extremely vague old statutes, but I
think it is worthwhile because they are a good example of what 17th century courts faced
when obliged to make sense of legislation over 200 years old, of whose form and
historical circumstances they could have had little idea. The judges hardly had a choice
but to imagine what the law based on these sources came to; there is no sign of their
analyzing the texts closely, if indeed they had the texts.
The later statute, 1 Rich. II, is the important one to focus on, as the 17th century
lawyers did, for it is at least less vague than its predecessor. The statute starts by reciting
the complaint of the prelates from which it arose: Viz., “beneficed people of Holy
Church” and “others” are arrested in cathedrals and other churches and conducted
(“drawn”) out of those edifices; they are also arrested and removed from the churchyards
attached to such churches (“their” churchyards); sometimes these arrests and removals
occur when the arrestee is “intending” on divine service; arrests are also made in “other
places” “although” “they” are bearing Christ’s body to sick persons, such arrestees being
“bound and brought to prison against the Liberty of Holy Church.” The ambiguities so
far are: (1) Are all arrests in churches and churchyards complained about, or only arrests
of beneficed clergy and other clerical personnel? (2) Is anyone included among those
“intending” on divine service beyond the clergy performing it? Note that while arresting
people directly involved in services is singled out, it is not expressly differentiated as a
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more serious cause of complaint than simply arresting in a church or churchyard. (3) Do
improperly arrested bearers of the Host to the sick extend beyond the priest on his way to
perform the sacrament—i.e., to servants or assistants, clerical or lay, accompanying him?
The enacting clause following the recital of the complaint is clear enough as far
as it goes: It is ordained “That if any Minister of the King or other, do arrest any Person
of Holy Church by such Manner, & thereof be duly convict, he shall have Imprisonment,
and then be ransomed at the King’s Will, and make Gree to the Parties so arrested…” It
modernizes the language only mildly to say that the statute makes the arrests complained
of a secular criminal offense and a secular tort for which the victim is entitled to be
compensated. (Ancient legal concepts are employed, such as taking pecuniary
punishment as “ransom” paid to the King. The only obscure word is “Gree”, but that is
only a truncated form of “agree”—“make Gree” probably means something like “come
to terms with”, which I suppose amounts to “settle with the victim for damage he claims,
or, failing settlement, be subject to suit by him.”) The statute says nothing specific about
procedure on either the criminal side or the civil. What it most conspicuously does not
make clear is where it leaves the ecclesiastical courts. If before the legislation those
courts could proceed against any or all of the arresters complained of and punish them by
spiritual censures, could they still do so, over and above the temporal sanctions now
imposed? Or was any prior ecclesiastical power taken away when the offenses were
“secularized”?
The antecedent act, 50 Edw. III, is not of much help for construing 1 Rich. II At
two places it uses language that seems more restrictive: Complaining of arrests—by royal
authority or “Commandment of other Temporal Lords”—of those taking the Sacrament
to the sick, it refers to “priests” and “their clerks with them”; it also refers to “Persons of
Holy Church” arrested when they are “attending [“entendant” in the extant French
version of this statute—equivalent to “intending” in 1 Rich. 2, which only survives in
English] to Divine Services in Churches, Churchyards, & other Places dedicated to
God.” Nothing is said to suggest that arrests of laymen, even if they are immediately
participating in services, are within the complaint behind the statute. It is, however, said
expressly in 50 Edw. III that besides offending God and the liberties of the church, the
arrests previously mentioned are disturbances of divine services (a likely candidate for an
already existing ecclesiastical crime, though officers executing their duty could possibly
be exempt.) The enacting part of this statute does not sharply create new offenses or new
remedies as 1 Rich. II does, but after saying that the King will be displeased if anyone
makes the arrests complained of, it says that he “will & granteth and defendeth [forbids]
upon his grievous forfeiture, That none do the same from henceforth.” The phrase I
italicize does have the effect of creating a highly indefinite secular offense—the King, so
to speak, undertakes to use his punitive arsenal against offenders somehow.
Both statutes end with provisos forbidding collusion on the part of churchmen: 1
Rich. II, “Provided always, That the said People of Holy Church shall not hold them
within the Churches of Sanctuaries by Fraud or Collusion in any Manner”; 50 Edw. III,
“So that Collusion or feigned causes be not found in any of the said Persons of Holy
Church in that Behalf.” The fear behind these clauses must be that clerics in charge of
the ecclesiastical places and occasions mentioned would collude with persons liable to
arrest in order to bring them under the protection of the statutes. There may be a faint
suggestion here that lay people merely present in those places or on those occasions are

264

within the act’s contemplation, rendering it necessary to provide that they be bona fide
participants in services rather than beneficiaries of favoritism or a “deal”. This is not,
however, a certain implication, for clerics could collude with other clerics too.
With the refractory but unavoidable statutes in mind, we may now return to the
course of Pit. Webly having put in his libel, the High Commission tried the case and
awarded Webly £6. The report says that the Commission allowed the cause of the arrest,
but gave Webly £6 as costs for the “contempt.” This is puzzling language. My
suggestion for making sense of it would be that it shows the High Commission leaning
over backwards to avoid any appearance of exceeding ordinary ecclesiastical powers. As
it were: “We have not used any secular punitive powers we may have against a man who
could be prosecuted at common law by virtue of 1 Rich. II and punished by secular
means if convicted there. We have pursued that man to the sole end of correcting him
spiritually. Upon finding him guilty of a contempt toward the Church and religion—
by making an arrest at a time and place that the secular law itself recognizes as out of
bounds—we awarded his prosecutor his costs for bringing the infraction to the
ecclesiastical court’s attention. That is not punishing the offender nor compensating the
person wronged, but a normal exercise of ecclesiastical courts’ power to tax litigative
costs against violators of ecclesiastical law in favor of a plaintiff or informer who has
incurred expenses in bringing the wrongdoer to justice. The action we have taken
involves no judgment that the arrest was unlawful in the sense that, if committed, it
would merit punishment or damages under 1 Rich. II, for that is a common law question.
All we have adjudged is that from the Church’s point of view a contempt of a sacred
place and occasion occurred, to which we might if we saw fit respond with admonition or
an assignment of penance, or perhaps no more than seeing that the worthy act of
complaining about the contempt did not leave the complainant out of pocket.”
Whatever the High Commission had in mind, Serjeant Henry Yelverton (son of
the judge Sir Christopher Yelverton and later a judge himself) sought a Prohibition as to
the costs. He did not object to Pit’s citation into an ecclesiastical court notwithstanding
his liability to secular sanctions, only to the monetary charge. The implied position on the
14th century statutes is that they bar ecclesiastical courts from imposing any material loss
on an offending officer—call it a fine, call it costs, or be it imprisonment—but not from
correcting him spiritually. Although it is not articulated in the report, the rationale of this
position must be that the statutes cannot intend an offender (in the special class of
officers carrying out their functions) to be out, let us say, £6, or £6 more if he should be
imprisoned or fined at common law, or should be prosecuted and acquitted there, or
indeed convicted and spared criminal punishment by judicial discretion, or found by jury
to have inflicted no damage on the arrested party.
The first judicial remark comes from Justice Croke, who alone speaks as an
individual in Bulstrode’s account. All he says is that 1 Rich. II certainly forbids arrests
during divine service, to which he added enough to give the reporter the impression that
he thought arrests of persons going to or coming from a service were also banned. Then
Henry Yelverton makes a remark which departs somewhat from the position stated above
in defense of Prohibition for the costs alone. Now he says that it is “hard” for one in Pit’s
circumstances—a royal officer “duly” arresting a man “for the King”, after evening
service (i.e., not during the service and not following a full Sunday Eucharistic service,
suggesting perhaps an arrest “at the end of the day”, when there might be no further
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opportunity to arrest the man that day) –should be sued in an ecclesiastical court and
excommunicated. That is to say, even if there had been no costs award, there might be
sufficient cause for Prohibition –this arrest is not forbidden by the statutes and therefore
not even purely spiritual measures may be taken against the arrester. The statutes may not
preempt jurisdiction for the common law absolutely, so that arrests they clearly forbid
could not be punished spiritually over and above the common law sanctions they were
subject to, but if an arrest simply does not violate the statutes ecclesiastical courts are not
free to treat it as nonetheless a spiritual offense. (Serjeant Yelverton’s language suggests
that Pit had actually been excommunicated, and a later comment of his does the same.
I.e., ecclesiastical process had run its course to excommunication, to which the award of
costs was then added. It does not seem to me to matter for the argument whether that was
the case, or whether Pit was only put in danger of excommunication by subjecting him to
ecclesiastical jurisdiction.)
Serjeant Yelverton next turned to the fact that the surmise before the court relied
on 23 Hen. VIII, the claim that neither he nor the judges thought advisable and that was
soon dropped. (See End Note, Ch.2.) After the exchange on that matter, with 23 Hen.
VIII out of the way, Justice Croke spoke again, reiterating his former opinion a bit more
decisively. (1 Rich. II forbids arrests during divine service and arrests of people going to
and coming from such services on Sunday, but not on other days.) Serjeant Yelverton
then makes an important argument for his side, not previously broached: 1 Rich. II does
not forbid arrests in a matter between the King and a subject, but only in those arising out
of civil lawsuits. I cannot see any textual warrant for this distinction, but it has
considerable common-sense probability. Is it likely that the King would have undertaken
to punish his own servants doing his own business, presumptively at his immediate
command, in order to secure ideal respect for the Church? Would he not have been much
more believably willing to discipline established officers less directly tied to his personal
service (principally sheriffs and their deputies) when they were routinely executing the
law for the benefit of a private litigant (typically a creditor)?
If Serjeant Yelverton’s construction is right, it would rule out secular proceedings
against officers strictly acting for the King, but would not by logical necessity forbid their
spiritual correction. If, however, we imagine the King balking at dissuading some of his
officers by means at his own disposal from making arrests the Church objected to, it is
reasonable to imagine him also declining to concede the Church’s power to dissuade
from such conduct by its means. If this argument is accepted, it gives Serjeant Yelverton
his simplest and strongest claim to a Prohibition. It comes to saying that by the statute
book it is merely not an ecclesiastical wrong for an officer acting directly for the King to
make arrests which if made by an officer acting on behalf of a private party would
certainly be a secular wrong and at least perhaps an ecclesiastical one as well. (One might
urge at the “constitutional” level that the statutes are irrelevant for ecclesiastical power to
proceed against such an officer, the ecclesiastical law being independently determinative.
I would not expect such an argument to prosper. To act on it might be to flirt with
Praemunire.)
So far as one can tell from a spare report, Serjeant Yelverton seems to have come
around to the “simplest and strongest” claim to Prohibition, abandoning not only the
initial invocation of 23 Hen. VIII, but also the idea that the High Commission’s mistake
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lay only in taxing costs, rather than in assuming jurisdiction at all. The King’s Bench,
moreover, seems to have concurred.
At the end of the report, the new surmise is described. As we have already noted,
it is in one way fully consonant with the stark “no jurisdiction” basis for Prohibition,
since it specifies the nature of the arrest—on a Justice of the Peace’s warrant—with the
evident purpose of showing that Pit was not acting in a matter between private parties.
The surmise is not, however, confined to that, for it adds that the arrest was after evening
service and without “tumult”. These alleged facts would seem to be irrelevant on the “no
jurisdiction” theory. Introducing them may be explicable as “insurance” in case the
justices should be reluctant to protect royal officers who gratuitously disturbed an ongoing service or otherwise violated decorum extremely.
The statement of the surmise is followed by a detached remark that does no more
than repeat the doctrine that the medieval statutes apply only in private suits. Whether
this came from one of the judges or from Serjeant Yelverton again is unclear. In any
event, the court is reported as seeming to be of clear opinion that Prohibition lay.
Although one cannot be sure, it seems probable from the course of the discussion that the
judges’ reason was the position developed by Serjeant Yelverton: there is no basis for
ecclesiastical, including High Commission, proceedings unless the 14th century statutes
authorize them, and they do not for the circumstances of this case. The judges were not
however, ready to grant Prohibition at once; in adjourning the case with permission to
move it again, they perhaps acknowledged its puzzling character. The parties’ settling, on
terms that are not reported, meant that it was never reopened. Although Pit v. Webly is of
negligible importance for issues specific to the High Commission, it is significant for this
study in part because of a later case.
End Note; The Official Record in Fuller’s Case
Some aspects of Fuller’s Case appear from the official record only. For want of full
or fully reported, argument, one cannot say exactly how these aspects were dealt with by
counsel and the judges. The purpose of this note is to look at these for their intrinsic
interest.
The official record consists of Fuller’s spelled out claim to have a Prohibition, plus
the brief text of the Consultation by which part of the Prohibition was reversed. It raises
two basic questions: (1) Just what did Fuller claim by way of privilege as a barrister to
say in the King’s Bench whatever he thought would avail his client, and what were the
grounds of his claim? (2) Just what did the High Commission accuse Fuller of, and how
plausibly can it be argued that it accused him partly of offenses within the Commission’s
jurisdiction and partly not? The second question can be asked because in his complaint
Fuller recites completely the charges, or “articles”, the Commission brought against him.
The main point to note about the “advocate’s privilege” claim is that it is cast in
insistently prescriptive form. After reciting that he has been a member of Gray’s Inn for
43 years, Fuller says that “from the time of memory” Gray’s has been an Inn of “men of
the common law courts” and of “conciliar men of the common law” [men who act as
common law counsel] .” He then says that for 32 years he has been “a conciliar man and
apprentice (in English an utter barrister”) of the Inn, and has been erudite in the common
law.” (In effect, he was certified as learned by his promotion from student to barrister.)
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Fuller continues by saying that from the time of memory the following “ancient and
laudable custom has existed [habetur] and has been used and approved [viz.] that all free
men of the realm who prosecute or defend any action real or personal between party and
party or any other thing or cause whatsoever (pleas of high treason or felony alone
excepted”) in the King’s Bench from the time of memory have retained and been
accustomed to retain conciliar men learned in the law and Serjeants at law for stating,
pleading, and explicating their causes to the Justices.” (Note that Fuller is careful to say
that the prescriptive right to counsel extends beyond civil suits, although it stops short of
prosecutions for treason or felony. The application here must be, although it is not spelled
out, that someone bringing a Habeas corpus to challenge a commitment for an
ecclesiastical offense is just as entitled to counsel as a civil plaintiff or defendant. The
exception, of course, states the familiar common law principle that persons indicted for
the gravest secular crimes may not be represented by counsel, so that the question of
“advocate’s privilege” could not arise.)
Next, crucially for “advocate’s privilege”, Fuller says that it is lawful, and from
time of memory has been, for counselors and Serjeants in arguing and pleading for a
client “modestly and decently” to object what they can against letters patent,
commissions, and grants of the King to whomever it [such patent or grant] has been
made, as much as against all liberties, jurisdictions, and privileges of private and
particular people if the cause of their client requires, leaving judgment and determination
to the Court aforesaid, which custom exists, has existed from time of memory “of
necessity”, and “contains in itself equum et bonum.”(The striking point about this passage
is its specification of the custom beyond a general right to say what one’s client’s cause
requires. The general right as stated includes specifically a right to challenge the validity,
or propose a construction, of royal patents, commissions, and grants. The judges may
reject any such challenge or construction, but a lawyer does no wrong in making one—
within the bounds of “modesty and decency”, which seems to go rather to the manner
than the matter. There is nothing untouchable about royal grants in discussion of people’s
rights and liabilities, whatever the law as determined by the judges may be—even if it
should turn out to be that the court addressed lacks jurisdiction to authenticate or construe
the grant.)
Apart from “advocate’s privilege,” the official record is mainly valuable for
showing the terms in which the High Commission charged Fuller. Lacking any reports of
pro and con argument by counsel and the judges, first on whether the High Commission’s
prosecution of Fuller should be prohibited and then of whether his Prohibition should be
reversed by Consultation, we have no way of knowing what the judges thought about the
charges one by one. We do know from the reports that in the upshot a qualified
Consultation was issued. The official record confirms that. The record concludes with
the full text of the Consultation. Although the reports are clear and accurate about what it
provided, the picture is perhaps sharpened by looking at the exact form of the
Consultation at the crucial point. First come words of permission: “We signify to you
[the Commissioners] that quoad schism, heresy, or erroneous . . . opinion . . . you may
proceed [against Fuller] . . . notwithstanding [the Prohibition] . . .” Then come two
inhibitions: (1) Quatenus non agatur de [so long as there be no dealing with or treating
of] the authority or validity of our [the monarch’s] letters patent for ecclesiastical causes
directed to you or any . . . or concerning the exposition or interpretation of the statute [of
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1 Eliz.] (2) And quatenus non agatur de any slanders, contempts, or other things which
by the common law or a statute of the realm should be punished or determined.”
There are no indications in the Consultation whether any of the charges we shall
now review might be in danger of violating the inhibitions or be considered not to make
an adequate accusation of “schism, heresy, or error” on Fuller’s part. The charges are,
however, of historical interest. Looked at in one way, the High Commission’s winning a
qualified Consultation can be seen as a Pyrrhic victory. The Commission would have
been liable to Attachment for disobeying the Prohibition if it proceeded against Fuller for,
say, “slander and contempt” of the Commission because a given charge was reducible to
that offense, even if the charge was written to give it the color of “schism, heresy, or
error.” In the opposite perspective, the Consultation can be seen as a clear vindication of
the High Commission’s power to proceed against Fuller on any or all of the charges, with
only an easily obeyed warning not to challenge the common law’s monopoly to construe
statutes and patents and not to punish “slanders and contempts” amenable to common law
prosecution. This comes to saying that the charges are carefully drawn to allege a
spiritual or religious component in Fuller’s misbehavior, over and above anything he nay
have said, correctly or incorrectly, touching secular matters.
In discussing the charges, besides simply summarizing them, I shall comment on
whether they probably do accuse Fuller of schism in a meaningful way, as opposed to
merely calling words or acts “schismatical” when they come down at most to secular
contempts or to claims about what 1 Eliz. and the patents implementing it provided. I
focus on schism because of the other two subjects the Commission was allowed to take
up heresy is referred to only once, and “error,” though affirmed in the Consultation (and
in other legal sources) is never in the charges against Fuller spoken of as an offense that
can clearly be committed without also committing schism or heresy.
There are eleven specific charges, all relating to utterances by Fuller in arguing
Maunsell and Ladd. They are assigned to particular times (nine of them to the 6th of May
or thereabouts, two to the 13th of June or thereabouts.) The charges are stated in English,
the language in which the Commission would have addressed them to Fuller, as opposed
to the Latin of the official record as a whole. Each is introduced by the same formula
with no more than trivial variations from item to item (“. . . wee object and articulate to
you that . . . you did factiously and falsly affirme publiquely and in the hearing of many
either in expressed words or in effect that . . .”) Note that this form alone implies that
Fuller’s schismatical behavior as alleged consisted in, or at any rate was solely evidenced
by, his speech-acts—speech-acts in a straightforward sense public, being committed in
the courtroom. He was not charged for his beliefs, nor confessions thereof exacted by
constraint, including any oath to answer questions about his beliefs; nor for overt acts
such as the participation in conventicles charged against Fuller’s client Ladd; nor for
communications to a few people, or intended to be heard or read only by selected
addressees.
The charges were as follows: (1) Fuller said that the High Commission’s
“manner of proceeding” was “Popish in that sometymes they did comitt men to Prison.”
The Commission alleged that his words to such effect “did tend to ye great offence of
manie and to the slander of the Church, to the hardening of Papists against the said
Commissioners, and to the malicious impeachment of his Ma[jes]t[ie’]s Authoritie in
Causes Eccl[es]i[ast]icall.”
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Why Fuller should call the High Commission’s proceedings “Popish” for the
specific reason that the court sometimes imprisoned in not obvious. For some reflections
on that, see Charge #11. #1 does not say in terms that casting the aspersion “Popish” on
the Commissioners was schism (or a form of error more suitable to top-level
ecclesiastical correction than other opinions that can be reasonably, but were not
unanimously, regarded as erroneous—e.g., that 1 Eliz. did not as a mere matter of law
permit giving the Commission imprisoning power.) My guess would be that the High
Commission in #1 was hoping to make out that any use of the epithet “Popish”, which
Puritans were notoriously given to applying to Church practices they thought should be
reformed, put the speaker in the class of schismatics, or nearly so, as other ways of
expressing the same criticisms might not—e.g., asserting that the criticized practices
lacked Scriptural warrant, or that they were illegal by secular law. As it were, “Papist”
and “Popish” express hatred, as opposed to disagreement or disapproval. How Fuller’s
words would “harden” Roman Catholics is less than evident. Catholics would not be less
subject to discipline for their outright opposition to the Royal Supremacy and all its fruits
because dissident Protestants “maliciously impeached” that institution, would they?
Could the point be that unless calling aspects of the English Church “Popish” was
branded as radically false, some average Protestants might lose zeal for prosecuting
genuine Papists?
(2) This article does not make a definite accusation, but concludes by ordering
Fuller to explain what he meant by certain language. The article recites that Fuller
appeared to cast “a malicious aspersion and false interpretation” on the High
Commissioners but was too vague to be quite so characterized. Therefore Fuller is
“commanded” to “set downe” his meaning.
Fuller had said he “feared” lest the authority to imprison “in some cases” which
the monarch had given the Commission “would be used to suppressed the ffaith of the
Sacrament.” He spoke, the charge continues, “as if you knew them to be Enemies to the
true doctrine of the Sacrament in that you feared least they would cast men into prison for
their maintenance of it, and suspecting that in your words touching the ffaith of the
Sacrament you purposed to broach some Error wee command you to set down what you
meane by the faith of the Sacrament.”
There is not much point in speculating about Fuller’s meaning when the High
Commission was not sure of it. He was presumably suspected of unacceptable beliefs
about Eucharistic doctrine. It would be helpful for showing that Fuller was a schismatic
to exact a religious error from him, as opposed to utterances construable as slander of
Church government.
(3) Fuller said: “Ordinaries (meaning B[isho]pps and the officers under them) did
proceed in these dayes by taking an el when they had but an ynch granted them, and in
examining men upon their Oathes at their discre[ci]on and indiscrecc[i]on and such their
dealings were now lamentable . . .” By so saying Fuller “used these and the like
scandalous words of purpose to bring in Contempt the calling of B[isho]pps and their
Eccl[esiasti]call Courts as being suspected, to be yourself a schismatick and a mainteyner
of sundrie false and erroneous opinions both against their calling and Authoritie.”
This article looks designed to avoid being a claim that Fuller had slandered the
High Commission itself or the “ecclesiastical government in general”—i.e., to head off
the argument that his offenses added up to no more than contempt subject to secular
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prosecution. There may be validity in maintaining that to slander the bishops was to
commit schism, even if slandering a latter-day department of ecclesiastical government
and the legal structure that made it possible was only contempt. The bishops were after
all deemed to hold ancient canonical power in succession to Christ’s apostles. Anglican
Protestants could well maintain that Henry VIII and his non-Romanist successors did not
choose episcopacy for the governance of their Church; they were vested by God with
Supreme Headship of a Church that was ab origine Episcopal. Thus to slander the
bishops come to attacking the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church per se, surely schism
if not heresy too. By contrast, having a High Commission was a choice (by monarch and
Parliament), a contingent feature of the ecclesiastical government, and perhaps even the
power of monarch and Parliament to regulate the ecclesiastical judicial system can be
seen as a political choice.
Some Puritans, of the so-called “Presbyterian” branch, of course believed that
episcopacy was unscriptural (and its imposition in England an unjustifiable choice.)
Whether what Fuller said about the bishops—in effect that some of their proceedings
were beyond their legal power and that they were greedy for powers never given them—
were slanderous enough to count as schism raises a question. Saying in the charge that
Fuller was himself suspected of the thoroughgoing anti-episcopal school adds nothing; if
the suspicion was correct, it might be arguable that slander from an “unclean heart” could
be schism, although the same words would not be if said by a lawyer personally free of
unorthodox ecclesiological views.
The only suggestion in Fuller’s alleged words of a specific basis for his vague
aspersion is his mention of wrongful examination under oath by the bishops. Whether
they were guilty of that is a question of fact on which I have no evidence. Legally, they
had well-warranted power to conduct sworn examination, subject to limits (see Vol. II.)
Since the issue in Maunsell and Ladd was the High Commission’s examining power,
which need not be identical with that of diocesan courts, it was in a strict sense irrelevant
for Fuller to take up the latter. In a looser sense, however, a neutral lawyer’s taking it up
might not be irrelevant if his point was that abuse of interrogating power was so
widespread in the ecclesiastical courts at large that one would surely expect it in the High
Commission. If it could somehow be made to stick that Fuller was infected with antiepiscopal principles, his taking an irrelevant swipe at the bishops might reinforce the
gravity of his offenses.
(4) Fuller said that the High Commissioners imprisoned men without showing
them cause why they were imprisoned and that they detained them in prison as long as
they liked and did not permit them to be bailed. He “uttered these untruths to make both
themselves [the Commissioners] and their proceedings odious, thereby rather satisfying
yo[u]r scismaticall and factious humor then having any regard of truth, or as if you might
slander yo[u]r sup[er]ior as you list without controllment insinuating directly, that they
kept men in Prison rather to suffer their owne wills than for anie just cause.”
This article seems to me a straightforward accusation of slander, with very little
said to stretch the alleged offense to schism or error close to schism. Fuller is alleged to
have actually said only that the Commission had abused its power to imprison. There is
not in his words so much as a claim that the Commission lacked imprisoning power
altogether, however untrue as to fact the imputation of abuse may have been or however
incorrect as to law Fuller’s assumptions about the extent of the imprisoning power may
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have been. To the degree that the charge goes beyond stating what Fuller said, it gets no
farther than a cloudy suggestion that “gross” or “malicious” slander exceeds the category
of slander.
(5) Fuller allegedly said falsely that “administering the oath ex officio doth tend
to the damning of their soules that take it thereby insinuating that it is an oath not lawfull
to bee ministered, but likewise in effect publishing such a gross and intolerable Error as
tendeth to the great ov[er]throw in manie Cases of Justice as well in the temporall Courts
of this Realme as in Eccl[esiast]icall.”
The idea behind Fuller’s words is that requiring people to testify under oath when
to answer the questions truthfully might be deleterious to themselves was a temptation to
perjury, a soul-damning sin. This idea was a motif throughout the history of controversy
over self-incrimination. What asserting it is alleged to “insinuate” was not, however,
legally true, viz. that the oath ex officio was flatly unlawful. The ex officio oath means
the oath by which ecclesiastical courts forced criminal defendants to testify against
themselves. English law held that examination under such oath was sometimes illegal,
but not always—not when the party was accused of a purely ecclesiastical offense and
some fairness rules were observed, such as that the examinee be informed of the
questions he would be asked before testifying. (For all this, see Vol. II, Ch. V.)
Fuller certainly believed that all sworn testimony with incriminating potential
ought to be against the law—essentially on moral grounds, though in Maunsell and Ladd
he proposed some good legal ones as well. It seems very hard to make a major
ecclesiastical offense out of misrepresenting the law or criticizing it. If egregious enough
that conduct might at most qualify as contempt, none too plausibly. The High
Commission’s effort to strengthen its charge by saying that Fuller’s language would be
subversive of secular justice is surely self-defeating. It is true that some anomalous
secular procedures used possibly soul-endangering oaths (e.g., compurgation in some
civil cases at common law), but by and large the common law’s reliance on juries
rendered such oaths unnecessary (and I believe tribunals such as the equity courts and the
Star Chamber avoided them.) To call attention to any threat Fuller’s opinions might pose
to secular law tends, however, to admit that if those opinions were criminal they should
be corrected by secular law.
(6) This article says in so many words that Fuller “presumed to slander his
Ma[jes]tie as well to bring his action into Contempt, as to pynch at his lawfull Authoritie
in Causes Eccl[esiast]icall” (by saying that the King’s patent authorizing the High
Commission was “contrarie to the Lawe”—how is not specified in the text of the article.)
This seems a manifest charge of contempt and slander of the government, no
doubt the graver for being directed at the King himself. The charge is given the color of
schism only by adding that “factious persons and disobedient scismatics cannot endure”
the King’s lawful authority in ecclesiastical causes.
(7) Fuller said that “his Ma[jes]ty’[s] Commissioners for causes eccl[esiast]icall
(notwithstanding you knew the tenor of his Ma[jes]t[ie’]s Commission granted unto
them) had no more Authoritie by the Act of Parliament primo Eliz: whereupon the said
Commission is founded, then they had before the making of that Act, whereby you utterly
deny in effect the Kings L[ette]res Patents granted to his said Com[missione]rs to bee of
any validitie for it is apparent, that before the said Act, there was nev[e]r anie such
Commission nor Com[missione]rs and that then if such his Ma[jes]t[y’s]
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Com[missione]rs have now no more Authoritie by such his highnes[s’] Commission then
they had before the making of the said Act, that they have now none at all, which is to
take from his Ma[jes]tie all lawfull meanes to execute his power and Authoritie in causes
Eccl[esiat]icall and consequently together [probably ‘altogether’] to deprive him if it, a
thing as well by the factious p[er]sons and scismaticks in these dayes as by the Papists
o[u]r Mortall Enemies much affected and desired.”
It is hard to say what Fuller was getting at in the words attributed to him. The
striking feature of this article is that the Commission appends a string of deductions to
show that those words have extreme implications. Because the letter of Fuller’s words
implies that the High Commission at present has no authority at all, it is further implied
that the King has “no lawful means to execute his power and authority in causes
ecclesiastical.” That is equivalent to claiming that he has no such authority. That, per
the Commission, is indistinguishable from what Roman Catholics hold. It comes, one
can say, to flatly denying the Royal Supremacy in a major aspect. If the deduction is
conceded, it seems difficult not to consider Fuller a schismatic, for separating himself
from the Church in England as now constituted, no less radically than Romanists do. It
may be no worse than contempt to criticize how the King’s ecclesiastical justice is
organized and applied, but can it not be schism to deny, with the Catholics, that there is
any such thing?
(8) Some of this article I can make no sense of, but it essentially objects that
Fuller’s “scornfull speeches” were grounded on his ignorance. (Of what I cannot make
out, but Fuller has already been accused, not without some justification, of not knowing
the law and the High Commission’s actual practices. Of course ignorance and open-eyed
misrepresentation are hard to distinguish.) Most significantly, it is alleged that Fuller’s
“sawcie ignorance did proceed from your malicious desire to discredit as much as in you
lay both his Ma[jes]t[y‘s] Commission and Com[missione]rs as foreseeing that if that
Authoritie might be ov[er]throwne once, your scismaticall Masters might doe what they
list.”
Again, we have a plea for the relevance of motive: Fuller is represented as
errand-boy for a conspiracy of people with notoriously schismatical intentions, though
they may have lacked or avoided his opportunities to commit prosecutable schism (and
lacked the cover, though it failed him, of his advocate’s role.) Could speaking falsely and
ignorantly about the High Commission to the end of liberating his co-conspirators from
need to fear ecclesiastical prosecution for schism, however boldly they pressed their
program, not be schism? Is it not weak consolation to the Church for the removal of this
danger merely to concede that the faction Fuller was spokesman for could not be saved
from the peril of secular prosecution—prosecution that might be effective, if lay jurors
willing to indict or convict could be found?
(9) Fuller said that the High Commissioners “by reason of their absolute
Authoritie, did thereby oftentimes commit sundrie absolute Wrongs.” This article, like
#2, concludes with a “command”, except here it is in the alternative: “. . . wee command
you to name the Com[mission]ers that have done such absolute wrongs, that they may be
dealt with according to their desert, or if you are able to name none, you may receive
such due punishment as your slanderous words deserve.”
Again, I think the point of this charge must be that loose defamatory language
about individual Commissioners comes to schism, not merely contempt for the
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ecclesiastical government. There is perhaps some plausibility in contending that even if
irresponsible aspersions on the Commission as an institution must come to the secular
offense, unwarranted attacks on the reputations of particular Commissioners need not.
The claim would be that the pitch of sinfulness reached by expressions of hatred or
malice against flesh and blood—against fellow Christians, especially ones clothed in
ecclesiastical dignity—is inherently spiritual and divisive within the Church to the point
of schism; this hardly can be turned into a secular crime (at any rate not without very
explicit Parliamentary legislation.) By contrast, attacks on institutions of Church
government need not be beyond the reach of secularization. (On the other hand, the
attacks on individuals attributed to Fuller might be reducible to common law defamation,
depending on how the vague “absolute wrongs” is taken or whether Fuller could be
compelled to spell it out.)
(10) This article contains vague and puzzling language, but on one point it is
specific enough. The charge starts by accusing Fuller of saying that the High
Commission’s proceedings were contrary to law, which of course he believed and could
hardly avoid asserting in some respects merely to argue that his client was improperly
held. Then he is said “in pride of yo[u]r hart” to have made “manie scornfull glosses and
observations” upon the Commission. In the first example of these, I can see no
explicable meaning. (Fuller allegedly said that the Commissioners “had power to devise
wayes for searching out of matters to proceed either by Eccl[esiast]icall lawed or
otherwise at their discrecion to command all Justic[e]s all subjects [sic] wh[i]ch you
disdainfully pretended you knew not how farr it extended . . .”)
Of the next point, however—or the continuation of the last after “extended”—the
legal gist is visible. Fuller allegedly went on with “. . . and to appoint Receivers of ffynes
. . .” It seems clear that Fuller was accusing the Commission of collecting its own fines
(fines he probably considered illegal, but he is not charged with error as to the fining
power itself.)
Granting that the Commission was not completely debarred from imposing fines,
there is ample authority that it must certify its fines to the Exchequer for collection as
debts to the Crown, rather than collect them itself. The procedure put the Exchequer in a
position to scrutinize the legality of fines. In the present article, the High Commissioners
were presumably saying they observed the procedure and had not appointed their own
collectors, or at any rate that they were not currently doing so. (The numerous common
law judicial pronouncements that estreatment into the Exchequer was always required
suggest that at some point the Commission had tried to do its own collecting.) Assuming
the Commission had acquiesced in the common law’s insistence on using the Exchequer,
it was gratuitous for Fuller to harp on a past error that may have been innocent before the
common law courts settled the point, and that in any event had nothing to do with the
issues in Maunsell and Ladd. To make things worse, Fuller allegedly could not resist
adding a sarcasm to his observations on fine-collection: “. . . if they had auditors too
what an Exchesq[uer] this would be.” I.e., so far as Fuller pretended to know, the
Commission might be planning to set up a full replica of the Exchequer. (A few more
words in the charge, following these about fine-collection I find simply unintelligible;
perhaps they were mistranscribed in copying the official record.)
For the purpose of making out schism or serious religious error, charge #10—like
#9—seems to me to rely on the tenuous but not entirely empty ground that gratuitousness
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and a “saucy” tone might lift Fuller’s utterances above secular contempt. As it were, a
broadside of assorted untruths about an ecclesiastical court bespeaks a schismatical spirit
as relevant argument in a case concerning an ecclesiastical court would not, even if it
were mistaken, known to the speaker to be, and in danger of constituting secular
slander/contempt.
(11) The final charge against Fuller may come to the clearest accusation of
schism, the hardest to reduce to contempt and slander of the ecclesiastical government,
Fuller is alleged to have said that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction granted to the High
Commissioners by 1Eliz. and the monarch’s patents “giving them Authoritie to inflict
some corporall punishment upon Delinquents is Antichristian, and that such
Eccl[esiast]icall Jurisdiccon is not of Christ, but of Antichrist and that thereby you
showed yo[u]r selfe to have embraced some notable scisme and heresie fitt to bee
corrected and amended in you . . .” The article continues, “besides that you have made
manifest your rebellious and lewd heart towards his Ma[jes]tie in ascribing unto him that
the maintenance of that Eccl[esiast]icall Jurisdiccon which is not of Chirst and making
Him to bee the Author and Grantor of that Authoritie unto his Com[missione]rs which is
Antichristian.”
It is the first part of the article that concerns us. The second part paints Fuller’s
offense as the worse for manifesting disloyalty toward the King, but does not represent
that as constituting schism or heresy. The Commission was well-advised not to appear to
be proceeding for a secular crime. Whether saying the monarch granted and maintained
an “Antichristian” jurisdiction and authority was treason or less, its prosecution must
surely be secular.
With respect to the first and essential section of the article, it should be noted that
calling a practice anti-Christian in the 17th century rings deep. As our document itself
explains, it means “not of Christ, but of Anti-Christ.” At the least, that says the practice
was shaped by Christ’s worst enemies, who to 17th century Protestants would include
both the devil and the Pope. That is stronger than some such definition as “inconsistent
with Christian ethical ideas as those are best understood.”
Observe secondly that Fuller’s extreme animadversion was on one particular
power—to inflict corporal punishment. That can only mean power to imprison—not the
Commission’s substantive jurisdiction, nor its authority to use temporal sanctions,
notably fining, but authority to imprison. I do not think that even Fuller could have
pretended that the Commission ever punished or thought it could punish in any further
“corporal” way—from death through the various “cruel and unusual” punishments for
which the Star Chamber eventually became notorious to minor inflictions of discomfort
and shaming in English secular law, such as setting people in the stocks. (I would
suggest reading the odd-sounding phrase “some corporall” punishment as “any
punishment that can be considered corporal, including arresting men’s bodies, even
briefly, as well as detaining them in jail.”)
Notice thirdly that here alone in the catalogue of charges against Fuller heresy is
alleged. While schism was usually spoken of as the second-ranking offense within High
Commission jurisdiction, after heresy—and some Puritan acts and utterances that could
not reasonably be taken as heresy were prosecuted as schism—the present article shows
that the most serious forms of schism could not be sharply differentiated from heresy and
that a heretic within the Church of England was ipso facto a schismatic.
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I can only speculate on why Fuller should have singled out “corporal
punishment”, among the disputed areas of jurisdiction and disputed sanctions belonging
to the High Commission as “of Antichrist.” Perhaps the ancient and undisputed rule that
the Christian Church may not shed blood was extended in some precisionist minds to rule
out any use of physical coercion by agents of the Church. This can be further extended to
the Church’s evading the rule by farming out physical coercion to the secular authorities,
as the statute De heretico comburendo provided for, or as the English writ De
excommunicato capiendo permitted. One can probably find enough examples of physical
coercion directly applied in the medieval and Counter-Reformation Roman church to
make out “corporal punishment” as “Popish” and so per Fuller “Antichristian”—hard
physical penances, “imprisoning” misbehaving clerics in monasteries, Church courts’
handling of the many varieties of wrongdoers subject to their jurisdiction via benefit of
clergy. More generally, it was a Puritan motif that the “discipline” of the Church should
be distinctively spiritual, rather than a sister-ship of worldly government, using the
latter’s rough if necessary sanctions and failing comparably short of reforming
misbehavers’ souls. (See my observations in Vol. I, p. 20 ff., on the sense in which
Puritans were at least latently hostile to the whole structure of ecclesiastical law. Fuller
may have thought there was much more “Antichristian” about the High Commission and
even the ordinary courts it partly displaced and exceeded in efficiency, than “corporal
punishment”, though he reserved his strongest rhetoric for the last straw.)
There seems to me no compelling basis for determining when criticism of
ecclesiastical courts’ procedures grows from a degree of reckless falsity and gratuitous
vituperation that only makes it slander and contempt to religious misconduct so grave that
its correction cannot be taken away from ecclesiastical justice (or from the High
Commission.) Whether any of the other charges against Fuller sufficed to cross that line,
one must probably say that as a matter of law Article 11 does so: The High Commission
imprisoned Fuller, he was remanded to prison on Habeas corpus, and the brief report of
his Habeas corpus suggests that the return focused on the charges in Article 11(“. . . he
was accused of saying that their proceedings were Popish and that it proceeds from
Antichrist and not Christ & c.”)
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Section 4: The High Commission during Coke’s Chief Justiceships
Sub-section (a): Common Pleas Cases (1606-1613)
Summary
Cases on the High Commission from the Common Pleas when it was presided
over by Coke are difficult to summarize. Common Pleas law on the Commission was
certainly altered over the seven-year span 1606-1613. It is possible to depict the change
in bright colors, but the more closely one looks at the reported cases the more muted the
colors become. The most important thing to note about this passage of legal history is
how the Common Pleas law became more complex and uncertain compared to what it
was in the Elizabethan and very early Jacobean period. A sense of that can only come
from immersion in the details.
The highlighted picture of the change would be as follows: Before Coke assumed
the Chief Justiceship, the court was permissive with respect to substantive jurisdiction
and restrictive with respect to sanctions. The High Commission was allowed to entertain
any recognized class of ecclesiastical claim or complaint. On the other hand, the
Commission was not permitted to go beyond recognized ecclesiastical sanctions. It could
neither impose a fine nor commit a party to prison. The Cokean period saw change on
both scores. The Commission was restricted to criminal cases and, within that class, to
serious offenses called “enormities”; a definite list of these was proposed by Coke.
Secular sanctions were permitted in cases on that list. A substantial majority of the court
was in favor of these rules, but one Justice, Walmesley, was characteristically at odds
with his brethren. As against these changes, restraints on the Commission that were
already in place when Coke took over the court persisted. (Procedural rules in Habeas
corpus, which demanded that commitments to prison be justified in particular even when
they were generically legal; the rule that parties could not be arrested first and informed
of what they were charged with later, but must be cited to appear and be coerced by
excommunication if they failed to; a ban on exacting performance bonds from
defendants.)
A more shadowed and more accurate picture has a few specifiable general
features, though it is only through looking at the details of particular cases that one can
see how the simplified summary above falters. The doctrine that High Commission
jurisdiction is at least limited to ecclesiastical criminal law was not easy to apply in all
contexts. Civil and criminal matters could be commingled in a single case. A couple of
sophisticated arguments appear in the cases to the effect that a kind of “public interest”
could sometimes give jurisdiction to the High Commission even when the charge could
hardly be made out as “criminal.” The simplified picture is certainly correct in asserting
that the “enormity test” won out in the Common Pleas as it had not done earlier. (Even
Justice Walmesley seems to have acquiesced in it up to a point.) The content of that
doctrine, however, was not clearly or stably agreed on. Coke’s stab at a very limited but
sharp list of enormities was in the event only a stab; additions were made or contended
for, and the very basis for the restriction to enormities was not always seen in the same
way. Cases within High Commission jurisdiction and cases in which secular sanctions
were allowed did not work out as fully coterminous categories. It is unclear that the
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conceded power to imprison was ever agreed to permit more than “equity-style”
imprisonment—i.e., power to coerce fulfillment of an already-imposed spiritual sanction.
Imprisonment to coerce replying to lawful interrogatories despite self-incriminating
effect was accepted. That is both an example of “equity-style” commitment and the best
proof that it was employed in practice. Though such imprisonment was endorsed
judicially for other contexts, there are not many instances of its actually being used. (See
Vol. II, Ch. 5, for self-incrimination cases.)
The effects of change in the Common Pleas law can mainly be seen in marital
litigation. Puritans were no more protected from the High Commission than they were
before. Serious Puritan activity was safely in the category of enormities; at most a few
minor misdemeanors inspired by Puritan sentiments may have escaped under the
enormity line. Puritans were worse off by being more subject to imprisonment. To the
degree that they were better off for common law protection it was largely because of
limits on the Commission worked out before Coke’s Chief Justiceship—restraints on
self-incriminatory questioning and on the power to imprison when it was as such lawfully
employed. (Insistence on formally adequate justification of commitments in Habeas
corpus; checks on perpetual or unreasonably long detention, these never reduced to clear
doctrine, but visible in practice.) What as a practical matter the High Commission wanted
and was prevented from having by the Common Pleas in several cases was a free hand or
wide discretion to handle marital disputes. It was largely in such disputes that criminal
elements—whose classification as enormities was typically problematic—were
intermixed with parties’ attempts to secure civil remedies, such as divorces and alimony
awards. While at a theoretical level spokesmen for the High Commission persisted in
their belief that the monarch had virtually unlimited prerogative to confer such
ecclesiastical jurisdiction and secular powers as he chose on the Commission, there was
no serious chance in the 17th century of that position’s being accepted by the common
law courts. In practice, it was not necessary to go so high to make a reasonable case for at
least broader powers in marital affairs than strict limitation to criminal enormities would
permit.
The best evidence that marital law was the real bone of contention between the
Common Pleas and the High Commission comes from extra-judicial events in 1611. In
response to the Common Pleas’ prohibiting alimony awards by the High Commission, the
government required all the judges to meet with the principal state officials, took the
Common Pleas to task for the court’s disposal of marital cases, and made a blatant
attempt to use the King’s Bench and Exchequer judges against those of the Common
Pleas. Although one should be cautious about attributing the “constitutional ethics” of the
future to the early 17th century, the flavor of inappropriate political interference with the
courts hangs heavy over this episode. Coke and his colleagues perceived that flavor and
objected; Coke’s courage and leadership on behalf of judicial independence are apparent.
The dust of the 1611 controversy, however, settled into a compromise. The consequence
is that as of the end of Coke’s Chief Justiceship of the Common Pleas in 1613 rules on
the High Commission’s marital role, and the wider implications of that for the
Commission’s scope, were in nubibus. Perhaps the closest thing to a safe generalization
would be that although the enormous crimes limit still held in the abstract, the
Commission gained some ground towards acknowledgment that it had a role in especially
aggravated marital cases. Wider marital jurisdiction for the High Commission would
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have favored more humane treatment of married women than lay law combined with
ecclesiastical law solely enforced by the regular Church courts would have made for.
Although the changes in Common Pleas law during Coke’s Chief Justiceship
were more muted and confused than they appear at first sight, changes did occur. In the
aetiology of these changes political pressure to accommodate the High Commission may
have figured. There was not, however, nearly enough change to satisfy the government
and the central officers of the Church. In the event, those patrons of the Commission
probably lost more than they gained. Though limited imprisoning power, mainly valuable
for more effective disciplining of Puritans, was conceded, narrowing the ecclesiastical
jurisdiction available to the Commission made its increasingly prominent aspiration to a
role in marital affairs harder to attain. Deference to political authority mainly took the
form of deciding cases against it on narrow grounds when possible.
It is likely that the explanation of the legal changes lies largely in Coke’s history
and then in the influence of his intellect and personality on his fellow judges. Before
becoming Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, Coke was a King’s Bench lawyer and a
government lawyer. The late Chief Justice Popham of the King’s Bench was probably his
most honored teacher and model. Although the King’s Bench did not have as many
opportunities as the Elizabethan Common Pleas to develop a comprehensive position on
the High Commission, it was tending, under Popham, in the direction the Common Pleas
took under Coke. Coke’s associations would probably have put him in basic sympathy
with the King’s Bench tendency to embrace a limited imprisoning power and to
adumbrate the enormity test. As Attorney General, he would probably have supported the
government he was part of in its hope for strengthening the Commission’s sanctions and
thereby its effectiveness. In any event, whether or not Coke would have said that the
King’s Bench point of view taking shape simply made better sense than the olderfashioned Common Pleas law, he must as the new “outsider” Chief Justice of the
Common Pleas have been concerned about the mere fact of a degree of divergence
between the principal courts. Sooner or later they would have to get together. Better take
the lead and achieve harmony sooner, Coke can be imagined thinking, than wait for a
Writ of Error in the King’s Bench or an Exchequer Chamber decision to override the
Common Pleas. Coke took pride in being an engineer of judicial unanimity. In carefully
reporting Fuller’s Case, whatever his own role in the achievement of unanimity there, he
provided an example of harmony on High Commission matters, even though Fuller did
not address the most basic issues about the Commission. The next step, he might well
have thought, was to achieve unanimity on those basic issues by a moderate change of
course in the Common Pleas.
Having firmly embraced the enormity test and linked imprisoning power to it,
Coke’s Common Pleas was not entirely successful in clarifying and sticking with what
was now its fundamental High Commission policy. Its commitment to the values behind
that policy, on the other hand, probably deepened, with catalytic help from the court’s
leading role in construing and giving effect to 23 Hen. VIII, c. 9 (Ch. 2 above.) By giving
that statute the serious attention it had not previously had, Coke’s court was forced to
think about the danger of centralized subversion of local ecclesiastical justice and the
subject’s interest in localism, not only his convenience but his traditional entitlement to
two appeals from an adverse sentence. This concern suggests curtailing the High
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Commission severely, since with broad jurisdiction it could both preempt local business
and, in contrast with other preemptors, cut off appeals completely.

The Cases

We turn now to Coke’s Common Pleas, 1606-1616, the richest source of law on
the High Commission. The earliest case decided by that court, Roper v. Bulbrooke,86 was
86

M. 3 Jac. C.P. Noy, 149, sub nom. Rooper v. Bulbroke; Harl. 4817, f. 191b; Add.
25,205, f. 35b; 12 Coke, 45-47 and (second entry) 47-48, sub nom. Sir Anthony Roper’s
Case.
The date M.3 Jac. is from Add. 25,205. Harl. 4817 is undated, while Noy says that
the case was disputed from M.3 until “now”, but “now” is not identified; Coke’s first
entry is undated, but his second dates the case M.5, with a citation to the Plea Roll for
that term. The complexity of the case makes it likely that it ran over several terms.
Harl. 4817, a MS. labeled as Justice Warburton’s reports, is the only version that
gives the full narrative. The text follows that report. Noy is brief but agrees in its
statement of the principles behind the result. It is possible to read Noy as saying that
according to the holding in this case the High Commission may not deal with any dispute
about “meum and tuum”—i.e., any purely civil matter—but the meaning is probably only
that it is excluded from disputes over the interests that were preserved by statute when
monastic property was secularized. Add. 25,205 presents some problems of
reconciliation. It gives the basic decision as stated in the text (ordinary ecclesiastical
remedy before the Dissolution, no remedy at all after 31 Hen. VIII, statutory remedy
provided by 34/35 Hen. VIII.) This appears, however, to figure as the argument against
Prohibition (per Justice Foster), and as a successful argument, for the report says that a
Consultation was granted. The argument can be imagined as cutting that way, perhaps in
the form “If the pension were recoverable de jure in an ordinary ecclesiastical court the
High Commission should probably not handle it, but it is appropriate for a statutory court,
which exercises the Supreme Head’s powers by delegation, to entertain a dispute over a
special quasi-ecclesiastical interest whose very existence depends on the statutory
reorganization of the Church.” On the other hand, Add. 25,205 accords with Harl. 4817
in having the court agree that 2 Hen. V requires the libel to be shown to the defendant in
civil litigation. It was reportedly agreed that Prohibition will lie until a copy of the libel is
furnished, which is surely the only meaningful use of a Prohibition claimed solely on 2
Hen. V. Justice Warburton is reported as distinguishing proceedings in ecclesiastical
courts, where by definition there is no libel and—per Warburton—no requirement that
the defendant be apprised of the charges in a manner equivalent to showing him the libel
in a civil suit (but cf. the last Sub-section above for contrary opinions on this point.) If a
general Consultation was really granted, the instant case must be classified as ex officio—
plausibly, but so classifying it would contradict Harl. 4817. That report is so clear and
detailed a narrative account that I think it must be preferred. If Add. 25,205 is not merely
inaccurate, it can be reconciled only by supposing that there was still more to the
narrative than Harl 4817 tells. Taking the hint from Noy (confirmed by Coke) that debate
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begun in 1605, before Coke’s accession to the Bench, and unanimously resolved in 1607
It presents an instance of resistance by the High Commission to regulation by the
Common Pleas, countered by that court’s insistence on its right to regulate. The problem
in the case was special, however, with the result that the decision has only limited
implications for the general scope of the Commission’s authority. Three of the four
reports stick to the immediate problem. The fourth, Coke’s (from the posthumous 12
Reports), adds a few broader “resolutions”. On the immediate problem, there are no
conflicts among the reports. We have had occasion before to observe that Coke was
capable of attributing more to courts than they may have known they were deciding.
Whether or not he did so in this case, I shall discuss Roper v. Bulbrooke as all the reports
agree it was and at the end note the further—not strictly necessary but not irrelevant—
holdings reported by Coke.
Bulbrooke was incumbent of a vicarage dependent on an impropriate rectory held
by Sir Anthony Roper. Bulbrooke claimed that a pension issuing out of the rectory was
due to him and unpaid by Roper—a pension, that is to say, which had been settled on the
vicar in the days of the monastery and for which Roper was liable as successor. To
recover his pension, Bulbrooke petitioned the King, presumably supposing that he had no
other remedy. The King referred the petition to the High Commission, which called the
parties before it summarily and decreed that Roper should pay the pension.
(“Summarily” means that the Commission proceeded without a libel—i.e., without
Bulbrooke’s having put in a written statement of claim such as civil litigation in
ecclesiastical courts normally started from. The Commission acted directly on the petition
to the King to make the defendant appear.) Roper refused to obey the decree, whereupon
the Commission imprisoned him in the Fleet.
Roper brought both a Prohibition and a Habeas corpus in the Common Pleas.
Upon the latter, he was discharged from prison. The reason for this decision is not
reported, but no further reason is required than the fairly well-settled view of at least a
majority of the court that the Commission simply lacked power to imprison. The
Prohibition was sought and granted on the basis of 2 Hen. V, c. 3, which provided that
ecclesiastical defendants must be given a copy of the plaintiff’s libel. In the present case,
relying on 2 Hen. V amounts to contending that Roper was not answerable in any
ecclesiastical court for a private adversary’s claim to a pension except on being sued by
libel. When they released Roper and granted the Prohibition, the judges told Bulbrooke
to start a suit by libel. Nothing in the reports at this point suggests that such a suit could
not be in the High Commission.
To the actions of the Common Pleas, the High Commission responded: “But the
High Commissioners say that they will not obey such direction, but that they have made a
decree in the case, and Sir Antony shall perform it or otherwise will be committed again
of the case extended over several terms starting in M.3 (the date given by Add. 25,205):
perhaps the first discussion did result in an inclination to grant Consultation, after which
the case was re-opened and the court persuaded to go the other way. Roper’s
imprisonment and the Habeas corpus (not mentioned in Add. 25,205) may have been
persuasive in the sense that it exposed the Commission’s readiness to act in a manner
which the Common Pleas regarded as illegal and therefore prompted the judges to look
more closely at its substantive claim to jurisdiction.
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toties poties, and accordingly they committed him to the Fleet again.” Thereupon Roper
prayed a new Habeas corpus and prayed further that Bulbrooke be attached for
disobeying the Prohibition. Both prayers were granted at once. A little later, the court
disposed of the case on both scores by deciding that the Prohibition should stand and that
Roper should again be discharged. At this stage, the judges resolved unanimously that the
High Commission had no jurisdiction to make a decree for a pension of the sort claimed
here.
The legal position behind this holding was as follows: The pension would have
been recoverable in a regular ecclesiastical court before the dissolution of the
monasteries. The statute of dissolution (31 Hen. VIII, c. 13) preserved such pensions, but
did not make it clear that they were to continue recoverable in ecclesiastical courts
against impropriators or other grantees from the Crown of monastic property. At that
point, Bulbrooke’s course—petitioning the King for want of an ordinary remedy—may
have been correct. The statute of 34/35 Hen. VIII, c. 19, soon altered matters, however. .
This act recited 31 Hen. VIII’s saving for pensions and took note of the fact that persons
entitled to them were not being paid for want of a “direct mean” to recover them. The act
therefore provided that such pensions were to be recoverable by ecclesiastical process, as
before the dissolution. 34/35 Hen.VIII is not restrictive in terms as to which ecclesiastical
courts were to have jurisdiction over suits for pensions. I.e., it does not say that such suits
must be in regular episcopal or archiepiscopal courts. The statutory language is general;
pensioners are only given “such process” as they formerly had, and they are empowered
to recover the sum due, plus costs and damages, when the adverse party is convicted
“according to the ecclesiastical laws.” The court in Bulbrooke, however, interpreted
34/35 Hen. VIII to mean that jurisdiction was restricted to the regular courts—sensibly
enough, inasmuch as the statute refers to pre-dissolution practice, before the High
Commission (conceived as the creation of 1 Eliz.) existed. Even if the High Commission
is considered entitled to entertain all de jure ecclesiastical causes, the particular type of
suit in question—claims to pensions against successors to the monasteries—is best
thought of as authorized “positively” or de novo by 34/35 Hen. VIII, and therefore as
entertainable only by such ecclesiastical courts as the statute assigns—as held, the regular
ones.
Besides the principal holding, the Common Pleas may have taken note of
information before it going to show that the High Commission had mishandled
Bulbrooke’s suit. For one thing, 34/35 Hen. VIII makes pensions recoverable by
ecclesiastical process only if they had been in the pensioners’ possession (presumably
meaning that he had been paid) within ten years before the dissolution. I.e., the
successors to the monasteries were protected against liability for old claims to pensions
newly dug up. The High Commission had omitted to require proof of payment or
“possession” within ten years before the dissolution. Therefore it had erred, in the sense
of failing to pursue 34/35 Hen. VIII, even assuming, contrary to the court’s opinion, that
it had jurisdiction under the statute. Secondly, it was also shown by Roper, apparently to
the court’s satisfaction, that the pension in question was actually tied to the former
possessions of the monastery generally, of which the rectory was only part. Presumably
Roper was not the present owner of all the former possessions and therefore, as owner of
the rectory, not liable for the whole of the pension. In charging him with all of it, the
Commission had allegedly erred in a determination of fact. Whereas that sort of error by
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an ecclesiastical court was as a rule not grounds for Prohibition, it might arguably be
where an ecclesiastical court is exercising a mere statutory power. 34/35 Hen. VIII is
careful to provide that contentions arising out of ex-monastic pensions should be
determined at common law if they presented issues appropriately determinable there.
Arguably, perhaps, the question of exactly what is charged with a pension is a common
law issue, wherefore ecclesiastical courts should be prohibited upon surmise that such an
issue has been raised or has been mistakenly disposed of. I am not sure whether the court
was made aware of the Commission’s alleged mistakes on or off the record. Awareness
of them may in any event have made prohibiting easier. Be that as it may, however, the
Commission’s lack of jurisdiction under 34/35 Hen. VIII as construed was sufficient
reason for Prohibition.
The court did not need to hold more than that to hold for Roper. It did not need to
examine the nature of the High Commission in any deeper sense than considering
whether 34/35 Hen. VIII gave jurisdiction to that tribunal by implication, or only to the
regular Church courts. Coke’s report, however, says that the Commission’s scope was
considered in wider terms. It is perfectly plausible that it should have been: in effect, the
further “resolutions” reported by Coke provide reinforcing reasons for the result, beyond
mere construction of 34/35 Hen. VIII. It is possible that Coke reports his own opinion,
rather than what the whole court expressly agreed on, though he professes that the
resolutions were unanimously embraced. The only ground for suspecting any such thing
is that the other reports have the court going only to the narrower, but sufficient, point
(plus perhaps giving some weight to he Commission’s errors, which Coke does not
mention.)
In any event, Coke gives six resolutions over and above the decision on the
narrower point: (1) 1 Eliz. does not “take away” (repeal or amend) any previous statute
which it does not expressly name. In application to the case at hand: 34/35 Hen. VIII
gives jurisdiction over ex-monastic pensions to the regular ecclesiastical courts; 1 Eliz.
does not in effect amend the earlier statute by extending the statutory jurisdiction to the
Commission, assuming the monarch authorizes it to exercise such jurisdiction. Similarly,
Coke notes, 2/3 Edw. VI, c. 13, gives the then-existing regular ecclesiastical courts
authority to award the double value of substracted tithes; 1 Eliz. does not operate to give
the High Commission authority to award such statutory punitive damages. Coke observes
that substracting tithes is not “injury or crime”, but a matter of “interest and property.”
The implication is perhaps that 1 Eliz. might “take away” a prior criminal statute, but
does not give the Commission any statutory civil jurisdiction formerly confined to regular
tribunals (despite the punitive element of double damages.)
(2) 1 Eliz. extends only to crime. Here we have a more fundamental statement about the
Commission: It may be erected as a criminal court only; no part of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction properly classifiable as civil may be given to it. Thus, for the case at hand,
whatever 34/35 Hen. VIII says or means, the High Commission cannot be given
jurisdiction over claims to pensions which are clearly civil. (Obviously 34/35 Hen. VIII
does not make a prophetic exception. A statute after 1 Eliz. could no doubt give the
Commission civil jurisdiction by express provision, but hardly an earlier statute.) (3) The
authority conferred on ecclesiastical courts by 34/35 Hen. VIII is essentially temporal,
whereas 1 Eliz. refers to spiritual jurisdiction. I.e., I take it: Waiving the points above—
granting that 34/35 Hen. VIII is rather general in its reference to ecclesiastical process,
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that 1 Eliz. might be taken to alter previous statutes in favor of the High Commission, and
that the Commission may be given civil as well as criminal jurisdiction—the most 1 Eliz.
gives the Commission is all spiritual jurisdiction properly so-called. But power to
entertain suits for pensions of a new sort (pensions charged on successor-grantees of
former Church property), such power and the preservation of the pensions themselves
being entirely owing to statute, is not true spiritual jurisdiction. It is no different from a
totally temporal matter, something in no way even associated with the past and present
affairs of the Church, assigned to ecclesiastical courts by statutory fiat. Therefore such
jurisdiction is outside the reference of 1 Eliz. (4) 1 Eliz. revives rather than repeals 23
Hen. VIII, c.9, with the implication that the High Commission may not entertain “private
causes.” (5) If 1 Eliz. intended to give the High Commission civil jurisdiction, it would
have provided for appeal from the Commission’s sentences. (6) The Commission’s
patent, in any event, does not give it civil jurisdiction, because it speaks of “offenders”
and confers power to imprison them; “offender” is to be understood as a term of art
meaning “one who commits a crime.”
If Coke’s report reflects what the whole court discussed and decided, Bulbrooke v.
Roper represents a significant step toward defining the High Commission’s scope: It can
only be given criminal jurisdiction, which a suit for a pension is not an example of. How
to draw the civil-criminal line in less clear-cut situations remains a problem, but the case
at any rate insists that the first question to ask is whether a suit falls on one side of the
other of that line. The thesis that universal ecclesiastical jurisdiction was grantable to the
Commission, which had had its advocates, is ruled out. The resolutions do not say that
only some grave ecclesiastical crimes may be assigned to the Commission, but reliance
on 23 Hen. VIII and the absence of appeals to exclude the Commission from civil suits
perhaps points forward to that. Resolution #6 countenances strict construction of patents
even when it is conceded that jurisdiction of a particular type could be assigned to the
Commission if the monarch chose. One should, however, be careful about using
Bulbrooke as clear authority for the Commission’s scope in general, since the broader
points in Coke’s resolutions, though rather reinforcing points or alternative reasons than
mere dicta, transcend the special problem in the case, about which there was no judicial
disagreement.
In Lane’s Case (1607)87, the High Commission was prohibited from prosecuting a
man for defaming his parish minister in church on Sunday before all the parishioners.
The words themselves (“a wicked man and an arrant knave”) are probably of
questionable defamatoriness, but their utterance in the circumstances was no doubt at
least a prima facie offense. It was not, however, severe enough for the High Commission,
the court held–the first ad hoc application of the enormity test by Coke’s Common Pleas.
In Wither’s Case (1608)88, the Commission proceeded against a “singing man” of
Exeter cathedral to the end of depriving him for incompetence as a singer and
misbehavior (not observing regulations made for the “government” of the cathedral
personnel and behaving himself “indecently.”) The suit was prohibited because it was not
for an “exorbitant” offense and because the party would lose his appeal. The latter point
has particular force in this case because the High Commission had actually interfered
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M. 5 Jac. C.P.—included in Coke’s report of Bulbrooke. 12 Coke, 47.
P. 6 Jac. C.P. Add. 25,215, f.63b.
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with the appellate process: The Bishop of Exeter had already deprived Wither for the
same offenses, and Wither had appealed to the Arches. The suit in the High Commission
was commenced pending this appeal. The Common Pleas held, as a separate reason for
Prohibition, that the appeal suspended the Bishop’s sentence, wherefore Wither was not
deprived at present. The point of insisting on that may be that if Wither were in
contemplation of law deprived the Commission would not be proceeding to the end of
depriving him, but for the possibly more excusable end of punishing him otherwise for
his misdeeds and not so flagrantly for the purpose of undermining his appellate rights in
the deprivation suit. Insofar, however, as the court was determined to exclude the
Commission from petty suits, even against clerics, the further consideration would not
seem to matter.
Allan Ball’s Case (1608)89 confirms earlier decisions holding that the High
Commission may not arrest persons subject to its jurisdiction to secure their attendance
and answer. The context of Ball is not reported, only the court’s unanimous resolution: A
pursuivant may not be sent to arrest an accusee; the party must be cited, and if he defaults
proper procedure is to excommunicate him, going on if necessary to De excommunicato
capiendo. In support of this holding, the judges went high, to Magna Carta and other
ancient statutes whence it appears that a freeman may not be arrested upon a bare surmise
or accusation. 1 Eliz. had no intent to repeal those profitable laws. The judges also went
to a recent case (which is alluded to above): The late Chief Justice Anderson and Justice
Glanville had resolved at Northamptonshire Assizes that a man who killed a High
Commission pursuivant in resisting arrest did not commit murder, the arrest being
tortious. The report ends with a note observing that neither the Star Chamber nor the
Chancery would warrant arrests merely to procure a party’s first appearance; they send a
Subpoena to the party and arrest him only when he commits the contempt of disobeying.
(An exact parallel with the Star Chamber and Chancery is obviously not intended, for
whereas those courts may proceed for contempt if the Subpoena is disobeyed, the High
Commission must excommunicate. The comparison does, however, suggest the question
whether the Commission may arrest for contempt after sentence—when a spiritual
sentence in the nature of an injunction is disobeyed. The present holding at least does not
imply that it may not. In contrast to earlier similar decisions, this one does not cut so
close to the general power of the Commission to imprison or otherwise transcend regular
ecclesiastical procedure. Its weight is more specifically on the illegality of arrest as the
first step in proceedings against a man—illegality which the High Commission did not
want to recognize, but which the Star Chamber and Chancery acknowledged in their
practice.)
Langdale’s Case (1608) 90 is a landmark as the first Cokean case testing the High
Commission’s authority to entertain marital suits. I think it likely that that authority
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T. 6 Jac. C.P. 12 Coke, 49.
The account in the text is constructed from the following sources: (a) Harl. 4817, f.
187b. Undated. (Fullest account of the facts—the wife’s allegations about the husband’s
wealth, the amount of the High Commission’s award, subsequent suit in the Arches.) (b)
12 Coke, 50, sub. nom. Marmaduke Langdale’s Case. Undated. (Agrees with Harl. 4817
on the result of the original motion for Prohibition. Suggests that a demurrer was
contemplated and gives the ruling that the count should run against the High
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became the main practical bone of contention between the common law judges and the
High Commission. Over serious Puritan cases they differed less than is perhaps
commonly believed; it is hard to criticize the judges for preventing the Commission from
infringing local autonomy for petty quarrels and misdemeanors; in marital matters, the
Commission may have believed it had a manifestly desirable role to play because
diocesan courts could not be trusted to enforce the morality embodied in ecclesiastical
law, or to insure fair treatment of women, against rich and influential people. The belief
was probably justified. In so far, however, as one is resolved that the High Commission is
limited to crime, and to grievous crime at that—primarily, if not exclusively, religious
unorthodoxy—, one will have trouble bringing marital litigation inside the Commission’s
jurisdiction. Adultery can be seen as a serious crime, even if it comes before the law only
as grounds in a divorce suit. But to hold it “enormous” without bringing the whole gamut
of commonplace sexual misconduct into the High Commission’s scope may be difficult.
Other marital matters are harder to give a criminal color or to elevate to enormity.
Langdale’s Case presents a pretty clear example of the civil end of the spectrum.
Langdale had “put away” his wife—why, whether with a legally valid or at least
understandable reason, and in what form, do not appear. The wife sued in the High
Commission for a separate-maintenance stipend, claiming that she was not allowed
enough support (not that she was provided with nothing at all) and showing her
husband’s financial circumstances, including her own contribution to his wealth. (He had
land to the value of over £1000 per year, plus land in his wife’s right worth £160 per
year—quod nota: we are dealing with a property arrangement for wealthy people.) The
Commission awarded that Langdale pay his wife £140 in separate maintenance. He
sought and obtained a Prohibition on the ground that no crime or enormous offense was
involved. Allowing maintenance belongs to the Bishop, the court said, and Langdale
ought not to be deprived of his appeal,
There are further wrinkles to the case, however. Justice Walmesley was at least
doubtful about the decision. Walmesley was by no means a friend of the Commission in
all respects, but he was to show in later cases a disinclination to exclude it from the
marital sector of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. I therefore take him as tending to dissent on
the substance in this case, as well as on a further point—whether the Common Pleas may
Commissioners. Records Walmesley’s doubts.) (c) 12 Coke, 58, sub nom. Langdale’s
Case. Dated M. 4 Jac. C.P. (It is likely that the other reports relate to a term or so earlier
than M. 4, though this is uncertain. There is no serious doubt that this is the same case as
Marmaduke Langdale, since we are told that one issue was whether an alimony suit may
be brought before the High Commission. But the report is exclusively about the Common
Pleas’ standing to prohibit without a plea pending. The arguments of counsel on this
point and the reply of a majority of the court are given in learned detail. It is not certain
that this discussion was upon the demurrer, but I take it that it was, because the other
report in Coke clearly indicates that a demurrer was expected and the arguments have the
thoroughness of debate on demurrer. The existence of two reports in Coke suggests
successive stages of the same case. Nothing is said about Walmesley’s dissent, but Coke
gives the names of the judges who agreed with himself—Warburton, Daniel and Foster;
Walmesley is missing, exactly as one would expect him to be on the basis of other cases
on the same issue.)
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prohibit when there is no pending suit, overlapping with the ecclesiastical one, in the
Common Pleas itself. The latter point was eventually debated at length and resolved by
the usual split: all the judges except Walmesley held that the Common Pleas may prohibit
any prohibitable suit, just as the King’s Bench may. (There are several cases on this point
not yet analyzed as a group in this study.)
The question about the Common Pleas’ standing to prohibit without a pending
case was resolved on demurrer in Langdale. A nice point of procedure was settled to
clear the way for a demurrer: The court ruled that plaintiff-in-Prohibition should count
against the High Commissioners—i.e., designate them as defendants-in-Prohibition—for
the purpose of formal pleading. This was necessary because a husband could not count
against his own wife. I.e., the real adverse party, the ecclesiastical plaintiff normally
treated as defendant-in-Prohibition, could not be the object of the declaration; a wife
could not be sued by her husband in Attachment-on-Prohibition, though there was no
objection to one spouse’s merely informing the court of an improper ecclesiastical suit
brought by the other; therefore, in order for a demurrer to be possible, the ecclesiastical
court must be treated, anomalously, as defendant-in-Prohibition.
The tone of Coke’s report suggests to me that the judges found this way to have a
demurrer because they were determined to find one. I imagine Langdale’s counsel
making trouble in the face of Mrs. Langdale’s (or perhaps more likely the High
Commission’s) desire to demur. As it were: “But how can there be a demurrer, when by
normal procedure Langdale would have to declare against his wife?” The report suggests
that the judges’ response may have been something like this: “Well, Prohibition cases
will always be settled on demurrer if defendant-in-Prohibition wants it that way. This is
categorical. We are not going to prevent Mrs. Langdale from prosecuting her
ecclesiastical suit on the basis of a mere surmise, nor confine her to objecting by a mere
informal motion. She has a right to her suit until a formal judgment on pleadings is given
against her, and when and if such judgment is given she is entitled to her Writ of Error.
Here’s how we’ll do it in his anomalous case—let the declaration run against the High
Commission.” (The possibility of a Writ of Error upon a formal judgment is expressly
mentioned. A parallel is irresistible in the context of this case: The court did not approve
of cheating people of their ecclesiastical appeals by taking suits needlessly to the High
Commission; it had no intention to let anyone be deprived of appellate recourse in
Prohibition proceedings at common law.)
A demurrer, especially one insisted on in the face of a certain difficulty, implies
seriousness and hope. Mrs. Langdale, or the High Commission behind her, was unwilling
to see a precedent set for prohibiting marital suits without maximum effort to prevent it.
She, or the Commission, must have hoped the judges would see the light on full-scale
argument. If that hope was faint, the prospect of overturning a Common Pleas judgment
by Error in the King’s Bench may have looked better. Having demurred, defendant-inProhibition would appear to have chosen the Common Pleas’ standing to prohibit without
a plea pending as the better ground to fight on, for it is the debate on that that is reported,
though the jurisdiction question may have had more attention than we know.
Emphasizing the standing of the Common Pleas perhaps drew Walmesley’s clear dissent,
which may have been as much as defendant hoped for. In Wither above, where High
Commission involvement was especially inexcusable, the court is reported as
unanimously holding that the Common Pleas may prohibit without an overlapping plea
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pending before it. Although Walmesley was to display his contrary opinion in several
cases, he would seem to have overcome it in Wither. In Langdale, he probably did not
approve of the Prohibition on the merits, and that disapproval may have moved him to
make up his mind to dissent on the issue of the Common Pleas’ standing—the stronger
ground, since it is hard to give the Commission jurisdiction in a separate maintenance suit
and deny it jurisdiction over any other ecclesiastical cause.
Langdale’s Case on demurrer had a sequel (briefly reported in Harl. 4817.) Mrs.
Langdale, having been prohibited from suing in the High Commission, sued in the
Arches. Her husband now sought a Prohibition from the Common Pleas to stop the new
suit. The writ was denied. This comes to holding that although an expelled wife’s suit
for maintenance does not belong in the High Commission it is perfectly appropriate to a
regular ecclesiastical court. The decision of the prior case on demurrer had cleared away
any objection to pursuing Prohibition in the Common Pleas, so the only question arising
is how the husband could have had any chance to stop the Arches suit. One possibility is
that exception was taken on 23 Hen. VIII to going to the Arches instead of a diocesan
court. There is no indication of that in the report, however, and the large sums of money
and complicated circumstances in Langdale make it quite likely that the case was
removed to the archdiocesan level at the Bishop’s request. The other possibility is that
the husband thought it arguable that the wife’s independent wealth debarred her from
recovering. The Common Pleas seems not to have debated that point, for the report has
the court saying only that the case was now in the proper court. That comes in effect to
saying that entitlement to separate maintenance is purely an ecclesiastical question.
The most significant point about Edwards’s Case (1608) 91 is another dissent by
Walmesley, it would appear. (The decision to prohibit is given as that of Coke,
Warburton, Daniel and Foster. If Walmesley participated he dissented. He could have
done so because of his opinion about the Common Pleas’ prohibiting power in general.
The plausibility of a dissent on the merits is discussed below. The case for prohibiting
seems very strong. The High Commission proceeded against Edwards for several things.
Part of the charge was that he had defamed a physician, Dr. Walton, by casting aspersions
on his professional competence. As to this, the court held that any wrong done to Walton
was temporal wrong, for which the remedy was at common law. The judges were
vehement: the Commission ran the risk of Praemunire for proceeding in such a matter.
The point, which is not specific to the High Commission, seems all but unanswerable.
The only possible basis for dissenting I can see so far is that defamation of Oxford
University was mixed in with defamation of Walton. (Edwards “taxed the University
with rashness” in making Walton an M.D.) The majority went on to say that even if there
were a cause for ecclesiastical defamation it should be complained of in the episcopal
court, not the High Commission. (Edwards had allegedly said that Walton and another
physician, Dr. Maders, were cuckolds and that Walton had inherited syphilis and leprosy
from his father. Such aspersions were less apt than professional incompetence to support
a common law action, for which reason there is perhaps a difficulty about contesting their
prima facie power to support an ecclesiastical suit, though I doubt that they would be
91
M. 6 Jac. C.P. 13 Coke, 9; Lansd. 601, f.2ll. No important differences. Lansd. 601
consists of cases published in 12 and 13 Coke, usually little different from the printed
versions.
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held capable of doing so. The judges were content to say that there was no High
Commission matter here.) One can dissent from the proposition that the High
Commission is excluded from ecclesiastical defamation at all; Justice Walmesley may
have done so.
Most of the color of enormity in the charges against Edwards comes from the rest:
Walton’s late father had been Bishop of Exeter, so that attributing French pox and
leprosy to him worked “to the dislike of the dignity and calling of Bishops.” Edwards had
obtained a Star Chamber sentence against Dr. Walton and boasted about it; as it
happened, Dr. Walton was a member of the Ecclesiastical Commission for Exeter (local
equivalent of the national—properly Canterbury Archdiocese—High Commission); by
bragging that he “had gotten on the hip of a Commissioner for causes ecclesiastical”,
Edwards not only vilified Walton but “in him the whole commission ecclesiastical in
those parts.”. Finally, when summoned before the High Commission, Edwards had
“arrogantly” said that “he cared not for anything this Court can do” to him, and that he
could remove the case at his pleasure. In short, the charges in part accused Edwards of
“contempt” or collective slander of the Church, smacking of Puritanism if not plain
irreverence. The majority of the Common Pleas held that slander of the High
Commission itself—referring to his behavior upon receiving his summons—was
punishable at common law. This accords with the King’s Bench in Fuller. The majority
did not single out what I call the further element of collective slander or disrespect, but
lumped it together with any possible ingredient of individual ecclesiastical defamation as
clearly less than enormous. Justice Walmesley could have dissented from the proposition
that the Commission may not proceed against contempt or slander of itself, and he could
have seen sufficient admixture of “collective slander” and irreligion to make a High
Commission case here without abandoning the enormity criterion and admitting the
Commission to any and all ecclesiastical causes. The majority decision adds no
limitations on the Commission that were not well-anticipated. (A further point on selfincrimination in Edwards is discussed in Vol. II above, p. 194.)
Perepoynt’s Case (1609)92 is considered in Chapter 2 above for its bearing on 23
Hen. VIII. On the High Commission’s substantive jurisdiction, the report gives a per
Curiam holding without sign of dissent that tithe, marriage, and testamentary matters are
not examinable by the Commission. The charge in the instant case was procuring a priest
to marry a gentleman’s daughter to a ploughman in the night and attending the
clandestine wedding. The case was complicated by an element of double vexation: The
defendant had been excommunicated by his bishop for the same offense and subsequently
absolved, after which the Commission undertook to prosecute him. We are told also that
he was imprisoned by the Commission, and that the court resolved that it would set him
at liberty if the Commission did not do so upon his making submission. That seems a bit
reticent if the court thought the Commission utterly ultra vires. The report, however, does
not so much as inform us whether the case arose on Prohibition or Habeas corpus. If the
former, advising the party to submit may come only to saving trouble and conflict—as it
were, “Go be polite and say you’re sorry and see whether the Commission, taking note of
the Prohibition, won’t release you, but if you fail bring a Habeas corpus.” There is no
sign of a Habeas corpus before the court and no discussion of the imprisoning power.
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Veniar v. Pellin (1609)93 is of interest mainly for its unusual structure and the
arguments of counsel. (A few judicial remarks are reported, but the case was adjourned
without decision.) Pellin, a parson, was prosecuted in the High Commission by the
“procurement” of Sir Henry Veniar. I.e., he was prosecuted ex officio, but Veniar
informed the Commission of his alleged offense and promoted the prosecution. Pellin
was charged with failure to provide services in a chapel of ease in his parish, as the
parson was allegedly bound to do by custom. Veniar failed to furnish sufficient proof
(presumably of the custom). Thereupon Pellin was acquitted of liability and Veniar was
sentenced to pay Pellin costs to the sum of 10 marks. Veniar sought a Prohibition to
block execution of the award of costs.
Serjeant Harris, for Veniar, argued simply that the High Commission had no
business proceeding for such a matter as failing to provide and finance religious services
in a chapel. This is surely a valid application of the enormity criterion, which Harris
expressly asserted. (1 Eliz. was directed against Popery and heresy and confines the
Commission to exorbitant offenses of that order.) As far as the report indicates, Harris did
not elaborate the tricky aspect of this case. The only question, as he represented the case,
was whether the Commission had jurisdiction over the matter. If it did not, then all acts
of the Commission in consequence of the proceeding were ultra vires and ought to be
nullified by Prohibition, as much the award of costs against Veniar upon Pellin’s acquittal
as any sentence that might have been given against Pellin if he had been found at fault.
That Veniar was responsible for Pellin’s being brought before the Commission for an
inappropriate matter and put to expense made no difference by Harris’s theory. (Let it be
said, before Pellin is pitied, that on Harris’s view of the law he could have nipped the
High Commission suit in the bud by Prohibition; contesting it can certainly be called his
folly.)
Serjeant Shurley, for Pellin, argued at greater length, both attacking Harris’s
position on the Commission’s jurisdiction and contending that the award of costs against
Veniar was lawful even if the prosecution of Pellin was not. On the jurisdiction question,
Shurley advanced a theory midway between that which would confine the Commission to
enormous crimes and that which would permit it to entertain any ecclesiastical causes the
King chose to assign it. His underlying premise is the same as will support unlimited
ecclesiastical jurisdiction for the High Commission: Supreme ecclesiastical authority is in
the monarch de jure, and 1 Eliz. only confirms his title and removes the Pope from de
facto possession. By virtue of his supremacy, the monarch may delegate ecclesiastical
jurisdiction without specific authorization from the statute. He may so delegate it as to
give special commissioners jurisdiction which would ordinarily belong to regular Church
courts. This is evident from the fact that the monarch, by virtue of the same supremacy,
may grant individuals exemption from ordinary episcopal jurisdiction by charter, as
several Year Books are cited to show. I.e., if the King may derogate from the regular
courts by way of charter of exemption, so may he by setting up an extraordinary court by
patent.
Shurley did not, however, push these premises to their implicit conclusion.
Rather, he conceded that the Commission was limited to “public offenses” and excluded
from “private or meum et tuum.” This contention he appears to rest on the statute, not on
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the contingent fact that the monarch had granted only “public” jurisdiction to the
Commission in his patent. The theory would seem to be: 1 Eliz. does limit the monarch’s
de jure power to assign any class of ecclesiastical litigation to special tribunals in
derogation of the ordinary ones. It confines such assignment to “public offenses”
(whatever the exact boundary between public and private, and however precisely that
distinction corresponds to criminal/civil and to the procedural antithesis ex officio/libelcommenced.) Public offense means any public offense; there is no restriction to
enormities. The offense charged against Pellin in the instant case, according to Shurley,
was clearly public.
What does the application in this case say about the meaning of “public”? It
seems questionable that Pellin’s alleged default can be made out as criminal, let alone
enormous. “Public” = “criminal” may = “lawfully liable to ex officio prosecution”, but it
can hardly be equivalent to “merely in fact prosecuted ex officio”, because any alleged
wrong could be prosecuted—improperly—in that form. Shurley is careful to point out in
his argument that no common law action would lie for neglect of Pellin’s duty—in
contrast to the situation where someone is obliged to maintain a chapel for the use of a
particular individual and his family. But that only goes to say that the High Commission
had not invaded the temporal sphere in this case. It need not imply that no one would
have “civil standing” to enforce the duty in the ecclesiastical sphere, though it is possible
that Shurley intended so to claim—i.e., to argue that since the chapel was for the benefit
of all the inhabitants of the hamlet it served, the duty to maintain it was not civilly
enforceable, whence breach of the duty, if legally controllable at all, must be controllable
as a “crime” of sorts. Shurley points to the rule that the King may pardon ecclesiastical
suits pro salute animae, but not ecclesiastical suits in which a private party has an interest
and says that in the instant case no particular party had one. Whether that implies only
that the present High Commission suit could be pardoned or that any conceivable suit by
inhabitants would be pardonable makes a question. Shurley probably intended to suggest
the latter—that an inhabitants’ suit, if possible, would still be pardonable and therefore is
inherently “public.” If we assume, however, that a civil suit by inhabitants would be
perfectly appropriate, or even unpardonable, does it follow that Pellin’s neglect of his
duty is not a “public” offense? Not necessarily. Arguably, the duty is “public” because it
runs to all inhabitants and concerns their spiritual welfare, as opposed to mere material
interest—notwithstanding that a suit by particular inhabitants, or a “class action” for all
of them, would lie. The only help Shurley supplies is that he says the offense here was
not “not only public facto but exemplo.” “Facto” must refer to the considerations I have
advanced. “Exemplo” may add a bit. I suggest: To make out that an ecclesiastical offense
is public, it is relevant to consider whether deterring it is plausibly important for setting a
good example in the Church, with a view to the Church’s morale and “image.” If that is
the point, the application makes sense. Clergymen responsible for maintaining ancillary
chapels in their parishes—for seeing that religious services are as conveniently available
to the people as they have been in the past—should be encouraged to take their
responsibility seriously. If known instances of neglect are overlooked, or left to the
chances of private litigation, other clergymen will be tempted to similar neglect. And the
quality of religious life will suffer. By contrast, one might suggest, whether Jane secures
the right to live apart from her abusive husband and receive alimony is a comparatively
private question, though the husband’s conduct is morally much worse than that of a
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clergyman trying to save himself the trouble of keeping up a separate chapel in an
obscure hamlet. Of course the husband is a bad example too, but so are those who
infringe the ecclesiastical duties that must surely be reserved for the private side, such as
the duty to pay tithes. Hence my suggestion that “exemplo” be taken to refer to the
Church’s internal standards and discipline.
How Shurley arrived at his theory about the High Commission’s scope is not
evident. He does not linger over exposition of 1 Eliz. A case for “crimes and public
offenses only, but not only enormous ones” based on the statute’s words does not seem to
me easy to make. Going by probable intent, however, that formula is plausible: Why
should Parliament have wanted to override the ordinary civil jurisdiction of established
ecclesiastical courts, with such effects as defeating the policy of 23 Hen. VIII? Why
should it not have foreseen the utility of an extraordinary, centralized tribunal for
enforcing the “public law” of the Church, especially the part of it that regulates clerical
behavior and demands respectful treatment by the laity? Is that not just the area where
local courts, if not lax or intimidated, are at least likely not to have uniform standards?
Are variable standards and the lure of paths of least resistance not likely to be a more
serious problem in small matters than in great—more likely to lead in some localities to
the decay of chapels of ease, say, than to the propagation of heresy? Rather than argue
directly about the statute, Shurley cites two important clerical-behavior cases, Cheinye (in
which he was counsel) and Caudry—both discussed above. In those cases, the
Commission’s authority to meddle beyond the narrow range of enormities can be said to
have been upheld. Though to rely on those cases alone is to ignore many decisions made
in the meantime, Shurley’s theory is a reasonable projection from King’s Bench cases,
which include those two.
Shurley then proceeded to argue that whether or not the Commission’s
prosecution of Pellin was lawful, Prohibition should not be granted to frustrate the award
of costs. Most basically, he sought in effect to distinguish that award from any sentence
that might have been given against Pellin. Conceding that the latter would have been an
improper arrogation of the diocesan court’s role, the same cannot be said of the former.
The award of costs to Pellin finally implies only that he was wrongfully vexed by the suit
in the High Commission and should therefore be compensated. To make that judgment is
not to pretend to do something that a Bishop’s court ought to be doing, or could do in the
circumstances (albeit that the circumstances may include a wrongful assumption of
jurisdiction by the Commission.) Surely the High Commission is prohibitable on
jurisdictional—as opposed to sanction—grounds only if it is in fact taking something
away from regular ecclesiastical courts. (I elaborate the argument here from the bare
sentence, “Auxi les costes assesse devant les Hault Commissioners est solement pur le
vexacon et ne tolle le Jurisdiccon del Ordinary.”)
Shurley’s next argument is that a sentence given in an ecclesiastical court may not
be examined by a common law court. That is as much as he says. What does he mean?
The remark could be a flat objection to Prohibition after sentence. That, however, is not a
very promising line (see Vol. I, pp. 115 ff.), and Shurley’s own further argument (just
below) shows that he knew a categorical rule against intervention after judgment was
untenable. I suggest as an alternative that Shurley’s point here is that the Common Pleas
ought not to take note of why Pellin was awarded costs. I.e., saying in the present context
that the sentence is not examinable is an instance of the respectable position that common
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law courts ought not to go behind ecclesiastical sentences to ask whether they were just
or correct by ecclesiastical law—a position perfectly compatible with holding that an
originally ultra vires suit may be prohibited whether or not it has proceeded to sentence.
Here, there is great virtue, from Shurley’s point of view, in not looking behind the
sentence awarding costs to Pellin. In fact, that sentence was given because the prosecutor,
Veniar, failed to prove the charge against Pellin, the Commission having assumed
jurisdiction. If we note only that sentence of costs was awarded to defendant for wrongful
vexation and ignore the reason, it need not appear to the court judicially that the
Commission assumed jurisdiction improperly, if that was the case. Costs for wrongful
vexation might have been awarded to defendant for what Shurley’s opponents must
regard as the best of reasons: because Pellin was wrongfully sued in the High
Commission instead of a diocesan court. Only by prying into how the Commission
actually justified the sentence to itself and claiming that a mistake about its jurisdiction
was involved as a cause of the Commission’s act can those opponents object to the
sentence On their own premises, they ought to welcome it as such—as due compensation
of a man who was wrongfully vexed. (Between the words quoted at the end of the last
paragraph above and those on which this paragraph is based—“Auxi sentence done in
Spirituall Court ne serra examine hic”—comes a sentence of which I can make no direct
sense: “Auxi le jusisdiccon fuit que suer devant lordinary.” I wonder whether that could
be a garbled link between the two intelligible points. As it were, “The most that can be
said is that by proper jurisdictional rules Pellin ought to have been sued before the
Ordinary; if we do not examine the reason for the sentence, we cannot say but what the
sentence takes note of that very point and compensates Pellin accordingly.”)
Shurley’s final point may seem the most obvious: that Veniar was trying to
prohibit, not his own private suit, but as good as that—a criminal suit prosecuted by him.
Shurley realized, however, that exploiting this situation was not obvious, however weak
Veniar’s moral position. (See Vol. I, pp. 161 ff. for the general point that prohibiting
one’s own suit was by no means ruled out in principle.) Shurley’s words here are, “”Sir
H. V. himself preferred the suit to the High Commissioners, and therefore he will not
have Prohibition, and yet 22 Edw. IV although the party admits the jurisdiction yet the
Court will award Prohibition…” The italics, which are mine, indicate the words by
which Shurley concedes, with the help of his Year Book source, that prohibiting what is
in some sense “one’s own suit” is not absolutely barred. (It is these words which lead me
to say above that Shurley probably did not claim that there can be no Prohibition after
sentence. As it were, waiting until after sentence is one form of –arguably—“admitting
the jurisdiction of the court”; starting a suit in a given court oneself is another.) To get
around this difficulty, Shurley proposed what can be seen as a modified version of Justice
Walmesley’s view of the Common Pleas’ general standing to prohibit: It is true that
admitting the jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical court is no bar to Prohibition if the purpose
of the Prohibition is to protect a plea pending in the Common Pleas. Otherwise, it is a bar
(mes ceo [the point based on 22 Edw. IV above] est intend ou est plea pendant in cest
court et issint nest nostre case”) Walmesley’s full view was that there must always be a
“plea pending in this court” to justify Common Pleas Prohibitions. Shurley would seem
to have realized that that would not go down with any of the judges except Walmesley,
but to have thought a piece of it salvageable. His position restated comes to: The policy
of the law, or at least this court, is against self-prohibition, but an exception is made in
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the situation in which Prohibition is so urgently desirable that it will lie on even the most
restrictive view of the Common Pleas’ authority—where to stop a foreign suit is to stop
encroachment on the court’s own business. But that situation does not obtain here, ergo
Veniar may not have a Prohibition after admitting the High Commission’s jurisdiction.
In justice to Shurley’s subtle argument, it is worth noting a road he does not take.
I think it is plausible to argue that people whose ecclesiastical suits are misplaced to
begin with may not later prohibit them. I.e., self-prohibition is clearly unobjectionable
only when the suit is well-commenced originally, but an issue appropriate to common
law determination arises in the course of it. If one concedes that Veniar ought never to
have promoted the High Commission suit, then one can argue that he ought not to have a
Prohibition. But that would be to concede what Shurley’s opponents claimed—the High
Commission lacked jurisdiction—, though they of course did not draw the conclusion
therefrom that Veniar lacked standing to have a Prohibition. Not wanting to concede that,
Shurley took another tack: asserting a general policy against self-prohibition, subject only
to exceptions not relevant here—wherefore Veniar should not have a Prohibition
regardless of whether the High Commission had jurisdiction. Note that Shurley’s two
points before the present one are in the same form. They do not involve conceding for the
sake of argument that the High Commission lacked jurisdiction, but by-pass that
question: whether it had jurisdiction or not, it did not encroach on the diocesan courts by
the specific act of awarding costs to Pellin and, in compensating him for wrongful
vexation, may for all we need know have denied its own jurisdiction. A judge who
thought the High Commission lacked jurisdiction might, however, take the alternative
route to denying Veniar a Prohibition. On Veniar’s, or Harris’s, own premise it may
follow that Veniar should not have a Prohibition, though Shurley’s claim that the general
policy is against self-prohibition be rejected. On the same premise, it may follow that
Prohibition lies because who informs the court of the ultra vires suit is immaterial. The
choice, which trenches to the theory of Prohibitions, must be made once the premise is
accepted. Shurley’s argument, on the other hand, permits holding that the Commission
had jurisdiction and therefore Prohibition does not lie. It also permits making no decision
about the Commission’s jurisdiction and still concluding that Prohibition does not lie.
(Again, cf. Vol. I on self-prohibition generally.)
The judicial response to Shurley’s careful argument was for the moment cursory.
Coke jumped immediately on the last point: “But as to that, Lord Coke said the
Prohibition is the King’s suit, as appears by 28 Edw. III. And the writ is contra coronam
et dignitatem, and therefore although the party himself may not sue, yet the Court must
award Prohibition.” I.e., Coke predictably embraced the “public stake” theory of
Prohibitions, whereby all that matters is whether a foreign suit should be prohibited on
the merits and the standing of the private party seeking Prohibition is never objectionable.
However, though Coke opposed his last argument, Shurley had several more. The rest
that Coke says, reportedly with Justice Foster’s concurrence, avoids taking up Shurley’s
further points but sounds encouraging for his cause. For after objecting to Shurley’s
position on self-prohibition, Coke turns around with a “but” and says Consultation will
lie in this case. The reasons he gives have nothing to do with the substance: “For
although the statute of 1 Eliz. is shown, which gives authority to the King to appoint
Commissioners etc., yet it is not shown what authority is given to him [sic—“luy”—but
probably “them”], and so it does not appear to the court that they have authority of the
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matter in question. Also, it is not shown that there are any commissioners, etc.” It looks
as if Coke turned his attention to picking purely formal holes in Veniar’s surmise—
failure to recite the statute and patent, the names of the Commissioners, and the like in
such form as was required if one wanted to prohibit the Commission. If that is right, the
course is understandable. The majority of the court is unlikely to have been persuadable
by Shurley’s theory of the Commission’s jurisdiction. On the other hand, Veniar’s moral
position was weak. If narrow reasons for holding in Pellin’s favor could be found, so
much the better. Raking over the Commission’s jurisdiction again—in the face of an able
argument against the court’s preferred enormity theory—could be avoided. If
technicalities would do the job of justice, it would be unnecessary to grapple with
Shurley’s position on the jurisdiction question. Even if nothing he said was actually
accepted by the court, Shurley’s argument may have had its effect in heading off Harris’s
glib appeal to the enormity theory and forcing a search for narrow grounds. The case was
adjourned after Coke spoke, and I have no report of its resumption.
Darrington’s Case (1609-10) 94 is discussed at length in Vol. II because of its
incidental bearing on self-incrimination. It will suffice here to restate summarily its
significance for the High Commission’s jurisdiction and sanctions. The significance is
considerable. For present purposes we need concern ourselves only with Darrington’s
Habeas corpus, not with the Prohibition he obtained at a later stage in his struggle with
the Commission. The case is the first on Habeas corpus wholly from the period of
Coke’s Chief Justiceship. It resulted in remand of the prisoner originally and later, on a
second writ, in his admission to bail at most—i.e., he was not discharged outright. In
justification of this result, the court per Coke adopted and supported by an express theory
the position that the Commission may imprison for some offenses. This position must be
regarded as a reversal of the opinion, which was quite well-entrenched in the Common
Pleas before Coke’s accession, that the Commission may simply not use secular
sanctions. In addition, going beyond the immediate needs of this case, Coke laid down
with purported comprehensiveness what offenses fall within the Commission’s
jurisdiction. The enormity test was endorsed, and its content was specified as in no
previous case. Finally, the court confirmed two propositions that were hardly still within
the range of realistic controversy. (a) Exposition of 1 Eliz., and hence the last word on
what the High Commission’s powers are, belongs to the common law judges and not to
the Commission itself. (b) The statute itself delimits the Commission’s powers—i.e.,
does not enable the monarch to confer such power as he chooses on it.
With respect to jurisdiction, Darrington itself was not difficult. The return on the
Habeas corpus may not have been beyond criticism with regard to every element in a
complex charge against the prisoner, but it was reasonably full and it made clear that one
of his offenses, at any rate, was Brownism. In his speech, Coke called Brownism heresy.
Be that as it may, it was certainly serious religious error by the standards of the
Established Church, with which the judges were never disposed to quarrel. The enormity
test was easily satisfied in this case. It is therefore by way of dictum that Coke in the
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course of his opinion ventured to say what offenses belonged to the Commission—viz.
heresy, schism, polygamy, incest and recusancy. He represents this list as exhaustive and
as having been agreed on in Queen Elizabeth’s time (by whom or in what context he does
not say.) For the inclusion of one item, polygamy, he offers an argument: that offense
was made felony by the statute of 3 Jac., wherefore it must have been an enormous
spiritual offense before. I.e., Parliament would surely not have felonized an ecclesiastical
crime unless it adjudged it to be of the most heinous intrinsic character. Towards defining
the Commission’s jurisdiction negatively, Coke offered one example of a non-enormous
crime: It was held in a Reimore’s Case (undated by Coke and not independently reported)
that the High Commission may not punish a man for working on holidays.
The problematic issue in Darrington was the power to imprison. It appeared on
Darrington’s first Habeas corpus that he was imprisoned until such time as he should
“make submission” to the Commission and give security not to repeat his offenses. I.e.,
he was committed to coerce performance of a spiritual sentence, not as a punishment.
(The order to make submission was a plainly legitimate ecclesiastical sentence. The
legitimacy of forcing him to enter a good behavior bond could probably be challenged,
but the reports give no sign of its having been.) The court’s decision upholding the
imprisonment, therefore, goes in strictness only to coercive or equity-style commitment.
Nothing in the Chief Justice’s language, however, indicates an intent to limit the
Commission to coercing and restrain it from punishing. Coke says incidentally that the
Commission may fine where it may imprison, and fining is hard not to regard as punitive.
(From other evidence—see the discussion of this case in Vol. II—it appears that
Darrington was in fact modestly fined. This fact does not come out in the reports of the
Habeas corpus, however, and was presumably not before the court.) After having been
remanded, Darrington brought a second Habeas corpus, claiming he had made
submission as required and was still not discharged. The second writ raised problems of
its own, concerning how closely the common law court should look into whether
Darrington had in fact made submission, or done so in an adequate form (see Vol. II.)
But no new questions about the imprisoning power as such arose on the second Habeas
corpus.
Coke’s theory in justification of the Commission’s power to imprison goes as
follows: Ecclesiastical courts have no inherent power to imprison, even for the most
serious crimes. Three statutes prior to 1 Eliz., however, gave them limited imprisoning
power. Two of these—5 Rich. II, Stat. 2, c. 5, and 2 Hen. IV, c.15—applied to heresy and
closely related matters. Both were repealed by 1 Eliz. The intention of 1 Eliz. was not,
however, to do away with such imprisoning power; it was rather to transfer it from the
ordinary ecclesiastical courts to the High Commission. With respect to heresy, removal of
secular sanctions from the hands of the then-untrustworthy Bishops, rather than the
reduction of all ecclesiastical courts to their de jure spiritual sanctions, was the policy of
the Elizabethan settlement. It obviously does not follow that imprisonment is lawful for
the other crimes on Coke’s list above, especially polygamy and incest (for serious
religious error short of heresy at least partakes of the nature of heresy, and it may fall
within the letter of the medieval statutes.) Indeed, it is the opposite that follows from the
present theory, on which Coke seems to insist quite clearly: nothing is punishable by
imprisonment in the High Commission that was not so punishable in other ecclesiastical
courts before the High Commission existed, even though 1 Eliz. permits the
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Commission’s jurisdiction to extend to a few major crimes which could not previously be
punished by imprisonment. Whether Coke intended so strict an inference to be drawn
from the theory I am not sure. The alternative would be that 1 Eliz. meant to give the
Commission imprisoning power for all offenses within its jurisdiction, in which case it
would not properly speaking have transferred the power from the Bishops to the
Commission. It would have made such a transfer for the most important offenses, while
conferring the power to imprison on the Commission de novo for a couple of further
crimes of comparable gravity. The only clue to Coke’s choice between the two
possibilities is indecisive: his citation of Fuller’s Case for the proposition that the
Commission may imprison for heresy or schism. If schism (which, rather than heresy,
was Fuller’s offense) is within the words or equity of the medieval statutes, then perhaps
imprisonment is lawful only for heresy, schism, et similia; otherwise, schism is within the
same case as incest for present purposes, and the Commission may imprison so long as it
has jurisdiction.
Coke’s third example of ecclesiastical power to imprison before 1 Eliz. introduces
its own complications. 1 Hen. VII, c. 4, gave ecclesiastical courts power to imprison
clergymen for various forms of incontinence. Coke mentions this statute only to complete
his catalogue of exceptions to the general rule that spiritual courts may not use temporal
sanctions. He does not say that 1 Eliz. intended to allow the monarch to confer power on
the High Commission to proceed against clerical incontinence. There were strong
reasons to suppose that the statute meant to permit the Commission to be given
jurisdiction, together with power of imprisonment, over serious religious offenses once
subject to ecclesiastical imprisonment, but why over the more commonplace clerical
incontinence, which regular ecclesiastical courts were already equipped to deal with by
imprisonment? I have found no spelled-out answers to this question. Cases below
suggest that the High Commission was unlikely to be prohibited from dealing with
incontinent clergy. This may reflect a never fully justified broadening of the “enormous”
category beyond Coke’s short list in Darrington, together with a loose readiness to
assume that in creating an ecclesiastical court with power to imprison Parliament
intended that anyone in danger of ecclesiastical imprisonment was subject to that court’s
jurisdiction.
In sum, Darrington is a clear vindication of the High Commission’s imprisoning
power in grave religious error cases. Coke was ready to stretch “enormity” a bit farther,
but only to a few specified crimes. It is worth noting that he took the occasion of this
case to affirm a broad limit on the imprisoning power: Coke cites, as Symsone’s Case, a
“resolution” of the Elizabethan Judges Anderson and Gianville at assizes, which we have
seen referred to before. In this case, a pursuivant was sent to arrest a man (for adultery,
probably not an infra vires High Commission offense) “in a layman’s house.” The
pursuivant was slain—by whom does not appear (the householder? the intended
arrestee?) It was decided “on great deliberation and conference with the other Justices”
that the slayer had committed manslaughter rather than murder, because the High
Commission may not arrest a man’s body, but should proceed by citation and
excommunication. This decision was the ancestor of others to the effect that the
Commission could not “imprison” suspects by arresting them, whatever its power to
detain the convicted.
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In Parson Wransfield’s Case, from the same term as Darrington’s second Habeas
corpus, 95 the Common Pleas had no objection to the High Commission’s prosecuting
Wransfield for inveighing against the Book of Common Prayer. The court called the
offense enormous, without labeling it heresy or, more plausibly, schism and without
speaking to whether a layman’s liability would be the same as that of the clergyman who
was defendant here. Imprisoning Wransfield for the purpose of compelling him to testify
was upheld, and he was accordingly sent back to prison. The serious issues in the case
were on authority to exact self-incriminating testimony, for which see the discussion of
the case in Vol. II (pp. 370-372, 376.)
A small point on the High Commission’s jurisdiction was decided the same term
at Serjeants’ Inn (probably by reference from the Common Pleas to all the judges.)96 It
was agreed that perjury committed in ecclesiastical courts is to be punished by those
courts, rather than by temporal proceedings pursuant to the statute of 5 Eliz., c.9. This
holding simply states what the Perjury Act of 5 Eliz. all but unmistakably provides. The
significant point in this case is a further gloss: “this is not to be understood [as meaning]
that one may be punished before the High Commissioners, but in the Ordinary’s court.”
I.e., if a man commits perjury in a regular ecclesiastical court he is to be punished for it
there; he is not to be cited before the High Commission. If you like, perjury in
ecclesiastical proceedings is not an enormous offense, nor does the High Commission
have a kind of supervisory authority over the whole ecclesiastical judicial system, by
virtue of which it may punish such abuses of the system as perjury wherever within it
they occur. The report leaves hanging, however, the question whether perjury committed
in the High Commission itself, in the course of proceedings within its jurisdiction, may
be punished by the Commission. To deny that it may seems an extreme conclusion, but it
is not an impossible one. If one insists that the Commission has jurisdiction over only a
few specified enormities, and perjury is not among them, it may well follow that perjury
even in a legitimate High Commission case must be prosecuted in a regular ecclesiastical
court. To the principal holding, Coke is reported to have added a further point: In
practice, he said in effect, perjury committed in ecclesiastical courts was not always left
to the ecclesiastical system. Rather, it was commonly punished in the Star Chamber.
(That practice in no way conflicts with 5 Eliz. The statute exempts perjury in
ecclesiastical courts from new penalty actions created by it, but it expressly saves means
of prosecuting perjury which already existed when the statute was made. The major effect
of that proviso was to preserve Star Camber jurisdiction over perjury in the temporal
sphere as an alternative to the newly created procedures, but there could be no reason
why it should not save such jurisdiction in the spiritual sphere as well. ) Calling attention
to the Star Chamber’s role in punishing ecclesiastical perjury reflects in two ways on the
judges’ holding concerning the High Commission. First, it points up the contrast between
the Star Chamber and the High Commission, the sense in which the Commission should
not be conceived as a kind of “ecclesiastical Star Chamber.” It was a function of the Star
Chamber, as an extraordinary court with a special responsibility for punishing abuses of
legal process, to deal with perjury committed anywhere in the judicial system, whether in
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the lay or the ecclesiastical branch. According to our principal holding, the High
Commission was not to function as an equivalent tribunal for the ecclesiastical system
alone. Secondly, the Star Chamber was simply available as a supplement to ecclesiastical
courts for ecclesiastical perjury. There was no need for the High Commission to serve as
a duplicate supplement to ordinary ecclesiastical courts. The availability of the Star
Chamber may, indeed, argue that the Commission ought not even to punish perjury
committed in its own cases. It is perhaps disturbing to imagine perjury in the superior
High Commission being tried in an inferior Bishop’s court, but there is no oddity in
holding that such perjury belongs to the still-superior, more comprehensive Star
Chamber.
A dictum by Coke from early 161097 takes a surprisingly broad view of the
Commission’s jurisdiction. In the principal case reported, the Common Pleas refused to
prohibit a regular ecclesiastical court from prosecuting a man who said he would not
listen to sermons by ministers who came to their positions via Bishops—i.e., presumably,
by episcopal institution. That is a highly predictable decision, the sort of Puritan case in
which the courts were not inclined to interfere with ecclesiastical discipline, including
that wielded by the High Commission. By the way, Coke noted another case, in which a
parson sued someone in the High Commission for calling him “knave.” According to
Coke, this suit was regarded as good in itself, but it was prohibited because the
Commission imprisoned the defendant. Coke seems to cite this decision with approval,
presumably thinking it supportive in the principal case. (If ecclesiastical courts, even the
High Commission, may proceed for defaming a clergyman by words so trivial that they
would probably not be defamatory of anyone else, surely they may proceed for a much
more serious expression of disrespect toward towards the constituted ecclesiastical
order.) Coke’s citation seems to deviate from Darrington in two ways: (1) It extends
High Commission jurisdiction, not to all ecclesiastical causes, presumably, but to smallpotatoes disrespect for the cloth. (2) Contrary to Darrington, it does not treat jurisdiction
and the power to impose secular sanctions as coterminous. I can only explain the report
by supposing that Coke casually used a pre-Darrington holding for his immediate
purpose without considering its correctness by present standards, if indeed he thought the
standards had been decisively changed.
With three reports from 1610, we return to marital disputes. One, George Melton’s
Case,98 tells us that Melton was imprisoned by the High Commission in his wife’s suit for
separate maintenance, a separation having been made between them. No further
particulars are given—at what stage of the wife’s suit and to what end the husband was
committed, whether the separation was de facto, as that in Langdale probably was, or by
order of the Commission or another ecclesiastical court. We are told in addition that
Melton was compelled to enter a bond to abide by the Commission’s award (but not
whether he had actually entered it, as opposed to holding out and suffering imprisonment
wholly or partly for his refusal.) Whether the case reached the Common Pleas by Habeas
corpus or Prohibition is not reported. In any event, three judges—Coke, Walmesley, and
Daniel—held that the imprisonment was unlawful. So far as the report indicates, that is
all they held. I.e., there is no affirmative sign, at any rate, that the judges objected to the
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Commission’s taking jurisdiction of the separate maintenance suit, if only it had not
resorted to a temporal sanction. Justice Walmesley, at least, should be expected so to
distinguish the scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction from the more limited range of its
secular sanctions; that position would be more surprising in Coke and Daniel (cf.
Langdale.) In support of their holding, the three judges cited the statute of 1 Hen, VII, c.
4, permitting the imprisonment of incontinent priests. The relevance is presumably to say
that ecclesiastical courts have no inherent power to imprison, for to the extent that they
have the power it has been by statute, and to the extent that the High Commission has it
the warrant of statute before 1 Eliz. is required (as held in Darrington.) After this
principal point, the report has Daniel and Walmesley saying that it was unlawful to take a
bond of the sort demanded of Melton. Is it possible that Coke’s not being mentioned in
connection with this holding means he doubted or dissented? It of course need not mean
that. (There is no sign of dissent by the other members of the court, Foster and
Warburton; they were probably simply absent.)
A second report from the same term 99 in the form of an opinion not tied to a
particular case, is probably only another version of Melton. It in any event, it appears to
confirm that in an alimony suit, if not across the board of ecclesiastical causes, the High
Commission may not fine or imprison, but may handle the suit by means of
excommunication and De excommunicato capiendo , again in apparent disregard of the
enormity test. Bonds to abide the award of the court are also said to be “void.”
Lady Throgmorton’s Case, from the next term,100 in a sense clears up points left
hanging by Darrington and subsequent cases and in a sense introduces further confusion
into the picture of just what the Common Pleas held. The double effect is owing to two
reports which are not irreconcilable but do differ in emphasis. It will be best to look at
them separately.
(a) The report from posthumous Coke (12 Reports) gives the facts and the
outcome straightforwardly. It appeared by return on Habeas corpus that Lady
Throgmorton was imprisoned for (1) “many evil offices” between Sir James Scudamore
and her daughter, Lady Scudamore, to the end of causing the Scudamores to be separated
and for “detaining” Lady Scudamore from her husband and (2) speaking contemptuous
words of the Commission after sentence (“she had neither law nor justice there.”) I.e., it
would appear that the interfering mother-in-law was prosecuted for breaking up a
marriage, convicted, and sentenced. Whether she was sentenced to imprisonment for the
primary offense, or in order to enforce some other sentence, or only for the contemptuous
words, is not clear, but the record on Habeas corpus, at any rate, related the
imprisonment to the offense, not merely to the contempt. The court reportedly resolved,
first, that the offense was not enormous and hence not within the Commission’s
jurisdiction. I.e., taking the case was held objectionable, not simply imprisoning in
connection with such a case—a predictable application of the enormity test, were it not
for the disturbing note in Melton. (A suit for separate maintenance hardly seems more
appropriate to the Commission than a prosecution for sowing domestic discord.) The
court also said that a common law remedy would lie for detaining Lady Scudamore from
her husband, which is of course a reason why no ecclesiastical court should proceed for
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that. It said further that the wife could not be imprisoned for such an offense. Since there
is no sign that Lady Scudamore was prosecuted along with her mother, though she may
have been, I take this remark as reinforcing: A wife may not be imprisoned for doing of
her own accord what Lady Scudamore stirred up her daughter to do—running away from
her husband and avoiding his efforts to get her back. If that is so, surely a third-party
promoter of such conduct may not be imprisoned. Note, however, that by the letter the
report does not say that the High Commission could not proceed against the wife, only
that it must not imprison her.
Secondly, as to Lady Throgmorton’s contemptuous words, the judges held that it
did not appear that the words were spoken in court, and that even if they were
imprisoning the party was unlawful because the Commission was not a court of record.
The implied position would seem to be: (1) the Commission may not punish for
expressions of disrespect spoken out of court, but may punish, as for contempt of court,
if the words are spoken in the face of the sitting Commission; (2) in the latter case,
however, it must confine itself to spiritual sanctions, for only contempt of a court of
record is a misdemeanor summarily punishable by imprisonment by the court offended.(I
put it this way because other cases suggest that contempt of the Commission may be
prosecuted by information or indictment at common law and punished by imprisonment.
The present holding could quarrel with that rule, but it need not.)
Having held against the Commission on both scores, the court proceeded to bail
Lady Throgmorton, rather than release her outright. I find this result hard to interpret
except as an example of discretion employed in Habeas corpus cases to avoid
challenging the High Commission too abruptly, even when it was found to lack
jurisdiction and to have used inappropriate sanctions. Other cases display the same
tendency. One must ask whether, in marital matters involving the highly placed, the
common law courts did not recognize a certain virtue in the High Commission’s taking a
hand, even though properly such cases belonged to regular ecclesiastical courts and
processes.
Coke’s report concludes by adding another case from the same term: a Habeas
corpus in which Randal and Hickins were remanded to prison because they were shown
to have been committed on vehement suspicion of Brownism. Coke explains this decision
by saying, consistently with his opinion in Darrington, that Brownism is heresy.
Imprisoning power in enormous cases is here extended to the suspected, as opposed to
the convicted or those who refuse to cooperate with the Commission. Coke introduces the
case to point to its contrast with Lady Throgmorton—the enormity case as against the
case of misconduct in marital affairs.
(b) The MS. report comes from a series headed “hors del liver de Justice
Warburton”, Warburton being a member of Coke’s Common Pleas. It is identifiable as
the same case as that reported in 12 Coke only by being labeled “Lady Throckmorton’s
Case”, for it bears no date and gives neither the facts nor the judgment in the case at
hand. Rather, it reports in general terms certain holdings about the High Commission. I
see no reason to doubt, however, that the report relates to the same Lady Throgmorton’s
Case we have just discussed. The points it makes are appropriate to the context of that
case, even though they do not go to its immediate issues. I surmise that the case gave the
court occasion to speak more at large than Coke’s report suggests.
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In any event, the MS. has the court holding that the High Commission may
imprison in some cases and in others not, and may sometimes fine and sometimes not.
This states as a clear generalization what other cases leave in doubt: The Commission’s
jurisdiction and its power to employ secular sanctions are not coterminous. The report
then proceeds to put flesh on the generalization. It reiterates the basic holding in
Darrington: the Commission may imprison in those cases in which ecclesiastical courts
could imprison by the authority of statutes in force before 1 Eliz. That means heresy, as is
is clear in Darrington and explicit in the present report. Whether it means schism and
serious religious error short of heresy is left open, as before. The present report’s
advantage over those of Darrington is that it draws an explicit conclusion from 1 Hen.
VII (incontinent clerics.) That statute is plainly given the same status as the medieval
heresy acts: Anyone may be imprisoned for heresy; a clergyman, but not a layman, may
be imprisoned for incontinence. The language of the report is such, however, as to
suggest that the judges may have meant to give 1 Hen. VII a wider significance—as
permitting the Commission to imprison clerics for any offense appropriate to its
jurisdiction, not just the acts of incontinence covered by 1 Hen. VII. One cannot be sure
that that was intended, and the convincingness of so projecting from 1 Hen. VII is not
evident, but the language of the relevant passage is notably general. (“Auxi per le statute
de 1 Hen. VII, c.4, le Ordinary poyt imprison un ecclesiastical person pur incontinency,
et pur ceo les Hault Commissioners poyt imprison ascum ecclesiastical person mes nemy
un temporall person nient plus que le Ordinary poyt.”) The ambiguity hangs on “ascun.”
It could mean some ecclesiastical persons—viz. ones guilty of incontinency—or it could
mean any ecclesiastical person, which is linguistically more compatible with the singular
number. The sentence just quoted is followed by “et quant al imposer des fynes ils ne
poyent ceo faire.” This I take to mean that the Commission may not fine an incontinent,
or perhaps otherwise offending, cleric, because the warrant for that case, 1 Hen. VII,
speaks only of imprisonment, not of fines. It cannot mean the Commission may never
fine, because the report has already said that it sometimes may. I do not see how one can
deduce a power to fine from the medieval heresy statutes, except by the theory that power
to impose a lesser secular punishment is comprehended in the power to impose the
greater one of imprisonment, and that reasoning seems as applicable to the incontinent
clerics act as to the heresy acts. The puzzling upshot seems still to be that an incontinent
cleric may not be fined, but a heretic may. (The final, incomplete, sentence of the report,
following the words just quoted, is “Et nota que le dame Throckmorton fuit imprison pur
ceo que…” It seems as if the reporter were at last ready to say something about the case
at hand, but was interrupted before writing down the cause of Lady Throgmorton’s
commitment. The context, however—discussion of the power to fine—suggests a
speculative possibility about the facts: that Lady Throgmorton may have been fined and
then imprisoned to enforce payment. The nature of her offense—non-religious and hardly
of the gravest criminality—would make a fine the predictable secular punishment in the
first instance.)
For the rest, the MS. restates the enormity test and the general principle that 1
Eliz. has a restrictive force. (On the latter point, the judges imagined alternative words
which would have allowed the Commission to use secular sanctions to any extent the
monarch chose—“according to such censure and manner as shall be appointed in and by
the said letters patent.” But given the actual words of the statute the Commission was
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confined to sanctions already employable by ecclesiastical courts, either de jure or by
statutory authority.) No content is given to the enormity standard except for the negative
statement that matters between party and party, such as proving of wills, and “common
inferior causes” are beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction. The rest of the report insists
that clerical incontinence must be added to Coke’s list of High Commission causes in
Darrington and perhaps suggests that other clerical misbehavior of comparable gravity
should be added. It may also suggest that punishment of clerics by imprisonment in cases
unaffected by the medieval heresy statutes—say bigamy or polygamy—might be justified
where such punishment of laymen would not.
The report of Eager’s Case, from the next term,101 consists entirely of generalities
and is rather unclear. Standing alone, it might be read as denying the Commission’s
power to fine and imprison altogether, but I doubt that it does any more than repeat the
general holdings in Lady Throgmorton. A second report from Michaelmas, 1610,102 has
Coke saying by the way, in a tithe case with no apparent connection to the High
Commission, that Fuller upheld the Commission’s power to imprison for heresy and
schism. His explanation is the now well-entrenched theory that 1 Eliz. transferred to the
High Commission such imprisoning power as medieval statutes gave to regular
ecclesiastical courts, even while repealing those statutes. Coke seems to have had no
doubt that schism, as well as heresy, was within the medieval statutes.
Three specific holdings from the same term are reported. One 103 confirms by an
actual decision Coke’s previously expressed opinion that polygamy is a High
Commission crime. It also shows notable reluctance to interfere with the Commission’s
handling of substantively appropriate suits. In this case, a man cited before the
Commission for polygamy was acquitted of the offense, but nevertheless censured to pay
costs. He sought a Prohibition to block the sentence for costs. The Common Pleas denied
Prohibition, relying on the principal-incident doctrine. I.e., the Commission was entitled
to proceed for the crime of polygamy; therefore Prohibition will not lie on account of
such an “accessory” decision as a costs award. One can of course object that it is
scandalous to charge costs against an acquitted party, and also that the courts did not
consistently refuse to prohibit the “incident” when the “principal” was within a tribunal’s
jurisdiction. Coke tried to soften the decision by saying, “peradventure it was very
suspicious that he was guilty.” I do not find the scandal much mitigated by the
suggestion that an innocent party is not really treated unjustly if made to pay for litigation
caused by conduct he was reasonably suspected of. One is inclined to posit considerable
“political will” not to make an issue of the High Commission’s doings so long as it stays
within its jurisdiction.
The same policy of perhaps overdone restraint can be seen in Parker’s Case.104
The High Commission deprived Parson Parker of his living for drunkenness, and Parker
sought a Prohibition. We are not told his grounds, but they must have been that
drunkenness, even in a clergyman, is not a High Commission offense, and that
deprivation on relatively trivial grounds by the Commission is especially objectionable
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because it imposes a serious loss without possibility of appeal, The Common Pleas in this
case simply side-stepped deciding whether the Commission had exceeded its authority, It
denied the Prohibition, and instructed Parker to bring an action for the tithes attached to
his living, whereby the validity of his deprivation could be drawn in question. Why were
the judges unwilling to act straightforwardly on the application for Prohibition before
them? Two slightly different answers are possible: (a) Judicial restraint is simply the
right policy toward an extraordinary ecclesiastical court of high rank, backed by the
government and putatively performing what it conceives as important functions for the
well-being of the Church. Therefore, even when the Commission appears to be exceeding
its authority, one ought to avoid checking it directly when other means are available to
insure that the law is correctly applied in the long run, and one should be reluctant to
draw sharp lines around the Commission’s authority when it is not necessary to do so.
Here the suggested action for tithes is a feasible alternative to the direct check of a
Prohibition. If gone through with, the tithe action might eventually require a decision on
the Commission’s powers, but later rather than sooner. If a decision against the
Commission should turn out to be necessary, it would not take the form of a direct
restriction on the Commission, but of a judgment against a private party—successorparson or parishioner—claiming that Parker was duly deprived. Litigation about the tithes
might manage to stay within the ecclesiastical system, questions about the validity of the
deprivation being raised and decided there, possibly against the Commission. Finally,
litigation about the tithes might not force a decision on the Commission’s legal power. It
might, for example, be resolvable in Parker’s favor on the facts (if he could manage in
pleading to get behind the sentence of deprivation and reopen the question whether he
was guilty of drunkenness) or on the incidents of procedure (as if he could show that
sentence was given against him without proper evidence or the like.) (b) Other cases
indicate that the Common Pleas was not quite firm, or unanimous, in the conviction that
the Commission was excluded from dealing with a fairly wide range of clerical
misconduct. The position that it could not only proceed, but imprison, for clerical
incontinence may have been at least a source of awkwardness—a reason for wondering
whether other behavior seriously unworthy of a clergyman might not be enormous
enough, even though the same behavior in a layman would clearly fall short of enormity.
The decision in Parker might reflect an inclination to hold that clerical drunkenness is
appropriate to the Commission, or at least enough doubt on the question to recommend
avoiding a contrary holding, especially when Parker could have another hearing by way
of tithe litigation if he wanted to insist on one.
The last decision from Michaelmas, 1610, in Dr. Conway’s Case, 105 confirms that
sexual offenses committed by a layman, save for incest and polygamy, are outside the
High Commission’s authority. Conway and his wife were prosecuted together, the wife
for adultery with one Sir Michael Blunt and the husband for conniving at the affair as a
“wittal” or pimp. The proceedings were prohibited, partly on the express ground that no
enormous offense was charged. The element of distastefulness beyond simple adultery,
pandering for one’s wife, was insufficient to promote the crime to a higher rank. There
was, however, a separate ground for Prohibition: a general pardon covered the offense, in
spite of which costs had been taxed against Conway. (Conway’s doctorate need not
105

M. 8 Jac. C.P. 2 Brownlow and Goldesborough, 37.
304

identify him as a cleric. One may wonder whether the Commission would have been held
unauthorized to proceed against a clergyman for the gross indecency he was charged
with. He was probably a physician or civilian.)
Two decisions from the next term—Hilary, 1611—add no new limits on the High
Commission, but implement well-established principles. The more important of these,
Huntley v. Clifford, 106 has been discussed in Vol. II (pp.373-375) because of its bearing
on incriminatory inquisition. For the rest, that case of blatant impropriety and abuse on
the Commission’s part makes the following points: The High Commission has no
jurisdiction over a complaint sounding in breach of promise to marry. Mary Clifford’s
promisee, Huntley, claimed that she intended to marry one Cage instead of himself and
sued in the Commission to restrain her both from doing that and from cohabiting with
Cage. The Common Pleas prohibited and clearly would have done so even if there had
been no procedural irregularities to add justification for the Prohibition. The ideas behind
the decision are not rendered in exactly the same way in the reports. The small
differences project to significantly different pictures of the court’s thinking. (1)
Harl.4817, which may have been written by Justice Warburton, a member of the court,
says that the Commissioners “must deal in high matters, and therefore it is called the
High Commission, but they may not meddle in inferior matters, which are called civil
causes or ordinary causes, such as contracts of matrimony, legacies, pensions, portions,
tithes, or such like, for those are not any offenses or contempts, but civil or ordinary
causes, and cognizance of such matters belongs to the Ordinaries, and not to the High
Commission.” This language, represented as what the whole court agreed on, is not
extremely restrictive. It is interesting for its hesitancy about taking a civil-criminal
distinction as quite adequate for demarcating the Commission’s authority. The examples,
however, are all of matters where it is next to inconceivable that litigation could be
commenced except on the initiative of a party harmed in a material interest. At the same
time, this report avoids drawing any lines within the area of “offenses and contempts” (an
expression approximating “crimes” but still different), or within the area of matters at
least amenable to ex officio prosecution (though not solely prosecutable in that form or
incapable of being intermixed with interested private claims.)
(2) If there is one member of the court whom I would suspect of a propensity to
exclude the Commission only from strictly civil cases, it is Justice Walmesley. In
Brownlow’s report, Walmesley speaks first to the question of jurisdiction, agreeing with
the result and saying. “… these High Commissioners ought to meddle only with things of
the most high nature, and not of [sic] things which concern matrimony, and the ordinary
jurisdiction.” These words do not suggest a strict civil-criminal distinction so much as the
antithesis between routine cases, including merely civil ones, and a few enormous
offenses. One may still wonder whether Walmesley’s participation in the decision might
not have been based on a narrower understanding of it than his words suggest. It is
questionable, in view of other cases, whether he was ready to exclude the Commission
from everything concerning matrimony short of situations involving the gravest sexual
crimes (Cf. Langdale.) Coke, following Walmesley in Brownlow, says only that the
Commission may not meddle with civil causes, instancing tithes and legacies and
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pointing to the usual reasons (the policy of the law can hardly be to “dissolve” the
Ordinaries’ jurisdiction and deprive parties of appeals.) I.e., Coke, speaking for himself
in this version, refrains from going beyond the immediate case and from distinguishing
enormous from non-enormous crimes.
(3) It is not quite clear whether the third report, Harg. 15, is a synopsis of what all
the judges agreed on or Coke’s speech, taken by the reporter as expressing the opinion of
the whole court. In any event, its language on the question of jurisdiction is somewhat
different from that of the other reports: “The ecclesiastical law has two terms or names
for all causes before them, causes civil or criminal, as with us common pleas and pleas of
the crown. Pleas civil comprise common matters, which are testamentary or matrimonial
or for tithes. Criminal [consist] in this—adultery and the like. For the first, the High
Commission by the said statute of 1 Eliz. may not deal [with it.] For the latter, solely in
certain [ascun] of them which are exorbitant and enormous [may the Commission]
intermeddle by this law, and not with legacies, obventions, tithes, pensions, nor
matrimony. For then they could well bastardize anyone’s issue, and no appeal, for it is the
highest court, from which there is no appeal. And this was confessed by the Archbishop
who lately was, that their jurisdiction does not extend to those things.” This version is of
interest because, while insisting that not all criminal causes are proper to the Commission
and in general terms laying down the enormity test, it still represents the civil-criminal
distinction as the main clue to the jurisdiction question and as grounded in ecclesiastical
law itself. It produces the distinctly interesting counter-example of adultery to the most
obviously civil examples also given in the other reports. The emphasized reason for
keeping matrimonial matters out of the Commission’s hands is neither their basically
civil nature nor the non-enormity of most marital misconduct, but the danger of having
marriages invalidated without appeal. That rationale is open to the objection that not
every cause classifiable as matrimonial could lead to invalidation of a marriage, while the
favored enormities, polygamy and incest could.
In sum, the reports of Huntley yield a somewhat confused account of the ratio
decidendi in the case. The absence of a clear embrace of “criminal jurisdiction only and
within that over only a specific list of enormities” may indicate that the court did not get
together on an unambiguous solution or intentionally avoided a decisive generalization. It
was not necessary to reach one in order to hold that a suit for breach of promise to marry,
at the behest of the offended party, is not a High Commission matter. Judicial restraint
may be visible in the very unreadiness to be decisive at a higher level.
(b) Clifford and Cage were arrested by a pursuivant at the outset of proceedings
against them—i.e., were not cited to appear, subject to spiritual sanctions, but attached
bodily as the first step. In clear accord with several earlier decisions, and with specific
reliance on the holding of Glanville and Anderson in Simpson’s (=Symsone’s) Case, here
dated 42 Eliz., the arrest was held illegal—“utterly tortious”, per Harg. 15, and false
imprisonment.
(c) Having been arrested, Clifford was compelled to enter a £2000 bond to
answer Huntley’s complaint in the Arches and meanwhile not to marry, make a
conflicting contract to marry, or commit fornication. The bond was held invalid (1)
because it was exacted by duress—i.e., by holding Clifford pursuant to an arrest that was
both illegal in form and motivated by a complaint over which the Commission had no
jurisdiction—and (2) because the Commission was held to have no power to exact a bond
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requiring a party to appear in another ecclesiastical court—i.e., the Arches (in the same
way, it was said, as the Common Pleas could not make someone enter an obligation to
appear before the Council of Wales—the specificity of the example may suggest a
specific case.) In Brownlow’s report, Coke generalizes about the Commission’s authority
to demand bonds. It may not do so in civil cases, such cases being beyond its jurisdiction.
The point of this may be a bit more than truistic, since it is conceivable that if the power
existed in could be used to gain a hold on a party to an ultra vires suit. Suppose there is
no element of duress, as there was in the present case, the effect of which is presumably
to make the bond like a secular one exacted by threat of mere force—uncollectable by
action of Debt if the duress is proved. Suppose, however, a gullible party is induced to
enter a bond to abide the award of the Commission and an attempt is then made to collect
on the bond if he changes his mind and seeks to prohibit the suit. I should not think this
apparently voluntary bond would be intrinsically “invalid” without a simple rule “no
jurisdiction, no bond of any sort connected with the case—an attempt to proceed on such
a bond should be prohibited.” On the other hand, Coke said, with conspicuous
tentativeness, that it seemed the Commission could take a bond in criminal cases, if the
case required, but that he did not want to dispute about that or affirm the point for sure.
One can only ask what the tentativeness signifies. Doubt and an uneasy inclination
toward a complementary “simple rule”—“granting the Commission’s jurisdiction, its
choice of means to make its decisions effectual, including perhaps the use of fines and
imprisonment, is its own business”? Dislike of bonds, perhaps because other secular
sanctions were available, combined with a preference not to lay down broader rules than
deciding Huntley required, with which other members of the court might not agree?
(d) Huntley was a terribly weak case from the High Commission’s point of view.
All that can be said practically in its behalf is that perhaps the amorous and concomitant
material squabbles of a certain class of people (rich enough to impose a £2000 bond on)
were too much for the regular ecclesiastical courts and the parties’ misconduct unlikely to
be responsive to spiritual sanctions. Despite poor prospects, however, one La Herbe, a
B.C.L and a King’s Proctor, was received to argue against the Prohibition. He did so in a
high theoretical vein, very likely representing the Commission more than the party
Huntley. We need not delay over this phase of the case, which appears from Harg. 15
alone, for the civilian only took the predictable and hopeless line of his party:
“…Prohibition ought not to be granted, first, because the King has both ecclesiastical and
temporal jurisdiction in his person, and the one shall not control the other so long as they
execute what is their proper jurisdiction. And if the King grants to either part more than
naturally belongs to it, the other part is not to examine that, because he has two rights and
powers in him and may abridge the one and enlarge the other as pertains to him. And
inasmuch as they have observed and held themselves within that which is given to them,
they may not be restrained from that, for that is to erect altar against altar…” The reporter
lacked patience with this (for he adds only that the Proctor “said many things to this
effect for the maintenance of their jurisdiction”), and the court was irritated. The Proctor
was mistaken, the judges said, in suggesting that they proposed to dispute the King’s
ecclesiastical authority; rather, “we are not here to do anything except expound an act of
Parliament, that is, the statute of 1 Eliz., which properly belongs to us to expound, and to
no others than the judges of the common law, and that is not altar against altar, as was
said, but it is to construe that which properly pertains to none other.” By now, years of
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practice were founded on the general position thus expressed, by no means all if it
illiberal towards the High Commission. Between the lines of the present scandalous case
(again, see the discussion in Vol. II for the full flavor) reluctance to hedge the
Commission more than was necessary can be discerned. As we shall see from other
phenomena than the Proctor’s performance in Huntley, a counter-offensive was working
up.
The second case from Hilary, 1611, Symonds v. Green,107 has also been dealt
with in Vol. II (pp.382-384, 390.) The decision appears from both reports to have been
based on the rule that the High Commission may not arrest accused persons by
pursuivant, the least controversial of the holdings in Huntley, well-confirmed by other
cases. The MS. report, however, has the judges reaffirming their decision in Huntley
generally, which probably implies the tentative view that the Commission was on no
stronger jurisdictional ground in this case than in the other, and so prohibitable even if
there had not been procedural abuses. Given fully adequate narrow grounds, the court
probably preferred to rest on them, rather than take up the Commission’s jurisdiction
once more and struggle with whether anything could be said in its favor in Symonds by
distinguishing Huntley. Coke says in so many words that he did not want to argue
recently debated matters again. In substance, Symonds is close to Huntley: the charge was
promoting a clandestine marriage, the making of which was a violation of a previous
contract to marry, The offense seems about as doubtful a High Commission matter as the
intended breach of contract in Huntley, but circumstances made suing in the Commission
perhaps more colorable: The participants in the offense were scattered over several
dioceses, and the Bishop with most probable jurisdiction had allegedly requested the
Commission to take the case. It seems the part of wisdom not to have gone into the
possibility of an anomalous extension of the Commission’s power (which would raise 23
Hen. VIII problems) when a simple resolution was at hand. The arrest was especially
egregious, since the pursuivant had demanded fees of the arrestees and received £4 from
one of them. Coke called the proceedings tort and oppression and reminded the parties
that False Imprisonment would lie against the pursuivant. The Prohibition was upheld
“with wonder” on the judges’ part that such troubles and oppressions should be done to
the subject.
A third decision from Hilary, 1611,108 concerned a celebrated personage but
legally went only to a technicality. Legate, soon to be distinguished as one of the two last
heretics executed in England, was committed to Newgate prison by the High Commission
for Arianism. He sought a Habeas corpus, and a writ was granted. The whole issue,
however, seems to have been whether Newgate was a lawful place for his imprisonment.
The basis for saying that the Commission is legally bound to use certain prisons is not
clear from this case, nor from a few others in which the matter occurs. Here Coke cites
the statute of 5 Hen. IV, c. 10, for the proposition that a Justice of the Peace may not
commit a man to a “private prison”, and that it is false imprisonment to do so in violation
of the statute. He adds that to commit someone to the Counters in London (the sheriffs’
private prison for debtors) for anything but debt is false imprisonment. The application of
these points to the present case is not explained. It would seem that there was some
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objection to the High Commission’s using Newgate; Coke’s brandishing the danger of
false imprisonment may come to saying that the Commission, like the officials
mentioned, should take its choice of prisons seriously. No outcome is reported. It is
surely unlikely that a suspect of unambiguous heresy went free; if Newgate was indeed
held to be an improper jail, the threat of liberating him, implicit in Habeas corpus, was
probably only used to make sure that Legate was transferred to a proper one.
In the following term, Easter 1611, came Sir William Chancey’s Case.109 This
case was something of a landmark for the use of 23 Hen. VIII to expound 1 Eliz. There
are two other senses as well in which it stands out. First, it raises squarely issues about
the High Commission’s authority over sexual offenses and marital affairs, which earlier
cases touch on obliquely and leave unsettled. Secondly, Chancey was the specific
occasion for political counterattack by the Commission against the Common Pleas.
Chancey brought Habeas corpus and Prohibition at the same time. This appears
from the best report, Brownlow’s, as does the fullest statement of the case; the other
reports are consistent but abbreviated. Chancey’s offenses were flagrant adultery,
expelling his wife, and allowing her either no or inadequate maintenance. The history of
his misbehavior and legal troubles was somewhat complex, and not every detail is as
exactly specified in the reports as could be wished. Some considerable time before the
present proceedings, he was cited before his Bishop and sentenced to penance for
adultery. Whether that suit was ex officio or on the complaint of Lady Chancey does not
appear, but there is nothing to suggest that a legal separation was granted or alimony
allowed at that time, only the criminal-style spiritual punishment. Chancey then
commuted the penance—i.e., made a charitable contribution or the like, with the
ecclesiastical court’s assent, in satisfaction of that duty. He then proceeded for several
years to live adulterously in his house with two successive women and begot two
bastards. At just what point Lady Chancey was turned out does not appear, but she
clearly was expelled in favor of the in-residence paramours, if she did not depart on her
own motion. At length, Chancey was cited before the High Commission for (a) adultery
and (b) not allowing his wife competent maintenance. It is not reported whether the
proceedings were ex officio—though presumably on the wife’s information—or in the
form of a suit by the wife for alimony, alleging the adultery. According to Brownlow,
Chancey was imprisoned because he refused to enter a bond to perform the
Commission’s order. Coke has him sentenced to pay alimony and to make submission for
the adultery, then imprisoned for failure to carry out the sentence. Either way, he sought
to challenge his imprisonment by Habeas corpus and, following Brownlow, also to
challenge the Commission’s jurisdiction by Prohibition.
Aside from arguing that 23 Hen.VIII was grounds for excluding the High
Commission from this case, Chancey’s counsel, Nichols, made the following arguments:
(a) Adultery is not enormous. The conclusion from that is surely that the
Commission had no authority to deal with Chancey criminally for that offense. But the
proposition also raises some collateral questions: May the Commission notice adultery as
part of a pattern of marital misconduct that would justify an award of separation and
alimony?—a question that obviously involves the further one whether it may make such
109

P. 9 Jac. C.P. 12 Coke, 82; 2 Brownlow and Goldesborough, 18; Harg. 15, f. 54b, sub.
nom. Chauncye.
309

civil awards in any circumstances. It would be possible to argue that the Commission
may award a wife maintenance after convicting her husband of incest or polygamy, those
offenses being within its criminal jurisdiction, but not upon convicting him of adultery.
On the other hand, one could argue that settlement of disastrous marital situations is
simply, as a civil matter, beyond the Commission, so that the incestuous polygamist can
only be punished criminally; if his wife is entitled to a divorce, she must seek it in the
Bishop’s court. Theoretically, though this would be hard to justify, one could argue that
the High Commission has civil jurisdiction in separation and alimony cases, even though
no crime within its authority, or no crime punishable by spiritual sanctions at all, is
charged against the husband.
(b) No ecclesiastical court may in any event imprison a layman for adultery—or,
as one must say to meet the facts of this case, in connection with adultery, even to
enforce a spiritual sentence; nor may any ecclesiastical court put a party under the
pressure of a bond to fulfill such a sentence. This is apparent from the fact that it is only
by force of the statute of 1 Hen. VII that clergymen may be imprisoned for adultery by
ecclesiastical courts
(c) No ecclesiastical court may grant alimony unless the husband is unwilling to
live with his wife. Per Nichols, Chancey was desirous of cohabiting with Lady Chancey
(now at any rate—nothing in the report reveals whether he took the position that her
removal was all along her own choice.) But even if alimony were awardable by a regular
ecclesiastical court, it is not a High Commission matter and should not be granted by a
court from which there is no appeal. (These propositions are stated categorically, so as
presumably to imply that the High Commission may not award alimony even if it has
criminal jurisdiction over matters connected with the breakdown of a marriage.)
Dodderidge, arguing contra, took a precise, narrow position. The report identifies
him as the King’s Serjeant. By virtue of his position, he probably appeared at the behest
of the Commission and the government. (One should note the contrast between this
common lawyer and the civilians received in various cases to defend ecclesiastical
interests. Dodderidge concedes what was likely to be lost and looks for winning ground;
civilians, as in Huntley above, tended to open wide, foredoomed theoretical questions.)
He admitted the general proposition that the Commission is confined to enormities and
that the matters in question, adultery and alimony, are not “originally” enormous. He
went on, however, to argue that Chancey’s behavior in the circumstances of this case did
amount to an enormous offense—his persistence in adultery of a flagrant character after
being disciplined by a regular ecclesiastical court, whereby he established himself as an
incorrigible offender.
Dodderidge’s theory is not without problems, but it makes a good deal of
common and historical sense. Is Parliament likely to have created an extraordinary court
with an absolutely definite list of offenses it was entitled to handle in mind? Is it not more
likely that the legislature was looking to need and contemplating that although only a few
offenses are by nature so grave that ordinary courts may not be adequate to them, others
can become so aggravated by circumstances that it may be necessary for the
extraordinary tribunal to step in? It is a problem for this approach whether all lesser
crimes, if appropriately aggravated by such factors as defiance of ordinary courts and the
evident failure of such courts to meet it, should be allowed to go to the Commission.
Perhaps a “moral gravity” test for the original offense would be required and hence
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explicit argument in such a case as this that adultery qualifies as close enough to the
recognized enormities while other specifiable ecclesiastical crimes do not. More
generally, the approach requires conceding to common law courts considerable
discretion, in Prohibition or Habeas corpus proceedings, to assess whether substantial
signs of aggravation, incorrigibility, or the helplessness of regular ecclesiastical courts
really exist. Nevertheless, the Dodderidge theory perhaps offers the best answer to “Why
should there be a High Commission?” unless one accepts the historically plausible view
that the tribunal was intended only to handle heresy and its near relatives, a view which
Coke’s willingness to stretch the list of enormities at least to polygamy and incest tends
to subvert.
Dodderidge’s position makes the better sense if the High Commission is entitled
to use secular sanctions whenever it has jurisdiction. I.e., if the Commission was
essentially meant to do what the regular courts, either presumptively for some offenses or
in actual aggravating circumstances, cannot effectively do, must the Commission not
have been given teeth that the regular courts lacked? The advantage of turning someone
like Chancey over to the Commission must surely consist mainly in exposing him to the
choice of reforming his ways or going to jail. It is rather idle to say merely that he is
worse than a simple adulterer—enough worse to pass the border between enormous and
non-enormous offenders—and therefore within the Commission’s jurisdiction, and then
to add that the Commission may do no more than try its luck with the spiritual sanctions
that had already failed. If Dodderidge is taken as speaking to the Habeas corpus, he must
be understood as making that extension of his point—i.e., as arguing that the Commission
has jurisdiction over aggravated adultery and by the same token may use imprisonment,
at least as a means to make its award effectual if not as a punishment proper. Coke’s
report, however, says that Dodderidge did not try to maintain that the imprisonment was
lawful. If that is correct, he conceded not only that adultery must be aggravated to give
jurisdiction, but that, having jurisdiction, the Commission is still confined to spiritual
sanctions. The concession tends to undercut the jurisdictional argument in the way I
suggest, but that does not prevent it from being a prudent anticipation of the court’s
opinion.
Dodderidge’s position leaves its civil implications hanging. Once an aggravated
form of criminal misconduct gives the Commission jurisdiction, may it award civil
remedies appropriate to the situation, such as granting alimony to Lady Chancey? For
that matter, could aggravated resistance to performing a merely civil duty, such as paying
tithes, justify the High Commission’s assuming jurisdiction? In sum, would Dodderidge
have presupposed the rule that the Commission is exclusively a criminal court, and did
the Commission do more than extend the enormity test to aggravated forms of nonenormous crime?
The judges did not respond at once to counsel’s arguments. On a later day,
Justices Foster, Warburton, and Walmesley spoke generally to the High Commission’s
powers in the area of this case, dividing Foster and Warburton versus Walmesley. They
did not speak directly to Dodderidge’s aggravation theory. (So Brownlow reports. In his
own report, Coke associates himself with the position of Foster and Warburton. He was
probably absent from the first discussion. Coke acknowledges Walmesley’s dissent.) The
Foster-Warburton opinion amounts to cursory acceptance of all Nichols said: adultery is
not enormous; use of secular sanctions is in any event unlawful in such a case as the

311

present one; alimony is beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction. The MS. report, which
gives the court’s opinion without stating the case and without mentioning the dissent,
adds a little emphasis on the last point. This version makes it clear that the court accepted
Nichols’s contention that an award of alimony was inappropriate in this case apart from
the Commission’s jurisdiction to award it. Whereas Nichols says generally that alimony
may not be granted if the husband is willing to cohabit with his wife, the judges say it
may be granted by Ordinaries on “divorce”, but not on separation. I.e., alimony is
grantable on a court-ordered legal separation (“divorce”), not when a wife is driven out
de facto, or when she goes away with justification, but does not bother to sue for a
“divorce.” (The husband’s willingness to cohabit would ordinarily bar a legal divorce, I
assume, but perhaps not in every situation. Whether there might be exceptions makes a
question, not only about the ecclesiastical law, but about the common law courts’
tolerance for ecclesiastical decisions in marital cases. Would the grant of a divorce
withstand Prohibition in the face of evidence of the husband’s present willingness to live
with his wife?) The MS. report also confirms that the appealability of alimony awards
seemed important to the judges; they emphasize that such an award may be appealed on
the ground that it is excessive in amount.
Walmesley’s dissent, delivered at greater length than the Foster-Warburton view,
goes unmistakably only to one point—criminal jurisdiction over adultery. He says
nothing about the alimony as a separate question and may have agreed with his brethren
on that. On the lawfulness of imprisoning Chancey, his position was complicated, as will
appear. On the criminal jurisdiction, Walmesley held that adultery is an enormous
offense. He says that in so many words. His reasoning, however, is far from certain. He
starts out by endorsing the enormity test and proceeds to apply it so that adultery comes
out an enormity. His reason is explicit: adultery is forbidden in the Decalogue. At first
sight, it may seem that there could hardly be a better criterion. On reflection, however,
questions quickly arise. Is it convincing that every article of ecclesiastical criminal law
with a basis in the Decalogue is an enormity by the intent of 1 Eliz. (one might instance
cursing and Sabbath-breaking as problem cases)? My inclination in the end, even so, is to
think that Walmesley did embrace the strong position that would confer jurisdiction over
some seemingly minor offenses on the High Commission. If so, however, he did little
more than propose a refined version of what he had long been disposed to think: viz. if an
action is a crime (not the basis for a civil claim assigned to the ecclesiastical system, such
as the paradigm cases of tithes and legacies), and if it falls under ecclesiastical
jurisdiction (of course some offenses in the Decalogue were preempted by secular law),
then it is up to the ecclesiastical system to decide whether resort to the extraordinary
High Commission is justified. The refinement in Walmesley’s Chancey opinion is to
concede that High Commission offenses other than heresy must by the language of the
statute be enormities and to imply that by and large ecclesiastical crimes are enormities.
This need not mean, I suggest, that they are all evidenced by the Decalogue, only that
they can be shown to be clear divine mandates not incorporated into “human” or secular
law. Of course an express commandment of God in the Decalogue is the most, perhaps
the only, indisputable example, and sufficient to the needs of Chancey, but there would
seem to be no reason to exclude more constructive ones from consideration.
I think that this interpretation of Walmesley is borne out by his further remarks.
From declaring that its place in the Decalogue makes adultery an enormity, he goes on to
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dispute the other judges’ view that “enormity” and “exorbitant crime” are synonyms.
Resorting to etymology, he insists on the root sense of “enormous”, whereby its meaning
is closer to “illegal” (a broad enough term to include disobedience of clear divine law)
than to “extremely grave” or “outrageous.” (“…enormous is where a thing is made
without rule, or against law.” So the translated report; read “done” for “made.”) He then
reinforces his linguistic point by looking at English legal usage: Writs of Trespass use the
phrase “et alia enormia ei intulit,” where the reference is not to extreme crimes, but only
to the trespasses specifically recited in the writ before that phrase (“…and yet these are
not intended exorbitant offences, but other trespasses of the nature of them, which are
first expressed particularly.”) So interpreted, Walmesley’s position seems to me coherent,
though it leaves many problems about how to isolate true ecclesiastical crimes from the
whole class of misdemeanors dealt with by Church courts, many of which are harder to
classify than the clearest analogues of secular civil claims. It may still be constructive to
hold that the problem is not one of weighing “gravity”, which is not easily ponderable,
but of placing an offense, as it were, in the theory and history of Christian moral doctrine;
adultery, at any rate, is an easy case on that premise.
Walmesley concludes the first part of his speech by saying that 1 Eliz. had been
expounded as he expounded it for many years. It is unclear whether he means only that
adultery has been recognized as a High Commission offense, or that his exposition of the
general sense of “enormity” had been accepted. Either way, his statement may at first
sight seem factually dubious. I am not sure, however, that the evidence above in this
chapter decisively rebuts it.
When he turns to the Commission’s power to imprison, Walmesley comes down
much closer to the other judges. Coke reports expressly that he concurred with the rest of
the court in holding Chancey’s imprisonment unlawful. That report has him saying that it
would be unlawful even if the Commission had been imprisoning in such cases for
twenty years. That position would come to saying that jurisdiction over adultery does not
entail authority to imprison in connection with adultery proceedings. Along with the rest
of the court, to go by earlier cases, Walmesley would have held that the Commission may
imprison only in those cases in which ecclesiastical courts had imprisoning power by
statute before 1 Eliz.
Brownlow’s report, however, shows that Walmesley reached his final position
only with some difficulty. In that account, he starts out by saying that the High
Commission had been imprisoning for twenty years. That could mean in adultery cases or
across the board in cases that came before it and were not halted by Prohibition. He then
admits that there was no warrant for the practice in 1 Eliz., but observes that it was
authorized in the King’s patent. Whether the authorization by patent was lawful without
the backing of the statute Walmesley does not say one way or the other, as if he might
consider that question still open. He expresses reluctance to interfere “suddenly” with
longstanding practice and concludes by giving a day at the beginning of the next term for
argument on the imprisoning power.
Walmesley’s assigning the day for reopening the case, as senior puisne Justice,
shows that Coke was not present at the first discussion. Probably only the judges who
spoke on that occasion—Warburton and Foster in addition to Walmesley—were in court.
Another round of debate was clearly necessary, as a courtesy to the absent judges and
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also because the Habeas corpus was a separate procedure not yet addressed. Even quoad
the Prohibition there was not yet a certain majority of the whole court in favor of a writ.
Going by the two printed reports, the court’s final stance was agreement on the
illegality of the imprisonment offset by a 3-1 split on the Commission’s jurisdiction over
adultery. Neither report gives a judicial reaction to Dodderidge’s argument that adultery
aggravated in the way it was in the circumstances of this case was proper to the
Commission. The MS. report corrects the impression that that argument was ignored.
This non-narrative report only summarizes the court’s final opinion. While otherwise
consonant with the printed versions, it records further that the judges were moved by
Dodderidge’s contention, though undecided as to its ultimate correctness. (“But the
Justices said that because the party was sentenced in the Ordinary’s Court to do penance
and reform himself, which he has done, and yet is newly relapsed in the same sin and
perseveres in it more grievously, whether this circumstance will not alter the nature of the
act and make that determinable before the High Commission which was not originally,
and they doubted thereof.”) Their doubt on this score, I think, was an important
consideration behind their final action.
To that final action we come at last. Pursuant to the Habeas corpus, after asserting
their right to deliver someone unlawfully imprisoned, the judges exercised their
discretion and bailed Chancey. He was instructed, while free on bail, to attend on the
Archbishop and do what right and reason required (Coke’s report). He did so attend, the
Archbishop assumed a mediator’s role, Chancey was reconciled with his wife, “and that
was the end of this business” (Brownlow). It is clear, I think, that the court simply took
no action on the Prohibition. To have prohibited the Commission, the judges would have
had to make up their minds on the effect of aggravating circumstances, the matter they
were in doubt about, and if the majority resolved that against the Commission they would
have had to act as a divided court. As it was, they asserted a principle they agreed on and
took advantage of their rather principle-free discretion, which is attested by several cases,
to bail the unlawfully imprisoned whom they might have liberated. Going by results, the
discretion could be useful, as Chancey shows, and as the judges probably realized, though
they were also probably aware that it was the better part of valor not to display
implacable hostility toward the High Commission. In an oblique way, Dodderidge won
his case on pretty much the ground he chose. Although he did not get a decision against
Prohibition, his shaking the court by his emphasis on aggravated circumstances is likely
to have been part of the reason for the compromise handling of the Habeas corpus.
Claiming High Commission jurisdiction over adultery as such, though congenial to
Justice Walmesley, might have prompted the other judges to favor outright discharge of
the prisoner as well as denial of the Prohibition. As a final note, Coke’s report adds that
the return on the Habeas corpus was found insufficient for uncertainty. There is no
explanation; it is hard to see in what the uncertainty could have consisted, since Coke,
who represents his report as relating only to the Habeas corpus, states the essential facts
of the case, presumably from the return. Reliance on a technicality as at least an
additional reason for finding the imprisonment unlawful is consistent, however, with the
court’s preference for narrow grounds.
In the upshot, Chancey’s Case was not a great blow to the High Commission. On
the other hand, a majority of the Common Pleas enunciated a strong anti-Commission
stance in principle on the sensitive matter of sexual and marital cases involving
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substantial people. It is therefore both appropriate and inappropriate that Chancey should
have prompted an extrajudicial offensive against the Common Pleas in the term after it
was resolved. It is likely that the case pushed a growing resentment on the High
Commission’s part, based on more cases than this single one, beyond the boiling point. I
shall only summarize the out-of-court proceedings here; for the details and the sources,
see the long note at the send of this Sub-section.
The Privy Council first held a series of meetings to consider complaints against the
Common Pleas’ handling of the Commission. As usual in such cases of political
intervention, the Council was hardly neutral. The hope, at least on the part of the
Archbishop of Canterbury and the dominant officers of state, Lord Treasurer Salisbury
and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, was to talk the Common Pleas judges out of their
opinion or, failing that, to use their colleagues from the other common law courts against
them. Coke was forced to produce a written “brief” in defense of his court, and then the
Common Pleas judges were called before the Council and required to defend themselves
orally. When they proved unbudgeable, the Council sought to extract pro-Commission
opinions from the King’s Bench and Exchequer judges by summoning and interrogating
them in the absence of their Common Pleas brethren. This operation had only qualified
success. As one would expect from decided cases, King’s Bench opinion was less set
against the High Commission. Some encouraging things, from the government’s point of
view, were said by some of the judges and Barons. The main result, however, was that
the friends of the Commission were persuaded that its patent ought to be narrowed. I.e.,
even the judges who would not embrace the Common Pleas position thought that the way
to avoid future trouble between the Commission and the courts was for the King to give
the Commission less sweeping jurisdiction than he had in the past. The politicians and
ecclesiastical authorities were either convinced of the merits of that proposal or
persuaded that the best they could do without offending a united judiciary was to concede
something in the hope that the Commission would be upheld in the more strictly defined
powers to be assigned to it. Issuance of a new patent subsequently led to a fresh
contretemps with Coke, for it was cleverly—or all-too cleverly—proposed to make him
and several other judges members of the Commission. (Laymen and non-civilians were
perfectly eligible; Commissions ordinarily included more members than were expected to
participate in practice in the tribunal’s business.) Coke thought of reasons—perfectly
good ones—to resist this scheme for creating a conflict of interest in certain judges.
Whether this further episode undermined such good as the earlier compromise might
have done I cannot say. In the last glimpse the documents give of the Archbishop, he
seems to be trying to soothe a newly ruffled Coke, rather than defy him further. Whether,
in more general terms, the extra-judicial offensive of the summer of 1611 had the effect
of making the courts more cautious in their regulation of the Commission, or by virtue of
the compromise of mitigating conflict, can only be determined from future cases. “A
little, perhaps, but hardly dramatically” is probably the right answer.
For the rest of Coke’s tenure on the Common Pleas, I have only two more cases.
Chetwirke’s Case, from the same term as Chancey’s,110 does not go far beyond Habeas
corpus policy. Chetwirke having been imprisoned by the High Commission, the return on
his Habeas corpus said that he was committed because he was the means of distributing
110

P. 9 Jac. C.P. Harg. 125, f. 246b.
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libels “scandalous to the state and government of the Church.” The Common Pleas held
the return insufficient “because he could disperse and be the means of dispersing without
having notice”—i.e., without knowing the subversive character of the literature. This
holding was justified by saying that distributors of libels and forged writings without
knowledge of the character of what they distributed were not punishable in the Star
Chamber. The court’s action in the light of this holding was stronger than it might have
been: the judges bailed Chetwirke instead of giving an opportunity for amendment of the
return and leaving him in jail meanwhile. The decision limits the Commission only in the
sense of forbidding it to impose criminal liability on, and use imprisonment against, a
bookseller or the like for mere unwitting distribution of objectionable literature, or for
taking insufficient care to know the content of what he disperses. The court had no
occasion to decide whether the Commission had jurisdiction to prosecute and power to
imprison an intentional distributor of such material. Earlier decisions suggest that its
authority would be upheld in such a case, subject to whatever requirements the court
would enforce as to an adequate showing that the literature was really subversive of the
Church. The argument from the Star Chamber would seem to imply that where that
tribunal could punish for distributing a secular libel the High Commission could proceed
for dispersing an ecclesiastical one—and probably imprison for it, on the strength of such
cases as Fuller’s, upholding the imprisoning power for schism. As an implementation of
Habeas corpus policy, Chetwirke militates against giving the Commission the benefit of
the doubt—i.e., presuming that it held Chetwirke liable by appropriate standards, as a
knowledgeable distributor, and leaving him to his action of False Imprisonment should
the presumption be false. The decision to bail, rather than release outright, indicates
respect for the Commission’s presumptive interest in the matter, though it also presumes
in the prisoner’s favor compared to merely waiting on a better return.
The last case, and the only one after the flurry of extrajudicial debate prompted by
Chancey, is another marital dispute. All the cursory report of this case, Agar’s,111 tells is
that a man was sued or prosecuted for beating his wife and calling her whore; that he was
sentenced to pay her 3/ per week alimony; that he was subsequently fined for not
performing the sentence and required to enter a bond to perform it; and that he had both a
Prohibition and a Habeas corpus to deliver him. Obviously he was imprisoned on top of
the other sanctions, or because he resisted them. Legally, nothing can be said for the
Commission as this case appears. The adultery and aggravated adultery of Chancey are
lacking; there is no sign of a divorce, nor of clear entitlement to one; even the clear-cut
expulsion of a wife, as in Langdale, is absent. This of course does not mean that the High
Commission was not readier to enforce humane behavior on husbands than regular
ecclesiastical courts, or than common law courts thought appropriate for ecclesiastical
tribunals.

111

T. 11 Jac. 2 Brownlow and Goldesborough, 36. Not identified as a C.P. case, but
almost certainly one coming from that series of reports .The report does not even say that
the case concerned the High Commission, but it obviously did, at least at the stage where
secular sanctions were employed. It is perfectly conceivable that the case originated in a
lower ecclesiastical court, the High Commission taking over when the party proved
obdurate.
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End-note: Sources and details of the 1611 extrajudicial debate.
I have four documents bearing on the extrajudicial debate summarized in the text:
(a) Lansd. 161, f.250. This document is headed “The Copy of th’ Information,
delivered to his Ma[jes]ty by Mr. Serse his Proctor, touch[ing] the many Prohibitions sent
to the High Com[m]issioners Ecclesiasticall fro[m] the Court of Com[m]on Pleas. 1611”
The Privy Council discussions about the Common Pleas’ regulation of the High
Commission took place in the summer of 1611 (T. 9 Jac.) The present document,
appropriately dated as to year, looks like a, or the, position paper from the ecclesiastical
side registering the complaints that led the Council to take action. It is a general statement
of objections and a petition to the King to come to the Commission’s help, rather than a
precedent-citing argument.
The High Commission’s point of view is clearly stated: The monarch may give
the Commission any or all parts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, civil as well as criminal.
Pursuant to this power, Queen Elizabeth gave it, and King James has given it, such
unlimited jurisdiction. Their intention was not that the Commission should handle petty
matters to the derogation of regular ecclesiastical courts. Rather, the policy has been to
trust the Commissioners’ discretion to accept only “exorbitant” cases. By the same token,
however, the policy is not to pre-define “exorbitant.” Correct use of discretion would
consist in taking major criminal cases plus lesser criminal and civil cases when “the
qualities of the persons in question enforced them.” (That, I believe, is close in practical
meaning to “divorce and morals cases involving substantial people”, as in Chancey.) The
Commission has always in fact used its discretion in this restrained way, and inferior
ecclesiastical courts have never complained. The Common Pleas specifically, not the
common law courts in general, is criticized for issuing unwarranted Prohibitions. The
Common Pleas is correctly enough credited with the position that the Commission may
use temporal sanctions in the few “enormous” criminal cases over which it has
jurisdiction. I.e., it is not said, falsely, that the court took the more extreme position that
temporal sanctions are unlawful as such. From the author’s point of view, of course,
temporal penalties are lawful whenever the Commission in its discretion decides that a
case is major or exceptional enough for it to take.
The paper takes express exception to the Common Pleas position that 23 Hen.
VIII was in a sense applicable to the High Commission (one of the points embraced in
Chancey), on the ground that that pre-Elizabethan statute in its terms covered only
regular ecclesiastical courts. Exception is also taken to the doctrine that the common law
judges have exclusive responsibility to interpret statutes. Excessive Prohibitions to
regular Church courts, as well as the High Commission, are protested incidentally. It is
objected that old, and irrelevant, statutes (Magna Carta and Articuli cleri) were relied on
as reasons why the Commission should not use temporal sanctions: the Common Pleas’
straightforward reliance on its reading of 1 Eliz. is perhaps underemphasized, and the job
of refuting that reading by close construction avoided.
The “information” ends by asking the King to “give order to take away these
Prohibitions” or else to authorize the Commission to disregard them. “Give order to take
away” may, I suppose, mean (vaguely) “do something to remove the abuse” or
(specifically) “order the Common Pleas to stop issuing them.” The King in the event “did
something” he hoped would be constructive—Privy Council meetings with the judges,
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persuasion, pressure, and compromise. The Proctor may have believed that he could or
would give direct orders to the common law courts.
(b) 12 Coke, 84.
This is a report of four successive Privy Council meetings concerned with the
Common Pleas and the High Commission, the first a few days before T. 9 Jac. and the
rest in that term.
(1) Owing to complaints specifically about Chancey, all the judges (i.e., it
appears, King’s Bench and Exchequer as well as Common Pleas) were summoned before
the Council, where the Archbishop of Canterbury and other churchmen and civilians
were also in attendance. Coke had already delivered to the Commission what he describes
as “the treatise which I made of it”—meaning presumably a brief or apologia he had
prepared defending his court’s actions in Chancey, if not its decisions generally. It would
appear that an out-of-court battle was going on before the Council intervened. Oral
argument on the points of Coke’s “treatise” took place before the Council, Coke and
Archbishop Abbot holding the floor. The Archbishop finally came up with a couple of
arguments which he thought the “treatise” did not anticipate; in his report, Coke treats
them with contempt, and so perhaps he did in oral argument. (The Archbishop claimed in
effect that 1 Eliz. authorized the monarch to give the Commission any powers he had
previously given de facto to commissioners appointed to hear ecclesiastical causes,
whether he had done so lawfully of not; he claimed that Henry VIII and Edward VI had
given temporal sanctions to such commissioners; Coke did not dispute the fact, only the
absurd theory that 1 Eliz. meant to legalize previously illegal acts so long as they were
precedented. Abbot also advanced the theory that because pre-Elizabethan statutes had
given ecclesiastical courts temporal sanctions in some cases, 1 Eliz. should be taken as
authorizing the monarch to give the Commission such sanctions, not only in those cases,
but in all others. One senses that Coke could do little more than sputter at so total a non
sequitur.) The meeting apparently ended inconclusively.
(2) The Common Pleas judges alone were summoned before the Council for
further argument. This time the Lord Chancellor did the talking against the resolutions in
Chancey. The judges stuck by their guns.
(3) The King’s Bench judges, except for Fenner and Yelverton, plus the Barons
of the Exchequer, were summoned before the Council. Document (c) below confirms
what reported cases would suggest: Fenner and Yelverton were probably left out because
they were the members of the King’s Bench least favorable to the Commission. Coke
says that the King’s Bench and Exchequer judges did not know why they were
summoned, and that they were unacquainted with the reasons behind the holdings in
Chancey. (But since they were present at Meeting #1 above, it is unlikely that they were
completely in the dark about the case.) Coke obviously and properly disapproved of the
government’s attempt to trick the King’s Bench and Exchequer judges into statements of
disagreement with the Common Pleas; he is visibly proud that it did not work.
For the King’s Bench and Exchequer judges, off the cuff and without talking among
themselves, came down in agreement with the Common Pleas. (At least as against broad
claims for the Commission put forward by the Lord Chancellor. One cannot tell from the
report exactly how the question was framed for the judges, Ellesmere is reported as
saying that the Commission had always fined and imprisoned for exorbitant crimes under
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the authority of 1 Eliz. This is what the King’s Bench judges are said to have reacted
against. How untrue or objectionable Ellesmere’s statement is depends on what it is
taken to mean. Possibly he suggested in an overstated way that there was simply no
question about the legality of temporal sanctions, that to deny their legality was to say
that a great deal of practice had been illegal and the assumptions underlying it false.
Perhaps in the context he was using “exorbitant” as the Proctor in the first document
above uses it. To such a tone and such a usage of “exorbitant” the judges ought to have
reacted with at least skepticism.
(4) This time the judges of all three principal courts were summoned, Fenner and
Yelverton included. The Common Pleas judges, however, were at once sent from the
room, to wait until the Council had parleyed with the members of the other courts. Lord
Treasurer Salisbury cast aspersions on the Common Pleas judges in the process of stating
a pretext for requesting their withdrawal. (They had “contested with the King.”)
According to Coke, the King and the Prince now entered and listened to the ensuing
discussion, but Document (c) below is better evidence that their entrance actually took
place after the interrogation of the judges. Coke again complains that questions were in
effect sprung on the King’s Bench and Exchequer judges. In contrast with the last
occasion, their replies were not unanimous this time. (The report gives no details as to
how they differed. There is of course nothing particularly surprising in the discrepancy
between their testimony on this occasion and on the previous one. Their responses would
depend on exactly what questions were put and in what manner. There is every reason to
think that judicial opinion outside the Common Pleas was at least relatively unformed,
and probably more favorable to the Commission.)
After two and a half hours, the Common Pleas judges were called back in. Instead
of upbraiding them for misapplying the law, the King announced his intention to reform
the Commission’s patent and define more narrowly or precisely what causes it should
have jurisdiction in. Only the general intent was announced, it would seem, not the
detailed features of the proposed new patent. The government’s exact game is therefore
hard to make out. It was clearly persuaded to concede something; interrogating the
King’s Bench and Exchequer judges did not leave the King and Council in a position to
say that the Common Pleas was flatly wrong. But it remains uncertain whether the
government was ready to retreat in substance from an overextended position, or only to
make minimal concessions and insist in the new patent on all the points it was really
interested in, such as adultery and alimony. Perhaps it had little more in mind at this
moment than a general strategy and a peace-making gesture; there had after all been no
time to deliberate.
After the King, the Lord Treasurer made a speech. Its tone is elusive, and it
contributes little clarification on the real point of the announced solution. Salisbury starts
on a sad or angry note (“…the principal feather was plucked from the High
Commissioners, and nothing but stumps remaining, and that they should not intermeddle
with matter of importance, but of petit crimes…”) If this is meant as criticism of the
judges, it is odd. Perhaps the “principal feather” is wide discretion in the Commission to
decide what “matter of importance” suitable to its jurisdiction is, without regard to
legalisms such as the civil-criminal distinction. The tendency of an enormity test in some
form, after all, is hardly to leave the Commission only “petit crimes”, unless Salisbury
wanted to suggest that leaving it mostly, in practice, with disciplining obscure Puritans
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and misbehaving clergymen amounted to as much, compared to dealing with important
people unwilling to respect ecclesiastical justice. He goes on, however, to give a little
indication of what may have been thought wrong with the present patent and how it
would be reformed. This suggests that the “sad or angry note” may have applied to the
proposed reform, Salisbury saying that in his own view too much was being conceded, or
else dramatizing the generosity of the concession. On the deficiencies of the present
patent, he notes that it used the loose word “errors”, which would be defined more
precisely for the future. He also says that the Commission’s taking bonds from parties,
“as before absurdly and unjustly had been taken,” would be stopped. That practice, at
least, he considered a genuine abuse, not a “principal feather.” He adds, finally, that there
would be still other reforms, but does not specify them. One senses that Coke, writing the
report, suspected that the reform would fall far short of bringing the patent clearly into
line with the law.
At last Coke got the floor and used it, with characteristic courage and
relentlessness, to complain to the King’s face about the Council’s examining judges of
other courts separately concerning a case argued and decided in the Common Pleas
(clearly Chancey.) In closing, he was only so far conciliatory as to say that when he and
his colleagues saw the new patent they would “as to that which is of right, seek to satisfy
the King’s expectation.” Again, it sounds as if he was hardly sanguine about the reform.
The meeting broke up with nothing more said.
(c) Harg. 17, f. 1, among a number of pages inserted upside down at the end of a volume
of reports.
This document is a personal minute by Justice Sir Christopher Yelverton of the
last of the meetings reported by Coke. It is written in the first person and refers to
Yelverton’s own feelings and problems. Its authenticity as Yelverton’s product, or a copy
thereof, is confirmed by the fact that the next document among the papers appended at
the end of Harg. 17 is labeled as Yelverton’s argument in Calvin’s Case (to which he
makes incidental reference in his minute of the Council meeting.) The document dates the
meeting—10 June, 9 Jac.
After giving the names of the fourteen Privy Councilors present and saying
generally that the question was about 1 Eliz. and the High Commission, Yelverton
recounts his own remarks to the Council. He begins by observing that he had not
previously heard the matter in question debated because of his omission from the earlier
meeting of the King’s Bench judges. He takes the occasion to complain about the
omission and clearly intimates that the reason for it was that he was suspected of being
unfriendly to the Commission. This he denies, citing his concurrence in Fuller’s Case,
where the Commission’s power to fine and imprison was upheld. He then generalizes:
“and so in other cases I think they may likewise do secundum quantitatem delicti.” The
language here is probably hedging. Fuller was visited with secular sanctions for schism.
“Secundum quantitatem delicti” probably means that those sanctions may be used in
some cases besides schism, provided the crime is serious enough—a true enough
proposition from the Common Pleas point of view. Alternatively, the phrase could mean
that secular sanctions are lawful in all cases within the Commission’s jurisdiction, but in
quantity they must be reasonably proportioned to the gravity of the offense. That too need
not on its face quarrel with the Common Pleas; it all depends on what the Commission’s
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jurisdiction comprises, and for the moment Yelverton says nothing about that. He
continues in what seems to me still a hedging vein. Wandering from what I should call
tightly relevant considerations, he notes that secular judges have a good deal of discretion
to fine and imprison when there is no “positive law” appointing those punishments in
specific amount. Even lowly constables may imprison under some conditions, and that
by common law (i.e., non-statutory) authority. Considering these truths, Yelverton
wonders how the High Commission can lack power to fine and imprison. (“And why may
not ecclesiastical Comissioners doe the same though they be not bounded within any
compasse for the Bishopps which be the Cheife Comissioners be most reverent learned
grave and considerable men.”) Then Yelverton observes that royal commissioners in
various secular contexts purporting to give power to imprison or seize goods would be
unlawful. But why? Because such commissions lack the statutory warrant that the High
Commission has—implying that the statute behind the High Commission’s patents makes
it at least probable that its use of secular sanctions is lawful.
At last, after what I should call a good deal of warm-up, Yelverton gets explicit
and says in effect that the best construction of 1 Eliz. is that it warrants secular sanctions
if the monarch chooses to authorize them. (“…the statute is the ground of the commission
and the commission the warrant of there authoritie, and the statute and the commission
together doe give them power to sett fines and to imprison men, And if the statute had
expressly given them power to sett fines and imprisonment noe man will denye but they
might have done it and so if the statute had expressly sett downe that the commission
should be so and this amounts to as much for the statute is that they shall execute all the
premises according to the effect of the commission and it is but a degree further that that
is contayned in the commission which is warranted by the statute and not contayned in
the statute it self.”)
So in the end Yelverton said what the Privy Council wanted to hear. He took the
respectable position that the “tenor and effect” clause in the puzzling 1 Eliz. is best read
as intended to give the monarch wide discretion as to the powers (and similarly the
jurisdiction) to be conferred on the Commission. His awkward way of saying that,
however, adds to the impression one gets from his roundabout way of working up to it—
of a thinking-out-loud quality that is natural enough if Yelverton was really surprised to
be asked his opinion, but that could also be assumed to avoid contradicting the Common
Pleas too flatly. His tone seems close to, “Well, now that you ask, it would seem odd if
the High Commission could not fine and imprison when so many other courts and
officers can do so without obviously overwhelming justification, and if we start with that
presumption—well, it is a little funny that 1 Eliz. does not give clear directions, but then
some of its language is hard to give effect except as conferring broad authority on the
monarch.”
The sequel seems to confirm that Yelverton was not enthusiastic about coming
out for the Commission. For after doing so, his face brightens, as it were, and he goes on
to suggest that the King take the initiative to clear up the present unpleasantness: “But in
this great commission I could wish that it would please his ma[jes]tie to bound it within a
more narrow compasse and not extend it to so many nor so slight causes.” Yelverton then
suggests three reforms: (1) Avoiding a multiplicity of Commissions—i.e., having just one
High Commission (per Archdiocese, presumably) and not supplementing the major
tribunal with other local ones of the same legal nature. (2) Some way of obviating the

321

repeated objection that to confer jurisdiction on the Commission was to deprive men of
their appeals in ecclesiastical causes. As Yelverton puts it, “That there might be a
petic[i]on to his Ma[jes]tie for the reviewe of there sentence, and not to have it so finall
or so peremptory as it may not be contradicted.” He proceeds to remind the Council that
no other high court in the realm is free from appellate review and that judges are always
better off when the possibility of reversal hangs over them. His proposal is not specific,
but it presumably calls for routinization of what was already technically available—the
right to petition the monarch for a review commission. Presumably, in Yelverton’s view,
some sort of standing body to hear appeals should be constituted, and the subject would
be assured that petitions would lead automatically to a hearing before such a body,
without an ad hoc exercise of royal discretion. Yelverton’s emphasis on this point
reveals, as his other reforms do not, his sympathy with a deep-seated judicial motive for
holding back the Commission’s jurisdiction. Assuring routine appeal might well be an
indirect cure for diseases beyond the immediate one, for the impulse of civil
complainants and private prosecutors to go to the Commission must have been
strengthened by knowledge that resorting there was a way to avoid the tedious process of
ecclesiastical appeals. (3) The personnel of the Commission should be improved by
appointment of “men of worth and of some eminence in the world and not the servants of
Bishopps nor any of there family.” Whatever the exact reality that suggested this
proposal, there is plenty in the reports of cases to make one think the Commission had
more trouble with the courts than a wiser use of its purported discretion would have
brought upon it. It would of course be optimistic to suppose that improving the caliber of
the Commission would cause the legal problems surrounding it to vanish.
Yelverton credits his scheme with smashing success. The Treasurer “amongst
many words in comendacon of it, said, he had not seene in so weake a body so strong a
minde.” The Lord Chancellor was no less impressed, saying “that I had satisfied him in
the matter more than all the rest of the Judges, and that it was a speech the best framed
and the most judicious that ever he heard.” With a pinch of salt for vanity—and perhaps
for condescension, irony, and appeasement of an offended Justice on the part of the great
officers—it is still possible that the idea of conceding some abuses and compromising
around a new patent originated with Yelverton, so that the Privy Councilors were
indebted to him for a constructive suggestion as well as a comforting doctrine. Yelverton
says that the other eight judges and Barons interrogated were “of the same opinion.”
There are too many variables to permit telling exactly what the terms of agreement were.
It can hardly be out of the question that the judges pre-concerted a united front. To the
degree that they were spontaneous, “of roughly the same opinion” would seem a likely
emendation—not so firmly against the Commission as the Common Pleas was supposed
to be, inclined to the compromise-reform option once it was broached.
At this point, after the interrogation of the judges, the King came in. Thus
Yelverton’s version, in contrast to Coke’s, as to when exactly the royal presence graced
the occasion. All one can say is that Yelverton was there while Coke fretted in the
antechamber. Salisbury and Ellesmere proceeded to recount the conference to the King.
There are no further details, except that Salisbury “tooke occason to speake in
comendacon of me, upon which I kneeled down“(perhaps a confirming hint that there
really was something special about Yelverton’s contribution.)
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The rest of Yelverton’s account is given over to a bit of by-play concerning
himself. Having an opportunity to speak to the King, and enjoying a modest limelight,
Yelverton thanked him for diverting “the disgrace that was intended to be imposed upon
me by removing me from my Circuite.” Yelverton explains in his minute that “the Lord
Chancellor before had purposed upon some private concept against me to have displaced
me of my Circuite.” He is presumably thanking the King for some previous decision to
veto the Chancellor’s recommendation, not for an action taken here and now in the glow
of Yelverton’s good performance in the matter of the High Commission. The King
replied that he never meant to remove Yelverton, had always thought well of him, and
was especially in his debt for his speech in the Case of the Post Nati or Calvin’s Case
(when Yelverton was among the large judicial majority, led by Coke, that decided the
case as the King wanted it decided.) The information supplied by this closing note
reflects back on the history of the meetings on the High Commission in several ways.
Yelverton’s initial exclusion might be explained by the Chancellor’s hostility, whatever
motivated that, as well as by the suspicion that Yelverton held unsound views on the
High Commission. That suspicion might of course have entered into the hostility.
Ellesmere may have gone out of his way to commend Yelverton on the present occasion
because he had a personal offense to make up for. Yelverton’s being out of favor for
collateral reasons may have moved him to say as much for the government’s point of
view on the High Commission as he conscionably could.
(d) 12 Coke, 88. M. 9 Jac. (i.e., the term following the Privy Council meetings
discussed above.)
This document is Coke’s account of his resistance to the plan to include him,
together with six other judges, on the new High Commission. The others were Chief
Justice Fleming of the King’s Bench, Chief Baron Tanfield , Justices Williams and
Croke from the King’s Bench , and Barons Altham and Bromley from the Exchequer.
The puisne Justices of the Common Pleas were unrepresented.
Coke’s position had three elements: (1) He claimed the right to be fully informed
of the content of the new patent before consenting, or being obliged, to serve. His
insistence was in the face of what would seem to have been a deliberate attempt to
prevent him from knowing what jurisdiction and powers were purportedly conferred on
the tribunal he was appointed to. (Coke says that the King’s Bench and Exchequer judges
knew the content of the patent, whereas he and the other Common Pleas judges did not.
This suggests that confabulation between the government and the favored King’s BenchExchequer group went on beyond the meetings above, as the new patent was being drawn
up.)
(2) Underlying Coke’s demand for disclosure was his view that a judge ought not
to sit on the Commission unless he was convinced of its legality. That is surely a
respectable position, if not axiomatic. It is perhaps arguable that a subject is bound to
accept appointment regardless of whether he considers the powers of the body to which
he is appointed legally unexceptionable. Could he not resist from within the exercise of
powers he thought unlawful? Was the point of introducing a common law component
into the Commission not to internalize possible disagreements over what powers could be
bestowed on the Commission and so to reduce the probability of inter-court warfare?
Those cavils seem pretty casuistical, however. It is likely that Coke was right in the view
that must presumably be imputed to him: the scheme was basically to embarrass him and
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other judges by setting up a conflict of roles and making the judges complicit in decisions
they thought the Commission had no title to render.
As things turned out, Coke got some support from the other judges and got his
way, or at least part of it. The patent was read aloud at the meeting to which Coke’s
report refers. This was an assembly at the Archbishop’s palace in Lambeth, where the
new commission was officially “published”—albeit without a reading, by the original
plan—and the new members of the court were to be sworn in by taking the Oaths of
Supremacy and Allegiance. Coke raised his objections towards the outset of the meeting
and thereby kept the ceremonies from moving smoothly on to the swearing-in. He may
have thought that written copies of the patent should have been furnished to the
appointees, but in any event he insisted successfully on a reading. Having heard it read,
he still refused to accept appointment, now on the ground that he needed more time to
consider. In his report, he tells us that in fact he thought the patent illegal in several
ways, but unfortunately he does not say what they were. Perhaps he was rather estopped
by the situation from saying more then and there but that he needed time. Having made
his protest, he then proceeded, “as the subject of the King”, to take the oaths, His posture
must have been something like, ”I will not refuse to take the oaths here offered as the
requisite step to effect my induction into the office of High Commissioner, because as a
loyal subject I would be glad so to swear daily before breakfast, but I do not regard my
swearing as inducting me into the office and regard it as my right, which I continue to
reserve, to refuse appointment.” Questions can be raised at this point about the law and
about Coke’s intent. Having protested first and then sworn, is it clear that he did not
“accept” the appointment? In the end was there any way of “refusing” except by not
taking the oaths? Did he mean the observers to see that at least his intention was to
decline the office, and that he swore only because it would be graceless not to when the
opportunity was offered? Or did he mean to allow them to suppose that he relented
despite his misgivings? In writing his report he could have touched up the face of his
behavior.
Coke’s taking the oaths at last cleared the way for the public relations stunt that
Archbishop Abbot had planned. Abbot delivered an oration on the urgent need for a High
Commission in these sinful days, “and then he caused to be called a most blasphemous
heretic, and after him another, who was brought hither by his appointment, to shew to the
Lords and the auditory the necessity of that commission.” One may suspect that the flat
tone of this reportorial language is charged with contempt for the sideshow on Coke’s
part. For the benefit of his judicial auditory, the Archbishop should perhaps have
substituted a delinquent alimony-payer for one of the heretics.
Coke then tells us that the Archbishop “afterwards” spoke privately with himself
and Chief Justice Fleming of the King’s Bench, promising them a copy of the new patent
and assuring Coke that when he had an opportunity to study it properly he would find it
very different from its predecessor. Whether “afterwards” means before the meeting
broke up or on a subsequent day is uncertain. In any case, the final note is conciliatory.
As at the last Privy Council conference in Trinity, there was at the end a certain yielding
to the judges’ sensitivities, a certain shrinking from political bravado. That Archbishop
Abbot was a reasonable man may have something to do with it.
Near the close of his report, Coke notes again something he mentions in passing
earlier: that the judges, on Coke’s insistence, remained standing throughout the meeting
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although they were asked to sit down. It looks as if what was normally a gesture of
respect was meant as a gesture of stand-offishness, a symbol of resistance to instant cooptation. The report ends with the Archbishop announcing the time and place at which he
would hold sessions of the new High Commission. This was pursuant to the King’s order
that the court sit in an “open place” at stated times—presumably a facet of the new leaf, a
response to the objection that the Commission was irregular in its habits and sometimes
avoided the publicity appropriate to judicial tribunals. Abbot also announced that there
would be a sermon in the morning of the days on which the Commission sat, for the
purpose of keeping the Commissioners better informed of their duty. Here too the odor is
of reform. Was the homilist to warn the Commissioners against foolish over-extension of
their jurisdiction and heavy-handed use of secular sanctions, as well as remind them of
the blasphemous heretics who needed putting down? “Bad public relations” seems to
have been part of the diagnosis of the High Commission’s troubles with the courts in
recent years. In several ways, Archbishop Abbot was trying to do better.
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Sub-section (b): The King’s Bench during Coke’s Chief Justiceship (1613-1616)
Summary
The King’s Bench during Coke’s Chief Justiceship did not define the High
Commission’s authority in significantly new ways. The court may have been brought
into clearer line with the Common Pleas position that the Commission lacked power
to award alimony, and probably by extension jurisdiction on the civil side of
matrimonial law generally. Although Coke’s King’s Bench held clearly enough that the
Commission may not touch alimony, and a fortiori may not use secular sanctions and
bonds in connection with alimony disputes, the court was tacitly disinclined to interfere
heavy-handedly with the Commission’s assumption of matrimonial jurisdiction. Persons
imprisoned in consequence of such proceedings were only bailed on Habeas corpus or
were induced to mediate their marital troubles. Recognition that the Commission’s role
was more useful than lawful seems implied, as well as a degree of deference to the
sensitivities of the government and the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
Otherwise, decisions from Coke’s King’s Bench largely confirm the High
Commission’s jurisdiction in areas where earlier holdings tend to support it: Clerical
incontinence, simony, Puritan activity in the nature of schism. On the other side, there is
a trace of confirmation that contempt or slander of the High Commission is not
punishable by it.
The Cases
We turn now to the cases from the King’s Bench during Coke’s Chief Justiceship
there, from October, 1613, until his dismissal in November, 1616. For all the
qualifications that must be put on his ferocity as a foe of the High Commission, litigants
seeking to limit that court certainly followed Coke. I have no cases from the Common
Pleas for the period he headed the King’s Bench, and there was little King’s Bench
business touching the Commission when he presided over the Common Pleas. The two
principal courts, though somewhat different, were not far enough apart on High
Commission questions to make seeking relief against the Commission hopeless except
where Coke sat. Nevertheless, he seems to have been the beacon for those who wanted to
complain
Two cases from Coke’s first term on the King’s Bench rather vindicate than limit
the High Commission’s jurisdiction. The structure of Watts’ Case112 is unclear from the
reports, but the essential point of the holding comes through. The Commission was
prohibited from awarding costs against Watts because he had a pardon covering the
offense for which he had been sued, clerical incontinence. The problem for the court
seems to have been whether the King’s pardon could toll the interest of the private
plaintiff in the High Commission suit. (Who the private plaintiff was, or what kind of
interest he could have claimed, is one of the obscurities in the reports, but there plainly
was such a plaintiff.) The court held that the offense was indeed pardonable, and the
award of costs accordingly improper, because all suits in the High Commission, like
112
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those in the Star Chamber, are the King’s, whether or not there is a private plaintiff. That
in effect says that the High Commission is an exclusively criminal court, even when its
proceedings are civil in form. So to hold is obviously to say that the Commission does
not have universal ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but that was by 1613 hardly controversial.
On the way to this determination, Coke spoke about the offense of clerical incontinence
in such a way as to show that he regarded it as manifestly a High Commission
matter.(This comes out from Bulstrode’s report alone.) He called it “heinous”, which
from the tone and context would seem to be indistinguishable from “enormous” and
“exorbitant.” He said that pre-Reformation statutes (not specifically cited) had made it
felony. (I do not think that is correct, but as we have seen above it was subject to
imprisonment by ecclesiastical courts by statute. Coke added that since clerical marriage
had come in the offense was so much the worse, because what was once mere fornication
was now in danger of being adultery. While earlier cases leave little doubt that clerical
incontinence, unlike most sexual offenses, was prosecutable in the Commission, the
proposition had never been embraced quite so firmly. Although its costs award was
nullified, the Commission gained in Watts a strong affirmation of authority in an
important area from its point of view. Centralized control over the moral standards of the
clergy, as over its religious conformity, was surely at the heart of what the government
and the hierarchy were seeking, control that would be effective in the face of local laxity
and the private interest of patrons.
The second case, Sir William Boyer’s113, has been discussed in Vol. II (pp. 399401) since its problematic aspect concerns the power to exact incriminating testimony.
Here we need only recall that along the way Coke declared simony an enormous offense,
“worse than felony.” His intent was clearly to leave no doubt that the crime was entirely
appropriate to the High Commission, whether proceedings were directed against a
clergyman who gained his benefice by simony or against laymen who made simoniacal
bargains in dealing with the advowson. Problems arose in the case only when it came to
whether interrogation tending to temporal detriment should be prohibited. It is not
surprising to find simony classified as an enormity, but no previous case affirms it to be.
Bradshawe’s (or Bradstone’s) Case (1614) 114 has also been discussed in Vol. II
(pp. 401-404) for the element of self-incrimination. As to the powers of the High
Commission generally, the King’s Bench held that fining and imprisoning to enforce
payment of alimony are unlawful. It made no difference at the level of principle that
adultery and aggravated marital misconduct were involved in the instant case. The court
also held that it was improper for the Commission to take a bond from the delinquent
husband; Coke said he would grant a Prohibition quoad the bond if one were sought. The
case, however, arose on Habeas corpus, and, as in several other such cases, the result was
not severely discouraging to the Commission’s meddling in marital disputes. The
prisoner was bailed, rather than discharged outright, and told to go to the Bishop of
London, submit himself, and use his wife better. The Bishop of London may have been
his diocesan, who ought to have handled the case in the first place, as well as a leading
member of the High Commission. But even if the party is considered referred to his
113
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Ordinary, his imprisonment commuted into bail was the means to make him heed the
ecclesiastical authorities,
Whereas the reports of Bradshawe go only to the use of secular sanctions, an
anonymous Prohibition case from the same term115 speaks to jurisdiction over alimony by
way of dictum. So far as appears the principal case did not involve the High Commission,
A wife complained of cruelty to the Ordinary, who awarded her weekly alimony. The
husband sought a Prohibition, on what ground is not reported, The theory that alimony is
only grantable as an adjunct of a formal divorce may have been the ground, for the
judges, besides saying generally that the matter was proper to the Ordinary, said that he
was entitled to take order for the wife’s safety and award alimony, The judges added that
a misused wife also has a temporal remedy, because she may have her husband bound to
good behavior (but it is not implied that this is any bar to her ecclesiastical remedy.)
They added further, incidentally it seems, that the High Commission may not meddle
with alimony. (There may be an implication, in the context, that there is no need for the
Commission to meddle with it, considering that Ordinaries have a fairly wide discretion
to deal with marital discord, and secular good behavior bonds may if necessary be used to
reinforce the regular ecclesiastical courts.)
The final cases in this Sub-section essentially adopt the Common Pleas position
on marital disputes into King’s Bench practice. In Broke’s Case, 116 it was returned on
Habeas corpus that the prisoner was committed for refusal to allow alimony to his wife.
The court held that the High Commission may not meddle in such a private case. This
time the judges did not use the bail technique to keep the misbehaving husband
responsive to ecclesiastical authority. Instead, they undertook mediation themselves and
persuaded the couple to agree that the wife should receive £20 per year in separate
maintenance.
A further group of eight reports117, all possibly relating to the same case and
probably to the same marital disturbance, also concerns whether alimony is beyond the
High Commission’s authority. The reportorial picture is so tangled that it will be best
simply to look at the accounts one by one:
(1) Harl. 4817, f. 234 b., dated H. 12 Jac. K.B.
Codd was sentenced to pay his wife alimony, entered an obligation to perform the
award, and was subsequently committed for failure to perform it. These facts being
returned on Habeas corpus, the court discharged Codd, outright it seems. The judges held
that the Bishops, not the High Commission, may hold plea of alimony. They also said
that the bond was unlawful.
(2) A Codd’s Case is mentioned in Rolle’s report of Bradshawe/Bradstone above.
It is dated H. 12 Jac.—oddly, since that term follows the M. 12 of Bradshawe/Bradstone.
Perhaps it is the reporter’s interpolation. No outcome is given, only that the return on
Habeas corpus said Codd was committed for contempt of the High Commission’s order
to receive his wife and use her as his wife—that rather than failure to pay alimony.
(3) 3 Bulstrode, 109, dated M. 13 Jac. K.B., sub nom. Codd v. Turback.
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The return on Habeas corpus said that Codd was committed for refusing his wife
alimony and for “diversa opprobriosa verba.” In this report, the court says nothing about
the alimony. It held vehemently, per Coke, that the return was insufficient for failure to
specify what the opprobrious words were and when they were spoken. The prisoner was
bailed.
(4) 1 Rolle, 245, sub nom. Codde’s Case; 3 Bulstrode, 146, sub nom. Hodd v.
High Commission; Harg. 47, f. 79b.
These three reports are all dated M. 13 Jac. K.B. They all have the return on
Habeas corpus saying that the prisoner was committed for reproachful words touching
the Commission and refusing to respond to articles concerning the same. I.e., there is no
mention of an underlying marital case. According to all the reports, the court held that
neither the reproachful words nor the articles of inquiry were sufficiently specified. It
also held that even if the return had been more detailed it would still almost certainly fail
to make out that the Commission had jurisdiction. The reason for this was that slander of
the High Commission going to the legality of is proceedings is not punishable by the
Commission itself, but at common law. This holding accords with earlier decisions. Coke
cited in support a Hales’s Case, where a man said that a sentence of divorce given by the
Commissioners was against their consciences, as well as against the law. He was indicted
for the slander at common law and fined upon his confession. (Note that Hales furnishes
a precedent of a High Commission divorce. Presumably the party did not try to prohibit
the divorce suit, just denounced the decision therein. The common law’s treating the
denunciation as a criminal contempt without regard for the suit’s lawfulness bespeaks
respect for the Commission’s dignity. Attacking its integrity as well as the legal
correctness of what it had done of course adds to the weight of the slander; it could
possibly be essential to its criminality.) Bulstrode has the prisoner in the principal case
discharged; Rolle has him bailed until the next term and then discharged; the MS. has
him simply bailed. (This version of Codd’s Case is discussed in Vol. II (pp. 427-428) as
it touches self-incrimination.)
(5) 1 Rolle, 432, and Harl. 4561, f. 272b.
These virtually identical reports are dated M. 14 Jac. K.B. That is Coke’s last term
on the court. He was already in disgrace, and one cannot be sure of his participation. The
decision given in these reports suggests either Coke’s absence or a change of tune when
he was in his straits.
Again, one Codd was imprisoned by the High Commission and brought a Habeas
corpus. The return explained that he had been ordered to cohabit with his wife or else
show cause why he should not, and that he refused to do either. It explained further that
he was ordered “superinde” (probably, “thereupon” rather than “moreover”—see below
for the difference) to enter an obligation to attend from day to day until the Commission
should determine what alimony he ought to allow his wife, which he also refused, and
was committed for refusing. The King’s Bench, “upon the sudden reading of this,”
thought that two reasons were alleged for the imprisonment—(a) refusal to cohabit or
show cause and (b) refusal to enter the obligation. The reporter thought, however, that the
return clearly claimed only the second reason, the first serving as “background.”
Anyhow, the judges said that the Commission could imprison for the first reason; they
were in doubt about the second and therefore remanded the prisoner for the present.
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Leaving aside the judges’ confusion about what they were called on to decide, their
opinion seems surprising. If they adhered to their earlier position that marital matters
were almost entirely beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction, and certainly not subject to
secular sanctions, it is hard to see how they could justify the imprisonment on one score
and be in doubt on the other. The only possibility of distinguishing I can see is to take the
Commission’s acts as merely interlocutory. I.e.: Codd was not ordered to cohabit with his
wife, but given a chance to show why he should not cohabit with her. Perhaps he could
prohibit the Commission from entertaining the case that led to that order, and perhaps he
should be released on Habeas corpus if he were ordered to cohabit and refused to; but the
Commission may imprison to make a party who has not protested its jurisdiction
cooperate in the sense of not “standing mute.” Similarly, Codd was not ordered to pay
alimony, but to cooperate with the process of assessing alimony. If we straighten out the
reading of the return, as the reporter suggests, this sort of argument gains in
persuasiveness: The Commission did not imprison Codd to make him cooperate with
proceedings designed to determine whether he ought to live with his wife. It did not treat
him as one subject to a nisi order is ordinarily treated if he fails to appear and show
cause—i.e., did not order him to live with Mrs. Codd. Such a disposition would be poor
handling of a marital situation even if Mrs. Codd was trying to get her husband to take
her back, and worse if separate maintenance was equally or more eligible from her point
of view. Rather, the Commission accepted the husband’s unresponsiveness to its first
order as an expression of unwillingness to live with his wife, in effect dropping the
demand that he justify his unwillingness. It held his unresponsiveness against him only in
the sense of concluding that he had nothing to say that would justify his refusal to cohabit
and therefore mitigate, if not remove, his responsibility to maintain his wife separately—
such as showing that the wife was adulterous or otherwise to blame for the breakdown of
the marriage. That is to say, the Commission concluded that an arrangement for separate
maintenance must be made. Even then, it did no more than seek to enforce the husband’s
cooperation in proceedings to assess the alimony—in which, incidentally, he might still
have an opportunity to cast blame on the wife by way of reducing the sum to be paid her.
It sought only to keep Codd from frustrating its efforts to ascertain such things as his
ability to pay, without which a settlement could hardly be worked out. To that end, it
tried to restrict itself to a bond and used imprisonment only to make Codd enter the
obligation after he refused to do so without coercion. All the while he made no effort to
prohibit the Commission and thereby liberate his wife to pursue her remedy in a regular
ecclesiastical court.
These considerations seem to me to lend a good deal of common-sense
justification to the King’s Bench’s decision to remand the prisoner, and even so he was
remanded only for the time being, until the judges resolved their doubts. They showed a
degree of sympathy for the Commission’s seemingly restrained effort to deal with a
refractory situation, even if on consideration they would have felt compelled to hold the
bond unlawful, in accord with most authority, and their decision need not quarrel flatly
with the well-established rule that alimony and related matters are simply beyond the
High Commission’s jurisdiction. One may still find it on balance surprising, given the
prior common law insistence that alimony is simply ultra vires for the Commission.
Exactly what human and legal story these clearly related reports add up to is not
worth speculating about. Suffice it to say in summary that among the reports one can find
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(a) straight confirmation of the position that the High Commission may not meddle with
alimony and a fortiori may not use secular sanctions in connection with it and may not
demand bonds; (b) a propensity to evade the question of the High Commission’s marital
jurisdiction by settling Habeas corpus cases on the formal sufficiency of returns and by
limiting the Commission’s authority to punish slander of itself; and (c) a qualified retreat
from (a), to the extent of saying that in some circumstances use of imprisonment in
marital proceedings may be justifiable. Codd may illustrate the truth that drawn-out,
oddly managed, intractable situations can distort the law.
Coke’s last major case involving the High Commission was the Habeas corpus of
Burrowes, Cox et al., which has been discussed at length in Vol. II (pp. 338, 404-427,
430) because it turns essentially on the power to exact self-incriminating testimony. We
may recall here that that case confirms the well-established principle that heresy and
schism are within the Commission’s jurisdiction and imprisoning power. It shows that
schism was interpreted broadly enough to take in most Puritan activity. It also illustrates,
along with several other cases, including marital ones, discretionary, indeed selfrestrained, administration of the Habeas corpus, whereby people whom the High
Commission ought never to have imprisoned were in practice allowed to spend
considerable time in jail or liberated only on bail.
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Section 5: Cases after Coke’s Chief Justiceships
Summary Covering Both Subsections
The Common Pleas after Coke’s departure cannot be said to have reversed any
positions taken in his time, but wavering and inclination toward a more pro-Commission
attitude are visible at a few points. The two decisions made by the Court under Sir Henry
Hobart (1613-1625) affirm the High Commission’s jurisdiction—over simony,
unsurprisingly, in one case, but in the other over clerical misconduct short of serious
religious error or gross immorality. The latter case is not a head-on holding, but it is
somewhat encouraging to the Commission in the still largely unsettled area of its
authority in intra-Church affairs, especially discipline of the clergy.
It is in that area that the Common Pleas under Sir Thomas Richardson (16251631) made its clearest holdings restricting the Commission. Two cases, one of them
decisive, exclude the Commission from punishing clergymen for variously compounded
forms of unedifying behavior—not all of it sub-criminal, though hardly “enormous”, and
in its pattern distinctly deleterious to the Church. Such decisions are pretty strong
reaffirmation of the value of localism, even in criminal and intra-Church matters, and of
the “enormity” test for the High Commission’s jurisdiction. On the other hand, an
opinion in a further case by two judges (Hutton and Richardson), while upholding the
“enormity” standard expressly, brings one rather surprising form of misconduct within
the standard and hence within the Commission’s jurisdiction—viz., converting a church
to profane uses. (The suit was brought by a patron against parson and parishioners.
Nothing like blatant sacrilege was charged—only failure to keep up the building as a
church, whereas the defendants claimed that alternative facilities were available and
customarily used.) Another decision supports the Commission’s authority to exercise
essentially administrative supervision over the ecclesiastical system (specifically, to
investigate, and possibly to deprive, a judicial officer—Bishop’s Chancellor—for alleged
professional incompetence, where there was no pretense that he had committed a crime.)
The “intra-Church affairs” cases from the Richardson Court, taken together, suggest an
inclination to stretch a point in the Commission’s favor for the sake of good order in the
Church, provided it did not get involved in listening to bills of complaint against
parochial clergy of the sort all-too likely to arise from parochial quarrels.
Otherwise, the High Commission was upheld by Richardson’s Common Pleas
only in a Puritan-activities case (notable for the comparative triviality of the activities, as
against anything that could seriously be considered schism) and in the case of a layman
prosecuted for adultery, blasphemy and drunkenness (where, however, the Court’s refusal
to prohibit was probably owing to an added element of subversive utterance—in itself
quite obviously inappropriate to the Commission, but probably the reason why the Court
did not look very deeply into the propriety of prosecuting the other offences there.)
The several cases outside the “intra-Church” area in which the Richardson Court
restricted the Commission basically perpetuate previously established lines, but they
show some signs of strain. Richardson himself was well-connected with the government
and in most departments of Prohibition law a conservative judge (i.e., disposed to limit
common law interference with extra-common law courts.) It was characteristically
Richardson who leaned toward favoring the High Commission. He was not able to carry
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the other judges with him, but his influence and the Court’s presumable preference for
avoiding head-on splits may account in part for the occasionally blunted edges of antiCommission decisions.
Two cases on sexual offences eventuated in restrictive decisions. One
(aggravated pandering to adultery) brings out the division between Richardson and the
puisne judges quite clearly. The majority thought the basic offence ultra vires for the
Commission (without, perhaps, wholly excluding the possibility that aggravation—here
prolonged promotion of an adulterous affair—could give jurisdiction); Richardson
plainly disagreed. It is less certain that he dissented from the majority view that in any
event secular sanctions and bonds could not be used in connection with such an offence.
The case, however, was disposable on separate grounds—a pardon covering the offence.
Although there were some problems about the applicability of the pardon, the judges
agreed that it did apply and were therefore able to stop the High Commission proceedings
without dissent. Consequently, the decision is not a strict precedent on the jurisdiction
and sanctions question. The second case was incest, which was as such indisputably
appropriate to the Commission. The issue was whether the Commission could be
controlled (via Habeas corpus) when it appeared on the record that statutory standards as
to what constitutes incest had been violated. The Court was inclined to think that the
Commission was controllable for mishandling a matter within its jurisdiction in that way
(misconstruing or ignoring a statute.) Interstitially, however, the discussion of this case
brings out positions favorable to the Commission, as to which the judges do not seem to
have disagreed: (a) Use of secular sanctions in an incest case (including punitive
imprisonment, or at least imprisonment to enforce a fine) is unobjectionable. (This point
represents no break with Coke’s courts, but is confirmation, for incest, of the rule that
secular sanctions may be used in connection with the small number of “enormities”
clearly within the Commission’s jurisdiction—a rule that in Coke’s day was never quite
sorted out from the rival rule that secular sanctions nay be used only for heresy—plus
clerical incontinence if that is infra vires—, where there was a statutory basis.) (b) The
Commission may probably justify imprisoning for incest in Habeas corpus without
showing wherein the incest consisted. (It had simply made the mistake of telling too
much and revealing its error in this case). If so for incest, why not for heresy, etc.? (c)
No more than bail was so much as sought for the prisoner, much less considered by the
Court, though to constrain him by bail was to constrain one who by the Court’s holding
had done nothing wrong.
The Richardson Court held pretty well to the position that the High Commission
may not touch alimony. It was strongly asserted by some judges, especially Hutton.
Richardson resisted to a degree, but not decisively. At least one (and possibly another)
decision to prohibit an alimony suit was deliberately, at Richardson’s request, put on
grounds that would be good against any ecclesiastical court, thus avoiding questions
specifically about the High Commission’s jurisdiction. A little countenance was given to
the proposition that a temporary award of alimony, pending marital litigation, may be
made by the Commission.
Two other restrictive decisions had special features. The Commission was denied
jurisdiction over assaults on clerics because ecclesiastical jurisdiction was entirely
statutory and the ancient statute (Articuli cleri) conferring it specified the episcopal
courts. Save for Richardson, however, the judges would perhaps have been equally ready
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to prohibit on the ground that the offence was too minor for the Commission. In this case
they expressly confirmed that patents to the Commission may not exceed the bounds set
by 1 Eliz. The second case holds that the Commission may not fine when the party could
be fined by temporal courts for the same offence. (The report does not tell what
particular offence was in question in the instant case.) However, the implications of the
discussion are not entirely unfavorable to the Commission. It was held that imprisoning a
man subject to a temporal fine for the same offence is at least not controllable by
Prohibition. The Commission was prohibited from fining the party in those
circumstances, but he was told to bring a Habeas corpus if he wanted to challenge his
imprisonment. Richardson probably had some doubt about the principal decision (no fine
under the circumstances), but he went along with it. The other judges did not deny that
the Commission may sometimes fine and imprison, but they did not on this occasion go
beyond affirming that it may do so in the clearest cases—heresy and clerical
incontinence, owing to the regular ecclesiastical courts’ one-time statutory power.
Richardson probably favored more permissive standards, at least power to imprison in all
cases for the purpose of enforcing a spiritual sentence.
The King’s Bench had less of a tradition of restricting the High Commission than
the Common Pleas. Nevertheless, the clearest restrictive decisions after Coke’s departure
come from the King’s Bench. All of the significant ones are from the late 1620’s, when
the Court was presided over by Sir Ranulphe Crewe and Sir Nicholas Hyde.
Alimony was straightforwardly held ultra vires. The King’s Bench saw itself as
adopting Common Pleas precedents at the very moment when the contemporary
Common Pleas was wavering somewhat on alimony. In its alimony cases, the King’s
Bench expressly held that the monarch required, and for this matter lacked, statutory
authority to confer jurisdiction on the Commission. The Court also emphasized the
importance of preserving appeals. In reaching these oft-repeated general points, the
judges implied a little more than they were called on to decide, for it would be hard to
deny jurisdiction over alimony with those points in mind and not also to deny it for other
civil causes, and perhaps the pettier criminal ones as well.
The strongest reaffirmation of restrictive guidelines came in an “intra-Church”
case of sorts (where the High Commission suit was to compel a rector to perform his de
jure duty to repair the chancel of the church.) In the process of holding this suit
inappropriate to the Commission, the Court insisted that the commission is limited, not
only to crime, but to “enormous” crime. Strict construction of “enormous” (i.e., that it
means “extremely grave”, not “unlawful”) was insisted on. So was the importance of
preserving appeals and the theory that the historic reason for authorizing a High
Commission was hardly more than an immediate need to purge the Church of Catholic
clergy. Defamation, including defamation of clerics, was incidentally said to be too civil
a matter for the Commission. Finally, the actual circumstances of the case were such that
Prohibition would probably have been justified if the suit had been in a regular
ecclesiastical court. The judges preferred to hold it ultra vires for the Commission, rather
than avoid passing on the Commission’s powers and seek other grounds for Prohibition.
Another case in the same Court confirms the principal decision (no suits before the
Commission to compel repair of a chancel.)
On the other hand, the Caroline King’s Bench showed some signs of
permissiveness toward the Commission in the “intra-Church” area. One clerical
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discipline case was rather ambiguously handled: A minister who refused to obey his
superior’s order to preach a visitation sermon was imprisoned by the Commission. The
King’s Bench relieved his immediate plight by bailing him on Habeas corpus. The Court
was probably inclined to doubt that imprisonment was lawful for so comparatively petty
a misdemeanor (and there was a question as to whether it was a misdemeanor at all), even
if the Commission had jurisdiction over the matter. However, the bail decision was
represented as tentative, pending a final resolution (of which there is no report.) The
indications are that the Court was reluctant to intervene in the process of clerical
discipline, although it was very ably urged to by counsel in this case. An opinion in
another case by two judges (Jones and Croke, neither particularly royalist or proecclesiastical) confirms such reluctance: they opposed interfering with the Commission’s
proceedings against a clergyman for drunkenness and “lewd behavior.” The King’s
Bench also had occasion to pass on the Commission’s power to proceed against a
Bishop’s Chancellor for professional incompetence. (The same case as the Common
Pleas decided on that point. The party appears to have tried his luck in the two courts
successively.) If anything more decisively than the Common Pleas, the King’s Bench
held that the Commission was within its rights.
No cases from either principal court have been found for the years 1631-1640.
What this means, insofar as it is more than an accident of reporting, is not obvious. It
may be tempting to suppose that no one dared challenge the High commission in the time
of Thorough, or that the courts were unwilling to interfere with it. Yet neither
proposition in really convincing. There was good precedential basis for challenging the
Commission’s activities in several areas, if such activities were taking place. In
proportion as the Commission was increasingly unpopular for political reasons, people
would perhaps have had all the more animus to resist it if it ventured into civil and petty
matters. On the other hand, there was virtually no precedential basis for challenging
High Commission proceedings against Puritan activity. Puritans in trouble with the
Commission may have thought it futile to seek the help of the common law courts, but
that could be for commonplace reasons—because the courts were all but foreclosed by
past practice from giving any help to such complainants. Adulterers, delinquent alimonypayers, and the like were not in the same boat. It is possible, indeed probable, that the
courts’ net sympathy with all anti-Commission positions would have declined in the ‘30s,
owing to changes in the complexion of the Bench and to the political atmosphere. Belief
that the courts were prostituted to the government was probably stronger than any reality
justifying the belief. Yet the belief is not finally a sound basis for predicting a low
incidence of resort to the courts. The impulse to bring test cases in politically
supercharged times is not necessarily dampened by pessimism about their success, nor
are litigants with any kind of chance likely to be so overcome by pessimism or cynicism
that they refrain from testing whether they are really as badly off as they fear. Anyhow,
as the Ship Money case classically demonstrated, the judiciary was not a prostituted
monolith. A lawyer hoping to save his client from an alimony suit in the High
Commission would have had every reason to predict from past performance that at least
some judges would argue on his side. Whether Hampden’s lawyers, in a far higher
matter and with much stronger reason to be gloomy, calculated that they would win
Justice Croke’s vote is probably unascertainable; in the alimony case, it would be easier
to say “Croke at least will be with us, and maybe he will be persuasive.”
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The safest course, therefore, is to reserve judgment as to what the apparent
absence of High Commission cases from the ‘30s means. The hypothesis that the
commission became more prudent and better ordered under Archbishop Laud is at least
as convincing as the theory that litigating against the Commission came to seem hopeless
(and perhaps was proved to be in cases of which we have no report.) Is it possible that
the Commission concentrated on Puritans (and perhaps on the always ambiguous “intraChurch” area), that it learned to stay away from civil and petty matters, especially those
involving laymen, and thereby to avoid gratuitous litigation and unedifying squabbles
with the secular courts? Could the Laudian vision of the Church not have had some
common ground with standard anti-Commission positions—respect for localism and “due
process of law” in the ecclesiastical system; a desire to see the regular ecclesiastical
courts in competent hands and playing their due role, not in danger of preemption by a
central tribunal; a hope of restoring the authority of spiritual sanctions in the common run
of spiritual causes, reserving temporal ones for the religious offences and other
“enormities” where a serious case for exceptional powers could be made (and whence the
secular courts in the 17th century had no inclination to exclude temporal sanctions)? By
concentrating on Puritans, as this hypothesis supposes, the Commission may have been
working its destruction in the long run—when Puritan political influence emerged in
new-found strength, and an explosive mixture of temporal and ecclesiastical politics had
been brewed up—, but in the short run it would have been the way to peace with the
secular judiciary. The value of religious conformity and the necessity of extraordinary
measures to enforce it were too deeply engraved in the law to be repudiated even by
judges who (as some, along with other moderate-conservative Anglicans, must have) had
no taste for Laud. (As for a possible “intra-Church” penumbra, where the High
Commission’s right to a free hand was less clear than in Puritan cases: Positing greater
self-restraint and appreciation for localism on the Commission’s part may suggest that it
would have been less inclined than earlier to take commonplace clerical discipline cases
and the like. If, on the other hand, we assume a continuing or increasing volume of High
Commission activity in that area, a low incidence of complaint about it might reflect
something other than a shift, or expected shift, of judicial opinion in the Commission’s
favor. It could conceivably reflect a certain success for the Laudian ideals and program,
clergy and other officers of the Church finding it less acceptable to quarrel with the
hierarchy, resist its supervision, and oppose it in the secular courts.)
Three decisions from 1640-1642 give no sign of discontinuity with practice
before 1631. The Common Pleas held very clearly in one case that alimony is ultra vires
for the Commission. Neither of two King’s Bench cases counts for much on major
issues. One Habeas corpus suggests disinclination to let the Commission issue “intraChurch” administrative orders and punish disobedience as contempt, but the reported
decision to bail in that case was only a tentative resolution. The other King’s Bench case
suggests not more than a disinclination to discuss the Commission’s power to fine where
there were special technical reasons for allowing a fine to be enforced without reaching
its original legality. This fragmentary evidence from the eve of the Civil War is probably
most consonant with the supposition that judicial opinion in the ‘30s stayed about where
it was before and would, given occasion, have manifested as much. The alternative
hypothesis would be that the courts were, or were assumed to be, exceptionally reticent
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towards the Commission in the ‘30s and then, in response to a changed political climate,
reverted to normal and attracted complainants.
(In connection with the above speculations on the 1630’s, cf. the similar points
concerning self-incriminatory questioning by the High Commission in Vol. II.)
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Sub-section (a): Cases from the Common Pleas after Coke left the Chief
Justiceship (1613 to the Civil War Period)
We move now to post-Cokean cases concerning the High Commission. For
whatever reason, there are more from the Common Pleas than from the King’s Bench. I
shall deal with the former consecutively down to the eve of the Civil War and take up the
few King’s Bench cases at the end (except .for .one case that is replicated in both courts.)
The earliest Common Pleas case, Bishop v. Caleb Mortry,118 though obscurely
reported, furnishes a clear holding that simony is within the High Commission’s
jurisdiction. The form of the simony alleged to the Commission in this case was that after
being presented to a benefice the presentee entered an obligation to pay the patron £100. I
suppose there was a question as to whether this constituted simony, in contrast to a gift—
whether in cash or a bond—made to the patron before presentment. In any event, the
King took the transaction as simoniacal, and hence as ipso facto forfeiture of the
immediate presentation to the Crown (by virtue of the statute of 31 Eliz., c.6), for the
King presented Mortry to the benefice. Mortry then complained against the erstwhile
patron in the High Commission for simony. If his motive was interested, as opposed to a
mere desire to see simoniacs punished, I presume it would be the belief that an
ecclesiastical judgment that simony was indeed committed would secure his incumbency.
A Prohibition was sought to stop the High Commission suit. Serjeant Ashley, arguing in
favor of the Prohibition, did not contend that simony was intrinsically inappropriate to the
Commission, but that simony was examinable at common law and in the instant case
should be examined there rather than in an ecclesiastical court. The report is too sparse to
bring out his reasoning, but his effort failed. The Common Pleas decided unanimously
that Prohibition would not lie. Two judicial observations shed some light on why
Ashley’s theory may have been colorable. Chief Justice Hobart, after saying that the High
Commission could without question deal with simony, adds that the obligation would
only be evidence of the offense. I take this to mean, though the reportorial language is
confusing, that the Commission could take note of the bare fact that an obligation was
given so long as it stayed away from any questions about the validity or construction of
the bond. Justice Winch probably made the same point with the remark, “If they do
anything that crossed the bond the prohibition will be granted.” Ashley’s argument
perhaps came to claiming that the potential presence of collateral common law issues
owing to the bond gave the common law exclusive jurisdiction. As far as the major High
Commission issues are concerned, this case confirms earlier indications that simony as
such qualified as an enormous ecclesiastical offense.
Searle’s Case119, also from Hobart’s court, does not raise direct questions about
the High Commission’s powers, but has some oblique bearing on them. Searle was
brought to the Bar on Habeas corpus. Thereupon he sought a Prohibition to block
execution of a sentence depriving him of his Church living that the Commission had
imposed on him. His ground was that the offenses for which he was deprived were within
a general Parliamentary pardon. The question before the court was in part whether two
episodes of misbehavior were included in the pardon; if there were other charges against
118
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P. 16 Jac. C.P. Harl. 1549, f.159b.
M. 22 Jac. C.P. Harl. 5148, f. 63.
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Searle, the pardon was presumably applicable without dispute. (1) Searle said “publicly
and maliciously in the church”, that a Mr. Michell was excommunicated. When he
ordered Michell to leave the church and Michell refused, Searle commanded the
churchwardens to drag him out. In fact, Michell was not excommunicated. The Common
Pleas held that the misconduct was not pardoned because the pardon contained an
exception for misdemeanors committed in church. Per the court, the exception applied
not only to misbehavior by parishioners toward the minister but a fortiori to
misdemeanors by the minister himself. Searle’s claim was obviously that ministers were
outside the exception (i.e., covered by the pardon.) I cannot say whether anything in the
text of the pardon would render the claim plausible. (2) Searle was also deprived in part
for saying to a sick parishioner “that he would commend his body to the earth and his
soul to the Devil.” The question about those words, which were presumably not spoken
in church, was whether they came to heresy or schism, which were excepted from the
pardon. The court held that although the words were atheistical and profane they did not
amount to heresy or schism and were therefore pardoned. Clearly Searle would have had
his Prohibition based on the pardon if he had only been charged with “atheistical and
profane” utterance. There is no suggestion in the case, however, that either such language
or abusive behavior by a minister in church would as such have been considered
insufficiently enormous for the High Commission to proceed against and punish by the
ecclesiastical sanction of deprivation. This accords with previous indications that the
Commission was given a pretty free hand in disciplining clerics. The effect of the pardon
in Searle raised complex problems beyond the comparatively simple one whether some
of the party’s offenses were covered by it, but only the latter has any bearing on the
jurisdiction of the High Commission. The case in full will be discussed later in this study,
when construction of pardons is taken up as a separate aspect of Prohibition law.
In Dr. Sutton’s Case,120 an unusual suit was brought in the High Commission, and
a persistent effort to prohibit it was unsuccessful. The case is not, however, essentially on
the Commission’s jurisdiction and powers. There is only one hint in the reports that
counsel seeking Prohibition thought of arguing that even if the case was generically
within ecclesiastical jurisdiction it was not appropriate to the High Commission
specifically. There was no judicial response to the one suggestion of such an argument.
The case is an important and difficult one on whether any ecclesiastical court could
proceed against Sutton in the form in which he was proceeded against. The judges, in
deciding against Prohibition, seem to have taken it for granted that the proceedings, since
they were within ecclesiastical jurisdiction, could take place in the High Commission.
Counsel favoring Prohibition—with the faint exception referred to—seems to assume that
to prohibit the suit it must be shown that any ecclesiastical court would be out of bounds
in entertaining it. In this chapter, therefore, we do not need to go deeply into Sutton as it
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was actually argued, but only to note what it obliquely has to say about the High
Commission.
It is an oddity of Sutton that it occurs in both the Common Pleas and the King’s
Bench 121 without significant substantive differences. Both principal courts reached the
same result—denial of Prohibition—on the same grounds. It seems clear that after
Prohibition in one court Sutton and his counsel simply tried their luck in the other.
Because Latch’s King’s Bench report is undated, one cannot say for sure which court
discussed the case first. I think, however, that the Common Pleas probably preceded the
King’s Bench. Sutton’s King’s Bench surmise has some additions and alterations of what,
so far as one can tell, he surmised in the Common Pleas—signs suggesting an effort to
strengthen his case in detail for a second try. If so, however, the effort had no effect.
The substance of the case in summary was as follows: Sutton, the Bishop of
Gloucester’s Chancellor, was “articled against” in the High Commission because he
allegedly lacked the educational qualifications required by his office—mainly a doctorate
in civil law, and it may have been claimed in addition no experience in the practice of
Church law that might compensate for that deficiency. (If he was a Doctor at all, his
degree may have been in divinity.) The attempt to prohibit the High Commission
proceedings was based on the fact that Sutton had a freehold interest in his office and the
theory that an ecclesiastical inquiry into his qualifications was unlawful because a finding
of unfitness might lead to deprivation of his freehold by an ecclesiastical court. I defer the
ins and outs of this issue and the question of exactly what the Common Pleas and King’s
Bench decided until later in this study. Minimally, the courts held that Sutton must try to
justify his qualifications; the High Commission should not be prohibited here and now on
the ground that an ecclesiastical court had no jurisdiction to ask him to,
The following seem to me to be the case’s implications for the High Commission
specifically:
(1) Mere failure to distinguish High Commission jurisdiction from ecclesiastical
jurisdiction in general implies a theory that is not without credentials: viz. The High
Commission is “just another ecclesiastical court” with intrinsic or de jure authority to
entertain any ecclesiastical cause. That jurisdiction may have been limited by 23 Hen.
VIII, c.9, as it was for regular ecclesiastical courts (but, as we have seen, that statute was
not clearly held to apply to the High Commission.) The Commission may have no power
to use secular sanctions, or statutory power to use them only in some of the cases in
which its jurisdiction (with power to employ spiritual sanctions) was unexceptionable.
(Regular courts of course had no power to use secular sanctions, except for a few ancient
statutory exceptions, which since the Elizabethan settlement probably survived only as
powers conferrable on the High Commission if the monarch chose to confer them.)
These restrictions do not, however, mean that any type of legitimate ecclesiastical
complaint was barred from the Commission.
Despite its history and merits, however, it would be surprising to find this theory
embraced in Charles I’s reign, or—if it were expressly proposed—accepted without
controversy. That is because the Cokean period left a considerable deposit of authority
for the proposition that 1 Eliz., in giving the monarch authority to constitute a High
Commission, did not permit conferral of all kinds of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on it.
121
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Rather, only criminal jurisdiction could be given to the new institution, and within
criminal jurisdiction, only power to proceed against “enormous” criminal offenses. The
“enormity” test may never have been universally and wholeheartedly accepted by
common lawyers and all judges, but it was well-entrenched. It continued to be invoked
and applied in some cases between Coke’s departure from the Bench and the Civil War.
Virtually by-passing it in so weighty a case as Sutton, and thereby implying the older
theory—High Commission jurisdiction basically = ecclesiastical jurisdiction—may,
however, signify a weakening of its influence.
(2) In my opinion, reasonable cases can be made for and against Prohibition in
Sutton without leaving the High Commission’s specific jurisdiction out of account. The
case for Prohibition is probably the easier. On that side, one can invoke the idea that the
High Commission was exclusively a criminal court and argue that Sutton was not
charged with a crime. The High Commission’s inquiry was predicated on the suspicion
that he was exercising an office without proper qualifications; he was asked in effect to
rebut the suspicion, but that is not the same as accusing a man of a crime. It is in fact not
clear from the reports of the case that Sutton was thought to have done anything with the
flavor of personal wrongdoing. For example, he may not have deceived the Bishop who
appointed him and the Dean and Chapter who confirmed his appointment. They may
have been satisfied that he was capable of performing the job despite his lack of a civil
law degree. He and they may have believed, even if incorrectly, that they were not
subject to rigid qualification-requirements. It may have been arguable as a matter of law
that the decision of the Bishop and Dean and Chapter was final—or perhaps not
examinable except by the diocesan authorities themselves—even if it was mistaken.
Should Sutton fail to justify his fitness to continue performing the office, it is not
inevitable that he would be subject to anything that can be strictly called a punishment, as
a convicted criminal should be. For example, he might be in effect suspended from active
exercise of the office without losing the title and emoluments. All these possibilities are
at least intimated in the thorny actual discussion of the case, a discussion based on the
assumption that the issue was the title of any ecclesiastical court to conduct a
retrospective inquiry into Sutton’s qualifications. Why could one not evade the question
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in general and merely argue that this case was not a criminal
one appropriate to the High Commission? Or—if all “flavor of wrong” cannot be
expunged from merely “doing something against the rules”—is it not at any rate arguable
that nothing like an “enormous” crime, nothing with the mens rea quality a crime against
God and the Church surely ought to have, was even indirectly “charged”? Should this
argument be accepted and the High Commission prohibited, the open question would be
whether regular archdiocesan courts could conduct the same inquiry into Sutton’s
qualifications as the High Commission undertook to, but that, by this argument, is not our
case.
On the other side, a sensible case can be made against prohibiting the High
Commission on grounds specific to it. “Criminal” should perhaps not be taken narrowly.
Conceding that private litigation—where a plaintiff with an interest sues a defendant with
an adverse interest—may not take place in the High Commission, the contrasting
category perhaps need not be confined to manifest criminal prosecutions. There may be
circumstances in which court-initiated or ex officio prosecutions are desirable for
purposes other than their usual one of supplementing private prosecution for a clear
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ecclesiastical crime. Although there is no 17th century vocabulary for this, what would
now be called an “administrative” purpose may sometimes justify such proceedings.
Seeing that, or investigating whether, the Church’s judicial system is in competent hands,
or functioning in accord with qualification-rules for its personnel, is a good illustration. It
is hard to argue that the makers of 1 Eliz. actually contemplated this role for the High
Commission, but it may not be unduly loose construction to see it as a legitimately
modest extension of what they did contemplate.
The central reason for the Commission, after all, was to have an ecclesiastical court
that could reach offenders who were not legally unreachable by regular courts, but were
likely de facto not to be so reached. Besides the case of powerful or refractory people
who had misbehaved in serious or complicated ways, it may be reasonable to count
situations which, if remediable, called for measures beyond the regular courts’ routine.
The situation in Sutton may be of that sort. It has some affinity with cases in which
inability to act owing to vested interests or legal confusion can be predicted for regular
courts. (If the Bishop of Gloucester would not, or could not, or believed he could not,
review his appointment of a Chancellor and possibly reverse it—and note that to do so he
would have to get around his chief legal officer, Chancellor Sutton—a regular
archdiocesan court would be the only body to take action if the High Commission is ruled
out. It might be diplomatically difficult for the Archbishop, or the civilian judges who
did his judicial work, to interfere with a Bishop, and they might have been unsure of their
power to interfere, especially in view of Sutton’s freehold. The High Commission has the
advantage of being, formally anyway, an agent of the King and the whole Church rather
than the Archbishop—in a sense a neutral supervisory body to deal with a tricky intraChurch problem.)
Although Sutton is a nearly unique example of the High Commission’s playing
the role of an “administrative” tribunal, there is some support in the case law for its doing
so. Some decisions stretch the Commission’s jurisdiction from “enormous crimes”
properly so-called to aggravated cases of lesser offenses and to compounded misbehavior
no single component of which would by itself rise to the level of a High Commission
offense. Is that less of a stretch than allowing the Commission to take on disorders in the
Church that hardly involve plain criminality, but which it might be practically the best
agency to deal with? Whatever else—whether the argument for or against High
Commission jurisdiction is the better—the case stands as a practice precedent for the
Commission’s undertaking to entertain a kind of “administrative” complaint and being
allowed to without challenge to its specific jurisdiction.
This hypothetical debate can be given another dimension by taking the High
Commission’s sanctions into account. Roughly, without further elaborating the
complexities of a figment: If one assumes the less-than-certain rule that the High
Commission may use secular sanctions in any case within its jurisdiction, then more
arguments for and against allowing the High Commission to touch such a case as Sutton
can be imagined. In favor of prohibiting the Commission on grounds specific to it, one
could urge the unfairness of exposing the party not only to deprivation of his office, but
to fine or imprisonment as additional punishment, or as means of coercing him to
cooperate with the inquiry into his qualifications which he claimed was beyond
ecclesiastical authority altogether. Against Prohibition, it could be argued that a larger
repertory of sanctions than regular courts possessed, if used to coerce the party’s
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cooperation rather than to punish, might help to bring about the sort of compromise that
would perhaps be the best solution of the case. That would probably take the form of
inducing Sutton to accept turning over the exercise of the office to a qualified deputy in
exchange for retaining the office itself.
(3) As I mention above, there is in one report a glimmer of an argument
specifically against High Commission jurisdiction. This occurs in Latch’s report of the
King’s Bench case. Glanville, speaking from the Bar in favor of Prohibition, starts off
with the main argument on that side in all reports: ecclesiastical jurisdiction is barred
generally by Sutton’s freehold. He then adds, however, the puzzling sentence “and the
Court of High Commission is not confirmed by Act of Parliament.” In the abstract, this
statement seems nonsense. If anything was true of the Commission, it was that the
tribunal had a statutory basis, even if the monarch could have created it without one. I can
only take Glanville as saying that 1 Eliz. gave no express authorization for conferring on
the Commission power to deal with unqualified Chancellors and the like. By contrast, the
statute did authorize jurisdiction over heresy and its kin and added the vaguer category of
“enormous” ecclesiastical crimes. Glanville’s assumption must be that investigating
whether such officers as Chancellors were qualified does not fall under the authorized
categories of jurisdiction. The point is well-taken and clearly directed at High
Commission jurisdiction specifically. It seems, however, to have got no attention or, if
attended to at all, to have been rejected. The report only tells us that the King’s Bench
refused Prohibition without giving any reasons, and two judges, Dodderidge and Jones,
who speak as individuals in the report confine themselves to some detailed reasons for
holding that ecclesiastical deprivation of the office is lawful notwithstanding the freehold.
A scrap of further information from Latch may, however, suggest part of the
reason why the High Commission’s specific jurisdiction was not objected to very
strongly, or at least not successfully. Latch gives a little more detail of the Commission’s
articles against Sutton than the Common Pleas reports. They recited inter alia that King
James had ordered the Archbishop of Canterbury to grant commissions to examine
defects of Chancellors and remove insufficient ones, and King Charles had renewed the
order. There could perhaps be a “constitutional” dispute over the King’s power to do this,
but if one wants to avoid the political stratosphere, it makes a certain sense to say that if
the King had lawfully authorized special commissions to look into unqualified
Chancellors, the Archbishop was entitled to use the extraordinary agency that already
existed. Doing so would be most tolerable if the High Commission qua—let us say again,
“administrative” tribunal—must stick to ordinary ecclesiastical sanctions, which include
deprivation.
In Smith v. Clay, 122 a clerical discipline case, the Common Pleas was inclined to
prohibit the High Commission (in this case, exceptionally, the High Commission for the
Province of York) but deferred final action in the Chief Justice’s absence. A private
complainant, from public spirit for all that appears, “articled” against Dr. Clay, the Vicar
of Halifax. The charges can hardly be called non-criminal, but it may be difficult to
promote any of Clay’s alleged misdoings to enormity. Whether the suit aimed at
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depriving Clay does not appear from the reports; it may have had no specific object, but
merely invited the Commission to take such measures against him as it saw fit.
Clay was charged with an impressive catalogue of unseemly deeds, as follows:
Reading the Bible in church in an irreverent manner, thus scandalizing the congregation;
failing to preach himself on Sunday mornings, “against his oath” and contrary to #45 of
the 1604 canons; taking communion cups and other holy vessels home, using them for
profane purposes, and putting barm in them, “so that the communicants were loath to
drink”; observing a recent fast proclaimed for a Wednesday on Thursday instead,
“because it was a holy day” (I suppose because Wednesday was and Clay did not want to
spoil the fun—?); keeping an adulterous drunkard as a curate or chaplain for a chapel of
ease in the parish; failure to catechize in accord with Canon # 59 (mistakenly cited as #39
by the MS., referred to as “the parish canon” in Hetley)—instead Clay allegedly made do
with buying a supply of one Dr. Wilkinson’s catechism at 2d. apiece and selling copies to
the parishioners for 3d.; letting parishioners on whom he was ordered by “commissions”
to impose penances get off with a money payment; menacing parishioners, or allowing
his servants to; “abusing himself” and “disgracing his function” by engaging in “base
labors”, specifically making mortar in a leather apron and, having himself taken a tithe
pig from the sty, gelding it with his own hands; selling gifts of meat, fish, and ale instead
of employing them in hospitality or giving them to the poor; ordering his curate to
perform an unlicensed marriage in a private house; letting persons who were
“peradventure” unlicensed as preachers and who were “suspected persons and of evil
life” preach in the parish.
Serjeant Henden, Clay’s counsel, sought a Prohibition on the ground that the High
Commission could not by 1 Eliz. meddle with “such matters”, “but only examine heresies
and not things of this nature” (MS.—the printed version lacks the probably too restrictive
“only heresies.”) Such a casual invocation of the enormity test might not have satisfied
some earlier courts, especially since Clay was so versatile a rascal as to suggest that he
could have been too much for the diocesan courts to handle or too much on the good side
of episcopal officials to expect discipline. Henden had one further arrow, however, which
may have relieved him of need to make a careful case for the pettiness of Clay’s offenses:
Somehow the Lambeth (Canterbury) High Commission had been consulted about, or in
any event found out about, the case and had certified to the York Commission that it
would not itself, or York should not, proceed in such a matter; the senior Commission, so
to speak, advised the junior to desist, which it would not do. One archdiocesan High
Commission probably had no power to command the other, but this case shows that a
consistent national policy was regarded as desirable, not least by the Common Pleas,
which prohibited unless cause were shown to the contrary. The Prohibition nisi was
probably a courtesy to the absent Chief Justice rather than a sign of doubt.
In another case from the same term as Smith v. Clay123, a clergyman, Giles, sued
Balam in the High Commission for assaulting him. Serjeant Athowe, arguing for
Prohibition, admitted that the current patent purported in express language to give the
Commission jurisdiction over assaults on clerics, but maintained that 1 Eliz. did not
permit the patent to confer that power. The words of the statute, he said, allowed
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jurisdiction to be given only over “men who stir up dissension in the Church, as
schismatics or new-fangled men who offend in this kind” (not a very precise definition of
what the Commission’s scope was, but Athowe’s implication was clearly that violence
toward clergymen could not possibly be in the same category as the offenses rather
generally indicated.) Serjeant Henden, arguing against Prohibition, emphasized to start
with that the ecclesiastical assault suit was for reformation of manners—in other words,
essentially criminal. He conceded that Prohibitions had in the past been granted to stop
suits of that character, instancing adultery and defamation. Those Prohibitions were
proper, because when they were issued the patent did not include those offenses, but the
present patent did. Henden did not say that any Prohibitions had been denied in adultery
or defamation cases since the current patent was issued, but relied on the familiar general
argument that 1 Eliz. annexed all ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the Crown and posed no
obstacle to its being granted to the Commission, so long as the patent was express about
the sorts of cases granted and so long as they fell in the pro reformatione morum class.
The qualifications—“so long as”—are not as reported stated with great clarity or
insistence, but it would appear that Henden was being careful not to make too extreme a
claim. He cited the now-published 5 Coke—Caudry and Coke’s commentary thereon
presumably—in support of his argument.
Prohibition was granted unanimously. Only Chief Justice Richardson’s
individual opinion is reported. Richardson relied primarily on the old quasi-statute
Articuli cleri: since that act expressly gave jurisdiction over laying violent hands on an a
clergyman to the Ordinaries, allowing it to be given to the High Commission would
unlawfully derogate from the Bishops’ powers. The court as a whole broadened the basis
for granting Prohibition by citing two express grants in the current patent which it
regarded as invalid—“a stroke in the churchyard” (presumably meaning a violent act in
that location) and substraction of tithes. “Strokes” in a churchyard seem to qualify well
enough as criminal or partly criminal offenses; I am not sure how substraction of tithes
differs from mere non-payment, a leading example of civil jurisdiction not grantable to
the High Commission except on the most permissive theory, but perhaps it is narrower,
with a colorable criminal element—retaking of tithes after they have been exposed and so
“paid”, which amounts to taking the parson’s vested property. In any event, the court’s
ground was that if such cases were allowed to the Commission—and presumably assaults
on clergy even without reference to Articuli cleri—“all the Ordinaries of England will be
to no purpose.” Giles v. Balam, in short, deals a pretty strong blow to the extendability of
High Commission jurisdiction much beyond the generally conceded core of serious
religious offenses.
Isabel Peel’s Case and the Countess of Purbeck’s Case (1628-29)124, though
separate, relate to the same situation. I shall discuss them together. Purbeck raises
straightforward questions about the High Commission’s powers; Peel is about whether a
party proceeded against in the High Commission was pardoned by a general pardon—i.e.,
whether the party’s offense was within the terms of the general pardon. The much more
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thoroughly reported Peel does, however, contain comments bearing incidentally on the
major issues concerning the High Commission. The reports of Purbeck fall in the term
after the last of several in which Peel was debated, but remarks in Peel show that
Purbeck was already launched and known to the lawyers and judges dealing with Peel.
The connection between the two cases is that the Countess of Purbeck was accused in the
High Commission of adultery with Sir Robert Howard, while Mrs. Peel was accused of
pandering to the Purbeck-Howard affair, a celebrated high-society scandal. Because
Purbeck is simpler and more important for the main High Commission issues, I shall
discuss it first and then return to Peel, despite the slightly later litigative disposition of
Purbeck.
The reports of Purbeck are close to identical, but with a couple of significant
small variations. Neither (unlike the reports of Peel) gives any factual details about the
Howard romance, only the legal skeleton of the case. The Countess was proceeded
against in the High Commission for adultery, convicted, and sentenced. Only then did she
seek a Prohibition, on the ground that the sentence was unlawful. I.e., there is no sign of
an earlier attempt to prohibit on the theory that adultery was simply beyond High
Commission jurisdiction. Such an attempt would have been unpromising, especially in
view of the party’s high rank and (as we shall see from Peel) the aggravated character of
the offense in this case, although it is less than clear that jurisdiction over adultery was
settled in the Commission’s favor. (There is no evidence that Howard, a son of the Earl of
Suffolk, was prosecuted.)
The sentence imposed on the Countess was that she be imprisoned without bail
until she found sureties to perform the sentence and that she be fined 400 marks. We are
told (Littleton) that she was “censured” in the High Commission, but no specific
penitential acts enjoined on her are reported. Thus it is not clear whether “performing the
sentence” would have required anything more than paying the fine. The most notable
feature of the sentence is its specification that the imprisonment be without bail until the
sureties were produced. I should very much doubt—as Justice Yelverton did in this case
(below)—that the Commission had any authority to make such a provision, even if
imprisoning the party were held unobjectionable per se. I.e., should she have brought
Habeas corpus, I think the common law court in which the writ was returnable would
surely have had its usual choice to release outright, remand, or bail, and that the anti-bail
provision in the sentence would have been nugatory. Nothing, however, is said explicitly
about the bail provision by Purbeck’s counsel seeking Prohibition. One wonders whether
it might not have reinforced his conviction, arguendo, that the sentence was utterly out of
bounds, but he perhaps thought he had enough reason for that conclusion without
belaboring this further point.
Serjeant Henden, representing the Countess, claimed Prohibition basically on the
ground that the High Commission may not impose secular punishment, imprisonment or
fine, in spiritual causes; excommunication is the only punitive measure, properly
speaking, that it may take. (Penances and the like, though it is often convenient to refer to
them as spiritual sanctions, were of course—to borrow a modern idiom—rather
“treatment” than punishment.) Without some qualification or explanation, that is a strong
proposition for 1629, but despite skimpy reports it is clear that Henden in fact admitted a
degree of modification. For he says that 1 Eliz. did not alter the rule (only spiritual
sanctions backed by excommunication for ecclesiastical offenses, whether they were
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pursued in the High Commission or a regular ecclesiastical court) except for the “things
there named.” He does not specify what those things are, but he must mean heresy (plus
perhaps a few other forms of comparably grave religious error and perhaps the special
case of clerical incontinence.) The striking feature of Henden’s argument is that the
“enormity” test is by implication rejected, both as a test for High Commission jurisdiction
and a test for power to use secular sanctions. With respect to the former, Henden shows
no disposition to be concerned with whether Purbeck’s adultery was grave enough for the
High Commission; he appears to concede that as an accepted ecclesiastical offense it was
as pursuable in the Commission as elsewhere in the ecclesiastical system. With respect to
sanctions, he flatly rejects the notion that an ecclesiastical offense must meet a certain
standard of gravity to be subject to them: the term “enormity” in 1 Eliz. is in effect
reduced to a synonym for the exceptions “named” in the statute. This is “strong for
1629”, but a leading lawyer did not think the argument futile; I do not think this study
shows unambiguously that he should have, that unsettlement of the most fundamental
issues about the Commission was firmly overcome so long as the tribunal lasted (i.e.,
until it was abolished by the Long Parliament.) Henden goes high in his argument,
insisting that the “precious” liberty of the subject demanded his comprehensive rule
against secular punishment and citing Magna Carta. By way of precedent he cites
Smith’s Case from 42 Eliz., and he makes the argument from 23 Hen. VIII against High
Commission jurisdiction.
Following Henden’s argument, observations by Chief Justice Richardson,
Serjeant Brampston, and Justice Yelverton are reported. Richardson says that the first
part of the High Commission’s sentence is not part of the punishment. In other words, the
Countess was not imprisoned punitively, but only to coerce performance of the rest of the
sentence. To imprisonment for that purpose, Richardson had no objection; by
implication, he would have considered punishing by imprisonment in the case at hand
unlawful. We have seen that distinguishing between impermissible punitive punishment
and permissible coercive had a pedigree, though to what extent it was accepted is unclear.
Serjeant Henden does not touch on the distinction, but would presumably have said that
the liberty of the subject demands no imprisonment by any court in ecclesiastical causes,
apart from a handful in which the High Commission had express statutory authority to
use the sanction. Besides embracing the difference, Richardson provides a little reasoning
in its support. He points out that if instead of jailing Purbeck directly the Commission had
excommunicated her, and then she had been committed to prison by De excommunicato
capiendo, she would be in virtually the same position she was in now: to be released she
would have to satisfy whatever ecclesiastical requirements she was excommunicated for
not having satisfied, or else agree to a substitute satisfaction acceptable to the
ecclesiastical courts, of which finding surety for performance, as prescribed in this case,
would be an instance. In Richardson’s view, the direct coercive imprisonment used in
Purbeck was “not but agreeable to the ecclesiastical course.” I.e., though technically
different from the course used by regular ecclesiastical courts, it came to the same thing.
(Needless to say, this equivalentizing can be criticized. Arguably, the “ecclesiastical
course” is the course that must be followed; there is no basis for saying that 1 Eliz.
permits a kind of short-cut around the letter of the due legal procedure, even if it would
be a practical convenience without substantive side-effects. Actually, the practical
equivalence is not perfect. De excommunicato capiendo was a distinct procedure, which
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at least required that for an excommunicated person to be jailed he must be able to be
apprehended, and there were checks on the writ such that the bare fact that X had been
excommunicated by some ecclesiastical court was not an automatic guarantee that he
would go to jail even if apprehended. Richardson’s theory needs a premise to the effect
that part of the purpose of the High Commission was to improve the efficiency of
ecclesiastical procedure, as by imprisoning an excommunicated “bird in the hand” subject
to being imprisoned by regular process eventually. Richardson may well have believed
this, but he could properly be pressed to argue it.)
As to what he calls the second part of the sentence—i.e., the fine—Richardson
had no doubt of its legality. (As I note generally above, if the sentence required any
strictly spiritual act nothing is said of it. Richardson’s position is clearly that the
imprisonment was lawful as the means to insure payment of a lawful fine.) On this point,
there is a significant difference between the reports. Littleton has Richardson saying that
fining the party “is expressly within their commission”, while Hetley has him saying it is
“express within their power.” The Littleton version involves the highly debatable
premise that if the current royal patent authorized punishing by fine, doing so was beyond
legal reproach. The Hetley version tends to make Richardson’s meaning, “1 Eliz.
authorized conferring power to fine on the Commission and the current patent confers it.”
Either way, the claim provides plenty to argue about. As Purbeck turned out, however,
there was no opportunity to contest Richardson’s claim or to review the cases in which it
had already been contested.
Serjeant Brampston spoke next. I think it probable that he was speaking for
himself, or using his Serjeant’s privilege to advise the court without being retained as
counsel for either side. Such interventions are not common in the 16th-17th century
reports, but in several of them comments by Brampston are interspersed with the judges’,
rather than clearly placed among the arguments of counsel. Both his readiness to speak
and the characteristic intelligence of what he has to say perhaps reflect an intellectual
authority later honored by his appointment as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench. In
Purbeck, he points out a disarming feature of the case, which poses a grave problem for
Richardson’s approach: The Countess was a married woman; therefore the part of the
sentence consisting in a fine was impossible to be performed (because money and
chattels brought to a marriage by the wife were disposable by the husband); therefore, if
subject to imprisonment to coerce performance of the sentence, the Countess could be
perpetually imprisoned. Brampston states no further conclusion, but surely he thought it
unacceptable to imprison coercively when the prisoner is releasable only on a condition
which nothing in his or her power to do would satisfy.
Possible generalized conclusions from Brampston’s point would include: (1)
Whether or not the High Commission may impose a determinate jail sentence as a
punishment, it may not imprison in the “equity style”—until the prisoner does something
prescribed—owing to the risk that in some circumstances the required performance could
be impossible. (2) The High Commission may imprison coercively (whatever its punitive
resources) in the sense that Prohibition will not lie to block execution of a sentence
ordering such imprisonment; the prisoner may, however, bring Habeas corpus, and if he
does so he should be released if it appears that the imprisonment could continue
indefinitely, or that release could not be achieved by the prisoner’s doing an immediately
doable act. (3) Imprisonment to coerce performance of a strictly spiritual injunction is
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unobjectionable, because by definition what is prescribed must be doable; it is fining that
introduces the possibility of perpetual imprisonment—certainly for a married woman for
as long as she remains one, but also for insolvents and parties simply too poor to pay the
amount of the fine .One response to this inconvenience is to rule out punishment by fine
altogether; the less radical response is to rule it out at least in the paradigm case of the
married woman, (Leaving open the question of how to deal with other forms of inability
to pay has the disadvantage, however, that observing the basic principle—no coercive
imprisonment unless the sentence is performable here and now—would in those other
cases require fact-finding in a nebulous area to enforce the law by Prohibition. I.e.: That
a party is a married woman is a simple and often notorious fact. Plaintiff-in-Prohibition
could easily allege it if that were considered a desirable formality; it would rarely be
controvertible. Other claims of inability to pay would tend to be resolvable only on
Attachment, and a jury would have to make a difficult determination; meanwhile—unless
bailed on Habeas corpus—the party would stay in prison, in effect suffering a covert and
indefinite form of punitive imprisonment.) Serjeant Brampston’s remark hardly commits
him among these projected possibilities—and there may be further permutations—but it
surely implies that Prohibition should be granted in the instant case.
Justice Yelverton, the last speaker, says that the High Commission could not
imprison with a “no bail” stipulation because its patent gave it no power to do so. The
minimum meaning of this I have already indicated: Prohibition need not, perhaps should
not, be granted, but the High Commission may of course not extinguish the common
law’s power to bail on Habeas corpus. A stronger meaning would be that execution of
the sentence should be prohibited for no further reason than the Commission’s purporting
to do something utterly ultra vires. Even if the impropriety could be undone on Habeas
corpus, why should the party have an extra procedural step forced on her? Why should
the legally transgressing court be able to detain its prisoner until she actually achieved
release, with or without bail—an outcome which, if perhaps likely, would not be
inevitable? Yelverton does not spell out the conclusion he wants to be drawn. He states
his point conservatively in emphasizing the patent’s failure to authorize “without bail”
addenda to imprisonment sentences. That does not imply, however, that if the patent had
authorized the addition “without bail” it would be within 1 Eliz. Yelverton had no reason
to go into that. His opinion does imply that if the patent authorized imprisonment in
general terms (as it probably did) adding “without bail”—a plain encroachment on
common law territory—would be acceptable. (Ecclesiastical courts had enjoyed, and the
High Commission probably did enjoy, on the basis of statute, at least within narrow
bounds, some power to imprison. Giving it that power does not per se limit the common
law in its administration of Habeas corpus. To do that, the High Commission would need
both a sufficient grounding in 1 Eliz. and an express direction by the monarch pursuant
thereto.)
On a day in the same term later than that of Henden’s argument for Prohibition
from the Bar and the three comments following it, Chief Justice Richardson is reported—
with a slight variation between the two reports—as saying in effect that whatever else
was true Prohibition could not be granted because the fine had already been estreated into
the Exchequer. There is no sign of disagreement on the part of any other judge. The point
is well-taken, for we have seen earlier indications that once a fine was estreated it became
the Exchequer’s business whether it was a legally collectable debt to the King. (How the
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Exchequer would regard the fine in this case, or any High Commission fine, is uncertain
for 1629, though there are earlier instances in which it appears to have disallowed fines
imposed by the Commission.)
As to the slight variance between the reports: Hetley has Richardson saying
merely that no Prohibition may be granted when a fine has been estreated, while in
Littleton he says that the Commission “has such power” and that Prohibition may not be
granted after estreatment. The difference is unimportant except for reconstructing the
narrative of Purbeck in detail. We obviously have thin evidence for such a reconstruction.
The following seems to me a reasonable speculation: When the case was first argued, the
court was not full, for we hear from only two judges. Richardson and Yelverton could
have granted a Prohibition, subject to motion for Consultation, if they agreed, but they
did not agree in favoring one. Richardson was opposed and Yelverton more likely than
not inclined the other way. They had heard from Brampston a strong objection to
Richardson’s view. The Chief Justice may not have been shaken in a perhaps stubborn
unwillingness to prohibit the High Commission in this case—a visible one, in which the
Commission had demonstrated its readiness to use its purported powers to bear down on
a prominent and egregious offender, arguably just what the Commission was for. On the
other hand, Brampston could hardly have avoided reinforcing Yelverton’s doubts. Then,
after the inevitable adjournment, the case was reopened. Not much time could have
passed, for Hilary was a short term, but enough had passed either for the fine to be
estreated or for the Common Pleas to learn that it had been. Although in the final entry of
both reports only Richardson speaks, it is probable that he was speaking for the court, not
for himself alone. That is to say, however strongly other judges may have opposed him
on the merits, they had no choice but to acknowledge that estreatment mooted the merits
that the case now belonged to the Exchequer. In Hetley’s version, Richardson took the
“cool” course and said only what the court held. In Littleton’s, he could not resist adding
that the narrow ground for decision led to victory for the side he still favored on the wider
questions, so far as the court he presided over was concerned.
Peel involved the High Commission, but was not centrally a case on the
Commission’s powers. Rather, it was about whether a general pardon released Mrs. Peel
from a sentence the Commission had imposed on her. In the course of discussion,
however, some judicial commentary on the basic High Commission issues occurs. The
reporting is confusing, especially Hetley’s, though that report significantly supplements
Croke, the best account of the case as a whole. Littleton is clear on its limited subject, the
first hearing of the case.
Mrs. Peel was prosecuted and convicted in the High Commission for abetting
adultery. (She had a house close by [“prochein annex” to] Somerset House, and there
was a private passage through her residence into Somerset House. She permitted Sir
Robert Howard to go to the Viscountess Purbeck by this passage for the purpose of
committing adultery with that lady. Peel was accused moreover of being an active
promoter of the illicit affair. (Per Littleton, she “abetted, caused, and procured adultery
between them”; per Croke, she was “chief agent for their meetings at unseasonable times,
by and through her private lodgings and passages, by means whereof they took their
opportunities to commit adultery.” In Croke’s language, her sentence was for bawdry
and “lenocynie” (anglicized form of the Latin lenocinium: the practice of being a gobetween or procurer.) The carryings-on around Somerset House took place over a span of
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about three years. Croke tells us that one Elizabeth Ash was joined with Peel in the
sentence and had a Prohibition on the same surmise—she was probably a friend or
servant of Peel’s who collaborated in the mischief.
Upon conviction, Mrs. Peel was sentenced to a £200 fine and enjoined to make
such penitential satisfaction in the Savoy Church as the Commissioners should appoint;
she was imprisoned until she found sureties for performance of the sentence (or,
alternatively, sentenced to imprisonment in addition to the other penalties—which
construction one adopts makes a difference. See below for this aspect of the case.) At this
point, she sought a Prohibition and, by Habeas corpus, release from imprisonment. Her
ground was that the offense behind the sentence was pardoned by the general pardon of
21 Jac. Littleton’s report notes that adultery itself was excepted from the pardon but
abetment thereof was not, which suggests that it may have been urged against Prohibition
that the exception for the principal offense carried incidentals such as abetment with it,
but if so the argument got nowhere: On the first hearing of the case, the court simply
assigned a day for the Commission to show why Prohibition should not be granted.
Certainly later on and probably from the start, Mrs. Peel was represented by the
ubiquitous Serjeant Henden.
There was ample debate when the case was reopened—lasting several days,
Croke says, “chiefly upon the pardon.” In the end Prohibition was granted, meaning
“chiefly” that the pardon was held to apply to Mrs. Peel’s sentence. The point was
problematic, even given that abetment of adultery was covered, because the sentence
expressly referred to acts committed after the pardon. I.e., the Commission claimed, and
Peel conceded, that the offense had gone on for some time before the pardon, but it was
claimed against Peel that it had also gone on for a while after; she, on the other hand, had
averred in her surmise seeking Prohibition that she had not continued to offend beyond
the date of the pardon. So was she released from her penalties in virtue of the pre-pardon
offenses, which may have been the only ones committed, or still subject to them so long
as her averment was not found true by verdict or by admission in common law pleading?
There are numerous remarks in the reports on this quite technical issue. I do not think
they add up to a completely clear presentation of both sides, but they do not as such
matter for our present purposes. Prohibition cases dealing with the law on pardons, of
which there are enough to constitute a separate topic in this study, have not yet been
discussed. What do matter here are the implications of judges’ and lawyers’ remarks for
the basic questions about the Commission’s powers.
As reported by Croke, Justice Hutton made two general observations on the
Commission’s authority after giving his opinion that the pardon applied and therefore that
Prohibition should be granted. (1) Peel’s imprisonment until she found sureties for
performance of the spiritual sentence and payment of the fine was unwarrantable. The
reason for this, per Hutton, is that 1 Eliz. gave the High Commission power to fine or
imprison “for the offense”, but not “for the fine or until sureties found.” Rather, the fine
“ought to be certified into the Exchequer.” Construing this remark and relating it to
earlier law present some problems. The conclusion was probably established law:
Granting the legality of imposing a fine, collection must be left to the Exchequer; the
Commission may not imprison in order to put pressure on the party to pay or to guarantee
payment by a bond. Punitive imprisonment is upheld, perhaps more explicitly than in any
previous case. I doubt that Hutton meant to exclude coercive imprisonment purely to
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coerce performance of a spiritual sentence, which would contradict most precedents, sed
quaere. Whether, on the punitive side, he meant that the Commission must choose
between a fine and imprisonment and may not use both instruments (in an alternative
statement, that using both in the same case should automatically be interpreted as
imprisoning to enforce the fine, whatever language the sentence uses) is uncertain. In any
event, Hutton’s opinion must, so far as the principal case is concerned, demand Peel’s
release on her Habeas corpus, though it does not say so in so many words. (Nor is there
any other separate mention of the Habeas corpus in the reported discussion. It may not
have been necessary for the Common Pleas to discharge her formally, given the decision
that she was fully pardoned.)
(2) Hutton next commented, a little indecisively, on the High Commission’s
jurisdiction over Peel in the first place. He noted that the Common Pleas had ruled that
adultery suits should go to the Ordinary, not the Commission, unless “exorbitant and
notorious.” I take his drift to be, though he does not spell this out, that even apart from
the pardon there might well be grounds for Prohibition: If adultery is ultra vires, abetting
it must surely be. Admittedly, the jurisdictional rule on adultery may be open to an
exception for aggravated cases—here Hutton makes the only express acknowledgment
from the Bench that I have seen of Dodderidge’s argument from the Bar in Chancey’s
Case. If aggravated abetment is in the same class as aggravated adultery, the duration of
Peel’s misbehavior and the high-ranking principal offenders might suffice to promote her
offenses to the “exorbitant and notorious.” At the least, however, if she had sought
Prohibition on substantive jurisdiction rather than the pardon, she would have had a
serious case, which might tend to encourage, though it would not legally justify, taking
the pardon in her favor. To reinforce his point about simple adultery, and by implication
simple abetment, Hutton states the familiar rule that High Commission patents are
bounded by1 Eliz. and may not confer any jurisdiction beyond what the statute allows to
be conferred. He observes that alimony suits have no place before the Commission and
cites several cases upholding the general principle that the statute controls the patent.
One, Dr. Conward’s (probably = Conway’s below) cuts close to the present case and
could plausibly be said to involve aggravation: the suit was prohibited even though the
defendant was accused of pandering to his own wife. The other two citations are outside
the marital/sexual category—Giles v. Balam (just above) about assaults on clerics and a
Condie’s Case on the election of a parish clerk.
Hetley has Justice Croke (the same person as the reporter) saying more firmly
than Hutton-per-Croke that there were two separate reasons for Prohibition, the
applicability of the pardon and the mere rule that the High Commission may not inquire
into adultery. Croke-per-Hetley makes no gesture toward a loophole for aggravation.
Rather, he simply cites the same case as Hutton-per-Croke sub nom Convey’s or
Conway’s with a bit more detail. Conway and his wife were sued together, she for
adultery with Sir Richard Blunt and he for serving as pander; Prohibition was granted.
The precedent was clearly being used to show that adultery and pandering to it are both
beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction and perhaps to imply that as no aggravation factor
was brought up in that case none could plausibly be in this. Croke-per-Hetley goes on to
say, like Hutton supra, that the High Commission could not touch alimony and, having
asserted the general principle that the patent without the statute’s support cannot confer
jurisdiction, to cite the parish clerk case sub nom Condith’s, also brought up by Hutton-
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per-Croke, explaining it. (It was properly a case on creating disturbance in a church,
behind which lay a dispute over the method for choosing a parish clerk. The 1604 canons
prescribed that the minister should select this official, but in many places it was claimed
that there was another method based on local custom. Regular ecclesiastical courts were
frequently stopped by Prohibition from giving effect to the canons pending common law
trial of whether the alleged custom existed. So far as I am aware, the High Commission
was never involved in mere electoral disputes. I take it that Condith acquired a criminal
flavor, and the Commission some pretense to jurisdiction, because in that case electees by
both methods tried to exercise the office at once—each setting his own psalms for the
congregation and so disturbing good order. The suit was prohibited because the matter
was too petty for the Commission, whatever the patent may have said.) At another point
in Hetley, Justice Croke expresses for himself essentially the view he attributes as
reporter to Hutton that the sentence to pay a fine and make submission (to spiritual
punishment) and be imprisoned until security was found was “void”. Justice Hutton
speaks twice as an individual in Hetley. (1) He cites a case from 44 Eliz. as holding that
the High Commission may only fine for heresies, schisms, and errors (which may be a
more stringent restriction than he would have insisted on himself.) (2) He says in general
terms, without reference to marital misconduct cases such as the one at hand, that 1 Eliz.
should be expounded according to “the meaning of the first intent”, which was to provide
a corrective to the Bishops who remained Catholic at Queen Elizabeth’s accession. The
only example he gives of the principle’s effect—excluding petty offenses from the
Commission—is an (undated and unnamed) prosecution for working on saints’ days) ,
but in connection with that he provides a valuable datum: The saint’s day violator was
fined and the fine estreated, but the Exchequer held upon argument that the High
Commission proceedings were void. This remark confirms scanty earlier indications that
the Exchequer played a significant part in limiting the Commission.
The small variances between the reports do not matter very much. Justices Hutton
and Croke were clearly enough in substantial agreement on all the issues in Peel.
Scattered remarks in Hetley (which I shall discuss below) tend to put Justice Yelverton
on the same side across the board. Justice Harvey is only reported as agreeing that Peel
was fully pardoned; there is no indication of whether he thought that the suit against her
should be prohibited even in the absence of the pardon. Chief Justice Richardson may
have been the odd man out. Most of his remarks are directed toward trying to make some
kind of case for the High Commission, but whether he ultimately dissented is uncertain.
By an unusual reportorial move, Hetley cuts us off from knowing all of what the Chief
Justice had to say, though he gives some of it. The reporter’s words are: “Richardson
objected divers things [to various arguments by counsel and judges] with much
earnestness, but so apparently contrary to the law, that I have omitted it.” The following
are the comments from Richardson that Hetley does report: (1) In response to Justice
Croke’s saying the sentence was void because of its demand for security backed by
imprisonment, he objected that the Commission had no other means to make the party
pay her fine and added that if she would pay she would be discharged. I suppose that
comes to suggesting that although it might have been improper to imprison her on top of
the other penalties, using imprisonment just to get the sentence performed was legitimate.
The rest of the judges replied, conventionally, that estreatment into the Exchequer was
the proper procedure. (2) Against Hutton’s statement that fines were lawful only for
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serious religious offenses, he said that I Eliz. provided that the Commission might
proceed according to the tenor and effect of the patent. He may have meant that the
patent could confer jurisdiction over any ecclesiastical crime, or only that it could confer
somewhat wider jurisdiction than the narrowest interpretation of the statute allows, and
with jurisdiction, secular sanctions. (3) A little later he perhaps adopts the less extreme
meaning of (2) by noting—relevantly enough—that by the words of the statute the
Commission was not confined to heresies and schisms, but permitted to proceed against
“abuses, contempts, &c.” (4) In response to Hutton’s saying in effect, with a citation, that
at least some offenses are too petty for the High Commission, Richardson revived Justice
Walmesley’s philological argument that “enormity” covers more than major religious
crimes because it means “quicquid est contra regulam et normam Juris”. There is no
telling whether Richardson would infer from this definition that anything in any sense
illegal by ecclesiastical law was conferrable on the High Commission or would see some
limiting implication in it—say to the criminal part of that law. Justice Yelverton promptly
rebuffed Richardson’s suggestion, saying that an “enormous” offense means only a great
one, for “so in common acceptance it imports.” (5) At the end of the discussion reported
by Hetley (which preceded the court’s delivering a decision), Richardson makes what
looks like an about-face by saying “They should proceed by excommunication and not
fine and imprison.” One can only speculate about what was in his mind. Could he have
thought, after sparring with his puisne judges, that the best hope for the High
Commission lay in the old Common Pleas doctrine that the tribunal’s jurisdiction
extended as far as ecclesiastical law but its sanctions no farther than those available to
other ecclesiastical courts? Going back to the old ways would have entailed granting
Peel’s Prohibition and releasing her from jail—in other words, the Commission’s losing
the present case—, but it would in future cases make room for a useful High Commission
role in such situations as flagrant abetment of adultery, especially among the sort of
people the Ordinaries may have found hard to deal with. As to whether the final decision
to grant Prohibition was unanimous, all one can say is that aside from most of
Richardson’s comments in Hetley there is no evidence to the contrary. Croke simply
gives the result—Prohibition granted—without any indication of ultimate disagreement.
A few features of Peel remain to be noted. As I intimate above, there might be a
shadow of doubt whether Justice Yelverton was completely in line with Croke and
Hutton, though he certainly agreed that Prohibition should be granted. From a couple of
remarks in Hetley, it is clear that he thought the pardon freed Mrs. Peel from any
obligation to pay the fine and any liability to imprisonment. He does not say that even in
the absence of the pardon the Commission would have lacked jurisdiction over her case
or at least power to use secular sanctions in such a case. One remark may suggest that he
was not entirely opposed to such sanctions, for he seems to base his objection to the
demand for security and the use of imprisonment on the form of the sentence rather than
the mere illegality of the sanctions. He says that the sentence was to a fine and penance,
and that the security-and-imprisonment clause on top of that was void. Per Serjeant
Brampston as well as Henden on Peel’s side and Serjeant Atthowe for the Commission,
one Sir Wil. Chamcer is said to have been both fined and imprisoned for adultery and that
“all the judges of England” held that the Commission could proceed by fine and
imprisonment. This looks like a not quite accurate reference to Chancey drawing on the
extrajudicial aftermath of that case. Taken as a comprehensive view of what the
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Commission might do, it was not followed in Peel, having probably been cited by the
Commission’s counsel.
Howson’s Case, decided in the same term as Mrs. Peel’s,125 is close in character
to Smith v. Clay above. The High Commission for York proceeded on libel against
another unedifying vicar. Howson’s sins were the following: non-residency and
neglecting his cure (Littleton specifies that Howson was Vicar of Sturton,
Nottinghamshire, but lived in Doncaster); wearing his hat during divine service; offensive
behavior when the High Commissioners visited his church (he spoke too loudly and
“gave a scornful answer” when he was reproved for doing so); spitting “in abundance” on
the pew of one Wright when Wright and his wife were occupying it; saying after that,
“with a common voice” (I suppose in a vulgar and offensive tone—?), that his own wife
was as good as Wright’s (i.e., her social equal); making jests in a sermon, which the next
words are presumably meant to illustrate (he said that Christ was laid in a manger
because he had no money to pay for a chamber, and attributed his exclusion to the
knavery of innkeepers—as it happened Howson was at the time “in contention” with an
innkeeper in the parish); (presumably on a different occasion than the spitting episode)
during divine service and to the disturbance thereof, thrusting open the door of Wright’s
pew and saying that he (Howson) and his wife would sit there.
Without any sign of divided opinion, the High Commission proceedings were
prohibited. Two of Howson’s offenses are singled out in the reports as in the court’s view
not punishable by the Commission, non-residency and breaking into the Wrights’ seat
during service—perhaps as not enormous enough, though perfectly good ecclesiastical
complaints in a regular court, but the reason might be legislative secularization of nonresidency and common law interests in the use of pews. For the rest of his offenses, the
judges said, he could or should be bound to good behavior. I take that to mean that
Howson’s critics should go to a Justice of the Peace and seek a plain secular good
behavior bond. I am not sure why the offenses should be divided into two classes. In any
event, the Common Pleas was unwilling to concede to the Commission any powers of
clerical discipline in multiform and perhaps refractory situations where the particular acts
of wrongdoing were run-of the-mill.
Aldam’s Case is also from Trinity, 1628.126 Here the High Commission suit was
for adultery, drunkenness, blasphemy, and speaking against the King. The last of the
offenses took a curious form: Aldam had seen a deed dated by the regnal year of Charles
I and said “Charles there was one Charles an Egyptian.” I can only suppose that this
utterance was taken to say something like, “Who is this fellow Charles? The gypsy of that
name I once heard of?” Prohibition was denied. Littleton had it privately from Justice
Harvey that the reason for the decision was “such scornful words against the King.” I am
inclined to take the court as indulging in a little innocuous politics. The charges of
adultery and blasphemy, though hardly of drunkenness, might perhaps with some
plausibility, though not a lot, be held grave enough for the Commission; “speaking
against the King” in the way Aldam spoke might have been hard to make out as secular
sedition. The “right” solution of the case would probably have been quoad the first three
125
T. 4 Car. C.P. Littleton, 152; Hetley, 104. Reports nearly identical; dating from
Littleton.
126
T. 4 Car. C.P. Littleton, 156.
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offenses Prohibition for want of enormity and quoad the fourth Prohibition because the
matter belonged to the common law. A dose of the High Commission, however, would be
sharper medicine for Aldam than he would be likely to receive otherwise, and the judges
can hardly be blamed for preferring to avoid the aspersion that they had let a bad apple
go, when he might—if not merely inebriated—have been a bad subject too.
In Larkin’s Case, from the next term,127 the Common Pleas prohibited an alimony
suit, but on grounds that avoided denying the High Commission’s jurisdiction over
alimony. It appeared from the two parties’ claims in the suit that Larkin himself caught
his wife in adultery, whereupon he beat and threatened her; she then left him and sued for
separate maintenance. The suit was therefore prohibitable on the theory that an adulterous
wife who has suffered lawful chastisement and left the husband’s house on her own
motion has no claim to alimony. (This harsh doctrine may not have been categorical in all
circumstances, but I take it there was nothing on the record amounting to a sufficient
claim of excessive cruelty in the justifiable beating or of threats constituting a “clear and
present danger” to the wife’s physical safety.) The judges were unanimous for
Prohibition, but Chief Justice Richardson “commanded” that it be express in the court’s
order that the action was taken “on view of the articles & hearing the articles of both
parties.” In other words, the court prohibited in awareness of the full state of the case as
pleaded, not because it knew, or pretended to know, only that the suit was for alimony.
Richardson may not have agreed with the rest of the court that alimony as such was ultra
vires; it was entirely proper for the others to go along with his insistence, since grounds
that would be good against any ecclesiastical court were the best reason for prohibiting
the Commission.
Coventry and Stamford’s Case (1628) 128 is reported in its first phase by Littleton.
Another report by Hetley sub nom. Coventry’s Case is clearly of the same controversy at
a later stage of the litigation. One aspect of the case is discussed in the End Note to Ch. 2
above , because it involved the statute of 23 Hen VIII, c. 9 (specifically, power to remove
a suit from a regular ecclesiastical court to the High Commission.) I shall first follow
Littleton and then Hetley. Though I shall indicate how the issue involving 23 Hen. VIII
fits in, the reader is referred to the End Note for the details of that aspect.
Littleton initially states the case without reference to the fact that it had been
removed to the High Commission—as if, in other words, it had been brought there
originally. The first round of discussion by counsel and the judges dealt only with
whether the suit was intrinsically appropriate to the Commission—as if, again, it had
been started there.
Coventry was a deputy of the Undersheriff of Essex. (Stamford, the co-defendant,
is not identified. He was probably a sub-deputy of Coventry’s who assisted him in
making the arrest whose legality was the substantive issue in the case.) When a minister
named Gumell was in his church on Sunday at the time of divine service, Coventry
entered the church “with Pistol, Sword, and Baston” and stationed himself under
Gumell’s pulpit. The congregation was “amazed” and asked “them” (Coventry and,
presumably, his sole assistant, Stamford) what they meant. They replied that they
intended to arrest Gumell at the suit of one Larkin. (I.e., their business was to effect an
127
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ordinary civil arrest, probably on behalf of an unsatisfied creditor.) Then they said that if
he would not come out of his pulpit they would pull him out. Gumell, “being terrified”,
came out before dismissing the congregation (thus while divine service was still going
on) and was arrested.
How just this account of the events reached the court and the reporter is
mysterious, because the case arose from Coventry’s and Stamford’s attempt to get a
Prohibition. They are unlikely to have put the colorful side of Gumell’s seizure into their
surmise, as opposed to saying only that they were sued for laying violent hands on a
clergyman, they being officers performing their lawful duty, for which they were not
answerable in an ecclesiastical court, or at least not in the High Commission. (Littleton’s
statement of the facts ends by saying “and so” violent hands were laid on Gumell. This
indicates that that was the core of the charge against Coventry and Stamford. They would
naturally have surmised something of their grounds for claiming that they were
improperly pursued for this prima facie ecclesiastical offense, but hardly—one would
suppose—with embellishments of their violent behavior. As will appear, however, they
could well have had reason for admitting in their surmise that their action involved
disturbing divine service, for one part of their contention was that that element turned the
offense into a secular one.)
In any event, Serjeant Ayliffe, launching the debate by arguing in favor of
Prohibition, made two separate points: (1) The offense Coventry and Stamford committed
was great, but was not heresy or schism and therefore not within the High Commission’s
jurisdiction. This is of course to adopt the narrowest construction of the authority 1 Eliz.
allowed to be conferred on the Commission. (2) Coventry and Stamford should not be
being sued in any ecclesiastical court because the statute of 1 Rich. II, c. 15, subjected the
specific class of act charged against these parties to secular remedies. (The statute
provided, roughly, that officers who make an arrest which in other circumstances would
be perfectly lawful in or near a church during services, or just before or after services,
should be subject to imprisonment and fine, and should be liable to compensate the
victim civilly. For a detailed analysis of this statute and its predecessor, 50 Edw. III, c.5,
see the case of Pit v. Webly, above in this chapter, where that legislation figures in a
central, though different, way.) As Ayliffe says expressly, 1 Eliz. left the 14th century
statute intact. Laying violent hands on a clergyman and interrupting divine service
remained ecclesiastical offenses, whether or not suitable to the High Commission, but if
they were committed by arresting officers they were preempted for the common law by
force of 1 Rich. II.
The first speaker after Ayliffe was Serjeant Brampston. I note in Purbeck, above,
that Brampston sometimes spoke for himself rather than as retained counsel, and so he
may have here, especially since on one point he disagrees with Ayliffe, although his
remarks put him on the same side with respect to the basic issue. Brampston says first
that the parties’ offense was “enormous”, but not punishable in any ecclesiastical court.
By using the word “enormous”, he was probably implying that if the parties were
pursuable in ecclesiastical courts at all they could be proceeded against in the High
Commission. That is to say, Ayliffe’s extremely narrow view of High Commission
jurisdiction was mistaken; wherever the line between “enormous” offenses appropriate to
the Commission and lesser offenses should be drawn, the parties’ conduct here was
within the bounds of “enormity”. This position is more realistic, in the light of numerous
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cases, than Ayliffe’s ultra-restrictiveness. Having so said, however, Brampston goes on to
make the case against ecclesiastical jurisdiction altogether. He does so with at least a
different emphasis than Aylliffe’s. Rather than simply claiming that 1 Rich. II takes
away ecclesiastical jurisdiction, he says that if the parties were to be fined or imprisoned
by an ecclesiastical court they would be liable to being fined and imprisoned again at
common law. The implication is that such double exposure would be unlawful; clearly, in
Brampston’s opinion, neither ecclesiastical nor lay courts could be prevented from
imposing punishment by a showing that the other system had already done so. Since,
however, the High Commission was the only ecclesiastical court that could possibly fine
or imprison for the offense in question here, Brampston’s second point is not perfectly
compatible with his apparent earlier statement that the offense was simply not punishable
in an ecclesiastical court. I.e., why should the parties not be pursued in an ordinary
ecclesiastical court and punished spiritually—the only way they could be punished by
such a court—over and above secular penalties that might be or had been imposed at
common law pursuant to 1 Rich. II? Indeed, why should the High Commission not
proceed so long as it did not use its secular sanctions, but only the spiritual ones which it
undoubtedly had as well? I suspect that the reporter, in letting this contradiction appear,
may have slightly garbled the argument he heard. In any event, “double exposure”
became an important motif in the case; Brampston first broached it.
In the first round of judicial discussion, remarks by three judges are reported. (1)
Justice Yelverton spoke briefly twice. The first time, in the immediate light of
Brampston’s observations, he says that the place makes the offense ecclesiastical. I.e., he
expresses skepticism toward Ayliffe’s and Brampston’s suggestions that ecclesiastical
jurisdiction is simply ruled out in this case; per Yelverton, it is not ruled out because the
offense was at least partly committed in a church; ruling it out in other situations covered
by 1 Rich. II need not be debarred. There is no necessary implication that High
Commission jurisdiction should be upheld. Yelverton’s second speech, which follows
Hutton (just below), is cryptic, perhaps misleadingly reported. Yelverton emphasizes that
the offense in question was a “great abuse” then adds—with a “yet” to introduce the
point—that 1 Rich. II and 1 Mary c.3 “aid all there is in this case”. What could that
mean? It rather sounds as if Yelverton now wanted to retreat from his previous
suggestion that secular law had not simply ousted all ecclesiastical jurisdiction—sed
quaere.
(2) Justice Hutton observed that such offenses as the one in question here would
have been punished in the Star Chamber, and that there were several precedents of this.
The rest of the court conceded the point. The Star Chamber practice in itself need have no
particular significance. By virtue of the medieval legislation, abusive behavior by
officials of the sort displayed by Coventry and Stamford was unquestionably a secular
offense, and it is unsurprising that it should commonly, perhaps exclusively, have been
prosecuted in the Star Chamber when it was prosecuted (as a major misdemeanor subject
to indefinite non-capital punishment and also to private damages, it is a typical Star
Chamber offense.) Hutton may have meant to suggest that the practice tended to support
the thesis that ecclesiastical jurisdiction of any sort was taken away, but it need not imply
that, and Hutton expresses no such conclusion.
(3) Chief Justice Richardson also spoke twice. His first, brief, contribution was
only to say that if the offense here was ecclesiastical it was “enormous” and thus fit for
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the High Commission (contrary to Ayliffe, but not to Brampston.) His second speech,
after Hutton’s reminder of the Star Chamber’s role, is more extensive. He acknowledges
that Star Chamber jurisdiction is perfectly appropriate, while noting that ordinary
common law procedure by indictment was also available. He goes on to say that if
someone exposed to secular process should be fined or imprisoned by the High
Commission he would be punished twice for the same offense: the High Commission
punishment could not be pleaded in the Star Chamber nor to bar an indictment. The rest
of the court agreed with these points as such. Richardson does not say in this speech that
double punishment would be intolerable, but there is no doubt that he and his colleagues
thought so. Richardson’s distinctive view turned out to be (below) that the High
Commission should not be prohibited until it actually did impose secular punishment.
That is contrary to a vein of opinion among the judges that immediate Prohibition was the
better course, but there was no dispute about the unacceptability of double secular
punishment.
With this much discussed on the apparent assumption that Coventry and Stamford
were prosecuted in the High Commission originally, Justice Hutton called the court’s
attention to the fact that the case had actually been removed to the Commission by
request of a diocesan judge in whose cognizance it originally fell. One cannot be sure
whether the Common Pleas was unaware of this feature until Hutton noticed it or simply
ignored it because the first point to get clear was whether 1 Rich. II ruled out
ecclesiastical jurisdiction altogether. Inasmuch, however, as there was not consensus that
ecclesiastical jurisdiction over such a case was flatly and long-since abolished, the fact
that the court was dealing with a removed case had to be taken into account. Hutton may
have so realized when he introduced the fact. The removal raised two questions: (1)
whether suits could ever be removed to the High Commission, as opposed to regular
ecclesiastical courts other than the one where the suit was commenced; (2) assuming
removal to the Commission was not altogether banned, whether, to be removed there, the
suit must be one appropriate to the Commission if originally brought there. These
questions depended on the meaning of the statute of 23 Hen. VIII, c. 9. That act preserved
a longstanding power to remove ecclesiastical suits at the request or with the consent of
the initial judge, subject to some restrictions, concerning which there was a good deal of
litigation. See the End Note to Ch. 2 for these matters in greater detail. For present
purposes, the point to keep in mind is that the remainder of the discussion of Coventry
intermixed consideration of the removal power with the issues already broached—
whether the offense in question was within ecclesiastical jurisdiction at all, and if so
whether it was a High Commission offense.
The rest of Littleton’s report contains several speeches by the three judges
already heard from—Richardson, Yelverton, and Hutton:
Richardson adheres, with greater explicitness, to the position he had already
adumbrated: no objection to the High Commission’s handling the case, provided it uses
only spiritual sanctions; Prohibition should not be granted until secular ones were
actually imposed. Removal to the High Commission seems in itself to have posed no
problem for Richardson. (It should be noted that the offense in Coventry was first
presented at an episcopal visitation and then remitted by the Bishop to the Commission.
Although none of the judges comments on this circumstance specifically, it does
guarantee that the case removed was criminal. Richardson need not have thought that
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civil cases could ever be removed to the Commission, much less that their removability
was virtually obvious. He had already said that Coventry’s and Stamford’s offense met
the enormity standard for High Commission matters, with which he would appear to have
had no quarrel.) As against what seems a flat assertion by Yelverton (below) that 23 Hen.
VIII did not permit removal to the High Commission, Richardson made the general point
that the statute did not, after all, ban removals-with-consent completely. He gave an
example of the sort of case in which the power to remove made especially good sense and
would surely be upheld (where the parties are fugitives, all of whom an Ordinary could
not reach within his diocese.) Though it is not spelled out, Richardson’s thought may be
that a criminal case as grave as Coventry’s and Stamford’s—involving officials subject to
secular punishment, whom diocesan judges might not be sure they were entitled to punish
spiritually, and who might be resistant with their superiors’ support—would be, like the
fugitives case, a fairly obvious candidate for removability. Of course either case could be
handled by removal to a regular archdiocesan court, but it makes sense to argue, as it
were, that since the High Commission existed it might as well be used for the function it
specialized in—seeing that serious ecclesiastical criminals with good prospects for
evading local ecclesiastical justice did not get away with it. Finally, Richardson
contradicts the position that 1 Rich. II took away ecclesiastical jurisdiction operating with
spiritual sanctions over offenses covered by that statute. The statute’s purpose was to
increase the punishment, to see that “such offenders could be smitten with two swords.”
This last point of Richardson’s is quite persuasive. While double secular
punishment for one offense would clearly be unacceptable, why should Parliament want
the offenders it had singled out as deserving secular punishment to escape spiritual
correction if the ecclesiastical authorities thought smiting them with the spiritual sword
would be to their religious benefit? To get around this argument, Justice Yelverton came
up with a plausible, though shaky, counter-position. Yelverton was indecisive in the first
round of discussion, but in the second his opinion is strong and clear. He now shows what
looks like an inclination to hold that 1 Rich. II simply terminated ecclesiastical
jurisdiction over the offenses it covers, for he emphasizes that the statute was made at the
prelates’ request, as if they wanted to be relieved of such cases. After Richardson’s “two
swords” speech, however, he retreats, conceding that Ordinaries could proceed spiritually
against statutory offenders. The High Commission, on the other hand, could not so
proceed. One reason for that, Yelverton now asserts, is that removal to the Commission is
simply not permitted by 23 Hen. VIII. That is a respectable position, backed by some
authority (see End Note, Ch. 2.) Yelverton does not, however, go into arguments for the
construction. Rather, he relies on the ingenious point at the center of his final stance in
Coventry: It should be presumed that if a case is before the Commission, either originally
or by removal, secular sanctions will be used. Therefore, the only way to avoid double
secular punishment is to prohibit the Commission from entertaining any suit for offenses
subject to common law or Star Chamber process. (Unless the secularizing statute
preserves ecclesiastical jurisdiction with an express proviso that only spiritual sanctions
be used? Possibly, but Yelverton adds no such qualification.)
It is certainly a good question, as Richardson insists, why the presumption
Yelverton proposes should be made. Yelverton does not say something like, “It almost
always happens, everybody knows—persons convicted in the High Commission are in
one way or another fined or imprisoned, or at least threatened with those sanctions unless
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they perform spiritual acts they are ordered to do for their correction, or unless they put in
a bond to guarantee performance.” (What the actual practice was would be hard to
ascertain historically, and a 17th century common lawyer would be unlikely to have more
than an impression.) Legally, the cases above show that there was less than perfect
judicial consensus as to whether, granting the High Commission’s jurisdiction, it could
always, sometimes, or –except perhaps in a heresy or schism case—never apply temporal
sanctions. Despite these difficulties, however, Yelverton’s “presumption” theory has a
certain plausibility, which I would state as follows: After all, starting a case in the
Commission or removing one there is usually, though not necessarily, motivated by a
desire to see an ecclesiastical offender punished more severely than by spiritual
sanctions, or at least coerced more effectively to perform a spiritual injunction than the
regular course of excommunication could insure. It makes better sense to assume that the
Commission will do what it primarily exists to do, even though what is assumed is not a
certainty, than to stand by until the Commission has wasted time and energy working out
whether to impose secular sanctions that cannot possibly be enforced (i.e., must be
blocked by Prohibition or another process, such as Habeas corpus.) Owing to the threat
of double exposure, the present case is paradigmatic for a sentence that “cannot possibly
be enforced.” In more routine cases, would it not be in the interest of efficiency for the
common law judges to ascertain here and now whether a majority would object to secular
sanctions’ being used in a given suit, and if it would to prohibit at once? The alternative
is treating jurisdiction as a separate issue, possibly leaving the suit before the
Commission, then later—when a secular sanction has been imposed—considering its
legality separately, perhaps with the result of having to prohibit a suit in which
Prohibition had been once refused, or to liberate a prisoner on Habeas corpus when he
could have been spared the trouble and expense of launching a legal proceeding.
Yelverton does not state such a rationale, but he must have had something like it
in mind when he proposed a rather strained presumption. All he is reported as saying to
justify it is that it resembles the presumption that ecclesiastical courts will not admit any
plea against tithes. At the present stage of this study—for tithe law as a whole has not yet
been analyzed—I can only suggest wariness of the analogy. It is true that persons sued
for tithes in kind could have a Prohibition merely by surmising that the tithes were
commuted by modus decimandi or composition real. Claiming such a commutation is
nearly all that making a “plea against tithes” could mean, since claims to complete
exemption from tithes were by the common law simply not available to laymen. If a
layman sued for tithes were to claim a total exemption as his defense in an ecclesiastical
court, I do not think there would be any basis for stopping the suit, though the plea would
in all probability be overruled. For another angle, by the better opinion attempts to
prohibit tithe suits on the ground that the current parson had agreed to take a
commutation in lieu of the tithes in kind ought not to succeed; taking that for law, though
the matter was controverted, one must say that ecclesiastical courts were left free to
recognize such bargains or not to; the parishioner’s common law protection, if the parson
did recover the tithes in kind contrary to his agreement, was an action for breach of
contract. The picture is somewhat complicated by the rule that ecclesiastical corporations
owning land could enjoy complete freedom from tithes. When such exemptions were
claimed, the common law did frequently preempt the case by Prohibition, but hardly
because it was presumed that ecclesiastical courts would not entertain pleas “against
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tithes.” Rather, the claims of these privileged institutions were usually based on alleged
immemorial custom or on statutory guarantees of exemptions originally granted by the
Pope. Over disputed customs and statutory titles, the common law simply asserted
exclusive jurisdiction. Ordinary modi too were custom-based. The best reason for taking
claims to them away from ecclesiastical courts was just that a custom disputed as to fact
must be tried by jury at common law. The connected question whether an alleged custom
is reasonable or valid on its face, whatever the de facto practice from time immemorial,
standardly belonged to the common law—almost always, in tithe law, questions of this
type were about whether an alleged modus was a disguised claim to total exemption from
some tithe.
In short, no presumption about what ecclesiastical courts would do with tithe
litigation is necessary to account for how those courts were restricted. At best there is a
superficial parallel between Yelverton’s proposed presumption and—let us say—what
could be conceived as a sort of practical presumption that ecclesiastical courts were too
apt to favor the tithe-recipient over the tithe-payer to be trusted with pleas that tithes
claimed were not owed. Both presume what may tend to happen but need not. The High
Commission perhaps as a rule used its secular sanctions when it had possession of a suit,
perhaps tended to the view that if it took a case at all, or was allowed to by the common
law courts, the matter was severe enough to be more stringently dealt with than by
regular ecclesiastical sanctions. Nothing, however, prevented the Commission from
making the judgment that spiritual sanctions would be sufficient correction for a
convicted defendant, or appropriate on other grounds, such as avoidance of prospective
double punishment. Estimation of how, over time, the Commission would choose among
its remedies and coercive tools could be no more than guesswork. Similarly, if
ecclesiastical courts had been given more scope to handle pleas “against tithes” than they
were given, it is by no means certain that they would have overruled such pleas
massively. Ecclesiastical lawyers tended to insist that reasonable commutations duly
established by their standard of prescription—which was not in principle as strict as the
common law’s, though perhaps more likely to be scrupulously applied than the common
law’s were by juries of lay tithe-payers—would be respected. (Although in this passage I
project beyond the cases I have analyzed systematically, the first three volumes of this
study contain a great deal of material on tithe law, some of it touching the issues
discussed here. The reader is referred to the index covering those volumes.)
When Justice Hutton reminded the court that it was dealing with a removed suit,
he said that removal to the Commission at least of offenses presented at visitations was
precedented and in his view unobjectionable. In the judges’ later discussion, however, he
says that the question before the court reduced to whether 23 Hen. VIII permitted
removal to the High Commission and announced his opinion that the statute does not so
permit. Then his thinking underwent another shift—see just below.
Littleton’s report ends by summing up where the judges stood. They were
divided 2-2 and therefore unable to grant a Prohibition at present. Justices Yelverton and
Harvey (who does not speak individually) favored immediate Prohibition. Chief Justice
Richardson of course opposed granting a writ until the Commission gave sentence
imposing secular punishment. Hutton now said that he was in doubt. All he says by way
of justifying his doubts is that “they”—presumably the Commissioners—were
proceeding for reformatio morum, which is too vague to explain much. Perhaps he was
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not quite sure of the interpretation of 23 Hen. VIII he had last seemed to embrace. Even if
that statute did not authorize removal to the Commission as liberally as it authorized
removal to regular ecclesiastical courts, did it make sense to suppose that it barred
removal of criminal suits looking to a spiritual remedy, so long as the offense was grave
enough to have been pursued in the Commission originally? Not being quite sure about
that, he may have been skeptical, with reason, of Yelverton’s “presumption theory”, and
yet preferred to hear more before joining Richardson in rejecting it. There was quite a lot
more to be heard in the next discussion of the case, reported by Hetley.
Hetley’s report, sub nom. Coventries Case, is all but certainly of an immediate
sequel. It may be in strictness of a separate case—a new attempt to get a Prohibition in
the light of events in the High Commission later than the debate we have just reviewed,
or at least unknown to the Common Pleas judges when they had that debate; or it could
be a reopening of the existing case left undecided by the divided court, with new
information adduced; which of these it is makes no significant difference. Hetley does not
tell us what the substance of the case was. Besides the case’s name and date, however,
one remark by Justice Yelverton makes it clear enough that Hetley is reporting a further
phase of the controversy described by Littleton. Yelverton says that although the High
Commission may sometimes fine and imprison, it may not do so in the present case
because the party was liable to be fined at common law. That is to say, the case was of
the type of Littleton’s Coventry, and the propinquity of name and date almost guarantees
that it was the identical case. Other judicial remarks, though “up in the air” as reported by
Hetley, resonate with the judges’ attitudes and concerns in the debate reported by
Littleton.
I now follow Hetley’s report as it unfolds: Serjeant Ashley, seeking Prohibition,
produced a copy of the libel in the High Commission, whereby the parties (note the
plural, another hint that this is the case of Coventry and Stamford) were fined £30 and
imprisoned. Chief Justice Richardson said at once that if the Commissioners had only
excommunicated the parties they would have “been well.” In effect, Richardson was still
insisting that the High Commission could, and in this case should, have confined itself to
spiritual sanctions, and that the Commission ought not to be prohibited until it failed to
do so; he was now, however, forced to admit that the condition had not been fulfilled and
thus that Prohibition was probably inevitable.
Justice Yelverton then makes the observation I note just above. He dissociates
himself from the extreme view that the Commission had no or very little power to fine
and imprison, without generalizing about the limits of that power beyond making the
point that the Commission may not impose secular punishment on a party subject to
being penalized at common law. This is consistent with the position he comes to in
Littleton. He does not mention his “presumption theory” again. There would of course be
no purpose in bringing it up now that it was ascertained that the Commission actually had
sentenced to fine and imprisonment. He must, however, have felt entitled to the “last
laugh”, since the High Commission had done what he proposed presuming it would do.
Its sentence is hard to account for if the Commissioners were aware of the previous
discussion in the Common Pleas, or for that matter if they knew of the statutes
secularizing the offense Coventry and Stamford were charged with. Granting that the
Commissioners were not ignorant of the high probability of their being prohibited if they
imposed a temporal punishment, they could conceivably have found the facts different
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enough from the narrative of the offense given in Littleton to take the officers’ conduct
outside the terms of 1 Rich, II while leaving them still guilty of laying violent hands on a
clergyman, although this hardly seems likely. (For example, Coventry and Stamford
could have behaved more politely than the Littleton narrative has them doing; Gumell
could have compliantly gone with them to his house or a public place, where they told
him their business; hot words and a scuffle could have occurred only then, which led to
their using inappropriate force in arresting him.) Otherwise, the Commissioners’ position
would have had to be that it was their duty to employ their temporal punitive powers
against anyone they convicted; if the common law courts had, or claimed to have,
authority to stop enforcement of the secular sentence, let them stop it, but until they did
let the warranted, or indeed obligatory, sentence be carried out. This comes to a stark
statement of the position Yelverton had wanted to presume the Commission would take.
One further twist in Yelverton’s remarks is worth noting. In explanation of his
basic view that the Commission was barred from imposing a secular penalty on a party
subject to common law punishment, he says that if someone is fined by the High
Commission and later indicted at common law he cannot plead the High Commission
fine. His legal incapacity to bar the indictment by pleading his High Commission fine of
course means that if the Commission may use secular punishments for the offense in
question, men can be exposed to double punishment for one offense, the crux of
Coventry. I do not think one could possibly argue that prosecution for an indictable
offense created by statute can be barred by events in the ecclesiastical sphere without an
express proviso in the creating statute. Thus Yelverton’s remarks as they start out come
to no more than restatement of the obvious. As they continue, however, they become
more interesting and more puzzling, for Yelverton goes on to state the converse: If one is
indicted and later sued in the High Commission he may plead the indictment. Is putting it
this way saying more than that the secular indictee may have a Prohibition quoad any
secular sanctions? May he have one to stop the ecclesiastical prosecution unconditionally
(in which event one proceeded against in a regular ecclesiastical court, with no danger of
incurring secular sanctions save by De excommunicato capiendo, should also be entitled
to a Prohibition?) Does the indictment simply—formalistically—constitute common law
preemption? If the indictee is acquitted at common law is he safe from ecclesiastical suit
looking only to spiritual sanctions? I can only put a quaere on these matters; it is of some
interest whether Yelverton meant to open them.
Richardson speaks again after Yelverton. Although he does not depart from his
concession that in the present case Prohibition must be granted to prevent execution of
the Commission’s secular punishments (at any rate the fine—an important qualification,
as we shall see), he adopts a position on the Commission’s imprisoning power of which
he gives no intimation in Littleton, but which he had embraced in Purbeck above. The
Chief Justice, it must be said, was persistent in his effort to salvage what could be
salvaged for the High Commission without permitting double punishment of a single
offense.
Richardson begins by stating what he took the strongest opponents of the
Commission’s secular powers to hold: without absolutely denying it power to fine and
imprison, they confined such power to heresy and clerical incontinence cases. Noting
this view seems at first hardly relevant for present purposes. Richardson did not think the
secular powers were that narrow, nor did the judges with whom he had disagreed on
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whether Prohibition should be granted to prevent secular punishment before it was
actually imposed. Even so, there is perhaps a sense in which having the most restrictive
view in mind is useful for the main point to emerge from Richardson’s speech. Before
reaching that point, Richardson deplores a bit more what the Commission had pigheadedly done in Coventry. Excommunication, he says—as others had said over the High
Commission’s history—is really a “greater” punishment than fines and jail terms, if only
it were so regarded. The immediate implication must be that the Commission’s imposing
secular punishment in the face of certain Prohibition reflects the general underestimation
of excommunication. (The explanation and remedy for that of course make a question.
Negligent religious instruction, all-too easily fallen into when ecclesiastical offenders
serious enough to bother about could be punished in ways that hurt, whether or not they
appreciated the soul’s desolation an excommunicate ought to feel? Failure to punish
frequently enough in the always-available “way that hurt”, imprisonment via De
excommunicato capiendo, when excommunicates did not do prescribed penances and
amend their lives to gain absolution? This failure was surely the more likely to occur
when an ecclesiastical tribunal existed with fairly broad powers to fine and imprison
directly, without the procedural fuss of putting De excommunicato in motion. Suppose, as
one brand of “strict constructionists” believed, the High Commission could only fine and
imprison heretics and incontinent clerics. Might forced reliance on excommunication and
its follow-up for the great majority of offenses not reduce the very need to
excommunicate, because sinners would face a more certain prospect of temporal
unpleasantness?)
Having so ruminated, Richardson announces his embrace of the position on the
High Commission’s powers that does not appear in Littleton, but which puts his point of
view throughout Coventry in a new light. For he now says, “they may enjoyn penance,
and put the party in prison until he does it.” The position is one we have encountered
aside from Richardson’s own adoption of it in Purbeck; it can be associated with Chief
Justice Popham, though it was not predominant since Coke’s time: Whatever the limits of
the Commission’s power to imprison punitively, it may always do so coercively to
enforce penance. If we assume Richardson held this opinion throughout the first debate
in Coventry, his insistence on withholding Prohibition until it was known what the
Commission would do takes on a different color. The Common Pleas was obliged to
wait, not until it was clear whether only a spiritual penalty had been imposed, and at most
followed by excommunication, but until it appeared that the parties had been fined or, if
imprisoned, imprisoned as a punishment rather than a coercive measure to effect
compliance with a spiritual injunction, Ascertaining that imprisonment was punitive
could not be easy. If a definite term was not specified, it requires only giving the
Commission the benefit of the doubt to infer a coercive intent—until new information
renders the supposition implausible, and that must probably take the form of a showing of
excessively long imprisonment, probably on Habeas corpus. The striking legal
proposition implied in Richardson’s position as now developed is that imprisoning a High
Commission convict coercively would not be ruled out by his liability to common law
punishment; double temporal punishment must be avoided, but a person who, though
liable to be, has not yet been sentenced to a punishment pursuant to indictment or in the
Star Chamber may be imprisoned for a while as an adjunct of his spiritual correction,
from which his temporal liabilities do not exempt him, per Richardson. The endorsement
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of coercive imprisonment does not sit quite comfortably with Richardson’s paeans to
excommunication, but there is no logical inconsistency. One can say, not only logically
but sensibly, that the High Commission would have barely been necessary if the Church
and its regular courts had done their job better; being necessary, it would we well-advised
to strengthen the established ecclesiastical sanctions by preferring them; it was, however,
empowered at discretion to use coercive imprisonment as a shorter route than De
excommunicato capiendo and a surer threat to offenders who, if they were in the
Commission’s hands and convicted, must do their penance promptly or taste jail, rather
than go off at worst excommunicated with a chance of evading commitment by De
excommunicato. If it makes sense to say that a new special tribunal must have some kind
of “teeth” that ordinary tribunals lacked, coercive imprisonment is a modest increment.
Adopting the coercive imprisonment theory made no practical difference for
Coventry as it stood, and Richardson says nothing more about it. He acknowledges again
that Prohibition must be granted. Yet he makes one more Fabian move, by saying that
“before he granted a Prohibition he would have the parties present.” He may have
wanted to have his own turn at lecturing the parties and impressing them with the
importance of making their peace with the Church. In any event, I suppose the Chief
Justice’s preference could not be denied as a matter of courtesy, even if the other judges
would sooner have put an end to the case at once by prohibiting execution of the whole
punitive sentence. As we shall see, however, by putting off a writ yet again Richardson
gained more than an opportunity to confront the culprits (and perhaps also to use the
court’s influence to insure that they were actually indicted or prosecuted in the Star
Chamber before they escaped custody.)
After Richardson, Justice Harvey made his sole individual comment in Coventry
(in Littleton we are only told that he was Yelverton’s ally in favor of immediate
Prohibition.) I do not understand his point, which has to do with the process of estreating
fines into the Exchequer. His remark may be a scrap of evidence that the High
Commission had accepted estreatment as the only permissible way to collect such fines
as it could lawfully impose (as contrasted with imprisoning to coerce payment of a fine or
exacting a bond conditioned on payment of the fine.) Harvey’s concern seems to be based
on the belief that if a fine such as the one in Coventry were estreated (he speaks of “such
unreasonable fines’) 1/3 of the sum would go to the prosecutor (but who would count as
that in the present case?) This Harvey regarded as impermissible. Whatever the
technicalities, my guess would be that he was just adding a reason why execution of the
sentence, at least quoad the fine, must be prohibited, without believing that any reason
was required beyond the fact that persons liable to a common law fine were fined by the
Commission.
The last observation in Hetley’s report is by Serjeant Brampston. He says that in
order to strengthen the High Commission’s jurisdiction the law gave power to fine and
imprison in cases not previously (before 1 Eliz. presumably) fineable at common law, but
the offense in the present case was fineable before, I take this as politely critical of
Richardson’s convoluted thoughts: It is better to keep things simple. The Commission
may fine and imprison as a punishment in many, perhaps nearly all, cases within its
jurisdiction—certainly not only for heresy and clerical incontinence. No doubt it may
imprison to coerce performance of a spiritual sentence, but that does not exhaust its
power to impose temporal sanctions. The one clear case in which it may not use them at
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all is where an offense—which need not be altogether beyond ecclesiastical or High
Commission jurisdiction as such—was subject to common law punishment before the
Commission came into existence, and this is that case.
On a later occasion, the Common Pleas at last decided Coventry. A Prohibition
was granted as to the fine, but not as to the imprisonment because “for that he ought to
have his habeas corpus.” The final move introduces a new note into the law, as well as
being one more tactical victory for the Chief Justice. I do not think it had been held
before that Prohibition would not lie to ban imprisonment from being imposed when it
should not be or to stop execution of a sentence of imprisonment already imposed. The
suggestion that Habeas corpus is the one way to challenge imprisonment is, I believe,
novel. A rule to that effect could be narrowed by holding that Habeas corpus is the only
route to release for someone already imprisoned, but that the High Commission may be
prohibited from imprisoning by anticipation at the time Prohibition is refused on
jurisdictional grounds. (It is implied, in other words, that there can be cases in which
High Commission jurisdiction is unobjectionable so long as spiritual sanctions alone are
used. This goes against the probably better opinion that if the Commission has
jurisdiction it may resort to secular sanctions. Chief Justice Richardson was successful,
however, in making out an exception in the unusual circumstances of Coventry.).
In Webb’s Case (1629),129 the patron of a living sued the parson and parishioners
in the High Commission for converting the church to profane use. The defendants alleged
in their pleading before the Commission that the parish had existed from before memory
and had no church; rather, the parishioners repaired to the nearest church in another
parish and paid all Church “duties” (presumably tithes, rates, mortuary fees, and the like)
there; in addition the parson of the churchless parish paid the neighboring parson 6/8d .a
year for the “instruction” the parishioners had there.
Chief Justice Richardson and Justice Hutton, who were alone in court, agreed that
Prohibition should be denied. Their basic position, which would have been good against
any ecclesiastical court, was that if there is a parish, the parishioners are compellable to
edify a church. That comes to saying that there could be no prescription against the;
universal duty to maintain an active church in the parish; a parish by prescription could
not be churchless by prescription; the fact that not having a church was in this case
compensated in a manner—the parishioners gaining no material benefit and the parson
paying for his sinecure—made no difference. If the arrangement made practical sense as
a sort of “merger” of small parishes, it was nonetheless illegal. Secondly, Hutton and
Richardson said without explanation that the “crime” was enormous and fit for the High
Commission. Seeing the case as criminal and the crime as enormous seems a little
surprising for Hutton, if not for Richardson. “Hands off the High Commission if possible,
when it is only trying to keep the ecclesiastical life of the nation running according to the
rules” might be the maxim of the decision. The fact that the suit would not have had a
chance of being prohibited if it had been brought in the Bishop’s court, and the fact that
the Bishop had presumably overlooked an illegal arrangement in his diocese for a long
time, tend to justify indulging the Commission.
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Miller’s Case, from the next term, 130 is discussed in Vol. II (pp.429-430) for a
self-incrimination aspect, which in the event had no effect on the resolution. In substance,
Miller et al. were prosecuted ex officio in the High Commission for minor Puritan
offenses. Prohibition was sought per Serjeant Hetley on the ground that they were too
minor to pursue in the Commission. Three judges, probably the only participants—
Richardson, Harvey, and Hutton—denied a writ. No serious discussion is reported of
where, if anywhere, a line runs between major religious crime—usually schism when
Puritans were concerned—and expressions of opinion with a Puritan tendency that were
illegal but non-enormous. Richardson delivered a diatribe against the plaintiffs-inProhibition and their activities, with which his colleagues appear to have been satisfied.
Harvey contributed the information that when he was at the Bar he once tried
unsuccessfully to prohibit a suit (presumably in the High Commission) for an
(unspecified) offense against the Book of Common Prayer on the ground that the
Uniformity Act subjected it to a secular penalty. (It is no wonder that he lost, because it
was generally agreed that the ecclesiastical courts retained concurrent jurisdiction over
such secularized offenses. They were only prohibited from interrogating the party so as to
force a confession of the secular crime.) For the purposes of the present case, Harvey
was probably saying something like. “If the High Commission may proceed against
practically any expression of disapproval of the Prayer Book—so long as it relies on
evidence rather than coerced confession—surely the misdemeanors charged here are
grave enough to fall within its jurisdiction.” In sum, Miller shows once again that
Puritans got almost no protection from the enormity standard; they were only shielded
from improper interrogation (which in the event Miller was held not to have suffered—
see Vol. II.)
The charges in Miller may of course have been better specified officially than as
reported by Littleton. In the report, Miller and associates are said to have been “men that
slighted the Government of the Church” (if “slight” means “speak disparagingly of”, they
should perhaps be prosecuted at common law—cf. Fuller); they “did hinder the
jurisdiction of a conformable minister” (What could be meant by his jurisdiction?); they
“had procured publique fasts & been present at them”; “had procured publique
Collections to be made for Poor Ministers and others of the Palatinate”; “commended Mr.
Angel to be a good Minister if he did not conform” (i.e., said it would be to his credit if
he would not or had not conformed—no assertion that he had actually not done so); and
“Received the Communion Sitting and not Kneeling.” Richardson in his denunciation
started off with the conclusion that they were “non-conformists to the government of the
Church of England.” He then said that it was not “fit” that they organized fasts and
collections because “the King of England should appoint fasts and collections.” (I should
like to be told the legal warrant for this royal monopoly. Collecting donations for the
Palatinate did, it is true, touch foreign policy.) He announced as a conclusion that these
misdoings were not “small things” and added that prosecuting them in the High
Commission did not violate 23 Hen. VIII because that statute “goes only to the Ordinary,
& only such causes which are ordinary.” In other words, Richardson endorsed the
reputable, but not clearly universal, opinion that 23 Hen. VIII simply did not apply to the
High Commission.
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One further feature is noteworthy. The party Miller sought Prohibition after he
had been fined £40 and the fine was estreated. (The heavy penalty is in a way explicable
because he, but not the other parties, was accused of failing to appear before the
Commission when summoned. He claimed to have a valid excuse, but the Commission
disallowed it.) The judges held that Prohibition would not lie after estreatment of a fine,
confirming the reason for decision in Purbeck above.
In a briefly reported case from the autumn of 1629,131 the High Commission was
prohibited from entertaining a wife’s libel seeking alimony. This is predictable for a
majority of the court, and no disagreement is reported. Littleton adds a rule qualifying the
general position that alimony is unsuitable for the Commission. There is no indication
whether there was any consideration of whether the rule might be applicable in the instant
case. If so, it was held inapplicable. The rule is that if a wife libels against her husband
causa saevitiae before the Commission, and it is ordered that the husband “allow the wife
so much pro expensis & alimony during the suit”—as it is said the Commission
customarily did—Prohibition will not be granted. In other words, if the wife has left the
husband on account of cruelty and sues him for it, he may be ordered to pay her a
temporary allowance to cover her litigative expenses and her living expenses while the
suit is going on. Indefinite alimony, normally attached to a divorce, is for the regular
courts.
The report of Lady Sherley’s Case, undated but from early in Charles I’s reign,132
is inconclusive. Lady Sherley sued her husband, Sir Henry, for alimony in the High
Commission. Nothing is said about the particular circumstances. Serjeant Hitcham moved
for Prohibition simply on the ground that alimony was not within the Commission’s
power. Chief Justice Richardson observed that the current patent purported to give
jurisdiction over alimony, but admitted that there was nothing in 1 Eliz. to warrant
granting such jurisdiction. Therefore, he said, the question was whether the King was
entitled by the common law to grant it. He suggests no answer. At most, his words
indicate that he thought the question a serious one—unsurprisingly in view of his remarks
in other cases. Justices Hutton and Yelverton, who with Richardson were the only
members of the court present, did not pay the question the compliment of taking it
seriously. Hutton made the familiar point that if alimony was conferrable without a basis
in the statute, so was any other form of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Yelverton said that
Coke, at the extrajudicial conference following Chancey’s Case, had peruaded James I to
take alimony out of the Commission’s patent. Yelverton “marvailed” that it had found its
way back in. (The exact words of the report of Yelverton’s opinion are: “I marvail how
that came within their commission: he said, that in tempore Iacobi, upon a debate before
him, Sir Edw. Cook so fully satisfied the King. And this matter of alimony was
commanded to be put out of their commission.” The speech is of some significance as an
additional datum on the post-Chancey conference. Note how ambiguous it is as to what
Coke “satisfied” King James of: That the King had no common law power to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission without a basis in the statute? That the statute in any
event provided no basis? That even if conferring alimony was not clearly illegal it was
unwise, wherefore it should be dropped from the patent, and was dropped as part of the
131
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compromise in which the proceedings ended? Yelverton may of course have had no
ready answer to these questions, but was merely irritated that Richardson might be ready
to jettison a sensible solution, causing such questions to be reopened.) Littleton’s report
ends with Richardson adjourning the case, instructing Hitcham to move it again when the
court was full, and saying that the judges would advise in the meantime. It is highly likely
that Hutton and Yelverton would have favored Prohibition in the end, and so, probably,
would Croke and Harvey. Richardson, having used the opportunity he could not be
denied to have a debate he thought worth having, may finally have acquiesced in the
Prohibition he could not in the advisement process talk his brethren out of.
Williams’ Case (1631)133 raised deep questions that had not been debated before.
The judges described it as a “great case.” No final outcome is reported; having said that
the case required deliberation, the court adjourned it. The reporter does, however, set
down his impression of where the judges’ thinking seemed to be tending on the first
discussion.
Williams arose on Habeas corpus. The carefully stated return was as follows:
“[The prisoner was held because the High Commissioners] have concluded unanimously
that he was guilty of incest because he had married the widow of his brother’s son & had
lived with her as his wife, and that such marriage was prohibited by certain canons made
to direct marriages by the Archbishop & clergy convocate & ordered to be read every
year in every church. And for this incest they sentenced him to be fined £500 & to be
imprisoned. And desire [i.e., the Commission requests] the Judge of the Arches to annul
the marriage.”
Serjeant Henden, representing Williams, moved that he be bailed. The reason was
that the marriage was lawful by the law of the land. That was because the statute of 32
Hen. VIII, c. 38, provided that “no reservation or prohibition except God’s law shall
impeach any marriage outside the Levitical degrees.” The statute of 25 Hen. VIII, per
Henden, though repealed, explains what 32 Hen. VIII means by “Levitical degrees”, and
neither that statute nor the later one mentions the present case of marriage to the widow
of a biological nephew. ”And so”, says Henden, the common law judges have taken upon
themselves the exposition of the Levitical degrees “by force of the statute of 32 Hen.
VIII.”
Note that Henden took no exception to the use of secular sanctions as such, nor to
the general proposition that incest is an enormity within the High Commission’s
jurisdiction—as Coke said in Darrington. His case rested on two foundations: (1) that
Williams did not commit incest by the relevant legal definition of that offense; (2) that it
was the common law courts’ business to say what that definition was, because it was laid
down by statute. It is interesting, however, that Henden seems not quite to proclaim it as
obvious that ecclesiastical courts are bound by the common law courts’ interpretation of
the term “incest” by virtue of their general monopoly over statutory construction. For he
says that the common law judges have taken on expounding the Levitical degrees and
cites precedential evidence, as if practice could have been different. If it had been, could
32 Hen. VIII be taken as intending to enact a standard for ecclesiastical courts alone—at
least with respect to criminal prosecution for incest—and to leave the meaning of
“Levitical degrees” to them? I say “at least with respect to criminal prosecution” because
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the High Commission seems to have been watching its step in Williams’ Case, carefully
avoiding the civil measure of annulling a marriage. Henden’s grounds ought perhaps to
justify outright discharge of the prisoner. His requesting only release on bail defers to the
common practice of restraint in Habeas corpus—relieving the party of imprisonment but
keeping him under the Commission’s thumb if there might be some basis for its still
having a legitimate interest in him. Here, Henden’s possible apprehension that serious
arguments contra could be made and the consideration that the case was generically wellwithin the Commission’s jurisdiction would recommend his concession that release on
bail would be a sufficient remedy.
Serjeant Brampston argued the other side, probably the harder one, with
considerable ingenuity. He took as his premise the indisputable rule that matters of fact
stated in returns on Habeas corpus must be taken as true. (I.e., if facts as stated are false
but furnish sufficient reason to return the prisoner to jail, he must be returned; his remedy
for wrongful detention is False Imprisonment.) Brampston proceeded to argue that the
present case was governed by that rule. Without (so far as the report shows) being quite
express, he introduced a second, almost equally incontrovertible, rule—just that the High
Commission had power to examine incest. (One must, I think, articulate this, because it is
surely obvious that it would not be a false statement of fact to say that the Commission
had jurisdiction over anything you please—say poaching, or, to stay within the
ecclesiastical realm, suits for legacies. It would be a statement of law, which would fail to
justify a commitment if a common law court in Habeas corpus regarded it as erroneous.)
The next step is the difficult one for Brampston’s argument. I think it amounts to
maintaining that in giving an explanation of the handling of Williams’ prosecution the
return did the equivalent of making mere factual statements, the truth of which would be
irrelevant for Habeas corpus. In view of earlier cases, it was probably necessary to say
more than “He was prosecuted and imprisoned for incest.” The common law courts
demanded a reasonable degree of specification when the Commission claimed to be
within its jurisdiction in pursuing and punishing someone for, say, erroneous opinions or
defamatory words—i.e., it was required to specify what opinions or what words. Surely,
then, the return in the present case must say something to show in what the Commission
took incest to consist. By Brampston’s theory, however, the return qua explanation need
not be on its face legally correct, but only colorable. It must make it appear, say, that
drunkenness had not been treated as incest. If, however, the Commission was only
mistaken about the legal bounds of incest, while making a bona fide effort to identify the
offense plausibly, and doing so in the sense that it followed canonical prescriptions
ecclesiastical courts were ordered to follow, its return on the Habeas corpus was not ipso
facto inadequate. Why should it be, when a return full of untrue statements of simple fact
would be perfectly satisfactory? Why should saying something true as mere fact—
Williams was convicted of marrying his niece-in-law and the Commission was applying
rules it thought it was or might be bound by—have consequences no different than
simply lying to make jurisdiction airtight, say by asserting that he was punished for
marrying his sister? The questions seem to me to make some sense, notwithstanding the
objection that the Commission had committed legal error, if it had, rather than factual
misstatement properly speaking. I do not think that the Commission (or its agent the
jailer) would escape liability in False Imprisonment if it was mistaken about the standard
of incest it should apply, but at least Williams would not be let out of jail here and now
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on the basis of an inadequate return. Some common law court in the future, with a jury,
would decide whether he was wronged and how much. (I think the words of the report,
though brief, show clearly enough that the “facts” in the return which Brampston took as
beyond scrutiny were the specification of what the Commission treated as incest and the
basis in the canons for that. The return contained a couple of facts in the simple sense—
the Commission’s unanimity and its reference of annulment to the Arches—, but whether
those were actually or putatively true could have no significant effect on the issue of the
return’s adequacy; they at most reinforce the Commission’s claim to have acted
circumspectly.)
In the rest of his argument, Brampston moved beyond the formal point that the
return was adequate even if it was not “true” to a substantive claim, viz. that the High
Commission was free to construe “incest” as it did. Perhaps it ought not, in what one can
only call an ideal sense, to have allowed the canons to supplement or override the statute
of 32 Hen. VIII, but if that was a mistaken reading of the statute, the mistake was the
Commission’s to make. In other words, the High Commission—specifically, not any
ecclesiastical court—had authority to interpret the statute. An exception was made from
the pervasive general rule that non-common law courts violating statutory requirements
as the common law judges understood them should be prohibited (and in the limited
range of situations in which non-common law courts could commit to prison—rarely
extending beyond High Commission cases—persons imprisoned in consequence of
misapplying a statute should be liberated on Habeas corpus.) Brampston reached this
surprising result by drawing an analogy between heresy and incest.
The statute of 1 Eliz. c. 10 provided that the High Commission—solely and
specifically the High Commission—should not have power to adjudge any thing heresy
which had not before been so adjudged by the authority of the canonical scriptures, &c.
By Brampston’s argument, although this statute was made to prevent the Commission
from over-extending the meaning of heresy, it implied that only the Commission had
jurisdiction to determine that meaning. At any rate, common law courts were to have no
role in determining it by way of their general responsibility to see that the statutes were
correctly observed by ecclesiastical courts—the rationale was that theological expertise
was required to tell whether alleged heresy had ever been adjudged heresy on proper
scriptural and supplementary theological authority. If regular ecclesiastical courts did not
utterly lose power to entertain a heresy case, still the High Commission was primarily if
not exclusively created to make sure that they did not decide such cases by wrong,
statutorily forbidden criteria. If a surviving Catholic Bishop were to do so, or were to be
invited to by a complainant, he should presumably be prohibited.
After listening to Brampston, the Common Pleas judges would not deliver any
opinion “fully” (i.e., a final opinion, normally in the form of judge-by-judge argument of
the case, though a per curiam statement of the grounds for decision could with the whole
court’s assent be substituted.) They were not ready to free the prisoner at present, but
ordered that he appear with a keeper on a future day for a ruling of the case. In addition to
emphasizing the magnitude and difficulty of the case and the need for deliberation, the
judges expressed their desire to hear both civilians and divines.
No final decision after the adjournment is reported. Littleton, the reporter, does
however, give his impression of what the judges seemed to think, so they must have
discussed the issues in a preliminary way before adjourning. Two tentative views are
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attributed to the court: (1) If the prisoner had been committed for heresy, and the return
on Habeas corpus did not state the cause “clearly” (i.e., show in particular in what the
heresy consisted), the prisoner could not be bailed—a common law court simply could
not meddle in the matter; (2) incest is not parallel to heresy—32 Hen. VIII governs what
can be counted as incest, and the interpretation of that statute, as of nearly all others,
belongs to the common law. In short, Brampston was right in his analysis of heresy, but
wrong in his attempt to bring incest under the same principle.
On the verge of the Civil War, in 164l-42, an important Prohibition case
concerning alimony came before the Common Pleas, the personnel of which had
changed. This case, Powell’s, was soon followed by another which, though different in
form, may involve the same people and the same controversy at a later stage.134 Lady
Powell sued Sir Edward for alimony in the High Commission; the husband sought a
Prohibition per Serjeant Clark. Rather than argue that alimony was too minor or too civil
for the Commission, Clark took the position that no ecclesiastical court could grant
alimony. Those courts could, he conceded without excluding the High Commission,
compel husbands to treat their wives properly and grant divorces. Alimony, however,
belongs to the common law. Clark’s first reason for this conclusion is a writ to a sheriff
from 7 and 8 Hen. III ordering him to set out “reasonable estovers” for a wife’s alimony
.In other words, ancient evidence showed that a wife entitled to alimony, presumably in
consequence of a divorce or of her justified withdrawal from the husband’s household,
could and therefore must pursue a common law procedure to secure payment. (There is a
variance between March and Harg. 23 in that the latter has Chief Justice Banks, rather
than counsel, bringing up the writ from Hen. III, with a more specific citation—Close
Rolls, 5 Hen. III, membrane 3. In the Harg. 23 version, Clark starts off with the more
predictable argument that alimony belongs to the Ordinary and so is inappropriate for the
High Commission. March shows, however, that Banks agreed with the more drastic
position evidenced by the 13th century writ. Discovering it, whoever was the original
discoverer, testifies, as do several cases in this study, to a higher standard of antiquarian
research in the mid-17th century than had obtained earlier.) According to the March
account, Clark went on to cite Chancey (probably MS. garbled) as a post-1 Eliz.
precedent for prohibiting an alimony suit in the High Commission. He presumably
wanted to show that the statute had not been taken to give the Commission specifically a
power in alimony which ecclesiastical courts in general lacked, Although in a narrow
way cases such as Chancey could be considered precedents for that, it misunderstands
them so to use them, since there is no sign that they rested on anything more than the
proposition that alimony, together with most of the rest of matrimonial law, was reserved
to the Bishops’ courts. Either some lawyers of the 1630s and beyond had lost touch with
the Jacobean law, or else they were doubtful that the Commission could be restrained
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from exercising any form of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Clark next made a textual
argument from 1 Eliz., as opposed to one from Prohibition precedents: the statute gives
the Commission power to “reform” or “redress” , but it is “not apt” to say that alimony
should be “reformed” or “redressed”. This amounts to saying that the Commission’s
powers, however extensive, must be criminal, which awarding alimony cannot be; not
paying alimony might be seen as a “reformable “, or punishable, offense, but it has no
foundation if ecclesiastical courts may not create a duty to pay. With the help of the
precedent from Hen. III, such a duty can come into being only when the common law
responds to a marital situation by conferring entitlement to material support on a divorced
or estranged wife. Finally, Clark says that alimony is a temporal thing and that it charges
a man’s inheritance (I.e., I suppose, it would be collectable from the heirs of the man
charged with alimony, instead of the administrators of his personal estate. How Clark
knows this is unclear, but perhaps it is in his 13th century source.}
Serjeant Rolle (spelled Rolls in March) then agued for the other side, against
Prohibition. His general position is that suits for alimony are perfectly appropriate to
ecclesiastical courts. Those courts, per Rolle with no exception for the High Commission,
may not fine or imprison, but they are not subject to Prohibition until they purport to use
those sanctions. So far as appears, his rule is categorical: ecclesiastical courts, including
the Commission, may order payment of alimony and excommunicate if it is not paid;
imprisonment to coerce payment or enforce a penance imposed for not paying is no more
lawful than punitive imprisonment and fining. Rolle’s reason for his position is that
alimony is merely an “incident” of the “principal” power of separation. I should think this
comes to little more than saying it makes sense, and is traditional, for courts entitled to
grant divorces and order abusive husbands to stay away from wives who have fled them
also to be entitled to insure the wives a livelihood. Rolle does not comment on the
argument, central to the other side, that the common law provided an equivalent of
alimony and preempted the field. Skepticism about the force to be given to a single
document 300 years old can of course be respected. Rolle does answer another argument,
which he says was made on the other side. (It does not occur in Clark’s speech, but from
the judicial remarks below it is clear that it weighed with the Bench.) The argument is the
familiar one, that parties should not be inconvenienced and lose appeals by being cited
out of their home diocese (owing to 23 Hen. VIII, that is to say, though Rolle does not
mention the statute.) His rebuttal, so far as one can tell from his words in March, comes
to no more than an assertion that citation outside the party’s diocese is unobjectionable so
long as it is within the same province. The more serious argument that 23 Hen. VIII does
not apply to the High Commission (see End Note to Ch. 2) is untouched.
Chief Justice Banks speaks first from the Bench in March’s report. His first point
is that precedents for the High Commission’s having held plea of alimony and granted it
do not mean that the practice is or ever was lawful, and that the patent’s purporting to
give the Commission jurisdiction in alimony is without effect unless 1 Eliz. permits. On
the matter of citation outside the diocese, Banks observes that the Commission would be
useless if it could not so cite. This must come to saying that 23 Hen. VIII does not govern
the High Commission, though Banks, like Rolle, does not mention the statute. Clearly,
however, the Commission’s being exempt from 23 Hen. VIII implies nothing about its
jurisdiction over any particular subject, such as alimony. The puisne justices—Crawley,
Reeve, and Foster—agreed that a Prohibition should be granted in the case at hand. They

374

expressed doubt about Banks’ view that citation out of the diocese into the High
Commission must be lawful if the Commission were to be effectual at all; deprivation of
appeals still seemed to them a serious cost. Banks speaks once more to correct Rolle’s
statement that the Commission had all forms of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; even if it had
jurisdiction in alimony, as Banks reemphasizes it does not, the more sweeping point
would not follow. Prohibition was granted unanimously, the judges agreeing that if the
High Commission could charge a man’s land with alimony it might as well have power to
encumber it with a rent charge.
About a year after Powell’s Case was decided, a Sir Edmund Plowden v. Warden
of the Fleet is reported. While there is no necessary reason why this could not be
unconnected with Powell, it seems unlikely. Powell and Plowden are similar enough
names to be confused; one version of Powell gives Edmund as the party’s first name, and
in all versions he is a “Sir”; most important, the issue in Plowden is whether the High
Commission had cognizance of alimony. Plowden, however, is a common law suit for
false imprisonment against the jailer. The defendant pleaded that he was holding the
plaintiff by virtue of a High Commission warrant; Plaintiff demurred on the ground that
the Commission lacked jurisdiction in alimony, so that he was proceeded against coram
non judice and the jailer was liable for false imprisonment. No result is reported except
that a day was assigned for plaintiff to maintain his demurrer.
If we assume that we are dealing with one and the same Sir. E.P., and that he was
imprisoned by the High Commission in consequence of Lady P.’s suit for alimony, there
is a mystery: Since Lady P.’s suit was prohibited, how did the Commission get the
occasion to imprison Sir. E.? One can only speculate. Could the Commission have
simply disobeyed the Prohibition, whereupon Sir E., being imprisoned, opted neither for
suing Attachment on his Prohibition nor for seeking liberation on Habeas corpus, but
instead pursued damages and the solemnest possible decision that the Commission had no
business touching alimony, viz. a common law judgment on demurrer?
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Sub-section (b): King’s Bench Cases after Coke’s Dismissal
(1616 to the Civil War Period)
Our last group of cases comes from the King’s Bench after Coke’s dismissal in
1616. Atwood’s Case of 1617,135 the only Jacobean one, is neither a Prohibition nor a
Habeas corpus, but it contains a significant incidental reference to the High Commission.
The case itself was a Writ of Error pursuant to Atwood’s indictment and conviction
before Justices of the Peace for scandalous words touching religion; upon conviction the
Justices had fined him 100 marks. The words in question, whether High Church or
Catholic in inspiration, were distinctly anti-Puritan. Atwood said that “the religion now
professed was a new religion within fifty years; preaching was but prating, & hearing of
service more edifying that two hours preaching.” The Writ of Error was based on the
proposition that speaking such words was not “inquirable by indictment” or before
Justices of the Peace, but only before the High Commission.
The King’s Bench did not make a definitive decision so far as the report goes. It
first referred the question of the J.P.s’ jurisdiction and the legality of proceeding by
indictment to Attorney General Yelverton. (This was Sir Henry Yelverton, who served as
a Common Pleas judge between 1625 and 1630 and appears several times in the cases
above.) Yelverton certified that the J.P.s had no authority in the matter. The court agreed
with him, but put off final decision pending advisement. The merits of the common law
question need not concern us. The feature of the report that is arresting for our purposes
is the statement in or in support of the Writ of Error that religious speech of the sort
complained of here could only be prosecuted in the High Commission. I think a more
correct formulation would be that the cause was ecclesiastical; whether it could be
pursued in the High Commission—or, doubtfully I should think, could not be pursued in
a regular Church court—would be determinable in challenges to some ecclesiastical
tribunal by Prohibition or Habeas corpus; those questions would be basically irrelevant
for the present case, unless perhaps someone were willing to argue that the absence of an
ecclesiastical remedy suggests that a lay one must exist. The remark about the High
Commission is therefore probably best seen as evidence of a common assumption: viz.
that the Commission is the place where in practice religious speech-offenses are dealt
with, rather than Bishops’ courts and rather than lay ones save where they were expressly
given jurisdiction by statute. The casual suggestion by the authors of Atwood’s Writ of
Error that the Commission positively could proceed for the words he was accused of
speaking should perhaps not be taken too seriously. An attempt to prohibit a High
Commission suit for those words—where a note of disrespect for the Church exactly as
established is offset by defense, perhaps in overzealous terms, of outlooks rather favored
by ecclesiastical officialdom—might be problematic. The political reality behind Atwood
was probably that Justices of the Peace with at least vague Puritan sympathies proceeded
against, and punished severely, a man whom they knew the High Commission might not
have prosecuted ex officio and might have treated leniently even if a libel against him
would have been hard to throw out flatly, as so non-enormous a complaint might not have
been.
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Stanway’s Case, of 1626136, came to a predictable result in the light of earlier
decisions. It is mainly of interest for details of the way the court discussed the limits on
the High Commission. Stanway was the farmer of a rectory that came to the Crown when
the monasteries were dissolved (i. e., the King retained title to the impropriate rectory,
but leased it to Stanway.) He was sued in the High Commission to compel him to repair
the chancel of the Church. The suit was prohibited as improper for the Commission. The
decision was defended first by saying that that tribunal was for enormous and exorbitant
offenses, heresy and schism “and such like.” (One wants to ask how sure the judges were
that the Commission was limited to a very few very serious spiritual offenses and how
much of an escape-clause “such like” provides.) Then the judges say the Commission is
“more” (“plusors”) a criminal court than a civil one. (How much tentativeness is in the
“more”, how much realization that defining and defending a strict civil-criminal
distinction would cause problems?) The Commission was “principally” founded by1
Eliz. to deprive Popish priests. (What can be inferred from this main, but not exclusive,
original purpose? Anything more restrictive, or less so, than confining the Commission to
heresy and a penumbra of unorthodoxy only technically distinct from heresy to which
Catholic clergy might be disposed?) Next the judges say that the Commission has
nothing to do with “matter of interest”; repairing a church or chancel belongs to
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but not, since it involves “interest”, to the Commission. (Is the
line drawn here any different than that between civil and criminal? Is a matter of
“interest” any ecclesiastical suit in which a losing party could be ordered to pay or
expend money?) Toward explaining and justifying the last point, the judges cite a case
from 5 Jac. C.P. in which a tithe suit in the Commission, being a “matter of interest”, was
prohibited. (Tithes had been cited before as a paradigm example of an ecclesiastical duty
not enforceable by the High Commission, but we have not previously seen a specific
precedent invoked. Although both involve a judgment to pay money, can no distinction
be claimed between every producer’s obligation to pay tithes and the duty of a particular
officer of the Church to defray a particular parish expense—repair of the chancel in this
case, for which the holder of the parochial living was normally responsible? We have
noted before that neglect of such burdens by clergy might well be looked on indulgently
by ordinary ecclesiastical courts, leaving the laity—which was normally responsible for
maintaining the body of the church, but not the chancel—with the full burden of keeping
the church from decaying. That seems a reason for High Commission authority, if one is
willing to extend it beyond the most austere limits.) The judges then cite another
precedent on a quite different subject: Prohibition granted in H. 5 Jac. to stop a High
Commission suit for calling a parson a “Knave and Brabler.” The court explains this by
saying that Prohibition was issued “because the suit was for words.” (There were
certainly precedents for using the enormity test to prevent the Commission from
entertaining minor defamatory remarks about clergymen, sometimes, as here, aspersions
so vague that regarding them as defamatory at all may be doubtful. The question that
arises in the present context is whether “suits for words” are not close to the opposite of
“matters of interest.” Ecclesiastical defamation was admittedly a semi-criminal offense.
Whether it was generically criminal enough for the Commission or whether a particular
instance was serious enough are good questions, but the object of suits was certainly not
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to compel a monetary payment; at most it could turn into one if the ecclesiastical court,
probably illegally, imposed compensation of the defamed person as, or in lieu of, a
spiritual punishment.)
I have asked caviling questions about the first passage of the judges’ opinion to
make one point: By 1626 there had been several decades of intense litigation about the
High Commission. All the doctrines broached in Stanway had been discussed before.
Qualifications and complications run through the reported cases, however. A more
nuanced—and from the Commission’s point of view less restrictive—position than the
maxims confidently embraced by the early Caroline judges add up to need not be
accepted, but I should expect it to be considered and, if rejected, rejected in favor of a
more coherent across-the-board theory of what the Commission may and may not do than
appears in Stanway. The judges in that case give the impression of grasping at the scraps
of familiar doctrine that would help justify the result they wanted, rather than of interest
in clarifying a confused area of the law for the future. One almost feels that they had
given up on making much sense of High Commission law.
After some judicial observations on medieval secular law touching on “matter of
interest” and what contrasts with it, Justice Jones makes an argument for the proposition
that ecclesiastical courts (High Commission or otherwise) may be prohibited from
entertaining suits for the repair of churches. Nothing earlier in the report suggests that
this was questionable as such, but it might plausibly have been. It is a little hard to see—
leaving aside “matters of interest”, which were urged only as an objection to High
Commission jurisdiction—what secular or “royal” interest would be offended if the duty
to repair churches, whether that of clerics or (to include lay impropriators) “officials of
the Church” or that of parishioners, were simply left to ecclesiastical justice. Jones’s
argument is that a suit for contribution to repairs can certainly be prohibited if the party
being sued claims to be an inhabitant of another parish. The reason is that the claim puts
the boundaries of parishes in question, and that is—as most authority agrees—a common
law issue requiring jury determination. Jones’s implication is presumably that if
Prohibition is appropriate in one sort of church-repair case it cannot be ruled out in
others, or is not an intrinsically improper remedy. This point does not seem to have any
necessary consequence for the jurisdiction of the High Commission versus that of regular
ecclesiastical courts, except that of course if no Church court could be prohibited in a
repair case the Commission could not be. If the remedy in itself was proper enough, it
remains an open question whether the Commission with its statutory basis was banned
from entertaining some or all repair cases.
The rest of the report of Stanway explains aspects of the case that do not touch the
prohibitability of repair suits as such or the High Commission’s jurisdiction. These need
not concern us. (Briefly, the King had leased the rectory to Stanway rendering rent and
covenanted to discharge his grantee of all pensions and encumbrances. The present suit
was originally for the minister’s pension as well as the repairs, but the first part of the
claim was mooted by payment of the pension. Justice Whitelocke thought that if it had
not been paid the minister could not pursue it in any ecclesiastical court, but only in the
Exchequer Chamber—here the branch of the Exchequer with authority over royal grants.
On the still-alive issue whether the King or his grantee was responsible for repairing the
chancel the reporter only refers his reader to a case in Dyer—36 Hen. VIII, f. 58. No
decision on the aspect of the case involving the law of royal grants is reported.)
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Johnson’s Case 137 is of interest because it is on the same jurisdictional issue as
Stanway. It was decided the same way on the most obvious available grounds, without
any elaborate or far-ranging argument. Johnson, being sued in the High Commission for
not repairing a chancel, sought a Prohibition per Banks for two reasons: (1) The charge
was not for an enormous crime and therefore not within the Commission’s jurisdiction;
(2) Because there is no appeal from the Commission, the party would not have the same
privilege as parties in other ecclesiastical courts. All the report tells us is that Prohibition
was granted for these two reasons.
Brown’s Case138 is reported twice by Latch, unclearly both times. The High
Commission is not said to have been involved, but from the report at Latch, 204, I think it
must have been. For there the question seems to be whether Brown should be discharged,
and it is clear that he was imprisoned. His lawyer, Finch, argued that he should be
discharged because “the statute’ (one would suppose 1 Eliz.) did not intend “to aid
ecclesiastical judges with temporal power in such small cases as defamations &c.”, but
only in “great cases of heresies.” Finch said there were many precedents of prisoners
discharged in such cases, and Rolle, also from the Bar, supported him with the remark
that there were many precedents in Lord Coke’s time. So far, the case looks like a
straightforward assertion of the enormity test, at least quoad power to imprison, in a
Habeas corpus to challenge a High Commission commitment. The rest of the report, as
well as the one—pretty clearly of the same case—at Latch, 174, confuse this familiar
picture, however. As Rolle continues (Latch, 204) he points out that the words of “the
statute” say that all pains and forfeitures are to be discharged and says that there is no
pain greater than imprisonment. The court is then reported as deciding that “this statute”
does not discharge the imprisonment. It is unclear what statute is now referred to.
Maybe Brown was trying to use Prohibition on 23 Hen. VIII instead of Habeas corpus.
Alimony arose in the King’s Bench in Hurbie’s Case.139 The report tells only that
Harbie’s wife sued him in the High Commission for alimony and that Prohibition was
sought per Serjeant Lloid, who so far as appears did not say more than that several
Prohibitions “in the very point” had recently been granted by the Common Pleas. The
King’s Bench was not ready to go along just for the sake of conformity and must have
argued the principles, for the case was discussed several times before decision. In the end
Prohibition was granted, however. The court emphasized the old rule that the
Commission’s patent can only confer what 1 Eliz. allows it to, which suggests that
despite the rule’s frequent reaffirmation, some members of the King’s Bench may have
had doubts.
I mention an anonymous report from i629140 only because it shows that the High
Commission’s occasional bad habit of committing people to improper prisons was still
alive. The circumstances of the case are not entirely clear, but a person brought into the
King’s Bench on Habeas corpus had been committed to what is referred to as “the new
prison.” He appears to have been remanded, but not to the “new prison”—rather “here”.
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Whatever that may mean, presumably a regular King’s Bench jail—“for this Court does
not take notice of the said prison. It would be otherwise if he were in a known prison.” I
suppose it would not have to be one of the King’s Bench’s own.
More materially, Drake’s Case (1631) 141 brings us back to alimony for one last
time. The wife suing in the High Commission alleged the “various” cruelties she had
suffered; she was forced to leave her husband, and he would not allow her maintenance.
The suit was prohibited, on the motion of Sir Laurence Hyde, because it belonged to the
Ordinary, from whom the losing party could appeal. The report acknowledges that the
Commission’s current patent gave it authority to try alimony suits; 1 Eliz., however, did
not in the court’s opinion permit conferral of such jurisdiction.
The rest of our cases shift away from matrimonial law and for the most part
concern clerical discipline and intra-Church affairs. George Huntley’s Case of 1629 142 is
a well-argued Habeas corpus. It contains novel issues, by which the judges were
sufficiently baffled to put off final decision. The return on Huntley’s Habeas corpus said
that he was imprisoned by the High Commission for refusing to preach a visitation
sermon, having been commanded to do so by the Archdeacon, and also for “various
contempts” against the Archdeacon and against the Archbishop of Canterbury, who was
Huntley’s immediate Ordinary. (I.e., he lived in the Diocese of Canterbury, rather than
another diocese within the Province of Canterbury. That means the Archbishop in his
other persona as Bishop was conducting his routine visitation on the occasion of
Huntley’s misbehavior; he was insulted in the line of duty, so to speak, rather than as a
dignitary who merely happened to be present.)
Huntley was represented by two prominent lawyers, Serjeant Heath and
Calthrope. Heath, who spoke first, started off by maintaining emphatically that Huntley
had done nothing deserving imprisonment. (In Prohibition, he might have said the party
had done nothing of which the High Commission had any business taking notice, but it
was at once more modest not to insist that even the mildest spiritual censure would have
been unlawful and more effective rhetorically to focus on the scandal of this
imprisonment. Liberation from prison was after all the only object of the Habeas corpus.)
Per Heath, Huntley had no duty entailed by his canonical obedience to preach the
sermon; his doing so would have been no more than “matter of courtesy.” Lest, however,
discourtesy toward the Ordinary and his entourage should furnish some kind of basis for
Huntley’s treatment, Heath goes on to argue that that he could not legally conform with
the Archdeacon’s request: As a licensed preacher, he was not allowed to preach outside
his cure; the Archdeacon had no power to dispense with that rule just by ordering him to
preach elsewhere. From highlighting the absurdity of the imprisonment in the particular
situation, Heath moves to more general points: The offense is intrinsically petty. (Though
he does not spell this out, Heath is obviously drawing on the entrenched idea that there is
some degree of seriousness required for High Commission jurisdiction, whether or not a
stringent test separates a few “enormities” from the bulk of reasonably consequential
offenses. Somewhat disobliging or somewhat legalistic behavior by a clergyman, who for
all we know may only have embarrassed by a demand that he preach without sufficient
preparation, does perhaps set a standard for pettiness.) The Commission’s patent does
141
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not include the offense (however it would be described if it were to be put in the patent),
but even if it did such an item in the patent would not be warranted by 1 Eliz. As what
appears to be conceived as a separate point, Heath proceeds to say flatly that the
Commission lacked power to fine and imprison “in this case.” (I would take this to
telescope another familiar argument—that the Commission’s power to use secular
sanctions is not coterminous with its jurisdiction, so that even if minor misconduct in the
special setting in which Huntley offended were within High Commission jurisdiction, it
must still be dealt with by spiritual sanctions.) Heath then adds some information by
telling us that besides imprisoning Huntley the Commission had fined him £500 (no
less!) and estreated the fine into the Exchequer, but that this fact was not contained in the
return. (Here a technical issue not anticipated in earlier cases arises. Must a valid return
on Habeas corpus involving the High Commission recite the whole punishment
imposed, spiritual and temporal elements alike, to justify the use of imprisonment, when
that is the only secular sanction that the writ challenges? There would seem to be good
reasons for an affirmative answer. It was occasionally suggested in earlier cases that an
ecclesiastical court with the privilege of using secular sanctions must keep them within
reasonable bounds. In the circumstances of Huntley, a huge fine and punitive
imprisonment as well must surely exceed plausible bounds. A further question is whether,
regardless of quantities, both punishments could legally be used in the same case. Heath’s
thinking is not spelled out on these and related matters, but he does seem to conclude that
returns must give a full picture of the sentence.) The penultimate point in this extensive
argument is the predictable unavailability of appeal; in the context in which that objection
is presented, it must be intended to emphasize that an outrageously disproportionate
sentence would be beyond appeal. Heath’s final point is a recurrent one in earlier cases:
in speaking of “various contempts” in addition to the more specified offenses, the return
is bad because too general.
After what I think one may call Heath’s crushing case for liberation of the
prisoner, his colleague Calthrope comes on with still more considerations. I am not sure
what his first argument says beyond what Heath had said amply, but there may be a
nuance. Calthrope, after asserting that it does not appear (from the return) that the offense
is within the Commission’s power, adds “and the Court will not take notice of their
particular jurisdiction.” The twist here may be that the return needed to say in some
explicit way that the High Commission laid claim to jurisdiction—say because its patent
conferred it (lawfully or not) over conduct recognizably, as described, like that attributed
to Huntley; common law courts should not decide whether to liberate or not to liberate
people committed by a special court—whose jurisdiction was certainly confined to
ecclesiastical law and was at least notoriously believed to be further limited—on the basis
of whatever they may think its jurisdiction is; an express claim to jurisdiction in the case
at hand must be put before the common law court for its evaluation; lacking one,
obviously the prisoner should be let go. If this is possibly the tendency of Calthrope’s
formulation, quaere whether the degree of nicety in returns it calls for was in practice
insisted on.
From his first argument, Calthrope moves into new territory. Focusing on the part
of the accusations against Huntley that had him “affronting” the Archdeacon by charging
that official with “injustice and wrongful dealing”, Calthrope maintained with the help of
secular analogies that at any rate Huntley could not be imprisoned for that. (It would
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seem that the return gave a little more information than the initial account of it in the
report specifies—or said at least something about what the “various contempts” consisted
in.) Counsel cites two common law cases to support this argument—the famous Dr.
Bonham’s Case as reported by Coke and a King’s Bench Case from 41 Eliz., Jarrett v.
Denlie. How Bonham applies is not explained, but Jarret is recounted: Someone said to a
London Alderman that he was a fool and knave and was for so saying imprisoned by the
Mayor; the King’s Bench liberated him. Why, one may ask, should the Mayor of
London’s lack of authority to punish criminally (at any rate by imprisonment) the
defamer of an Alderman (or at least one who spoke disrespectfully of him) have
implications for the High Commission’s powers? The question need not be unanswerable.
In any event, with this argument Calthrope seems to intimate a deep theory of the need
for some level of ultimate agreement between the law applied in ecclesiastical courts and
the secular “law of the land.” Such theories are not implausible—see Vols. II and III
sparsim—but novel in discussion of the High Commission.
Calthorpe then returns to more familiar themes, apparently declaring that the
High Commission simply had no power to fine or imprison because 1 Eliz. was “only a
restoration of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.” Though too extreme a doctrine to fit most of
the case law later than Queen Elizabeth’s reign, this view has a history, and some lawyers
may have thought that the old formula “all ecclesiastical jurisdiction but no secular
sanctions” remained the best solution to the puzzles of the Commission’s authority and
was still worthy of serious consideration. Calthrope cites “2 Hen. 4” for the general point
that ecclesiastical courts may not imprison but must punish by spiritual censures. This is
probably a Year Book holding what for its time—before the picture was somewhat
complicated by statute—was undoubtedly true.
Two more arguments complete Calthrope’s contribution. He notes that the return
said in part that Huntley was imprisoned because he did not pay costs (again adding a bit
more to the return than the reporter’s opening statement of it contains.) Per Calthrope, an
action of Debt—not imprisonment outside the regular course of Debt proceedings—was
the proper remedy to recover costs, so that at least in one respect jailing Huntley was
unjustified. Finally, Calthrope came up with a canon requiring the Bishop himself to
preach at visitations—a further basis for arguing that Huntley was illegally imprisoned
for unwillingness to comply with an illegal command.
Two brief remarks by individual judges are reported after the speeches by counsel.
Justice Whitelocke took exception to Calthrope’s raising the general question of the
Commission’s power to fine and imprison. In Whitelocke’s view, the sole question in this
case was whether, admitting that Huntley’s refusal to preach was a breach of his duty of
canonical obedience, a complaint of that offense could under 1 Eliz. be assigned to the
High Commission or must be left to the Ordinary. Since the “general question” is not
intellectually irrelevant for the case, Whitelocke must have thought it so firmly resolved
as to be beyond reopening (i.e., resolved in favor of the Commission’s having some
power to use secular sanctions, leaving only the question of its extent.) His formulation of
the narrow issue sufficient for the purposes of this case is at odds with Heath’s statement
that the refusal was not a breach of canonical obedience, but perhaps Whitelocke meant
no more than that it was better for the court to stay away from a canon-law matter which
it might arguably be considered incompetent to decide. Assuming that the Commission
had grounds for holding that Huntley was guilty of an ecclesiastical offense obviously
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left ample room for doubting whether the offense was a High Commission matter. The
second judicial remark, by Justice Croke, is too cryptically reported to make sense of,
except to say that it had something to do with the role of the fine in the case.
On a later day than the argument of the case from the Bar, the court bailed
Huntley until the next term, but it deferred delivering an opinion on the “matter in law.”
There is no report of subsequent proceedings. Bailing the prisoner rather than remanding
him is a symptom of an inclination on the judges’ part to think the imprisonment
unlawful. On the other hand, in the light of the strong advocacy in his favor, it may seem
surprising that he was not released outright, that the judges thought there was enough
merit on the High Commission’s side to require advisement and perhaps a round of
public discussion from the Bench. It is tempting to suspect a political motive not to
offend the Archbishop of Canterbury, and there may have been strains of politics that the
report does not reveal in Huntley’s trouble-making at the visitation. The hierarchy could
have had various motives for giving that clergyman a “hard time”, perhaps not very
honorable ones, but sensitivity toward the Archbishop might still be the better part of
valor. Puritanism may have figured in the contretemps: We know that Huntley was a
“preaching parson”; he was willing to make a great fuss by refusing to preach before and
in lieu of an official he may have thoroughly disapproved of, and of course expectation of
a fuss by the other side may have been why this improbable preacher was picked out; he
was so inordinately punished that it is hard to believe mere orneriness or some personal
quarrel was behind the assault on him; trapping a notorious Puritan and making a colossal
example of him, hoping to get away with it because common law courts did not go out of
their way to help Puritans, could have been an attractive project to the authorities;
fighting his imprisonment with impressive legal auxiliaries may have been attractive to
Huntley for larger purposes than escaping a personal imbroglio. If, however, we curb the
play of imagination over a strange episode and stick to the law, I think the King’s Bench
may have been well-advised to move slowly and be sure of its steps. While there was
probably enough in Huntley’s whole armory to require his eventual release, I do not think
earlier cases clearly rule out High Commission jurisdiction and secular sanctions in a
matter of clerical discipline, especially an unprecedented one full of complications and
uncertainties which regular episcopal courts could perhaps hardly be expected to unravel,
William Copland’s Case (1629) 143 also concerned clerical discipline, but in a
much simpler way than Huntley. Copland, a minister from Cumberland, was sued in the
High Commission for drunkenness and lewd behavior and sought a Prohibition per
Banks. The report notes that Prohibition was pursued after sentence against Copland.
Although sentence was not a bar to Prohibition (see Vol. I pp. 115 ff.), common law
courts retained some discretion to withhold a writ when plaintiff-in-Prohibition delayed
seeking one until after he had been tried and sentenced. There would be no reason to
make such an exception in a case such as Copland; we see in this case, from a turn of
Banks’ language, that there are situations in which Prohibition could reasonably be
denied unless a sentence had already been given. A minor point about dealing with the
High Commission is perhaps documented by this detail. To open his briefly reported
argument, Banks relies on one precedent (Turner and Neweport’s Case, 43 Eliz. C.P)
where Prohibition was granted to stop a prosecution for drunkenness and “brabling”
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words. In the present case, he says, Prohibition should “the rather” be granted because
Copland had no appeal from the sentence against him. The phrase suggests that if
common law intervention had been sought before sentence there might be grounds for
waiting and seeing what the High Commission would do, whereas the subject’s right to
appeal a sentence was rarely defeasible (i.e., only for a few heinous offenses, where
Parliament unmistakably meant to cut off appeals.) This reversal of the view that
Prohibitions should be sought as soon as possible, even though delay should not normally
stand in the way of a writ, makes some sense in High Commission cases as a class. To
defend a hands-off policy toward the Commission, one surely must regard it as a selfpolicing agency, which could be expected to understand the interest of Bishops’ courts,
the subject’s interest in conveniently local justice and appellate rights (affirmed by 23
Hen. VIII even if that statute did not bind the Commission), and the sheer undesirability
of distracting a solemn tribunal with petty litigation (on the level of drunken clergyman
one might well say.) It should therefore be presumed that the Commission will not take a
case without strong special reason, so that Prohibition should be withheld until the
Commission has acted. One should always remember also that the Commission was an
ecclesiastical court, free to confine itself to spiritual sanctions whatever secular ones it
might have power to apply at discretion in one or another sort of case. This bears on the
value of preserving appellate rights. Someone convicted by the Commission and given,
let us say, only admonition and a mild penance ought perhaps in the abstract to enjoy the
same right of appeal as any ecclesiastical litigant, but how likely is it that pursuing an
appeal would be worth the party’s time and money? Again, it perhaps makes sense to
know that the party actually wants to make an issue of his interest in appeals before
telling a high-ranking Church court that it is out of bounds. (Of course insisting on
Prohibition after sentence would be most probable if secular sanctions had been applied,
and the common law court’s duty to be sure that they were properly applied would be
clear. Unfortunately the report of Copland says nothing about the content of the
sentence.)
The points above are only speculative reflections prompted by Copland, for the
case itself, so far as the report goes, went flatly against plaintiff-in-Prohibition. Justices
Jones and Croke, who were the only judges present in court, simply declined to grant
Prohibition on their own. The best explanation of their decision is probably that the “lewd
behavior” alleged against Copland makes his case a cut more serious than Turner and
Neweport and may, depending on what the vague charge covered, turn the case into one
on clerical incontinence, arguably always appropriate for the High Commission.
Otherwise, the two judges must be seen as leaning to a very broad tolerance for the
Commission’s power to take any case on clerical conduct if in its discretion it saw reason.
(It is not clear from Banks’ Elizabethan precedent as stated that the party was a
clergyman, and if he was his offense hardly extends beyond drunkenness—“drunk and
noisy or quarrelsome”, without so much as a suggestion that anyone was defamed, is a
small stretch from mere “drunk.”)
One late anonymous case144 brings up a point not anticipated in any previous
report. A prisoner brought Habeas corpus, on which the return said he was committed by
order of the Exchequer for not paying a £50 fine imposed by the High Commission.
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(The commitment is said to have taken place in 9 Car., which if correct means the man
had been in jail for seven years!) The King’s Bench held that although the return did not
show why the fine was imposed it could not bail or discharge the prisoner because he was
imprisoned by a “Judicial Court.” I do not know how to formulate or generalize the
Habeas corpus law applied in this decision, but it would seem to be that none of the
principal common law courts (probably most of the meaning, if not necessarily all of the
meaning, of “judicial court”) may release the prisoners of another by means of the writ.
Perhaps False Imprisonment against the jailer would lie in another court than the one
responsible for the imprisonment. Quaere. Otherwise, the case adds a few strands to the
history of the Exchequer’s role in the regulation of the High Commission, of which we
have seen other traces but not enough evidence for a satisfactory account. The Exchequer
obviously did not in this case rule the High Commission fine unlawful, as it appears
sometimes to have done, but it may not have been unlawful by standards of the
Commissions’ jurisdiction and secular powers shared by the other principal courts. All
the decision really says on High Commission law is that a return which would certainly
have been found inadequate if the Commission itself had committed the prisoner was
saved by a “judicial court’s” having done the deed, here the Exchequer in the process of
trying to collect an estreated fine. If the prisoner had in fact been held for an inordinate
time, it is conceivable that in seeking a writ after so many years he was hoping that
irregular intervention by the King’s Bench could be sold as the remedy against perpetual
imprisonment for a High Commission offense. A few earlier indications suggest it would
be remedied, although there are no instances of prisoners clearly released for no other
reason than that they had been held as long as any ecclesiastical offender could be.
Torle’s Case (1640),145 on Habeas corpus, involves a purported High
Commission power untested in previous cases. Torle and four others were committed for
contempt of the High Commissioners in not performing their order to pay a parish clerk
his wages. It is not clear why these four persons were considered liable to pay the wages,
but we are told that the Commissioners had assessed the sum due at 4d. a quarter for
every house in the parish (the London parish of Great St. Bartholomew’s.) It is unusual to
see what amounts to a parish rate pursued in the High Commission, as opposed to a
regular ecclesiastical court, where such suits were commonplace. It is not, however,
obvious that such a suit on intra-Church affairs must be ultra vires for the Commission.
Torle et al. refused to pay because they claimed that by custom they were obliged to pay
the clerk what the churchwardens and vestry assessed. Their defense, again, is one that
occurs in many cases: parties alleged to be liable for a rate duly assessed by ecclesiastical
law (usually according to the 1604 canons) claim that they are entitled to the benefit of an
alternative customary method of assessment. The defense was almost always successful,
on the theory that immemorial custom in these matters of parish finance should prevail
over ecclesiastical law, and when a custom was claimed ecclesiastical suits for the rate
should be prohibited until it was ascertained whether a jury would verify the custom.
(The practice is closely analogous to the treatment of customary modi decimandi in tithe
law.) The involvement of the High Commission in the instant case would seem to be
irrelevant, in the sense that the standard doctrine quoad jurisdiction to proceed at all
pending common law determination of the existence of the alleged custom would seem to
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apply to the Commission as well as any other ecclesiastical court. If the Commission had
no authority to proceed, it would seem to have no authority to imprison, whether or not it
might have such authority after the custom was disverified at common law. It looks as if
in Torle the Commission had hopes to evade the law applicable to ecclesiastical courts
generally, for it brought on two civilians (Dr. Merrick and Ecleston) to argue that the
Commission’s patent expressly provided that parish clerks should receive their wages as
ordered by the Commission and could be fined or imprisoned for any “contempt.” Even
apart from whether such terms in the patent were consistent with 1 Eliz., the argument for
making a special case of the Commission for such parochial purposes seems to me feeble.
It is not clear that the King’s Bench thought so too, because the action the judges took
was to bail the parties until a specified day in the next term. I suspect, however, that
granting bail instead of discharging outright was mostly a courtesy to the Commission.
The prisoners, relieved of duress, were given some time to seek the Prohibition that
would temporarily free them from liability to any sort of ecclesiastical prosecution.
Should they neglect to do so, the Commission might have some color to claim
acquiescence in its jurisdiction and to use its patent to argue that it had acted within its
authority in using secular sanctions.
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